διττῆς δὴ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὔσης, τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς δὲ ἠθικῆς, ἡ μὲν διανοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ διδασκαλίας ἔχει καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν, διόπερ ἐμπειρίας δεῖται καὶ χρόνου, ἡ δʼ ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται, ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα ἔσχηκε μικρὸν παρεκκλῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους. ἐξ οὗ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδεμία τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται· οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλως ἐθίζεται, οἷον ὁ λίθος φύσει κάτω φερόμενος οὐκ ἂν ἐθισθείη ἄνω φέρεσθαι, οὐδʼ ἂν μυριάκις αὐτὸν ἐθίζῃ τις ἄνω ῥιπτῶν, οὐδὲ τὸ πῦρ κάτω, οὐδʼ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλως πεφυκότων ἄλλως ἂν ἐθισθείη. οὔτʼ ἄρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίνονται αἱ ἀρεταί, ἀλλὰ πεφυκόσι μὲν ἡμῖν δέξασθαι αὐτάς, τελειουμένοις δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἔθους.
Excellence, then, is of two kinds, intellectual and of character. Intellectual excellence owes both its origin and its growth mostly to teaching, which is why it needs experience and time; excellence of character comes about from habit, which is also where it got its name, a slight variation on the word for habit. From this it is also clear that none of the excellences of character arises in us by nature. For nothing that is by nature one way can be habituated to be another: a stone, which by nature moves downward, could not be habituated to move upward, not even if someone tried to habituate it by throwing it up ten thousand times; nor could fire be habituated to move downward, nor anything else that is naturally one way be habituated to be another. So the excellences arise in us neither by nature nor against nature: we are naturally able to receive them, and are brought to completion through habit.
ἔτι ὅσα μὲν φύσει ἡμῖν παραγίνεται, τὰς δυνάμεις τούτων πρότερον κομιζόμεθα, ὕστερον δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀποδίδομεν (ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις ἰδεῖν ἢ πολλάκις ἀκοῦσαι τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐλάβομεν, ἀλλʼ ἀνάπαλιν ἔχοντες ἐχρησάμεθα, οὐ χρησάμενοι ἔσχομεν)· τὰς δʼ ἀρετὰς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν· ἃ γὰρ δεῖ μαθόντας ποιεῖν, ταῦτα ποιοῦντες μανθάνομεν, οἷον οἰκοδομοῦντες οἰκοδόμοι γίνονται καὶ κιθαρίζοντες κιθαρισταί· 1103b οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντες δίκαιοι γινόμεθα, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονες, τὰ δʼ ἀνδρεῖα ἀνδρεῖοι. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν· οἱ γὰρ νομοθέται τοὺς πολίτας ἐθίζοντες ποιοῦσιν ἀγαθούς, καὶ τὸ μὲν βούλημα παντὸς νομοθέτου τοῦτʼ ἐστίν, ὅσοι δὲ μὴ εὖ αὐτὸ ποιοῦσιν ἁμαρτάνουσιν, καὶ διαφέρει τούτῳ πολιτεία πολιτείας ἀγαθὴ φαύλης.
Again, with the things that come to us by nature, we first acquire the capacities and later exercise the activities (this is clear with the senses: we did not get our senses from seeing often or hearing often; on the contrary, we had them and then used them, rather than getting them by using them). But the excellences we acquire by first exercising them, as happens with the crafts too. For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them: people become builders by building, for instance, and lyre players by playing the lyre. 1103b In the same way we become just by doing just things, moderate by doing moderate things, and brave by doing brave things. What happens in cities bears this out too: lawgivers make the citizens good by habituating them. This is what every lawgiver wants, and those who do not do it well miss the mark; this is what distinguishes a good constitution from a bad one.
ἔτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ γίνεται πᾶσα ἀρετὴ καὶ φθείρεται, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τέχνη· ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ κιθαρίζειν καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ γίνονται κιθαρισταί. ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ οἰκοδόμοι καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ πάντες· ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ εὖ οἰκοδομεῖν ἀγαθοὶ οἰκοδόμοι ἔσονται, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ κακῶς κακοί. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως εἶχεν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει τοῦ διδάξοντος, ἀλλὰ πάντες ἂν ἐγίνοντο ἀγαθοὶ ἢ κακοί. οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἔχει· πράττοντες γὰρ τὰ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους γινόμεθα οἳ μὲν δίκαιοι οἳ δὲ ἄδικοι, πράττοντες δὲ τὰ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς καὶ ἐθιζόμενοι φοβεῖσθαι ἢ θαρρεῖν οἳ μὲν ἀνδρεῖοι οἳ δὲ δειλοί.
Again, every excellence both comes about and is destroyed from the same things and through the same things, and likewise every craft. For it is from playing the lyre that both good and bad lyre players come to be. The same goes for builders and all the rest: from building well people will become good builders, from building badly bad ones. If this were not so, there would be no need for anyone to teach; everyone would simply turn out good or bad. So it is with the excellences too. By doing what we do in our dealings with other people, some of us become just and others unjust; by doing what we do in the face of danger, and being habituated to feel fear or confidence, some become brave and others cowardly.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ὀργάς· οἳ μὲν γὰρ σώφρονες καὶ πρᾶοι γίνονται, οἳ δʼ ἀκόλαστοι καὶ ὀργίλοι, οἳ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ οὑτωσὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀναστρέφεσθαι, οἳ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ οὑτωσί. καὶ ἑνὶ δὴ λόγῳ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται. διὸ δεῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποιὰς ἀποδιδόναι· κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τούτων διαφορὰς ἀκολουθοῦσιν αἱ ἕξεις. οὐ μικρὸν οὖν διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων ἐθίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν.
The same holds for appetites and for anger. Some people become moderate and gentle, others self-indulgent and irascible, the one group from behaving one way in these situations, the other from behaving another way. In a word, states come about from activities like them. That is why we must make our activities of a certain quality, since the states follow the differences among them. So it makes no small difference whether we are habituated one way or another right from childhood; it makes a very great difference—or rather, all the difference.
ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ παροῦσα πραγματεία οὐ θεωρίας ἕνεκά ἐστιν ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι (οὐ γὰρ ἵνα εἰδῶμεν τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτόμεθα, ἀλλʼ ἵνʼ ἀγαθοὶ γενώμεθα, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν ὄφελος αὐτῆς), ἀναγκαῖον ἐπισκέψασθαι τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις, πῶς πρακτέον αὐτάς· αὗται γάρ εἰσι κύριαι καὶ τοῦ ποιὰς γενέσθαι τὰς ἕξεις, καθάπερ εἰρήκαμεν. τὸ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν κοινὸν καὶ ὑποκείσθω—ῥηθήσεται δʼ ὕστερον περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ τί ἐστιν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. 1104a ἐκεῖνο δὲ προδιομολογείσθω, ὅτι πᾶς ὁ περὶ τῶν πρακτῶν λόγος τύπῳ καὶ οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ὀφείλει λέγεσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ κατʼ ἀρχὰς εἴπομεν ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ὕλην οἱ λόγοι ἀπαιτητέοι· τὰ δʼ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα οὐδὲν ἑστηκὸς ἔχει, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινά.
The present inquiry, then, is not undertaken for the sake of contemplation, as the others are (for we are investigating not in order to know what excellence is, but in order to become good, since otherwise there would be no benefit in it). So we must examine matters concerning actions, and how they should be done; for actions are what determine the quality of our states, as we have said. Now, that we should act in accordance with correct reason is commonly agreed, and let it be assumed—we will discuss it later, both what correct reason is and how it is related to the other excellences. 1104a But let this be agreed beforehand: every account of matters of action has to be given in outline and not precisely, just as we said at the start that accounts must be demanded in keeping with their subject matter. And matters of action and of what is beneficial have nothing fixed about them, any more than matters of health do.
τοιούτου δʼ ὄντος τοῦ καθόλου λόγου, ἔτι μᾶλλον ὁ περὶ τῶν καθʼ ἕκαστα λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τἀκριβές· οὔτε γὰρ ὑπὸ τέχνην οὔθʼ ὑπὸ παραγγελίαν οὐδεμίαν πίπτει, δεῖ δʼ αὐτοὺς ἀεὶ τοὺς πράττοντας τὰ πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν σκοπεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰατρικῆς ἔχει καὶ τῆς κυβερνητικῆς. ἀλλὰ καίπερ ὄντος τοιούτου τοῦ παρόντος λόγου πειρατέον βοηθεῖν. πρῶτον οὖν τοῦτο θεωρητέον, ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα πέφυκεν ὑπʼ ἐνδείας καὶ ὑπερβολῆς φθείρεσθαι, (δεῖ γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυρίοις χρῆσθαι) ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος καὶ τῆς ὑγιείας ὁρῶμεν· τά τε γὰρ ὑπερβάλλοντα γυμνάσια καὶ τὰ ἐλλείποντα φθείρει τὴν ἰσχύν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ποτὰ καὶ τὰ σιτία πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω γινόμενα φθείρει τὴν ὑγίειαν, τὰ δὲ σύμμετρα καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ αὔξει καὶ σῴζει.
And since the general account is like this, the account of particular cases is still less precise. For these do not fall under any craft or set of precepts; the agents themselves must always consider what suits the occasion, as happens in medicine and navigation too. But even though our present account is of this kind, we must try to be of help. First, then, we should observe that things of this sort are naturally destroyed by deficiency and excess (for we must use evident cases as evidence for what is not evident), as we see with strength and health. Exercise that is excessive or deficient destroys strength, and likewise food and drink, when too much or too little, destroy health, while the proportionate amount produces, increases and preserves it.
οὕτως οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας ἔχει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν. ὅ τε γὰρ πάντα φεύγων καὶ φοβούμενος καὶ μηδὲν ὑπομένων δειλὸς γίνεται, ὅ τε μηδὲν ὅλως φοβούμενος ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάντα βαδίζων θρασύς· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν πάσης ἡδονῆς ἀπολαύων καὶ μηδεμιᾶς ἀπεχόμενος ἀκόλαστος, ὁ δὲ πᾶσαν φεύγων, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄγροικοι, ἀναίσθητός τις· φθείρεται δὴ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ὑπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς μεσότητος σῴζεται.
So it is with moderation and courage and the other excellences. The person who runs from everything, fears everything and stands firm against nothing becomes a coward, while the one who fears nothing at all and walks into everything becomes rash. Likewise, the person who indulges in every pleasure and abstains from none becomes self-indulgent, while the one who shuns every pleasure, as boorish people do, becomes a sort of insensible person. Moderation and courage, then, are destroyed by excess and deficiency, and preserved by the mean.
ἀλλʼ οὐ μόνον αἱ γενέσεις καὶ αὐξήσεις καὶ αἱ φθοραὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν γίνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔσονται· καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν φανερωτέρων οὕτως ἔχει, οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος· γίνεται γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλὴν τροφὴν λαμβάνειν καὶ πολλοὺς πόνους ὑπομένειν, καὶ μάλιστα ἂν δύναιτʼ αὐτὰ ποιεῖν ὁ ἰσχυρός. οὕτω δʼ ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· ἔκ τε γὰρ τοῦ ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν γινόμεθα σώφρονες, καὶ γενόμενοι μάλιστα δυνάμεθα ἀπέχεσθαι αὐτῶν· 1104b ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας· ἐθιζόμενοι γὰρ καταφρονεῖν τῶν φοβερῶν καὶ ὑπομένειν αὐτὰ γινόμεθα ἀνδρεῖοι, καὶ γενόμενοι μάλιστα δυνησόμεθα ὑπομένειν τὰ φοβερά.
But not only do their origin, growth and destruction come from the same things and through the same things; their activities too will be exercised in the same things. This is so with other, more evident things as well, such as strength: it comes from taking a lot of food and enduring a lot of exertion, and it is the strong person who is most able to do these things. So too with the excellences: by abstaining from pleasures we become moderate, and once we have become moderate we are most able to abstain from them. 1104b Likewise with courage: by being habituated to despise what is frightening and to stand firm against it we become brave, and once we have become brave we will be most able to stand firm against what is frightening.
Pleasure and pain as signs of character
Aristotle argues that how a person feels about his actions reveals his character.
σημεῖον δὲ δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ἕξεων τὴν ἐπιγινομένην ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην τοῖς ἔργοις· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεχόμενος τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ χαίρων σώφρων, ὁ δʼ ἀχθόμενος ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπομένων τὰ δεινὰ καὶ χαίρων ἢ μὴ λυπούμενός γε ἀνδρεῖος, ὁ δὲ λυπούμενος δειλός. περὶ ἡδονὰς γὰρ καὶ λύπας ἐστὶν ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετή· διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ φαῦλα πράττομεν, διὰ δὲ τὴν λύπην τῶν καλῶν ἀπεχόμεθα. διὸ δεῖ ἦχθαί πως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησίν, ὥστε χαίρειν τε καὶ λυπεῖσθαι οἷς δεῖ· ἡ γὰρ ὀρθὴ παιδεία αὕτη ἐστίν. ἔτι δʼ εἰ αἱ ἀρεταί εἰσι περὶ πράξεις καὶ πάθη, παντὶ δὲ πάθει καὶ πάσῃ πράξει ἕπεται ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη, καὶ διὰ τοῦτʼ ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας.
We must take the pleasure or pain that accompanies people’s deeds as a sign of their states. The person who abstains from bodily pleasures and enjoys doing just that is moderate, while the one who finds it irksome is self-indulgent; and the one who stands firm against dangers and enjoys it, or at least is not pained by it, is brave, while the one who is pained is a coward. For excellence of character is concerned with pleasures and pains: it is because of pleasure that we do bad things, and because of pain that we hold back from fine ones. That is why we need to have been brought up in a certain way right from childhood, as Plato says, so as to enjoy and be pained by the things we should; for that is correct education. Again, if the excellences are concerned with actions and feelings, and every feeling and every action is accompanied by pleasure and pain, this too would make excellence concerned with pleasures and pains.
μηνύουσι δὲ καὶ αἱ κολάσεις γινόμεναι διὰ τούτων· ἰατρεῖαι γάρ τινές εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἰατρεῖαι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων πεφύκασι γίνεσθαι. ἔτι, ὡς καὶ πρῴην εἴπομεν, πᾶσα ψυχῆς ἕξις, ὑφʼ οἵων πέφυκε γίνεσθαι χείρων καὶ βελτίων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν φύσιν ἔχει· διʼ ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας φαῦλοι γίνονται, τῷ διώκειν ταύτας καὶ φεύγειν, ἢ ἃς μὴ δεῖ ἢ ὅτε οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὡς οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὁσαχῶς ἄλλως ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου διορίζεται τὰ τοιαῦτα. διὸ καὶ ὁρίζονται τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀπαθείας τινὰς καὶ ἠρεμίας· οὐκ εὖ δέ, ὅτι ἁπλῶς λέγουσιν, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προστίθεται. ὑπόκειται ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ εἶναι ἡ τοιαύτη περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τῶν βελτίστων πρακτική, ἡ δὲ κακία τοὐναντίον.
Punishments, too, which are inflicted by means of these, point the same way: they are a kind of cure, and cures naturally work by means of opposites. Again, as we said just now, every state of soul has its nature in relation to, and concerned with, the things by which it naturally becomes worse or better. And it is through pleasures and pains that people become bad, by pursuing and avoiding them—either the ones they should not, or when they should not, or as they should not, or in any of the other ways that such distinctions are drawn by reason. That is why some people even define the excellences as states of impassivity and calm. But they do not do so well, because they speak without qualification, not adding “as one should” and “as one should not” and “when”, and the other qualifications. It is assumed, then, that excellence is the sort of state that does what is best in matters of pleasure and pain, and vice the opposite.
γένοιτο δʼ ἂν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκ τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων τῶν εἰς τὰς αἱρέσεις καὶ τριῶν τῶν εἰς τὰς φυγάς, καλοῦ συμφέροντος ἡδέος, καὶ τριῶν τῶν ἐναντίων, αἰσχροῦ βλαβεροῦ λυπηροῦ, περὶ ταῦτα μὲν πάντα ὁ ἀγαθὸς κατορθωτικός ἐστιν ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἁμαρτητικός, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· κοινή τε γὰρ αὕτη τοῖς ζῴοις, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν παρακολουθεῖ· 1105a καὶ γὰρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον ἡδὺ φαίνεται. ἔτι δʼ ἐκ νηπίου πᾶσιν ἡμῖν συντέθραπται· διὸ χαλεπὸν ἀποτρίψασθαι τοῦτο τὸ πάθος ἐγκεχρωσμένον τῷ βίῳ. κανονίζομεν δὲ καὶ τὰς πράξεις, οἳ μὲν μᾶλλον οἳ δʼ ἧττον, ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ.
It may also become clear to us from the following that they are concerned with the same things. There are three objects of choice and three of avoidance: the fine, the beneficial and the pleasant, and their three opposites, the shameful, the harmful and the painful. With respect to all of these the good person tends to get things right and the bad person to go wrong, but especially with respect to pleasure. For pleasure is shared with the animals, and it accompanies all objects of choice: 1105a the fine and the beneficial also appear pleasant. Again, it has grown up with all of us from infancy, which is why it is hard to rub off this feeling, ingrained as it is in our life. And we also measure our actions, some of us more and some less, by pleasure and pain.
διὰ τοῦτʼ οὖν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι περὶ ταῦτα τὴν πᾶσαν πραγματείαν· οὐ γὰρ μικρὸν εἰς τὰς πράξεις εὖ ἢ κακῶς χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι. ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἡδονῇ μάχεσθαι ἢ θυμῷ, καθάπερ φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος, περὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον ἀεὶ καὶ τέχνη γίνεται καὶ ἀρετή· καὶ γὰρ τὸ εὖ βέλτιον ἐν τούτῳ. ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πᾶσα ἡ πραγματεία καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ πολιτικῇ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὖ τούτοις χρώμενος ἀγαθὸς ἔσται, ὁ δὲ κακῶς κακός. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας, καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ὧν γίνεται, ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ αὔξεται καὶ φθείρεται μὴ ὡσαύτως γινομένων, καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ὧν ἐγένετο, περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐνεργεῖ, εἰρήσθω.
For this reason, then, the whole of our inquiry must be concerned with these; for it makes no small difference to our actions whether we feel pleasure and pain well or badly. Again, it is harder to fight pleasure than anger, as Heraclitus says, and both craft and excellence are always concerned with what is harder, since succeeding is better there. So for this reason too the whole concern, both of excellence and of political science, is with pleasures and pains: the person who uses them well will be good, and the one who uses them badly will be bad. Let it be taken as stated, then, that excellence is concerned with pleasures and pains; that the things from which it arises also increase it, and destroy it when they occur differently; and that it is active in the same things from which it arose.
Doing just acts and being just
Aristotle explains how doing just acts differs from acting as a just person does.
ἀπορήσειε δʼ ἄν τις πῶς λέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντας δικαίους γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονας· εἰ γὰρ πράττουσι τὰ δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα, ἤδη εἰσὶ δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες, ὥσπερ εἰ τὰ γραμματικὰ καὶ τὰ μουσικά, γραμματικοὶ καὶ μουσικοί. ἢ οὐδʼ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν οὕτως ἔχει; ἐνδέχεται γὰρ γραμματικόν τι ποιῆσαι καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου. τότε οὖν ἔσται γραμματικός, ἐὰν καὶ γραμματικόν τι ποιήσῃ καὶ γραμματικῶς· τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὑτῷ γραμματικήν.
But someone might raise the difficulty of what we mean when we say that people must become just by doing just things and moderate by doing moderate things. For if they do just and moderate things, they are already just and moderate, just as, if they do grammatical and musical things, they are already grammarians and musicians. Or is this not so even with the crafts? For it is possible to produce something grammatical by chance, or at someone else’s prompting. So a person will be a grammarian only if he both produces something grammatical and does so grammatically—that is, in accordance with the grammatical knowledge in himself.
ἔτι οὐδʼ ὅμοιόν ἐστιν ἐπί τε τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα τὸ εὖ ἔχει ἐν αὑτοῖς· ἀρκεῖ οὖν ταῦτά πως ἔχοντα γενέσθαι· τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινόμενα οὐκ ἐὰν αὐτά πως ἔχῃ, δικαίως ἢ σωφρόνως πράττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ὁ πράττων πῶς ἔχων πράττῃ, πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰδώς, ἔπειτʼ ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος διʼ αὐτά, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἐὰν καὶ βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων πράττῃ. 1105b ταῦτα δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἔχειν οὐ συναριθμεῖται, πλὴν αὐτὸ τὸ εἰδέναι· πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι οὐδὲν ἢ μικρὸν ἰσχύει, τὰ δʼ ἄλλα οὐ μικρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ πᾶν δύναται, ἅπερ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις πράττειν τὰ δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα περιγίνεται.
Besides, the case of the crafts is not even similar to that of the excellences. The things produced by crafts have their goodness in themselves, so it is enough that they come out in a certain condition. But things done in accordance with the excellences are not done justly or moderately merely if they themselves are in a certain condition; the agent too must be in a certain condition when he does them: first, he must know what he is doing; second, he must decide on the actions, and decide on them for their own sake; and third, he must act from a firm and unchangeable state. 1105b For having the other crafts these conditions do not count, except knowledge itself; but for having the excellences knowledge has little or no weight, while the others count not for a little but for everything—and they are just what results from often doing just and moderate things.
τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματα δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα λέγεται, ὅταν ᾖ τοιαῦτα οἷα ἂν ὁ δίκαιος ἢ ὁ σώφρων πράξειεν· δίκαιος δὲ καὶ σώφρων ἐστὶν οὐχ ὁ ταῦτα πράττων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ οὕτω πράττων ὡς οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες πράττουσιν. εὖ οὖν λέγεται ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ τὰ δίκαια πράττειν ὁ δίκαιος γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τὰ σώφρονα ὁ σώφρων· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν οὐδὲ μελλήσειε γίνεσθαι ἀγαθός. ἀλλʼ οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ πράττουσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον καταφεύγοντες οἴονται φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οὕτως ἔσεσθαι σπουδαῖοι, ὅμοιόν τι ποιοῦντες τοῖς κάμνουσιν, οἳ τῶν ἰατρῶν ἀκούουσι μὲν ἐπιμελῶς, ποιοῦσι δʼ οὐδὲν τῶν προσταττομένων. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδʼ ἐκεῖνοι εὖ ἕξουσι τὸ σῶμα οὕτω θεραπευόμενοι, οὐδʼ οὗτοι τὴν ψυχὴν οὕτω φιλοσοφοῦντες.
Actions, then, are called just and moderate when they are such as the just or moderate person would do; but the just and moderate person is not the one who does these things, but the one who also does them in the way just and moderate people do. So it is rightly said that the just person comes to be from doing just things, and the moderate person from doing moderate things; and without doing them no one would have even a prospect of becoming good. But most people do not do them; instead they take refuge in argument, and think they are doing philosophy and that this is how they will become excellent. They behave rather like sick people who listen attentively to their doctors but do none of the things they are told. Just as those people will not be in good bodily condition if they are treated like that, neither will these be in good condition of soul if they do philosophy like that.
Excellence is a state
Aristotle argues that excellence is a state, not a feeling or a capacity.
μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτέον. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα τρία ἐστί, πάθη δυνάμεις ἕξεις, τούτων ἄν τι εἴη ἡ ἀρετή. λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν ὀργὴν φόβον θάρσος φθόνον χαρὰν φιλίαν μῖσος πόθον ζῆλον ἔλεον, ὅλως οἷς ἕπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη· δυνάμεις δὲ καθʼ ἃς παθητικοὶ τούτων λεγόμεθα, οἷον καθʼ ἃς δυνατοὶ ὀργισθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι ἢ ἐλεῆσαι· ἕξεις δὲ καθʼ ἃς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν εὖ ἢ κακῶς, οἷον πρὸς τὸ ὀργισθῆναι, εἰ μὲν σφοδρῶς ἢ ἀνειμένως, κακῶς ἔχομεν, εἰ δὲ μέσως, εὖ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τἆλλα.
Next we must consider what excellence is. Since the things that arise in the soul are of three kinds—feelings, capacities and states—excellence would be one of these. By feelings I mean appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendly feeling, hatred, longing, emulation, pity—in general, whatever is accompanied by pleasure or pain. By capacities I mean what makes us said to be capable of these feelings, for instance, capable of getting angry or being pained or feeling pity. By states I mean what makes us well or badly disposed in relation to the feelings: in relation to getting angry, for example, if we are disposed to it violently or too slackly we are badly disposed, and if moderately, well; and likewise with the others.
πάθη μὲν οὖν οὐκ εἰσὶν οὔθʼ αἱ ἀρεταὶ οὔθʼ αἱ κακίαι, ὅτι οὐ λεγόμεθα κατὰ τὰ πάθη σπουδαῖοι ἢ φαῦλοι, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας λεγόμεθα, καὶ ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη οὔτʼ ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα (οὐ γὰρ ἐπαινεῖται ὁ φοβούμενος οὐδὲ ὁ ὀργιζόμενος, οὐδὲ ψέγεται ὁ ἁπλῶς ὀργιζόμενος ἀλλʼ ὁ πῶς), 1106a κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας ἐπαινούμεθα ἢ ψεγόμεθα. ἔτι ὀργιζόμεθα μὲν καὶ φοβούμεθα ἀπροαιρέτως, αἱ δʼ ἀρεταὶ προαιρέσεις τινὲς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ προαιρέσεως. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη κινεῖσθαι λεγόμεθα, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας οὐ κινεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ διακεῖσθαί πως.
Neither the excellences nor the vices, then, are feelings. For we are not called excellent or bad on account of our feelings, but we are on account of our excellences and vices; and we are neither praised nor blamed for our feelings (the person who is afraid or angry is not praised, nor is the one who is simply angry blamed, but the one who is angry in a certain way), 1106a whereas we are praised or blamed for our excellences and vices. Again, we get angry and afraid without deciding to, whereas the excellences are kinds of decision, or at least not without decision. Besides, with respect to our feelings we are said to be moved, but with respect to our excellences and vices we are said not to be moved but to be disposed in a certain way.
διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὐδὲ δυνάμεις εἰσίν· οὔτε γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ λεγόμεθα τῷ δύνασθαι πάσχειν ἁπλῶς οὔτε κακοί, οὔτʼ ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα· ἔτι δυνατοὶ μέν ἐσμεν φύσει, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ ἢ κακοὶ οὐ γινόμεθα φύσει· εἴπομεν δὲ περὶ τούτου πρότερον. εἰ οὖν μήτε πάθη εἰσὶν αἱ ἀρεταὶ μήτε δυνάμεις, λείπεται ἕξεις αὐτὰς εἶναι. ὅ τι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τῷ γένει ἡ ἀρετή, εἴρηται.
For these reasons they are not capacities either: we are not called good or bad, nor praised or blamed, simply for being capable of feeling. Again, we have capacities by nature, but we do not become good or bad by nature; we spoke of this earlier. If, then, the excellences are neither feelings nor capacities, it remains that they are states. So much for what excellence is in genus.
δεῖ δὲ μὴ μόνον οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἕξις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποία τις. ῥητέον οὖν ὅτι πᾶσα ἀρετή, οὗ ἂν ᾖ ἀρετή, αὐτό τε εὖ ἔχον ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εὖ ἀποδίδωσιν, οἷον ἡ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετὴ τόν τε ὀφθαλμὸν σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ· τῇ γὰρ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετῇ εὖ ὁρῶμεν. ὁμοίως ἡ τοῦ ἵππου ἀρετὴ ἵππον τε σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ ἀγαθὸν δραμεῖν καὶ ἐνεγκεῖν τὸν ἐπιβάτην καὶ μεῖναι τοὺς πολεμίους. εἰ δὴ τοῦτʼ ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ εἴη ἂν ἡ ἕξις ἀφʼ ἧς ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνεται καὶ ἀφʼ ἧς εὖ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον ἀποδώσει. πῶς δὲ τοῦτʼ ἔσται, ἤδη μὲν εἰρήκαμεν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὧδʼ ἔσται φανερόν, ἐὰν θεωρήσωμεν ποία τίς ἐστιν ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς.
But we must not only say that it is a state; we must also say what kind of state. We should say, then, that every excellence both brings into good condition that of which it is the excellence and makes it perform its function well. The excellence of the eye, for example, makes both the eye and its function excellent, since it is by the excellence of the eye that we see well. Similarly the excellence of a horse makes the horse excellent, and good at running, at carrying its rider and at standing firm against the enemy. If this is so in every case, then human excellence too will be the state from which a person becomes good and from which he will perform his own function well. How this will come about we have already said, but it will also become clear in the following way, if we consider what sort of nature excellence has.
The mean relative to us
Aristotle defines excellence as a chosen state lying in a mean relative to us, set by reason.
ἐν παντὶ δὴ συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ ἔστι λαβεῖν τὸ μὲν πλεῖον τὸ δʼ ἔλαττον τὸ δʼ ἴσον, καὶ ταῦτα ἢ κατʼ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ δʼ ἴσον μέσον τι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως. λέγω δὲ τοῦ μὲν πράγματος μέσον τὸ ἴσον ἀπέχον ἀφʼ ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσιν, πρὸς ἡμᾶς δὲ ὃ μήτε πλεονάζει μήτε ἐλλείπει· τοῦτο δʼ οὐχ ἕν, οὐδὲ ταὐτὸν πᾶσιν. οἷον εἰ τὰ δέκα πολλὰ τὰ δὲ δύο ὀλίγα, τὰ ἓξ μέσα λαμβάνουσι κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα· ἴσῳ γὰρ ὑπερέχει τε καὶ ὑπερέχεται· τοῦτο δὲ μέσον ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν.
In everything continuous and divisible one can take more, less, or equal, and these either in terms of the thing itself or relative to us; and the equal is a sort of mean between excess and deficiency. By the mean of the thing I mean what is equidistant from each of the extremes, which is one and the same for everyone; by the mean relative to us, what neither exceeds nor falls short—and this is not one thing, nor the same for everyone. For example, if ten is many and two is few, six is taken as the mean in terms of the thing, since it exceeds and is exceeded by an equal amount. This is the mean according to arithmetical proportion.
τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐχ οὕτω ληπτέον· 1106b οὐ γὰρ εἴ τῳ δέκα μναῖ φαγεῖν πολὺ δύο δὲ ὀλίγον, ὁ ἀλείπτης ἓξ μνᾶς προστάξει· ἔστι γὰρ ἴσως καὶ τοῦτο πολὺ τῷ ληψομένῳ ἢ ὀλίγον· Μίλωνι μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγον, τῷ δὲ ἀρχομένῳ τῶν γυμνασίων πολύ. ὁμοίως ἐπὶ δρόμου καὶ πάλης. οὕτω δὴ πᾶς ἐπιστήμων τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μὲν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν φεύγει, τὸ δὲ μέσον ζητεῖ καὶ τοῦθʼ αἱρεῖται, μέσον δὲ οὐ τὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς.
The mean relative to us, though, is not to be taken this way. 1106b If ten pounds of food is a lot for someone to eat and two pounds a little, the trainer will not prescribe six pounds; for perhaps this too is a lot for the person who is to take it, or a little—little for Milo, a lot for someone just beginning his training. The same goes for running and wrestling. In this way every expert avoids excess and deficiency and seeks out the mean and chooses it—the mean not of the thing but relative to us.
εἰ δὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη οὕτω τὸ ἔργον εὖ ἐπιτελεῖ, πρὸς τὸ μέσον βλέπουσα καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἄγουσα τὰ ἔργα (ὅθεν εἰώθασιν ἐπιλέγειν τοῖς εὖ ἔχουσιν ἔργοις ὅτι οὔτʼ ἀφελεῖν ἔστιν οὔτε προσθεῖναι, ὡς τῆς μὲν ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως φθειρούσης τὸ εὖ, τῆς δὲ μεσότητος σῳζούσης, οἱ δʼ ἀγαθοὶ τεχνῖται, ὡς λέγομεν, πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες ἐργάζονται)· ἡ δʼ ἀρετὴ πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα καὶ ἀμείνων ἐστὶν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις, τοῦ μέσου ἂν εἴη στοχαστική. λέγω δὲ τὴν ἠθικήν· αὕτη γάρ ἐστι περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις, ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον.
If, then, every science does its work well in this way—by looking to the mean and bringing its products into line with it (which is why people usually say of well-made works that nothing can be taken away or added, on the assumption that excess and deficiency destroy what is good in them while the mean preserves it; and good craftsmen, as we say, keep their eyes on this as they work)—and if excellence, like nature, is more precise and better than any craft, then excellence would be the sort of thing that aims at the mean. I mean excellence of character; for it is concerned with feelings and actions, and in these there is excess, deficiency, and the mean.
οἷον καὶ φοβηθῆναι καὶ θαρρῆσαι καὶ ἐπιθυμῆσαι καὶ ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἐλεῆσαι καὶ ὅλως ἡσθῆναι καὶ λυπηθῆναι ἔστι καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, καὶ ἀμφότερα οὐκ εὖ· τὸ δʼ ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ἐφʼ οἷς καὶ πρὸς οὓς καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὡς δεῖ, μέσον τε καὶ ἄριστον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον. ἡ δʼ ἀρετὴ περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις ἐστίν, ἐν οἷς ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἁμαρτάνεται καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις ψέγεται, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπαινεῖται καὶ κατορθοῦται· ταῦτα δʼ ἄμφω τῆς ἀρετῆς. μεσότης τις ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή, στοχαστική γε οὖσα τοῦ μέσου.
For instance, one can feel fear, confidence, appetite, anger, pity, and pleasure and pain generally, both too much and too little, and in both cases not well; but to feel them when one should, about the things one should, toward the people one should, for the sake of what one should, and in the way one should, is the mean and what is best—and this is what belongs to excellence. Similarly with actions, too, there is excess, deficiency, and the mean. Excellence is concerned with feelings and actions, in which excess is an error and deficiency is blamed, while the mean is praised and gets it right—and both of these belong to excellence. Excellence, then, is a kind of mean, since it is, at any rate, the sort of thing that aims at the mean.
ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἁμαρτάνειν πολλαχῶς ἔστιν (τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι εἴκαζον, τὸ δʼ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου), τὸ δὲ κατορθοῦν μοναχῶς (διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν ῥᾴδιον τὸ δὲ χαλεπόν, ῥᾴδιον μὲν τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, χαλεπὸν δὲ τὸ ἐπιτυχεῖν)· καὶ διὰ ταῦτʼ οὖν τῆς μὲν κακίας ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις, τῆς δʼ ἀρετῆς ἡ μεσότης· ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί.
Again, there are many ways to go wrong (for evil belongs to the unlimited, as the Pythagoreans pictured it, and good to the limited), but only one way to get it right. That is why the one is easy and the other hard: it is easy to miss the target, hard to hit it. For these reasons, too, excess and deficiency belong to vice, and the mean to excellence: “People are good in just one way, but bad in every way.”
ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, 1107a ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν. μεσότης δὲ δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθʼ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατʼ ἔλλειψιν· καὶ ἔτι τῷ τὰς μὲν ἐλλείπειν τὰς δʼ ὑπερβάλλειν τοῦ δέοντος ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι, τὴν δʼ ἀρετὴν τὸ μέσον καὶ εὑρίσκειν καὶ αἱρεῖσθαι. διὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης.
Excellence, then, is a state that issues in decisions, lying in a mean relative to us, 1107a a mean determined by reason, in the way the practically wise person would determine it. It is a mean between two vices, one of excess and one of deficiency; and again, it is a mean in that the vices fall short of or exceed what is right in feelings and actions, while excellence both finds and chooses the mean. Hence, in respect of its substance and the account that states what it is to be, excellence is a mean; but with regard to what is best and doing well, it is an extreme.
οὐ πᾶσα δʼ ἐπιδέχεται πρᾶξις οὐδὲ πᾶν πάθος τὴν μεσότητα· ἔνια γὰρ εὐθὺς ὠνόμασται συνειλημμένα μετὰ τῆς φαυλότητος, οἷον ἐπιχαιρεκακία ἀναισχυντία φθόνος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων μοιχεία κλοπὴ ἀνδροφονία· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται τῷ αὐτὰ φαῦλα εἶναι, ἀλλʼ οὐχ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ αὐτῶν οὐδʼ αἱ ἐλλείψεις. οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν οὐδέποτε περὶ αὐτὰ κατορθοῦν, ἀλλʼ ἀεὶ ἁμαρτάνειν· οὐδʼ ἔστι τὸ εὖ ἢ μὴ εὖ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν τῷ ἣν δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὡς μοιχεύειν, ἀλλʼ ἁπλῶς τὸ ποιεῖν ὁτιοῦν τούτων ἁμαρτάνειν ἐστίν. ὅμοιον οὖν τὸ ἀξιοῦν καὶ περὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν καὶ δειλαίνειν καὶ ἀκολασταίνειν εἶναι μεσότητα καὶ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν· ἔσται γὰρ οὕτω γε ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως μεσότης καὶ ὑπερβολῆς ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἐλλείψεως.
But not every action or every feeling admits of a mean. Some have names that already imply badness—for instance malicious glee, shamelessness, and envy, and among actions adultery, theft, and murder. All these and others like them are so called because they themselves are bad, not their excesses or deficiencies. So one can never get it right with them, but always goes wrong; nor does doing them well or badly depend on committing adultery with the right woman, at the right time, and in the right way—simply to do any of them at all is to go wrong. It would be just as absurd, then, to claim that there is a mean, an excess, and a deficiency in doing wrong, being cowardly, and being self-indulgent; for then there would be a mean of excess and deficiency, an excess of excess, and a deficiency of deficiency.
ὥσπερ δὲ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις διὰ τὸ τὸ μέσον εἶναί πως ἄκρον, οὕτως οὐδʼ ἐκείνων μεσότης οὐδʼ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἂν πράττηται ἁμαρτάνεται· ὅλως γὰρ οὔθʼ ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως μεσότης ἔστιν, οὔτε μεσότητος ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις.
Just as there is no excess or deficiency of moderation and courage, because the mean is in a way an extreme, so too with those there is no mean, excess, or deficiency: however they are done, they are wrong. For in general there is no mean of excess and deficiency, nor excess and deficiency of a mean.
The mean in each excellence
Aristotle applies the mean to particular excellences such as courage, generosity and truthfulness.
δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ μόνον καθόλου λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς καθʼ ἕκαστα ἐφαρμόττειν. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς περὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγοις οἱ μὲν καθόλου κοινότεροί εἰσιν, οἱ δʼ ἐπὶ μέρους ἀληθινώτεροι· περὶ γὰρ τὰ καθʼ ἕκαστα αἱ πράξεις, δέον δʼ ἐπὶ τούτων συμφωνεῖν. ληπτέον οὖν ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς διαγραφῆς. περὶ μὲν οὖν φόβους καὶ θάρρη ἀνδρεία μεσότης· 1107b τῶν δʼ ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ μὲν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ἀνώνυμος (πολλὰ δʼ ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμα), ὁ δʼ ἐν τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλων θρασύς, ὁ δʼ ἐν τῷ μὲν φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλων τῷ δὲ θαρρεῖν ἐλλείπων δειλός. περὶ ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας—οὐ πάσας, ἧττον δὲ †καὶ† περὶ τὰς λύπας—μεσότης μὲν σωφροσύνη, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀκολασία. ἐλλείποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς οὐ πάνυ γίνονται· διόπερ οὐδʼ ὀνόματος τετυχήκασιν οὐδʼ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἔστωσαν δὲ ἀναίσθητοι.
We must not only state this in general terms but also apply it to particular cases. For in discussions about actions, general accounts are broader, but those dealing with particulars are truer, since actions concern particulars, and our accounts must agree with these. Let us take the particular cases, then, from our table. About fears and confidence, courage is the mean. 1107b Of those who exceed, the one who exceeds in fearlessness has no name (many states have no name); the one who exceeds in confidence is rash; and the one who exceeds in fear and falls short in confidence is a coward. About pleasures and pains—not all of them, and less so about pains—the mean is moderation, the excess self-indulgence. People who fall short with regard to pleasures are hardly found; that is why such people haven’t even got a name, but let us call them insensible.
περὶ δὲ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λῆψιν μεσότης μὲν ἐλευθεριότης, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἀσωτία καὶ ἀνελευθερία. ἐναντίως δʼ ἐν αὐταῖς ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄσωτος ἐν μὲν προέσει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ λήψει ἐλλείπει, ὁ δʼ ἀνελεύθερος ἐν μὲν λήψει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ προέσει ἐλλείπει. νῦν μὲν οὖν τύπῳ καὶ ἐπὶ κεφαλαίου λέγομεν, ἀρκούμενοι αὐτῷ τούτῳ· ὕστερον δὲ ἀκριβέστερον περὶ αὐτῶν διορισθήσεται. περὶ δὲ χρήματα καὶ ἄλλαι διαθέσεις εἰσί, μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοπρέπεια (ὁ γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπὴς διαφέρει ἐλευθερίου· ὃ μὲν γὰρ περὶ μεγάλα, ὃ δὲ περὶ μικρά), ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ βαναυσία, ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροπρέπεια· διαφέρουσι δʼ αὗται τῶν περὶ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, πῇ δὲ διαφέρουσιν, ὕστερον ῥηθήσεται.
About giving and taking money, the mean is generosity, the excess and deficiency wastefulness and stinginess. In these the excess and deficiency run in opposite directions: the wasteful person exceeds in giving away and falls short in taking, while the stingy person exceeds in taking and falls short in giving away. For now we are speaking in outline and summarily, and that is enough for present purposes; later these will be defined more precisely. About money there are other dispositions too: the mean is magnificence (for the magnificent person differs from the generous one: the former deals with large sums, the latter with small), the excess tastelessness and vulgarity, the deficiency shabbiness. These differ from the states concerned with generosity; how they differ will be discussed later.
περὶ δὲ τιμὴν καὶ ἀτιμίαν μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοψυχία, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ χαυνότης τις λεγομένη, ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροψυχία· ὡς δʼ ἐλέγομεν ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, τῷ περὶ μικρὰ διαφέρουσαν, οὕτως ἔχει τις καὶ πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν, περὶ τιμὴν οὖσαν μεγάλην, αὐτὴ περὶ μικρὰν οὖσα· ἔστι γὰρ ὡς δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἧττον, λέγεται δʼ ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ταῖς ὀρέξεσι φιλότιμος, ὁ δʼ ἐλλείπων ἀφιλότιμος, ὁ δὲ μέσος ἀνώνυμος. ἀνώνυμοι δὲ καὶ αἱ διαθέσεις, πλὴν ἡ τοῦ φιλοτίμου φιλοτιμία. ὅθεν ἐπιδικάζονται οἱ ἄκροι τῆς μέσης χώρας· καὶ ἡμεῖς δὲ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τὸν μέσον φιλότιμον καλοῦμεν ἔστι δʼ ὅτε ἀφιλότιμον, 1108a καὶ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε ἐπαινοῦμεν τὸν φιλότιμον ἔστι δʼ ὅτε τὸν ἀφιλότιμον.
About honor and dishonor, the mean is greatness of soul, the excess what is called a kind of vanity, and the deficiency smallness of soul. And just as we said that generosity is related to magnificence, differing in that it concerns small sums, so there is a state related to greatness of soul, which concerns great honor, while this one concerns small honor. For one can desire honor as one should, or more than one should, or less; the person who exceeds in these desires is called ambitious, the one who falls short unambitious, while the one in the middle has no name. Their dispositions have no names either, except the ambitious person’s, ambition. That is why the extremes lay claim to the middle ground; and we ourselves sometimes call the person in the middle ambitious and sometimes unambitious, 1108a and sometimes praise the ambitious person, sometimes the unambitious one.
διὰ τίνα δʼ αἰτίαν τοῦτο ποιοῦμεν, ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς ῥηθήσεται· νῦν δὲ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν λέγωμεν κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον. ἔστι δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ μεσότης, σχεδὸν δὲ ἀνωνύμων ὄντων αὐτῶν τὸν μέσον πρᾶον λέγοντες τὴν μεσότητα πραότητα καλέσωμεν· τῶν δʼ ἄκρων ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ὀργίλος ἔστω, ἡ δὲ κακία ὀργιλότης, ὁ δʼ ἐλλείπων ἀόργητός τις, ἡ δʼ ἔλλειψις ἀοργησία. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι τρεῖς μεσότητες, ἔχουσαι μέν τινα ὁμοιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλας, διαφέρουσαι δʼ ἀλλήλων· πᾶσαι μὲν γάρ εἰσι περὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν, διαφέρουσι δὲ ὅτι ἣ μέν ἐστι περὶ τἀληθὲς τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς, αἳ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ· τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ τὸ δʼ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον.
Why we do this will be explained in what follows; for now let us speak about the remaining states in the way we have laid down. With anger, too, there is an excess, a deficiency, and a mean. Since these have practically no names, let us call the person in the middle gentle and the mean gentleness. Of the extremes, let the one who exceeds be irascible and his vice irascibility, and the one who falls short something like unirascible and the deficiency unirascibility. There are also three other means, which have a certain likeness to one another but differ from one another. All are concerned with shared life in words and actions, but they differ in that one concerns truth in these, the others what is pleasant—and of this, one sort is found in amusement, the other in all the dealings of life.
ῥητέον οὖν καὶ περὶ τούτων, ἵνα μᾶλλον κατίδωμεν ὅτι ἐν πᾶσιν ἡ μεσότης ἐπαινετόν, τὰ δʼ ἄκρα οὔτʼ ἐπαινετὰ οὔτʼ ὀρθὰ ἀλλὰ ψεκτά. εἰσὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτων τὰ πλείω ἀνώνυμα, πειρατέον δʼ, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, αὐτοὺς ὀνοματοποιεῖν σαφηνείας ἕνεκα καὶ τοῦ εὐπαρακολουθήτου. περὶ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀληθὲς ὁ μὲν μέσος ἀληθής τις καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἀλήθεια λεγέσθω, ἡ δὲ προσποίησις ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον ἀλαζονεία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν ἀλαζών, ἡ δʼ ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον εἰρωνεία καὶ εἴρων ὁ ἔχων.
So we must talk about these too, so as to see better that in everything the mean is praiseworthy, while the extremes are neither praiseworthy nor right but blameworthy. Most of these, too, have no names, but we must try, as with the others, to make up names ourselves, for the sake of clarity and so that we can be easily followed. About truth, then, let the person in the middle be called truthful and the mean truthfulness; pretense that exaggerates is boastfulness and the person who has it a boaster, and pretense that understates is self-deprecation and the person who has it self-deprecating.
περὶ δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ ὁ μὲν μέσος εὐτράπελος καὶ ἡ διάθεσις εὐτραπελία, ἡ δʼ ὑπερβολὴ βωμολοχία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν βωμολόχος, ὁ δʼ ἐλλείπων ἄγροικός τις καὶ ἡ ἕξις ἀγροικία· περὶ δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἡδὺ τὸ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὁ μὲν ὡς δεῖ ἡδὺς ὢν φίλος καὶ ἡ μεσότης φιλία, ὁ δʼ ὑπερβάλλων, εἰ μὲν οὐδενὸς ἕνεκα, ἄρεσκος, εἰ δʼ ὠφελείας τῆς αὑτοῦ, κόλαξ, ὁ δʼ ἐλλείπων καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀηδὴς δύσερίς τις καὶ δύσκολος. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι καὶ περὶ τὰ πάθη μεσότητες· ἡ γὰρ αἰδὼς ἀρετὴ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπαινεῖται δὲ καὶ ὁ αἰδήμων.
About the pleasant in amusement, the person in the middle is witty and the disposition wit; the excess is buffoonery and the person who has it a buffoon, while the one who falls short is a sort of boor and the state boorishness. About the remaining kind of pleasantness, the kind found in life generally, the person who is pleasant as one should be is friendly and the mean friendliness; the one who exceeds is obsequious if he has no further aim, a flatterer if he aims at his own advantage; and the one who falls short and is unpleasant in everything is a quarrelsome, difficult sort. There are means also in experiences and concerning feelings. Shame is not an excellence, yet the person with a sense of shame is praised.
καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὃ μὲν λέγεται μέσος, ὃ δʼ ὑπερβάλλων, ὡς ὁ καταπλὴξ ὁ πάντα αἰδούμενος· ὁ δʼ ἐλλείπων ἢ μηδὲν ὅλως ἀναίσχυντος, ὁ δὲ μέσος αἰδήμων. 1108b νέμεσις δὲ μεσότης φθόνου καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας, εἰσὶ δὲ περὶ λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴν τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβαίνουσι τοῖς πέλας γινομένας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ νεμεσητικὸς λυπεῖται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως εὖ πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ φθονερὸς ὑπερβάλλων τοῦτον ἐπὶ πᾶσι λυπεῖται, ὁ δʼ ἐπιχαιρέκακος τοσοῦτον ἐλλείπει τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι ὥστε καὶ χαίρειν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων καὶ ἄλλοθι καιρὸς ἔσται· περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἁπλῶς λέγεται, μετὰ ταῦτα διελόμενοι περὶ ἑκατέρας ἐροῦμεν πῶς μεσότητές εἰσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἀρετῶν.
For in these, too, one person is said to be in the middle and another to exceed, like the bashful person who is ashamed of everything; while the one who falls short, or is not ashamed of anything at all, is shameless, and the one in the middle has a sense of shame. 1108b Righteous indignation is a mean between envy and malicious glee, and these are concerned with pain and pleasure at what happens to one’s neighbors. The righteously indignant person is pained at people who do well undeservedly; the envious person goes beyond him and is pained at everyone’s doing well; and the person given to malicious glee falls so far short of being pained that he actually rejoices. But there will be an opportunity to discuss these elsewhere. As for justice, since it is not spoken of in just one sense, after this we will distinguish its two kinds and say how each is a mean; and similarly with the excellences of reason.
How the extremes are opposed
Aristotle explains how the two vices oppose each other and the mean, and which is more opposed.
τριῶν δὴ διαθέσεων οὐσῶν, δύο μὲν κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθʼ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατʼ ἔλλειψιν, μιᾶς δʼ ἀρετῆς τῆς μεσότητος, πᾶσαι πάσαις ἀντίκεινταί πως· αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄκραι καὶ τῇ μέσῃ καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι εἰσίν, ἡ δὲ μέση ταῖς ἄκραις· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ ἴσον πρὸς μὲν τὸ ἔλαττον μεῖζον πρὸς δὲ τὸ μεῖζον ἔλαττον, οὕτως αἱ μέσαι ἕξεις πρὸς μὲν τὰς ἐλλείψεις ὑπερβάλλουσι πρὸς δὲ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς ἐλλείπουσιν ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν. ὁ γὰρ ἀνδρεῖος πρὸς μὲν τὸν δειλὸν θρασὺς φαίνεται, πρὸς δὲ τὸν θρασὺν δειλός· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώφρων πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀναίσθητον ἀκόλαστος, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀναίσθητος, ὁ δʼ ἐλευθέριος πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀνελεύθερον ἄσωτος, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἄσωτον ἀνελεύθερος.
There are three dispositions, then: two vices, one of excess and one of deficiency, and one excellence, the mean; and all are in some way opposed to all. The extremes are contrary both to the mean and to each other, and the mean is contrary to the extremes. For just as the equal is greater relative to the less and less relative to the greater, so the middle states exceed relative to the deficiencies and fall short relative to the excesses, in both feelings and actions. The courageous person appears rash compared with the coward, and cowardly compared with the rash person; similarly the moderate person appears self-indulgent compared with the insensible person, and insensible compared with the self-indulgent one; and the generous person appears wasteful compared with the stingy person, and stingy compared with the wasteful one.
διὸ καὶ ἀπωθοῦνται τὸν μέσον οἱ ἄκροι ἑκάτερος πρὸς ἑκάτερον, καὶ καλοῦσι τὸν ἀνδρεῖον ὁ μὲν δειλὸς θρασὺν ὁ δὲ θρασὺς δειλόν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνάλογον. οὕτω δʼ ἀντικειμένων ἀλλήλοις τούτων, πλείστη ἐναντιότης ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄκροις πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ πρὸς τὸ μέσον· πορρωτέρω γὰρ ταῦτα ἀφέστηκεν ἀλλήλων ἢ τοῦ μέσου, ὥσπερ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μικροῦ καὶ τὸ μικρὸν τοῦ μεγάλου ἢ ἄμφω τοῦ ἴσου. ἔτι πρὸς μὲν τὸ μέσον ἐνίοις ἄκροις ὁμοιότης τις φαίνεται, ὡς τῇ θρασύτητι πρὸς τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τῇ ἀσωτίᾳ πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα· τοῖς δὲ ἄκροις πρὸς ἄλληλα πλείστη ἀνομοιότης· τὰ δὲ πλεῖστον ἀπέχοντα ἀπʼ ἀλλήλων ἐναντία ὁρίζονται, ὥστε καὶ μᾶλλον ἐναντία τὰ πλεῖον ἀπέχοντα.
That is why each extreme pushes the person in the middle toward the other: the coward calls the courageous person rash, and the rash person calls him a coward, and correspondingly in the other cases. Since these are opposed to one another in this way, the extremes are more contrary to each other than to the mean; for they are further from each other than from the mean, just as the large is further from the small, and the small from the large, than both are from the equal. Again, some extremes show a certain likeness to the mean, as rashness does to courage and wastefulness to generosity, whereas the extremes are most unlike each other. And things furthest apart from each other are defined as contraries, so that things further apart are more contrary.
πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέσον 1109a ἀντίκειται μᾶλλον ἐφʼ ὧν μὲν ἡ ἔλλειψις ἐφʼ ὧν δὲ ἡ ὑπερβολή, οἷον ἀνδρείᾳ μὲν οὐχ ἡ θρασύτης ὑπερβολὴ οὖσα, ἀλλʼ ἡ δειλία ἔλλειψις οὖσα, τῇ δὲ σωφροσύνῃ οὐχ ἡ ἀναισθησία ἔνδεια οὖσα, ἀλλʼ ἡ ἀκολασία ὑπερβολὴ οὖσα. διὰ δύο δʼ αἰτίας τοῦτο συμβαίνει, μίαν μὲν τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος· τῷ γὰρ ἐγγύτερον εἶναι καὶ ὁμοιότερον τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον τῷ μέσῳ, οὐ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον ἀντιτίθεμεν μᾶλλον· οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁμοιότερον εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἡ θρασύτης καὶ ἐγγύτερον, ἀνομοιότερον δʼ ἡ δειλία, ταύτην μᾶλλον ἀντιτίθεμεν· τὰ γὰρ ἀπέχοντα πλεῖον τοῦ μέσου ἐναντιώτερα δοκεῖ εἶναι.
To the mean 1109a it is in some cases the deficiency that is more opposed, in others the excess. For instance, what is more opposed to courage is not rashness, which is an excess, but cowardice, which is a deficiency; and to moderation not insensibility, which is a lack, but self-indulgence, which is an excess. This happens for two reasons. One comes from the thing itself: because one extreme is closer and more similar to the mean, we set not it but its contrary against the mean. For example, since rashness seems more similar and closer to courage, and cowardice less similar, it is cowardice we set against courage; for things further from the mean seem more contrary to it.
μία μὲν οὖν αἰτία αὕτη, ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος· ἑτέρα δὲ ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν· πρὸς ἃ γὰρ αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμέν πως, ταῦτα μᾶλλον ἐναντία τῷ μέσῳ φαίνεται. οἷον αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμεν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονάς, διὸ εὐκαταφορώτεροί ἐσμεν πρὸς ἀκολασίαν ἢ πρὸς κοσμιότητα. ταῦτʼ οὖν μᾶλλον ἐναντία λέγομεν, πρὸς ἃ ἡ ἐπίδοσις μᾶλλον γίνεται· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ ἀκολασία ὑπερβολὴ οὖσα ἐναντιωτέρα ἐστὶ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ.
This, then, is one reason, coming from the thing itself. The other comes from ourselves: the things we are somehow more naturally inclined toward appear more contrary to the mean. For instance, we are naturally more inclined toward pleasures, which is why we are more easily carried off toward self-indulgence than toward orderliness. So we call those things more contrary toward which we more readily drift; and this is why self-indulgence, which is an excess, is more contrary to moderation.
Hitting the mean
Aristotle notes that hitting the mean is hard and gives practical advice for approaching it.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ μεσότης, καὶ πῶς, καὶ ὅτι μεσότης δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθʼ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατʼ ἔλλειψιν, καὶ ὅτι τοιαύτη ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ στοχαστικὴ τοῦ μέσου εἶναι τοῦ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν, ἱκανῶς εἴρηται. διὸ καὶ ἔργον ἐστὶ σπουδαῖον εἶναι. ἐν ἑκάστῳ γὰρ τὸ μέσον λαβεῖν ἔργον, οἷον κύκλου τὸ μέσον οὐ παντὸς ἀλλὰ τοῦ εἰδότος· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὲν ὀργισθῆναι παντὸς καὶ ῥᾴδιον, καὶ τὸ δοῦναι ἀργύριον καὶ δαπανῆσαι· τὸ δʼ ᾧ καὶ ὅσον καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὥς, οὐκέτι παντὸς οὐδὲ ῥᾴδιον· διόπερ τὸ εὖ καὶ σπάνιον καὶ ἐπαινετὸν καὶ καλόν.
That excellence of character is a mean, then, and in what sense; that it is a mean between two vices, one of excess and one of deficiency; and that it is such because it aims at the mean in feelings and actions—all this has been sufficiently stated. That is also why it is hard work to be excellent. In each case it is hard work to find the middle—finding the center of a circle, for instance, is not for everyone but for someone who knows how. In the same way, getting angry is something anyone can do, and easy, and so is giving money away or spending it; but to do it to the right person, in the right amount, at the right time, for the right reason, and in the right way is no longer something anyone can do, nor is it easy. That is why doing it well is rare, praiseworthy, and fine.
διὸ δεῖ τὸν στοχαζόμενον τοῦ μέσου πρῶτον μὲν ἀποχωρεῖν τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐναντίου, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ Καλυψὼ παραινεῖ τούτου μὲν καπνοῦ καὶ κύματος ἐκτὸς ἔεργε νῆα. τῶν γὰρ ἄκρων τὸ μέν ἐστιν ἁμαρτωλότερον τὸ δʼ ἧττον· ἐπεὶ οὖν τοῦ μέσου τυχεῖν ἄκρως χαλεπόν, κατὰ τὸν δεύτερον, φασί, πλοῦν τὰ ἐλάχιστα ληπτέον τῶν κακῶν· τοῦτο δʼ ἔσται μάλιστα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὃν λέγομεν. 1109b σκοπεῖν δὲ δεῖ πρὸς ἃ καὶ αὐτοὶ εὐκατάφοροί ἐσμεν· ἄλλοι γὰρ πρὸς ἄλλα πεφύκαμεν· τοῦτο δʼ ἔσται γνώριμον ἐκ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς λύπης τῆς γινομένης περὶ ἡμᾶς. εἰς τοὐναντίον δʼ ἑαυτοὺς ἀφέλκειν δεῖ· πολὺ γὰρ ἀπάγοντες τοῦ ἁμαρτάνειν εἰς τὸ μέσον ἥξομεν, ὅπερ οἱ τὰ διεστραμμένα τῶν ξύλων ὀρθοῦντες ποιοῦσιν.
So someone aiming at the mean must first steer away from the more contrary extreme, as Calypso too advises: “Keep the ship clear of that spray and surf.” For of the extremes one is more of an error, the other less; since, then, it is extremely hard to hit the mean, we must take the second-best course, as they say, and choose the least of the evils—and this will best be done in the way we describe. 1109b We must also consider what we ourselves are easily carried off toward, since different people are naturally inclined toward different things; and this will become clear from the pleasure and pain that arise in us. We must drag ourselves off in the contrary direction; for by pulling far away from error we will arrive at the middle, as people do when they straighten warped timber.
ἐν παντὶ δὲ μάλιστα φυλακτέον τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ ἀδέκαστοι κρίνομεν αὐτήν. ὅπερ οὖν οἱ δημογέροντες ἔπαθον πρὸς τὴν Ἑλένην, τοῦτο δεῖ παθεῖν καὶ ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὴν ἡδονήν, καὶ ἐν πᾶσι τὴν ἐκείνων ἐπιλέγειν φωνήν· οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀποπεμπόμενοι ἧττον ἁμαρτησόμεθα. ταῦτʼ οὖν ποιοῦντες, ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν, μάλιστα δυνησόμεθα τοῦ μέσου τυγχάνειν. χαλεπὸν δʼ ἴσως τοῦτο, καὶ μάλιστʼ ἐν τοῖς καθʼ ἕκαστον· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον διορίσαι καὶ πῶς καὶ τίσι καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις καὶ πόσον χρόνον ὀργιστέον· καὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ὁτὲ μὲν τοὺς ἐλλείποντας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ πράους φαμέν, ὁτὲ δὲ τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἀνδρώδεις ἀποκαλοῦντες. ἀλλʼ ὁ μὲν μικρὸν τοῦ εὖ παρεκβαίνων οὐ ψέγεται, οὔτʼ ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον οὔτʼ ἐπὶ τὸ ἧττον, ὁ δὲ πλέον· οὗτος γὰρ οὐ λανθάνει.
In everything we must be most on guard against what is pleasant and against pleasure, since we are not impartial judges of it. So we should feel toward pleasure what the elders of the people felt toward Helen, and repeat their words on every occasion; for if we send pleasure away like this, we will go wrong less. To sum up, then, by doing these things we will be best able to hit the mean. But this is perhaps difficult, especially in particular cases: it is not easy to determine how, with whom, over what, and for how long one should be angry. We ourselves sometimes praise those who fall short and call them gentle, and sometimes call those who are harsh manly. Yet someone who deviates a little from what is right, whether toward more or toward less, is not blamed—only someone who deviates more, since he doesn’t escape notice.
ὁ δὲ μέχρι τίνος καὶ ἐπὶ πόσον ψεκτὸς οὐ ῥᾴδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀφορίσαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν· τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα ἐν τοῖς καθʼ ἕκαστα, καὶ ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις. τὸ μὲν ἄρα τοσοῦτο δηλοῖ ὅτι ἡ μέση ἕξις ἐν πᾶσιν ἐπαινετή, ἀποκλίνειν δὲ δεῖ ὁτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ὁτὲ δʼ ἐπὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν· οὕτω γὰρ ῥᾷστα τοῦ μέσου καὶ τοῦ εὖ τευξόμεθα.
But up to what point and how far someone is blameworthy is not easy to define in an account—nor is anything else perceptible. Such matters lie in particulars, and the judgment rests with perception. This much, then, is clear: the middle state is praiseworthy in everything, but we must sometimes lean toward the excess and sometimes toward the deficiency; for this is the easiest way to hit the mean and what is right.