πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξίς τε καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ· διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο τἀγαθόν, οὗ πάντʼ ἐφίεται. διαφορὰ δέ τις φαίνεται τῶν τελῶν· τὰ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι, τὰ δὲ παρʼ αὐτὰς ἔργα τινά. ὧν δʼ εἰσὶ τέλη τινὰ παρὰ τὰς πράξεις, ἐν τούτοις βελτίω πέφυκε τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τὰ ἔργα. πολλῶν δὲ πράξεων οὐσῶν καὶ τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν πολλὰ γίνεται καὶ τὰ τέλη· ἰατρικῆς μὲν γὰρ ὑγίεια, ναυπηγικῆς δὲ πλοῖον, στρατηγικῆς δὲ νίκη, οἰκονομικῆς δὲ πλοῦτος.
Every craft and every inquiry, and likewise every action and decision, seems to aim at some good. That is why people have rightly declared that the good is that at which all things aim. But there appears to be a difference among ends: some are activities, while others are products of some kind over and above the activities. And where there are ends beyond the actions, the products are by nature better than the activities. Since there are many actions, crafts and sciences, their ends turn out to be many as well: the end of medicine is health, of shipbuilding a ship, of generalship victory, of household management wealth.
ὅσαι δʼ εἰσὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὑπὸ μίαν τινὰ δύναμιν, καθάπερ ὑπὸ τὴν ἱππικὴν χαλινοποιικὴ καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι τῶν ἱππικῶν ὀργάνων εἰσίν, αὕτη δὲ καὶ πᾶσα πολεμικὴ πρᾶξις ὑπὸ τὴν στρατηγικήν, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ἄλλαι ὑφʼ ἑτέρας· ἐν ἁπάσαις δὲ τὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν τέλη πάντων ἐστὶν αἱρετώτερα τῶν ὑπʼ αὐτά· τούτων γὰρ χάριν κἀκεῖνα διώκεται. διαφέρει δʼ οὐδὲν τὰς ἐνεργείας αὐτὰς εἶναι τὰ τέλη τῶν πράξεων ἢ παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλο τι, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λεχθεισῶν ἐπιστημῶν.
Wherever such pursuits fall under a single capacity—as bridle-making and all the other crafts concerned with a horse’s equipment fall under horsemanship, and horsemanship and every action in war fall under generalship, and in the same way others fall under still others—in all of them the ends of the master crafts are more choiceworthy than all the ends subordinate to them, since it is for the sake of the former that the latter too are pursued. And it makes no difference whether the ends of the actions are the activities themselves or something else beyond them, as with the sciences just mentioned.
εἰ δή τι τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ὃ διʼ αὑτὸ βουλόμεθα, τἆλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο, καὶ μὴ πάντα διʼ ἕτερον αἱρούμεθα (πρόεισι γὰρ οὕτω γʼ εἰς ἄπειρον, ὥστʼ εἶναι κενὴν καὶ ματαίαν τὴν ὄρεξιν), δῆλον ὡς τοῦτʼ ἂν εἴη τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον. ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡ γνῶσις αὐτοῦ μεγάλην ἔχει ῥοπήν, καὶ καθάπερ τοξόται σκοπὸν ἔχοντες μᾶλλον ἂν τυγχάνοιμεν τοῦ δέοντος; εἰ δʼ οὕτω, πειρατέον τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν αὐτὸ τί ποτʼ ἐστὶ καὶ τίνος τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἢ δυνάμεων. δόξειε δʼ ἂν τῆς κυριωτάτης καὶ μάλιστα ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς.
Suppose, then, that there is some end of the things we do that we wish for on account of itself, wishing for everything else on account of it, and that we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for in that way the process would go on without limit, so that our desire would be empty and futile). Clearly this end would be the good—the best good. Won’t knowledge of it, then, carry great weight for how we live? Like archers who have a target, wouldn’t we be more likely to hit what we should? If so, we must try to grasp, in outline at least, what it is and which of the sciences or capacities it belongs to. It would seem to belong to the most authoritative one, the one that is most of all a master craft.
τοιαύτη δʼ ἡ πολιτικὴ φαίνεται· τίνας γὰρ εἶναι χρεὼν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, 1094b καὶ ποίας ἑκάστους μανθάνειν καὶ μέχρι τίνος, αὕτη διατάσσει· ὁρῶμεν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐντιμοτάτας τῶν δυνάμεων ὑπὸ ταύτην οὔσας, οἷον στρατηγικὴν οἰκονομικὴν ῥητορικήν· χρωμένης δὲ ταύτης ταῖς λοιπαῖς πρακτικαῖς τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἔτι δὲ νομοθετούσης τί δεῖ πράττειν καὶ τίνων ἀπέχεσθαι, τὸ ταύτης τέλος περιέχοι ἂν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστε τοῦτʼ ἂν εἴη τἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἑνὶ καὶ πόλει, μεῖζόν γε καὶ τελειότερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σῴζειν· ἀγαπητὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἑνὶ μόνῳ, κάλλιον δὲ καὶ θειότερον ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἐφίεται, πολιτική τις οὖσα.
Political science appears to be of this kind. For it is political science that lays down which of the sciences there must be in cities, 1094b and which ones each group of citizens must learn, and up to what point. We see, too, that even the most honored capacities fall under it—generalship, for example, household management and rhetoric. And since it uses the rest of the practical sciences, and also legislates what people must do and what they must refrain from, its end would include the ends of the others, so that this end would be the human good. For even if the good is the same for an individual and for a city, the good of the city is evidently a greater and more complete thing both to attain and to preserve. It is welcome enough to secure it for one person alone, but finer and more divine to secure it for a people and for cities. This, then, is what our inquiry aims at, since it is a kind of political science.
λέγοιτο δʼ ἂν ἱκανῶς, εἰ κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην διασαφηθείη· τὸ γὰρ ἀκριβὲς οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς λόγοις ἐπιζητητέον, ὥσπερ οὐδʼ ἐν τοῖς δημιουργουμένοις. τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια, περὶ ὧν ἡ πολιτικὴ σκοπεῖται, πολλὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην, ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μή. τοιαύτην δέ τινα πλάνην ἔχει καὶ τἀγαθὰ διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς συμβαίνειν βλάβας ἀπʼ αὐτῶν· ἤδη γάρ τινες ἀπώλοντο διὰ πλοῦτον, ἕτεροι δὲ διʼ ἀνδρείαν. ἀγαπητὸν οὖν περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας παχυλῶς καὶ τύπῳ τἀληθὲς ἐνδείκνυσθαι, καὶ περὶ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας τοιαῦτα καὶ συμπεραίνεσθαι.
Our account will be adequate if it is made as clear as its subject matter allows. Precision should not be sought equally in all discussions, any more than in all the things craftsmen make. Fine and just things, which political science examines, involve a great deal of disagreement and variability, so much so that they are thought to exist only by convention and not by nature. Good things too involve variability of this kind, because they bring harm to many people: before now some have been ruined by their wealth, and others by their courage. So when we speak about such things, and from such premises, we must be content to indicate the truth roughly and in outline; and when we speak about what holds for the most part, and from premises of that kind, we must be content to reach conclusions of the same kind.
τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἀποδέχεσθαι χρεὼν ἕκαστα τῶν λεγομένων· πεπαιδευμένου γάρ ἐστιν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τἀκριβὲς ἐπιζητεῖν καθʼ ἕκαστον γένος, ἐφʼ ὅσον ἡ τοῦ πράγματος φύσις ἐπιδέχεται· παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται μαθηματικοῦ τε πιθανολογοῦντος ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικὸν ἀποδείξεις ἀπαιτεῖν. ἕκαστος δὲ κρίνει καλῶς ἃ γινώσκει, καὶ τούτων ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς κριτής. 1095a καθʼ ἕκαστον μὲν ἄρα ὁ πεπαιδευμένος, ἁπλῶς δʼ ὁ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος. διὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκεῖος ἀκροατὴς ὁ νέος· ἄπειρος γὰρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεων, οἱ λόγοι δʼ ἐκ τούτων καὶ περὶ τούτων· ἔτι δὲ τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκολουθητικὸς ὢν ματαίως ἀκούσεται καὶ ἀνωφελῶς, ἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν οὐ γνῶσις ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις.
Each of the things we say should be received in the same way. For it is the mark of an educated person to look for precision in each kind of thing just so far as the nature of the subject admits. Accepting merely plausible arguments from a mathematician seems much the same as demanding demonstrations from an orator. Each person judges well the things he knows, and of these he is a good judge. 1095a So in a given field the person educated in that field judges well, and without qualification the person educated in everything. That is why a young person is not a suitable student of political science. He has no experience of the actions of life, and our discussions start from these and are about these. Besides, since he tends to follow his feelings, he will listen to no purpose and without benefit, because the end here is not knowledge but action.
διαφέρει δʼ οὐδὲν νέος τὴν ἡλικίαν ἢ τὸ ἦθος νεαρός· οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τὸν χρόνον ἡ ἔλλειψις, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ κατὰ πάθος ζῆν καὶ διώκειν ἕκαστα. τοῖς γὰρ τοιούτοις ἀνόνητος ἡ γνῶσις γίνεται, καθάπερ τοῖς ἀκρατέσιν· τοῖς δὲ κατὰ λόγον τὰς ὀρέξεις ποιουμένοις καὶ πράττουσι πολυωφελὲς ἂν εἴη τὸ περὶ τούτων εἰδέναι. καὶ περὶ μὲν ἀκροατοῦ, καὶ πῶς ἀποδεκτέον, καὶ τί προτιθέμεθα, πεφροιμιάσθω ταῦτα.
It makes no difference whether he is young in years or youthful in character. The deficiency is not a matter of time; it comes from living, and pursuing each thing, according to feeling. For such people knowledge proves useless, just as it does for those who lack self-control. But for those who form their desires and act in accordance with reason, knowing about these matters would be of great benefit. So much, then, by way of preface, about the student, about how our claims should be received, and about what we are setting out to do.
What people say happiness is
Aristotle notes that all call the highest good happiness but disagree about pleasure, honor and wealth.
λέγωμεν δʼ ἀναλαβόντες, ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα γνῶσις καὶ προαίρεσις ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ὀρέγεται, τί ἐστὶν οὗ λέγομεν τὴν πολιτικὴν ἐφίεσθαι καὶ τί τὸ πάντων ἀκρότατον τῶν πρακτῶν ἀγαθῶν. ὀνόματι μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν ὑπὸ τῶν πλείστων ὁμολογεῖται· τὴν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ χαρίεντες λέγουσιν, τὸ δʼ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν ταὐτὸν ὑπολαμβάνουσι τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν· περὶ δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, τί ἐστιν, ἀμφισβητοῦσι καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς ἀποδιδόασιν. οἳ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐναργῶν τι καὶ φανερῶν, οἷον ἡδονὴν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ τιμήν, ἄλλοι δʼ ἄλλο—πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἕτερον· νοσήσας μὲν γὰρ ὑγίειαν, πενόμενος δὲ πλοῦτον· συνειδότες δʼ ἑαυτοῖς ἄγνοιαν τοὺς μέγα τι καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς λέγοντας θαυμάζουσιν.
Let us take up the question again. Since all knowledge and every decision reaches for some good, let us say what it is that we say political science aims at, and what is the highest of all the goods achievable in action. As to its name, most people pretty much agree: both ordinary people and the refined call it happiness, and they take living well and doing well to be the same as being happy. But about what happiness is they disagree, and the many do not give the same account as the wise. Some take it to be something plain and obvious, like pleasure or wealth or honor; others take it to be something else—and often the same person takes it to be different things: health when he is ill, wealth when he is poor. And when people are conscious of their own ignorance, they admire those who talk of something grand and above their heads.
ἔνιοι δʼ ᾤοντο παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἄλλο τι καθʼ αὑτὸ εἶναι, ὃ καὶ τούτοις πᾶσιν αἴτιόν ἐστι τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθά. ἁπάσας μὲν οὖν ἐξετάζειν τὰς δόξας ματαιότερον ἴσως ἐστίν, ἱκανὸν δὲ τὰς μάλιστα ἐπιπολαζούσας ἢ δοκούσας ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον. μὴ λανθανέτω δʼ ἡμᾶς ὅτι διαφέρουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς. εὖ γὰρ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἠπόρει τοῦτο καὶ ἐζήτει, πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς ἐστιν ἡ ὁδός, 1095b ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀθλοθετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρας ἢ ἀνάπαλιν. ἀρκτέον μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων, ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν τὰ δʼ ἁπλῶς. ἴσως οὖν ἡμῖν γε ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων.
Some, however, used to think that besides these many goods there is something else that is good by itself, which is also the cause of all these being good. Examining all the opinions would perhaps be rather futile; it is enough to examine those that are most widespread or that seem to have some reason in their favor. But let us not overlook the difference between arguments from first principles and arguments toward first principles. Plato too was right to raise this problem and to ask whether the path runs from the first principles or toward them, 1095b as on a racecourse it may run from the judges to the far end or back again. We must begin from what is known; but this has two senses, since some things are known to us, others known without qualification. Perhaps, then, we at any rate must begin from what is known to us.
διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἦχθαι καλῶς τὸν περὶ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ ὅλως τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀκουσόμενον ἱκανῶς. ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι, καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο ἀρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι· ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἔχει ἢ λάβοι ἂν ἀρχὰς ῥᾳδίως. ᾧ δὲ μηδέτερον ὑπάρχει τούτων, ἀκουσάτω τῶν Ἡσιόδου· οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ, ἐσθλὸς δʼ αὖ κἀκεῖνος ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται. ὃς δέ κε μήτʼ αὐτὸς νοέῃ μήτʼ ἄλλου ἀκούων ἐν θυμῷ βάλληται, ὃ δʼ αὖτʼ ἀχρήιος ἀνήρ.
That is why anyone who is going to be an adequate student of what is fine and just, and of political matters generally, must have been well brought up in his habits. For the starting point is the fact that something is so, and if this is sufficiently clear, there will be no further need of the reason why. Such a person either has the starting points or can easily get them. As for someone who has neither, let him hear the words of Hesiod: “Best of all is he who understands all things himself; / good, too, is he who listens to one who speaks well. / But he who neither understands himself nor, hearing another, / takes it to heart—that man is useless.”
ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν ὅθεν παρεξέβημεν. τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὐκ ἀλόγως ἐοίκασιν ἐκ τῶν βίων ὑπολαμβάνειν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ φορτικώτατοι τὴν ἡδονήν· διὸ καὶ τὸν βίον ἀγαπῶσι τὸν ἀπολαυστικόν. τρεῖς γάρ εἰσι μάλιστα οἱ προύχοντες, ὅ τε νῦν εἰρημένος καὶ ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ τρίτος ὁ θεωρητικός. οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ παντελῶς ἀνδραποδώδεις φαίνονται βοσκημάτων βίον προαιρούμενοι, τυγχάνουσι δὲ λόγου διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις ὁμοιοπαθεῖν Σαρδαναπάλλῳ. οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες καὶ πρακτικοὶ τιμήν· τοῦ γὰρ πολιτικοῦ βίου σχεδὸν τοῦτο τέλος. φαίνεται δʼ ἐπιπολαιότερον εἶναι τοῦ ζητουμένου· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τιμῶσι μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ τιμωμένῳ, τἀγαθὸν δὲ οἰκεῖόν τι καὶ δυσαφαίρετον εἶναι μαντευόμεθα.
But let us return to where we digressed. To judge from the lives they lead, the many and most vulgar seem—not unreasonably—to take the good, that is, happiness, to be pleasure; that is why they are content with the life of enjoyment. For there are three lives that stand out most: the one just mentioned, the political life, and third the contemplative life. The many appear quite slavish, choosing a life fit for grazing cattle; yet they get a hearing because many of those in positions of power share the tastes of Sardanapallus. Refined people and people of action, on the other hand, take the good to be honor, since this is roughly the end of the political life. But honor appears more superficial than what we are looking for. It seems to depend on those who confer it more than on the one who receives it, whereas we have a hunch that the good is something of one’s own and hard to take away.
ἔτι δʼ ἐοίκασι τὴν τιμὴν διώκειν ἵνα πιστεύσωσιν ἑαυτοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι· ζητοῦσι γοῦν ὑπὸ τῶν φρονίμων τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ παρʼ οἷς γινώσκονται, καὶ ἐπʼ ἀρετῇ· δῆλον οὖν ὅτι κατά γε τούτους ἡ ἀρετὴ κρείττων. τάχα δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἄν τις τέλος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ βίου ταύτην ὑπολάβοι. φαίνεται δὲ ἀτελεστέρα καὶ αὕτη· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ καθεύδειν ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ ἀπρακτεῖν διὰ βίου, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ἀτυχεῖν τὰ μέγιστα· 1096a τὸν δʼ οὕτω ζῶντα οὐδεὶς ἂν εὐδαιμονίσειεν, εἰ μὴ θέσιν διαφυλάττων. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἅλις· ἱκανῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις εἴρηται περὶ αὐτῶν. τρίτος δʼ ἐστὶν ὁ θεωρητικός, ὑπὲρ οὗ τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν ἐν τοῖς ἑπομένοις ποιησόμεθα.
Further, people seem to pursue honor in order to convince themselves that they are good. At any rate they seek to be honored by the practically wise, by people who know them, and for their excellence. Clearly, then, on their own view at least, excellence is better. Perhaps one might even suppose that excellence, rather than honor, is the end of the political life. But this too appears incomplete. For it seems possible to have excellence and yet be asleep, or inactive throughout one’s life, and on top of this to suffer terribly and meet with the greatest misfortunes; 1096a and no one would call a person living that way happy, unless he were defending a thesis. But enough of this; these matters have been discussed adequately in our popular works as well. The third life is the contemplative, which we shall examine in what follows.
ὁ δὲ χρηματιστὴς βίαιός τις ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν· χρήσιμον γὰρ καὶ ἄλλου χάριν. διὸ μᾶλλον τὰ πρότερον λεχθέντα τέλη τις ἂν ὑπολάβοι· διʼ αὑτὰ γὰρ ἀγαπᾶται. φαίνεται δʼ οὐδʼ ἐκεῖνα· καίτοι πολλοὶ λόγοι πρὸς αὐτὰ καταβέβληνται. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω.
The life of money-making is a life of constraint, and wealth is clearly not the good we are looking for, since it is useful and for the sake of something else. So one might rather suppose the ends mentioned earlier to be the good, since they are liked for their own sake. But evidently they are not either, even though many arguments have been laid down in their support. So let us leave these aside.
Plato’s form of the good
Aristotle criticizes Plato's idea of a single universal Form of the good.
τὸ δὲ καθόλου βέλτιον ἴσως ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ διαπορῆσαι πῶς λέγεται, καίπερ προσάντους τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως γινομένης διὰ τὸ φίλους ἄνδρας εἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἴδη. δόξειε δʼ ἂν ἴσως βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀναιρεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ φιλοσόφους ὄντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντοιν φίλοιν ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. οἱ δὴ κομίσαντες τὴν δόξαν ταύτην οὐκ ἐποίουν ἰδέας ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἔλεγον, διόπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἰδέαν κατεσκεύαζον· τὸ δʼ ἀγαθὸν λέγεται καὶ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῷ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρός τι, τὸ δὲ καθʼ αὑτὸ καὶ ἡ οὐσία πρότερον τῇ φύσει τοῦ πρός τι (παραφυάδι γὰρ τοῦτʼ ἔοικε καὶ συμβεβηκότι τοῦ ὄντος)· ὥστʼ οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινή τις ἐπὶ τούτοις ἰδέα.
It is perhaps better to examine the universal good and to work through the difficulties about how it is meant, even though such an inquiry is an uphill task, because the forms were introduced by friends of ours. Yet it would perhaps seem better—indeed our duty—to do away even with what is our own for the sake of preserving the truth, especially since we are philosophers. For while both are dear to us, piety requires us to honor the truth first. Those who introduced this view did not posit forms of things in which they spoke of a prior and a posterior, which is why they did not set up a form of numbers either. But the good is spoken of in the category of what a thing is, in that of quality, and in that of relation; and what exists by itself, substance, is prior by nature to what is relative (the relative is like an offshoot, an accident, of being). So there could not be a common form over these.
ἔτι δʼ ἐπεὶ τἀγαθὸν ἰσαχῶς λέγεται τῷ ὄντι (καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τί λέγεται, οἷον ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῷ αἱ ἀρεταί, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποσῷ τὸ μέτριον, καὶ ἐν τῷ πρός τι τὸ χρήσιμον, καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ καιρός, καὶ ἐν τόπῳ δίαιτα καὶ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα), δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινόν τι καθόλου καὶ ἕν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐλέγετʼ ἐν πάσαις ταῖς κατηγορίαις, ἀλλʼ ἐν μιᾷ μόνῃ. ἔτι δʼ ἐπεὶ τῶν κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν μία καὶ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἁπάντων ἦν ἂν μία τις ἐπιστήμη· νῦν δʼ εἰσὶ πολλαὶ καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ μίαν κατηγορίαν, οἷον καιροῦ, ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν γὰρ στρατηγικὴ ἐν νόσῳ δʼ ἰατρική, καὶ τοῦ μετρίου ἐν τροφῇ μὲν ἰατρικὴ ἐν πόνοις δὲ γυμναστική.
Further, the good is spoken of in as many ways as being is: in the category of what a thing is, as god and intellect; in quality, as the excellences; in quantity, as the moderate amount; in relation, as the useful; in time, as the right moment; in place, as a suitable habitat; and so on. Clearly, then, it could not be something common, universal and one; for then it would not be spoken of in all the categories, but in one only. Further, since there is one science of the things that fall under one form, there would also have been one science of all goods. But in fact there are many sciences even of the goods that fall under a single category: of the right moment, for example—in war it is generalship, in disease medicine; and of the moderate amount—in diet it is medicine, in exercise gymnastics.
ἀπορήσειε δʼ ἄν τις τί ποτε καὶ βούλονται λέγειν αὐτοέκαστον, εἴπερ ἔν τε αὐτοανθρώπῳ 1096b καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. ᾗ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲν διοίσουσιν· εἰ δʼ οὕτως, οὐδʼ ᾗ ἀγαθόν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῷ ἀίδιον εἶναι μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἔσται, εἴπερ μηδὲ λευκότερον τὸ πολυχρόνιον τοῦ ἐφημέρου. πιθανώτερον δʼ ἐοίκασιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, τιθέντες ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ τὸ ἕν· οἷς δὴ καὶ Σπεύσιππος ἐπακολουθῆσαι δοκεῖ.
One might also be puzzled about what on earth they mean by “the thing itself,” if the account of man is one and the same in man-itself 1096b and in a man. For insofar as they are man, they will not differ at all; and if so, neither will they differ insofar as they are good. Nor, again, will the good be any more good by being eternal, if a white thing that lasts a long time is no whiter than one that lasts a day. The Pythagoreans seem to give a more plausible account of the good, placing the One in their column of goods; and Speusippus seems to have followed them.
ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος· τοῖς δὲ λεχθεῖσιν ἀμφισβήτησίς τις ὑποφαίνεται διὰ τὸ μὴ περὶ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ τοὺς λόγους εἰρῆσθαι, λέγεσθαι δὲ καθʼ ἓν εἶδος τὰ καθʼ αὑτὰ διωκόμενα καὶ ἀγαπώμενα, τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τούτων ἢ φυλακτικά πως ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικὰ διὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι καὶ τρόπον ἄλλον. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι διττῶς λέγοιτʼ ἂν τἀγαθά, καὶ τὰ μὲν καθʼ αὑτά, θάτερα δὲ διὰ ταῦτα. χωρίσαντες οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν ὠφελίμων τὰ καθʼ αὑτὰ σκεψώμεθα εἰ λέγεται κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν. καθʼ αὑτὰ δὲ ποῖα θείη τις ἄν; ἢ ὅσα καὶ μονούμενα διώκεται, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἡδοναί τινες καὶ τιμαί; ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ καὶ διʼ ἄλλο τι διώκομεν, ὅμως τῶν καθʼ αὑτὰ ἀγαθῶν θείη τις ἄν. ἢ οὐδʼ ἄλλο οὐδὲν πλὴν τῆς ἰδέας;
But let us leave these matters for another discussion. An objection to what we have said suggests itself: that the arguments were not meant to cover every good. Things pursued and liked for their own sake are called good by reference to a single form, while the things that produce these, or in some way preserve them, or prevent their opposites, are called good because of these, and in another way. Clearly, then, goods would be spoken of in two ways: some by themselves, the others because of these. So let us separate the things good by themselves from the useful ones and consider whether they are called good by reference to a single form. What sort of things would one class as good by themselves? Those that are pursued even on their own, such as being practically wise, seeing, and certain pleasures and honors? For even if we also pursue these for the sake of something else, one would still class them among things good by themselves. Or is nothing good by itself except the form?
ὥστε μάταιον ἔσται τὸ εἶδος. εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτʼ ἐστὶ τῶν καθʼ αὑτά, τὸν τἀγαθοῦ λόγον ἐν ἅπασιν αὐτοῖς τὸν αὐτὸν ἐμφαίνεσθαι δεήσει, καθάπερ ἐν χιόνι καὶ ψιμυθίῳ τὸν τῆς λευκότητος. τιμῆς δὲ καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἡδονῆς ἕτεροι καὶ διαφέροντες οἱ λόγοι ταύτῃ ᾗ ἀγαθά. οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν κοινόν τι κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν. ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγεται; οὐ γὰρ ἔοικε τοῖς γε ἀπὸ τύχης ὁμωνύμοις. ἀλλʼ ἆρά γε τῷ ἀφʼ ἑνὸς εἶναι ἢ πρὸς ἓν ἅπαντα συντελεῖν, ἢ μᾶλλον κατʼ ἀναλογίαν; ὡς γὰρ ἐν σώματι ὄψις, ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦς, καὶ ἄλλο δὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ. ἀλλʼ ἴσως ταῦτα μὲν ἀφετέον τὸ νῦν· ἐξακριβοῦν γὰρ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἄλλης ἂν εἴη φιλοσοφίας οἰκειότερον.
In that case the form will be pointless. But if these things too are among the things good by themselves, the account of the good will have to show up as the same in all of them, just as the account of whiteness is the same in snow and in white lead. But the accounts of honor, practical wisdom and pleasure are distinct and different precisely insofar as they are goods. So the good is not something common answering to a single form. How, then, is it spoken of? It does not seem to be like things that merely happen to share a name. Is it by all goods deriving from one thing, or all contributing to one thing? Or is it rather by analogy? For as sight is in the body, so intellect is in the soul, and so on, one thing in another. But perhaps we should leave these questions for now, since going into them precisely would belong more properly to another branch of philosophy.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἰδέας· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἔστιν ἕν τι τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον ἀγαθὸν ἢ χωριστὸν αὐτό τι καθʼ αὑτό, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη πρακτὸν οὐδὲ κτητὸν ἀνθρώπῳ· νῦν δὲ τοιοῦτόν τι ζητεῖται. τάχα δέ τῳ δόξειεν ἂν βέλτιον εἶναι γνωρίζειν αὐτὸ 1097a πρὸς τὰ κτητὰ καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οἷον γὰρ παράδειγμα τοῦτʼ ἔχοντες μᾶλλον εἰσόμεθα καὶ τὰ ἡμῖν ἀγαθά, κἂν εἰδῶμεν, ἐπιτευξόμεθα αὐτῶν. πιθανότητα μὲν οὖν τινα ἔχει ὁ λόγος, ἔοικε δὲ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις διαφωνεῖν· πᾶσαι γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφιέμεναι καὶ τὸ ἐνδεὲς ἐπιζητοῦσαι παραλείπουσι τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ. καίτοι βοήθημα τηλικοῦτον τοὺς τεχνίτας ἅπαντας ἀγνοεῖν καὶ μηδʼ ἐπιζητεῖν οὐκ εὔλογον.
The same goes for the form. For even if there is some one good that is predicated in common, or something separate, itself by itself, clearly it could not be done or acquired by a human being; and it is something of that kind that we are now looking for. Perhaps someone might think it better to know the form 1097a with a view to the goods that can be acquired and done: with it as a kind of model, we shall know better the things that are good for us, and if we know them, we shall attain them. The argument has a certain plausibility, but it seems to clash with the sciences. All of them aim at some good and seek to supply what is lacking, yet they pass over knowledge of this good. And it is not reasonable that all craftsmen should be ignorant of so great an aid and not even look for it.
ἄπορον δὲ καὶ τί ὠφεληθήσεται ὑφάντης ἢ τέκτων πρὸς τὴν αὑτοῦ τέχνην εἰδὼς τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαθόν, ἢ πῶς ἰατρικώτερος ἢ στρατηγικώτερος ἔσται ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν αὐτὴν τεθεαμένος. φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν ὑγίειαν οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν ὁ ἰατρός, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀνθρώπου, μᾶλλον δʼ ἴσως τὴν τοῦδε· καθʼ ἕκαστον γὰρ ἰατρεύει. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.
It is also hard to see how a weaver or a carpenter will be helped in his own craft by knowing this good itself, or how someone who has beheld the form itself will be a better doctor or general. For the doctor does not even seem to consider health in this way, but human health—or rather, perhaps, the health of this particular person, since he treats patients one by one. So much for these matters.
Happiness as the complete end
Aristotle argues that happiness is the most complete end, chosen for itself and self-sufficient.
πάλιν δʼ ἐπανέλθωμεν ἐπὶ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν, τί ποτʼ ἂν εἴη. φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῃ πράξει καὶ τέχνῃ· ἄλλο γὰρ ἐν ἰατρικῇ καὶ στρατηγικῇ καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς ὁμοίως. τί οὖν ἑκάστης τἀγαθόν; ἢ οὗ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πράττεται; τοῦτο δʼ ἐν ἰατρικῇ μὲν ὑγίεια, ἐν στρατηγικῇ δὲ νίκη, ἐν οἰκοδομικῇ δʼ οἰκία, ἐν ἄλλῳ δʼ ἄλλο, ἐν ἁπάσῃ δὲ πράξει καὶ προαιρέσει τὸ τέλος· τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα τὰ λοιπὰ πράττουσι πάντες. ὥστʼ εἴ τι τῶν πρακτῶν ἁπάντων ἐστὶ τέλος, τοῦτʼ ἂν εἴη τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν, εἰ δὲ πλείω, ταῦτα. μεταβαίνων δὴ ὁ λόγος εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀφῖκται· τοῦτο δʼ ἔτι μᾶλλον διασαφῆσαι πειρατέον.
Let us return once more to the good we are looking for and ask what it might be. It appears to be different in different actions and crafts: one thing in medicine, another in generalship, and likewise in the rest. What, then, is the good of each? Isn’t it that for the sake of which everything else is done? In medicine this is health, in generalship victory, in housebuilding a house, in another field something else, and in every action and decision it is the end, since it is for the sake of the end that everyone does everything else. So if there is some one end of everything done in action, this would be the good achievable in action; and if there are several, it would be these. So our argument, taking a different route, has arrived at the same point; but we must try to make this still clearer.
ἐπεὶ δὲ πλείω φαίνεται τὰ τέλη, τούτων δʼ αἱρούμεθά τινα διʼ ἕτερον, οἷον πλοῦτον αὐλοὺς καὶ ὅλως τὰ ὄργανα, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πάντα τέλεια· τὸ δʼ ἄριστον τέλειόν τι φαίνεται. ὥστʼ εἰ μέν ἐστιν ἕν τι μόνον τέλειον, τοῦτʼ ἂν εἴη τὸ ζητούμενον, εἰ δὲ πλείω, τὸ τελειότατον τούτων. τελειότερον δὲ λέγομεν τὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ διωκτὸν τοῦ διʼ ἕτερον καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε διʼ ἄλλο αἱρετὸν τῶν καὶ καθʼ αὑτὰ καὶ διʼ αὐτὸ αἱρετῶν, καὶ ἁπλῶς δὴ τέλειον τὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν ἀεὶ καὶ μηδέποτε διʼ ἄλλο.
Since there are evidently several ends, and we choose some of them for the sake of something else—wealth, for example, pipes, and instruments in general—clearly not all ends are complete; but the best good appears to be something complete. So if there is just one thing that is complete, this would be what we are looking for; and if there are several, the most complete of them. We call what is pursued for its own sake more complete than what is pursued for the sake of something else, and what is never chosen for the sake of something else more complete than things chosen both for their own sake and for the sake of that; and what is always chosen for its own sake and never for the sake of something else we call complete without qualification.
τοιοῦτον δʼ ἡ εὐδαιμονία μάλιστʼ εἶναι δοκεῖ· 1097b ταύτην γὰρ αἱρούμεθα ἀεὶ διʼ αὐτὴν καὶ οὐδέποτε διʼ ἄλλο, τιμὴν δὲ καὶ ἡδονὴν καὶ νοῦν καὶ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν αἱρούμεθα μὲν καὶ διʼ αὐτά (μηθενὸς γὰρ ἀποβαίνοντος ἑλοίμεθʼ ἂν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν), αἱρούμεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν, διὰ τούτων ὑπολαμβάνοντες εὐδαιμονήσειν. τὴν δʼ εὐδαιμονίαν οὐδεὶς αἱρεῖται τούτων χάριν, οὐδʼ ὅλως διʼ ἄλλο. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὐταρκείας τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνειν· τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὔταρκες εἶναι δοκεῖ. τὸ δʼ αὔταρκες λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ, τῷ ζῶντι βίον μονώτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῦσι καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γυναικὶ καὶ ὅλως τοῖς φίλοις καὶ πολίταις, ἐπειδὴ φύσει πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος.
Happiness above all seems to be like this. 1097b We always choose it for its own sake and never for the sake of anything else. Honor, pleasure, intellect and every excellence we do choose for their own sake (since we would choose each of them even if nothing came of it), but we also choose them for the sake of happiness, supposing that through them we shall be happy. Happiness, on the other hand, no one chooses for the sake of these, or for the sake of anything else at all. The same conclusion appears to follow from self-sufficiency too, since the complete good seems to be self-sufficient. By self-sufficient we mean not sufficient for oneself alone, living a solitary life, but also for parents, children and wife, and in general for friends and fellow citizens, since a human being is by nature a political creature.
τούτων δὲ ληπτέος ὅρος τις· ἐπεκτείνοντι γὰρ ἐπὶ τοὺς γονεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἀπογόνους καὶ τῶν φίλων τοὺς φίλους εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰσαῦθις ἐπισκεπτέον· τὸ δʼ αὔταρκες τίθεμεν ὃ μονούμενον αἱρετὸν ποιεῖ τὸν βίον καὶ μηδενὸς ἐνδεᾶ· τοιοῦτον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰόμεθα εἶναι· ἔτι δὲ πάντων αἱρετωτάτην μὴ συναριθμουμένην—συναριθμουμένην δὲ δῆλον ὡς αἱρετωτέραν μετὰ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου τῶν ἀγαθῶν· ὑπεροχὴ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν γίνεται τὸ προστιθέμενον, ἀγαθῶν δὲ τὸ μεῖζον αἱρετώτερον ἀεί. τέλειον δή τι φαίνεται καὶ αὔταρκες ἡ εὐδαιμονία, τῶν πρακτῶν οὖσα τέλος.
But some limit must be set here, since if we extend it to parents and descendants and friends’ friends, it goes on without limit. That, however, must be examined another time. We take the self-sufficient to be what on its own makes life choiceworthy and lacking in nothing; and this is what we think happiness is. Further, we think it the most choiceworthy of all things, not counted as one good among others. If it were so counted, it would clearly be more choiceworthy with the addition of even the smallest of goods; for what is added makes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always more choiceworthy. Happiness, then, appears to be something complete and self-sufficient, since it is the end of what is done in action.
The human function
Aristotle defines happiness as activity of the soul in accordance with excellence, based on the human function.
ἀλλʼ ἴσως τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν ὁμολογούμενόν τι φαίνεται, ποθεῖται δʼ ἐναργέστερον τί ἐστιν ἔτι λεχθῆναι. τάχα δὴ γένοιτʼ ἂν τοῦτʼ, εἰ ληφθείη τὸ ἔργον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. ὥσπερ γὰρ αὐλητῇ καὶ ἀγαλματοποιῷ καὶ παντὶ τεχνίτῃ, καὶ ὅλως ὧν ἔστιν ἔργον τι καὶ πρᾶξις, ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ, οὕτω δόξειεν ἂν καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, εἴπερ ἔστι τι ἔργον αὐτοῦ. πότερον οὖν τέκτονος μὲν καὶ σκυτέως ἔστιν ἔργα τινὰ καὶ πράξεις, ἀνθρώπου δʼ οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἀλλʼ ἀργὸν πέφυκεν; ἢ καθάπερ ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ χειρὸς καὶ ποδὸς καὶ ὅλως ἑκάστου τῶν μορίων φαίνεταί τι ἔργον, οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρώπου παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα θείη τις ἂν ἔργον τι; τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτʼ ἂν εἴη ποτέ;
But perhaps saying that happiness is the best good seems a commonplace, and what is wanted is a clearer statement of what it is. This might perhaps be achieved if we grasped the function of a human being. For just as for a pipe-player, a sculptor and every craftsman, and in general for all things that have a function and an action, the good—the doing well—seems to lie in the function, so it would seem to be for a human being too, if he has a function. Do the carpenter and the shoemaker, then, have certain functions and actions, while a human being has none and is by nature idle? Or, just as the eye, the hand, the foot and in general each of the parts evidently has a function, may one likewise posit a function for a human being over and above all these? What, then, could this be?
τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζῆν κοινὸν εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς, ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον. 1098a ἀφοριστέον ἄρα τήν τε θρεπτικὴν καὶ τὴν αὐξητικὴν ζωήν. ἑπομένη δὲ αἰσθητική τις ἂν εἴη, φαίνεται δὲ καὶ αὐτὴ κοινὴ καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ βοῒ καὶ παντὶ ζῴῳ. λείπεται δὴ πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος· τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ, τὸ δʼ ὡς ἔχον καὶ διανοούμενον. διττῶς δὲ καὶ ταύτης λεγομένης τὴν κατʼ ἐνέργειαν θετέον· κυριώτερον γὰρ αὕτη δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι.
Living is evidently shared even with plants, but we are looking for what is distinctive. 1098a So we must set aside the life of nutrition and growth. Next would be some sort of life of perception, but this too is evidently shared, with the horse, the ox and every animal. What remains, then, is some sort of practical life of the part that has reason. Of this, one part has reason in the sense that it obeys reason, the other in the sense that it has reason and thinks. And since this life too is spoken of in two ways, we must take the life in activity, since this seems to be the more authoritative sense.
εἰ δʼ ἐστὶν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον ἢ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου, τὸ δʼ αὐτό φαμεν ἔργον εἶναι τῷ γένει τοῦδε καὶ τοῦδε σπουδαίου, ὥσπερ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ σπουδαίου κιθαριστοῦ, καὶ ἁπλῶς δὴ τοῦτʼ ἐπὶ πάντων, προστιθεμένης τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὑπεροχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἔργον· κιθαριστοῦ μὲν γὰρ κιθαρίζειν, σπουδαίου δὲ τὸ εὖ· εἰ δʼ οὕτως, ἀνθρώπου δὲ τίθεμεν ἔργον ζωήν τινα, ταύτην δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν καὶ πράξεις μετὰ λόγου, σπουδαίου δʼ ἀνδρὸς εὖ ταῦτα καὶ καλῶς, ἕκαστον δʼ εὖ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν ἀποτελεῖται· εἰ δʼ οὕτω, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατʼ ἀρετήν, εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ἀρεταί, κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειοτάτην. ἔτι δʼ ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ.
Suppose the function of a human being is activity of the soul in accordance with reason, or not without reason. We say that the function of a thing of a given kind and of an excellent thing of that kind are the same in kind—of a lyre-player and an excellent lyre-player, for example, and so without qualification in every case, superiority in excellence being added to the function: a lyre-player’s function is to play the lyre, an excellent one’s is to play it well. If so, and if we take the function of a human being to be a certain kind of life, and this to be activity of the soul and actions involving reason, and the function of an excellent man to be to do these things well and finely, and each thing is accomplished well when it is accomplished in accordance with its proper excellence—if all this is so, the human good turns out to be activity of the soul in accordance with excellence, and if there are several excellences, in accordance with the best and most complete. And further, in a complete life.
μία γὰρ χελιδὼν ἔαρ οὐ ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ μία ἡμέρα· οὕτω δὲ οὐδὲ μακάριον καὶ εὐδαίμονα μία ἡμέρα οὐδʼ ὀλίγος χρόνος. περιγεγράφθω μὲν οὖν τἀγαθὸν ταύτῃ· δεῖ γὰρ ἴσως ὑποτυπῶσαι πρῶτον, εἶθʼ ὕστερον ἀναγράψαι. δόξειε δʼ ἂν παντὸς εἶναι προαγαγεῖν καὶ διαρθρῶσαι τὰ καλῶς ἔχοντα τῇ περιγραφῇ, καὶ ὁ χρόνος τῶν τοιούτων εὑρετὴς ἢ συνεργὸς ἀγαθὸς εἶναι· ὅθεν καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν γεγόνασιν αἱ ἐπιδόσεις· παντὸς γὰρ προσθεῖναι τὸ ἐλλεῖπον. μεμνῆσθαι δὲ καὶ τῶν προειρημένων χρή, καὶ τὴν ἀκρίβειαν μὴ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασιν ἐπιζητεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἐν ἑκάστοις κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐφʼ ὅσον οἰκεῖον τῇ μεθόδῳ. καὶ γὰρ τέκτων καὶ γεωμέτρης διαφερόντως ἐπιζητοῦσι τὴν ὀρθήν· ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἐφʼ ὅσον χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ ἔργον, ὃ δὲ τί ἐστιν ἢ ποῖόν τι· θεατὴς γὰρ τἀληθοῦς.
For one swallow does not make a spring, nor does one day; and in the same way one day, or a short time, does not make someone blessed and happy. Let this, then, serve as an outline of the good; for perhaps we must first sketch it roughly and fill it in later. It would seem that anyone can carry forward and articulate what has been well outlined, and that time is a good discoverer of such things, or a good helper. That is also how advances in the crafts have come about, since anyone can add what is missing. We must also remember what was said before, and not seek precision equally in all things, but in each case in keeping with the subject matter and only so far as suits the inquiry. A carpenter and a geometer both look for the right angle, but in different ways: the carpenter as far as it is useful for his work, while the geometer looks for what it is or what sort of thing it is, since he is a contemplator of the truth.
τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιητέον, ὅπως μὴ τὰ πάρεργα τῶν ἔργων πλείω γίνηται. 1098b οὐκ ἀπαιτητέον δʼ οὐδὲ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐν ἅπασιν ὁμοίως, ἀλλʼ ἱκανὸν ἔν τισι τὸ ὅτι δειχθῆναι καλῶς, οἷον καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς· τὸ δʼ ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή. τῶν ἀρχῶν δʼ αἳ μὲν ἐπαγωγῇ θεωροῦνται, αἳ δʼ αἰσθήσει, αἳ δʼ ἐθισμῷ τινί, καὶ ἄλλαι δʼ ἄλλως. μετιέναι δὲ πειρατέον ἑκάστας ᾗ πεφύκασιν, καὶ σπουδαστέον ὅπως διορισθῶσι καλῶς· μεγάλην γὰρ ἔχουσι ῥοπὴν πρὸς τὰ ἑπόμενα. δοκεῖ γὰρ πλεῖον ἢ ἥμισυ τοῦ παντὸς εἶναι ἡ ἀρχή, καὶ πολλὰ συμφανῆ γίνεσθαι διʼ αὐτῆς τῶν ζητουμένων.
We must proceed in the same way in other matters too, so that side issues do not outweigh the main work. 1098b Nor should we demand the cause equally in all cases; in some it is enough that the fact be properly shown, as with first principles, where the fact is primary and is itself a starting point. Of first principles, some are grasped by induction, some by perception, some by a kind of habituation, and others in other ways. We must try to pursue each kind in the way natural to it, and take pains to define them well, since they carry great weight for what follows. For the starting point seems to be more than half of the whole, and through it many of the things we are inquiring into become clear.
σκεπτέον δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ συμπεράσματος καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων περὶ αὐτῆς· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεῖ πάντα συνᾴδει τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, τῷ δὲ ψευδεῖ ταχὺ διαφωνεῖ τἀληθές. νενεμημένων δὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τριχῇ, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐκτὸς λεγομένων τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν κυριώτατα λέγομεν καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαθά, τὰς δὲ πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς ψυχικὰς περὶ ψυχὴν τίθεμεν. ὥστε καλῶς ἂν λέγοιτο κατά γε ταύτην τὴν δόξαν παλαιὰν οὖσαν καὶ ὁμολογουμένην ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων. ὀρθῶς δὲ καὶ ὅτι πράξεις τινὲς λέγονται καὶ ἐνέργειαι τὸ τέλος· οὕτω γὰρ τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγαθῶν γίνεται καὶ οὐ τῶν ἐκτός.
We must examine this starting point not only on the basis of our conclusion and the premises of our argument, but also on the basis of what is said about it. For with what is true all the facts harmonize, whereas with what is false the truth soon clashes. Now goods have been divided into three kinds: some are called external, others goods of the soul, and others goods of the body. We say that the goods of the soul are goods in the most authoritative sense and to the highest degree, and we class actions and activities of the soul as belonging to the soul. So our account would be right, at least by this view, which is ancient and agreed on by philosophers. It is also right in saying that the end consists in certain actions and activities; for in this way it turns out to be among the goods of the soul and not among the external ones.
συνᾴδει δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν τὸν εὐδαίμονα· σχεδὸν γὰρ εὐζωία τις εἴρηται καὶ εὐπραξία. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα τὰ περὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἅπανθʼ ὑπάρχειν τῷ λεχθέντι. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τοῖς δὲ φρόνησις ἄλλοις δὲ σοφία τις εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ ταῦτα ἢ τούτων τι μεθʼ ἡδονῆς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς· ἕτεροι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐκτὸς εὐετηρίαν συμπαραλαμβάνουσιν. τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ παλαιοὶ λέγουσιν, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγοι καὶ ἔνδοξοι ἄνδρες· οὐδετέρους δὲ τούτων εὔλογον διαμαρτάνειν τοῖς ὅλοις, ἀλλʼ ἕν γέ τι ἢ καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα κατορθοῦν. τοῖς μὲν οὖν λέγουσι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ ἀρετήν τινα συνῳδός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος· ταύτης γάρ ἐστιν ἡ κατʼ αὐτὴν ἐνέργεια.
Also in harmony with our account is the idea that the happy person lives well and does well, since we have practically described happiness as a sort of living well and doing well. And the things people look for in happiness all appear to be present in what we have described. For some think happiness is excellence, others practical wisdom, others a kind of wisdom, others all these or one of them, with pleasure or not without pleasure; and others include external prosperity as well. Some of these views are held by many people and have come down from long ago, others by a few distinguished men; and it is not reasonable that either group should be wholly mistaken, but rather that they are right in at least one respect, or even in most. Now our account agrees with those who say happiness is excellence or some particular excellence, since activity in accordance with excellence belongs to excellence.
διαφέρει δὲ ἴσως οὐ μικρὸν ἐν κτήσει ἢ χρήσει τὸ ἄριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν, καὶ ἐν ἕξει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἕξιν ἐνδέχεται μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀποτελεῖν ὑπάρχουσαν, 1099a οἷον τῷ καθεύδοντι ἢ καὶ ἄλλως πως ἐξηργηκότι, τὴν δʼ ἐνέργειαν οὐχ οἷόν τε· πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ εὖ πράξει. ὥσπερ δʼ Ὀλυμπίασιν οὐχ οἱ κάλλιστοι καὶ ἰσχυρότατοι στεφανοῦνται ἀλλʼ οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι (τούτων γάρ τινες νικῶσιν), οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλῶν κἀγαθῶν οἱ πράττοντες ὀρθῶς ἐπήβολοι γίνονται. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ βίος αὐτῶν καθʼ αὑτὸν ἡδύς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἥδεσθαι τῶν ψυχικῶν, ἑκάστῳ δʼ ἐστὶν ἡδὺ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται φιλοτοιοῦτος, οἷον ἵππος μὲν τῷ φιλίππῳ, θέαμα δὲ τῷ φιλοθεώρῳ· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῷ φιλοδικαίῳ καὶ ὅλως τὰ κατʼ ἀρετὴν τῷ φιλαρέτῳ.
But perhaps it makes no small difference whether we take the best good to lie in possessing or in using, in a state or in an activity. For a state can be present without producing any good, 1099a as in someone who is asleep or inactive in some other way; but the activity cannot, since it will necessarily act, and act well. And just as at the Olympic Games it is not the finest and strongest who are crowned but those who compete (since it is some of these who win), so too it is those who act rightly who win the fine and good things in life. Their life is also pleasant in itself. For being pleased belongs to the soul, and to each person that is pleasant of which he is called a lover: a horse to the horse-lover, a spectacle to the lover of spectacles; and in the same way just things to the lover of justice, and in general things in accordance with excellence to the lover of excellence.
τοῖς μὲν οὖν πολλοῖς τὰ ἡδέα μάχεται διὰ τὸ μὴ φύσει τοιαῦτʼ εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ φιλοκάλοις ἐστὶν ἡδέα τὰ φύσει ἡδέα· τοιαῦται δʼ αἱ κατʼ ἀρετὴν πράξεις, ὥστε καὶ τούτοις εἰσὶν ἡδεῖαι καὶ καθʼ αὑτάς. οὐδὲν δὴ προσδεῖται τῆς ἡδονῆς ὁ βίος αὐτῶν ὥσπερ περιάπτου τινός, ἀλλʼ ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ. πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις γὰρ οὐδʼ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς ὁ μὴ χαίρων ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν· οὔτε γὰρ δίκαιον οὐθεὶς ἂν εἴποι τὸν μὴ χαίροντα τῷ δικαιοπραγεῖν, οὔτʼ ἐλευθέριον τὸν μὴ χαίροντα ταῖς ἐλευθερίοις πράξεσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. εἰ δʼ οὕτω, καθʼ αὑτὰς ἂν εἶεν αἱ κατʼ ἀρετὴν πράξεις ἡδεῖαι. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀγαθαί γε καὶ καλαί, καὶ μάλιστα τούτων ἕκαστον, εἴπερ καλῶς κρίνει περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ σπουδαῖος· κρίνει δʼ ὡς εἴπομεν.
Now for most people the things they find pleasant are at war with one another, because these things are not pleasant by nature; but to lovers of what is fine, the things that are pleasant by nature are pleasant. Actions in accordance with excellence are like this, so they are pleasant both to these people and in themselves. Their life, then, has no further need of pleasure as a kind of amulet hung around its neck, but has its pleasure in itself. For in addition to what has been said, a person who does not enjoy fine actions is not even good: no one would call someone just who does not enjoy acting justly, or generous who does not enjoy generous actions, and similarly in the other cases. If so, actions in accordance with excellence must be pleasant in themselves. And they are also good and fine, and each of these to the highest degree, if the excellent person judges well about them; and he judges as we have said.
ἄριστον ἄρα καὶ κάλλιστον καὶ ἥδιστον ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οὐ διώρισται ταῦτα κατὰ τὸ Δηλιακὸν ἐπίγραμμα· κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιότατον, λῷστον δʼ ὑγιαίνειν· ἥδιστον δὲ πέφυχʼ οὗ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν. ἅπαντα γὰρ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα ταῖς ἀρίσταις ἐνεργείαις· ταύτας δέ, ἢ μίαν τούτων τὴν ἀρίστην, φαμὲν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. φαίνεται δʼ ὅμως καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν προσδεομένη, καθάπερ εἴπομεν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἢ οὐ ῥᾴδιον τὰ καλὰ πράττειν ἀχορήγητον ὄντα. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ πράττεται, 1099b καθάπερ διʼ ὀργάνων, διὰ φίλων καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολιτικῆς δυνάμεως· ἐνίων δὲ τητώμενοι ῥυπαίνουσι τὸ μακάριον, οἷον εὐγενείας εὐτεκνίας κάλλους· οὐ πάνυ γὰρ εὐδαιμονικὸς ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν παναίσχης ἢ δυσγενὴς ἢ μονώτης καὶ ἄτεκνος, ἔτι δʼ ἴσως ἧττον, εἴ τῳ πάγκακοι παῖδες εἶεν ἢ φίλοι, ἢ ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες τεθνᾶσιν.
Happiness, then, is the best, finest and most pleasant thing, and these qualities are not separated as the inscription at Delos has it: “Finest is what is most just, best is health; / but most pleasant is to win what one desires.” For all of them belong to the best activities; and it is these, or the one that is best among them, that we say happiness is. All the same, as we said, happiness evidently needs external goods as well, since it is impossible, or not easy, to do fine things without resources. Many things are done 1099b by means of friends, wealth and political power, as if by instruments; and the lack of certain things spoils blessedness—good birth, for example, good children, beauty. For someone who is utterly ugly in appearance, or low-born, or solitary and childless, is not quite the happy type; still less, perhaps, someone whose children or friends are thoroughly bad, or were good but have died.
καθάπερ οὖν εἴπομεν, ἔοικε προσδεῖσθαι καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης εὐημερίας· ὅθεν εἰς ταὐτὸ τάττουσιν ἔνιοι τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἕτεροι δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν.
As we said, then, happiness seems to need this sort of prosperity as well. That is why some identify good fortune with happiness, while others identify excellence with it.
ὅθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται πότερόν ἐστι μαθητὸν ἢ ἐθιστὸν ἢ καὶ ἄλλως πως ἀσκητόν, ἢ κατά τινα θείαν μοῖραν ἢ καὶ διὰ τύχην παραγίνεται. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλο τί ἐστι θεῶν δώρημα ἀνθρώποις, εὔλογον καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν θεόσδοτον εἶναι, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὅσῳ βέλτιστον. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἴσως ἄλλης ἂν εἴη σκέψεως οἰκειότερον, φαίνεται δὲ κἂν εἰ μὴ θεόπεμπτός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ διʼ ἀρετὴν καί τινα μάθησιν ἢ ἄσκησιν παραγίνεται, τῶν θειοτάτων εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἆθλον καὶ τέλος ἄριστον εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ θεῖόν τι καὶ μακάριον. εἴη δʼ ἂν καὶ πολύκοινον· δυνατὸν γὰρ ὑπάρξαι πᾶσι τοῖς μὴ πεπηρωμένοις πρὸς ἀρετὴν διά τινος μαθήσεως καὶ ἐπιμελείας.
This is also why there is a puzzle whether happiness can be learned, or acquired by habituation or some other kind of training, or whether it comes by some divine dispensation or even by chance. Now if anything at all is a gift of the gods to human beings, it is reasonable that happiness too should be god-given, and more so than any other human good, inasmuch as it is the best. But this question perhaps belongs more properly to another inquiry. Even if happiness is not sent by the gods but comes through excellence and some kind of learning or training, it appears to be among the most divine things; for the prize and end of excellence appears to be the best thing, something divine and blessed. It would also be widely shared, since it can belong, through some kind of learning and care, to everyone who is not incapacitated for excellence.
εἰ δʼ ἐστὶν οὕτω βέλτιον ἢ τὸ διὰ τύχην εὐδαιμονεῖν, εὔλογον ἔχειν οὕτως, εἴπερ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς οἷόν τε κάλλιστα ἔχειν, οὕτω πέφυκεν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ κατὰ τέχνην καὶ πᾶσαν αἰτίαν, καὶ μάλιστα τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον ἐπιτρέψαι τύχῃ λίαν πλημμελὲς ἂν εἴη. συμφανὲς δʼ ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τὸ ζητούμενον· εἴρηται γὰρ ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατʼ ἀρετὴν ποιά τις. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖον, τὰ δὲ συνεργὰ καὶ χρήσιμα πέφυκεν ὀργανικῶς. ὁμολογούμενα δὲ ταῦτʼ ἂν εἴη καὶ τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ· τὸ γὰρ τῆς πολιτικῆς τέλος ἄριστον ἐτίθεμεν, αὕτη δὲ πλείστην ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖται τοῦ ποιούς τινας καὶ ἀγαθοὺς τοὺς πολίτας ποιῆσαι καὶ πρακτικοὺς τῶν καλῶν.
And if it is better to be happy this way than through chance, it is reasonable that this is how things are. For things that come about by nature are naturally as fine as they can be, and likewise things that come about by craft or by any cause, and most of all those that come about by the best cause. To leave what is greatest and finest to chance would be a grave discord. What we are looking for is also evident from our account, since happiness has been said to be a certain kind of activity of the soul in accordance with excellence. Of the remaining goods, some must be present as prerequisites, while others are by nature helpful and useful as instruments. This would also agree with what we said at the beginning. We took the end of political science to be the best end, and political science takes the greatest care to make the citizens of a certain kind—good, and able to do fine things.
Happiness and fortune
Aristotle asks whether misfortune, or the fortunes of one's descendants after death, can undo happiness.
εἰκότως οὖν οὔτε βοῦν οὔτε ἵππον οὔτε ἄλλο τῶν ζῴων οὐδὲν εὔδαιμον λέγομεν· 1100a οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οἷόν τε κοινωνῆσαι τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας. διὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν οὐδὲ παῖς εὐδαίμων ἐστίν· οὔπω γὰρ πρακτικὸς τῶν τοιούτων διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν· οἱ δὲ λεγόμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα μακαρίζονται. δεῖ γάρ, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, καὶ ἀρετῆς τελείας καὶ βίου τελείου. πολλαὶ γὰρ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται καὶ παντοῖαι τύχαι κατὰ τὸν βίον, καὶ ἐνδέχεται τὸν μάλιστʼ εὐθηνοῦντα μεγάλαις συμφοραῖς περιπεσεῖν ἐπὶ γήρως, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς Τρωικοῖς περὶ Πριάμου μυθεύεται· τὸν δὲ τοιαύταις χρησάμενον τύχαις καὶ τελευτήσαντα ἀθλίως οὐδεὶς εὐδαιμονίζει.
It is reasonable, then, that we do not call an ox or a horse or any other animal happy, 1100a since none of them can share in activity of this kind. For the same reason a child is not happy either, since his age does not yet allow him to do such things; children who are called blessed are called so because of the hope they hold out. For happiness requires, as we said, both complete excellence and a complete life. Many changes and all kinds of fortune occur in the course of a life, and even the most prosperous person may meet with great disasters in old age, as the Trojan stories tell of Priam; and no one calls happy someone who has met with such fortunes and come to a wretched end.
πότερον οὖν οὐδʼ ἄλλον οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων εὐδαιμονιστέον ἕως ἂν ζῇ, κατὰ Σόλωνα δὲ χρεὼν τέλος ὁρᾶν; εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ θετέον οὕτως, ἆρά γε καὶ ἔστιν εὐδαίμων τότε ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ; ἢ τοῦτό γε παντελῶς ἄτοπον, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῖς λέγουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνέργειάν τινα τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν; εἰ δὲ μὴ λέγομεν τὸν τεθνεῶτα εὐδαίμονα, μηδὲ Σόλων τοῦτο βούλεται, ἀλλʼ ὅτι τηνικαῦτα ἄν τις ἀσφαλῶς μακαρίσειεν ἄνθρωπον ὡς ἐκτὸς ἤδη τῶν κακῶν ὄντα καὶ τῶν δυστυχημάτων, ἔχει μὲν καὶ τοῦτʼ ἀμφισβήτησίν τινα· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναί τι τῷ τεθνεῶτι καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ καὶ τῷ ζῶντι μὴ αἰσθανομένῳ δέ, οἷον τιμαὶ καὶ ἀτιμίαι καὶ τέκνων καὶ ὅλως ἀπογόνων εὐπραξίαι τε καὶ δυστυχίαι.
Must we, then, call no other human being happy either as long as he is alive, but, as Solon says, look to the end? And if we are indeed to lay this down, is a person actually happy at the time when he has died? Or isn’t that altogether absurd, especially for us, who say that happiness is a kind of activity? But if we do not call the dead person happy, and Solon does not mean this either, but rather that only then can one safely call a human being blessed, as being at last beyond evils and misfortunes, even this is open to some dispute. For something seems to be both bad and good for a dead person, if indeed it is for a living person who is not aware of it: honors and dishonors, for example, and the successes and misfortunes of his children and of his descendants in general.
ἀπορίαν δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παρέχει· τῷ γὰρ μακαρίως βεβιωκότι μέχρι γήρως καὶ τελευτήσαντι κατὰ λόγον ἐνδέχεται πολλὰς μεταβολὰς συμβαίνειν περὶ τοὺς ἐκγόνους, καὶ τοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ τυχεῖν βίου τοῦ κατʼ ἀξίαν, τοὺς δʼ ἐξ ἐναντίας· δῆλον δʼ ὅτι καὶ τοῖς ἀποστήμασι πρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς παντοδαπῶς ἔχειν αὐτοὺς ἐνδέχεται. ἄτοπον δὴ γίνοιτʼ ἄν, εἰ συμμεταβάλλοι καὶ ὁ τεθνεὼς καὶ γίνοιτο ὁτὲ μὲν εὐδαίμων πάλιν δʼ ἄθλιος· ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ μηδὲν μηδʼ ἐπί τινα χρόνον συνικνεῖσθαι τὰ τῶν ἐκγόνων τοῖς γονεῦσιν. ἀλλʼ ἐπανιτέον ἐπὶ τὸ πρότερον ἀπορηθέν· τάχα γὰρ ἂν θεωρηθείη καὶ τὸ νῦν ἐπιζητούμενον ἐξ ἐκείνου.
But this too raises a difficulty. Someone may have lived blessedly into old age and died in a manner to match, and yet many changes may befall his descendants: some of them may be good and get the life they deserve, others the opposite. And clearly they can stand at every sort of remove from their ancestors. It would be absurd, then, if the dead man changed along with them, becoming happy at one time and wretched again at another; but it would also be absurd if what happens to descendants did not reach their ancestors at all, not even for a time. But we must go back to the difficulty raised earlier; perhaps from it we will also see the answer to what we are now asking.
εἰ δὴ τὸ τέλος ὁρᾶν δεῖ καὶ τότε μακαρίζειν ἕκαστον οὐχ ὡς ὄντα μακάριον ἀλλʼ ὅτι πρότερον ἦν, πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπον, εἰ ὅτʼ ἔστιν εὐδαίμων, μὴ ἀληθεύσεται κατʼ αὐτοῦ τὸ ὑπάρχον 1100b διὰ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι τοὺς ζῶντας εὐδαιμονίζειν διὰ τὰς μεταβολάς, καὶ διὰ τὸ μόνιμόν τι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὑπειληφέναι καὶ μηδαμῶς εὐμετάβολον, τὰς δὲ τύχας πολλάκις ἀνακυκλεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς αὐτούς; δῆλον γὰρ ὡς εἰ συνακολουθοίημεν ταῖς τύχαις, τὸν αὐτὸν εὐδαίμονα καὶ πάλιν ἄθλιον ἐροῦμεν πολλάκις, χαμαιλέοντά τινα τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἀποφαίνοντες καὶ σαθρῶς ἱδρυμένον. ἢ τὸ μὲν ταῖς τύχαις ἐπακολουθεῖν οὐδαμῶς ὀρθόν; οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταύταις τὸ εὖ ἢ κακῶς, ἀλλὰ προσδεῖται τούτων ὁ ἀνθρώπινος βίος, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, κύριαι δʼ εἰσὶν αἱ κατʼ ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, αἱ δʼ ἐναντίαι τοῦ ἐναντίου.
If, then, we must look to the end and only then call each person blessed—not as being blessed but because he was so before—surely it is absurd that, at the time when he is happy, what is true of him will not be truly said of him, 1100b because we are unwilling to call the living happy on account of life’s changes, and because we have taken happiness to be something stable and not easily changed, while fortunes often turn full circle for the same people. For clearly, if we followed people’s fortunes, we would often call the same person happy and then wretched again, making the happy person out to be a kind of chameleon, standing on rotten foundations. Or is following fortunes not right at all? For doing well or badly does not lie in them; human life needs them in addition, as we said, but what controls happiness is activity in accordance with excellence, and the opposite activities control its opposite.
μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ νῦν διαπορηθέν. περὶ οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ὑπάρχει τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἔργων βεβαιότης ὡς περὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς κατʼ ἀρετήν· μονιμώτεραι γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αὗται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι· τούτων δʼ αὐτῶν αἱ τιμιώταται μονιμώτεραι διὰ τὸ μάλιστα καὶ συνεχέστατα καταζῆν ἐν αὐταῖς τοὺς μακαρίους· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔοικεν αἰτίῳ τοῦ μὴ γίνεσθαι περὶ αὐτὰς λήθην. ὑπάρξει δὴ τὸ ζητούμενον τῷ εὐδαίμονι, καὶ ἔσται διὰ βίου τοιοῦτος· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἢ μάλιστα πάντων πράξει καὶ θεωρήσει τὰ κατʼ ἀρετήν, καὶ τὰς τύχας οἴσει κάλλιστα καὶ πάντῃ πάντως ἐμμελῶς ὅ γʼ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τετράγωνος ἄνευ ψόγου.
What we have just puzzled over also bears witness to our account. For no human function has as much stability as activities in accordance with excellence; these seem to be more lasting even than the branches of scientific knowledge. And among them, the most honorable are the most lasting, because the blessed spend their lives in them most fully and most continuously; this seems to be why we do not forget them. The happy person, then, will have what we are looking for, and will be happy throughout his life. For always, or more than anyone, he will do and contemplate what accords with excellence, and he will bear his fortunes most finely and with complete good grace in every way—he who is truly good, “foursquare, without blame.”
πολλῶν δὲ γινομένων κατὰ τύχην καὶ διαφερόντων μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι, τὰ μὲν μικρὰ τῶν εὐτυχημάτων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, δῆλον ὡς οὐ ποιεῖ ῥοπὴν τῆς ζωῆς, τὰ δὲ μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ γινόμενα μὲν εὖ μακαριώτερον τὸν βίον ποιήσει (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ συνεπικοσμεῖν πέφυκεν, καὶ ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῶν καλὴ καὶ σπουδαία γίνεται), ἀνάπαλιν δὲ συμβαίνοντα θλίβει καὶ λυμαίνεται τὸ μακάριον· λύπας τε γὰρ ἐπιφέρει καὶ ἐμποδίζει πολλαῖς ἐνεργείαις. ὅμως δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαλάμπει τὸ καλόν, ἐπειδὰν φέρῃ τις εὐκόλως πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἀτυχίας, μὴ διʼ ἀναλγησίαν, ἀλλὰ γεννάδας ὢν καὶ μεγαλόψυχος. εἰ δʼ εἰσὶν αἱ ἐνέργειαι κύριαι τῆς ζωῆς, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο τῶν μακαρίων ἄθλιος· οὐδέποτε γὰρ πράξει τὰ μισητὰ καὶ τὰ φαῦλα.
Many things happen by chance, and they differ in greatness and smallness. Small pieces of good fortune, and likewise of the opposite, clearly do not tip the scales of a life. But great and numerous ones, if they turn out well, will make life more blessed (for by nature they help to adorn it, and the use of them becomes fine and excellent), while if they turn out the other way they crush and spoil blessedness, since they bring pains and impede many activities. Yet even in these the fine shines through, when someone bears many great misfortunes calmly, not through insensitivity to pain but because he is noble and great-souled. And if activities are what control life, as we said, no blessed person could ever become wretched; for he will never do what is hateful and base.
τὸν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἔμφρονα πάσας οἰόμεθα τὰς τύχας εὐσχημόνως φέρειν καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀεὶ τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν, καθάπερ καὶ στρατηγὸν ἀγαθὸν τῷ παρόντι στρατοπέδῳ χρῆσθαι πολεμικώτατα καὶ σκυτοτόμον ἐκ τῶν δοθέντων σκυτῶν κάλλιστον ὑπόδημα ποιεῖν· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τεχνίτας ἅπαντας. εἰ δʼ οὕτως, ἄθλιος μὲν οὐδέποτε γένοιτʼ ἂν ὁ εὐδαίμων, οὐ μὴν μακάριός γε, ἂν Πριαμικαῖς τύχαις περιπέσῃ. οὐδὲ δὴ ποικίλος γε καὶ εὐμετάβολος· οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας κινηθήσεται ῥᾳδίως, οὐδʼ ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων ἀτυχημάτων ἀλλʼ ὑπὸ μεγάλων καὶ πολλῶν, ἔκ τε τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο πάλιν εὐδαίμων ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, ἀλλʼ εἴπερ, ἐν πολλῷ τινὶ καὶ τελείῳ, μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν ἐν αὐτῷ γενόμενος ἐπήβολος.
For we think that the truly good and sensible person bears all his fortunes gracefully and always does the finest things possible with what he has, just as a good general makes the most effective military use of the army he has, and a shoemaker makes the finest shoe out of the hides he is given, and so with all other craftsmen too. If so, the happy person could never become wretched—though he would not be blessed either, if he met with the fortunes of Priam. Nor, then, is he variable and easily changed. He will not be moved from his happiness easily, nor by ordinary misfortunes but only by great and numerous ones; and after such things he would not become happy again in a short time, but, if at all, only in a long and complete one, in which he has achieved great and fine things.
τί οὖν κωλύει λέγειν εὐδαίμονα τὸν κατʼ ἀρετὴν τελείαν ἐνεργοῦντα καὶ τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀγαθοῖς ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένον μὴ τὸν τυχόντα χρόνον ἀλλὰ τέλειον βίον; ἢ προσθετέον καὶ βιωσόμενον οὕτω καὶ τελευτήσοντα κατὰ λόγον; ἐπειδὴ τὸ μέλλον ἀφανὲς ἡμῖν ἐστίν, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ τέλος καὶ τέλειον τίθεμεν πάντῃ πάντως. εἰ δʼ οὕτω, μακαρίους ἐροῦμεν τῶν ζώντων οἷς ὑπάρχει καὶ ὑπάρξει τὰ λεχθέντα, μακαρίους δʼ ἀνθρώπους. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον διωρίσθω.
What, then, prevents us from calling happy the person who is active in accordance with complete excellence and is adequately equipped with external goods, not for some chance period but for a complete life? Or must we add that he will also go on living this way and die accordingly, since the future is obscure to us, and we take happiness to be an end and complete in every way? If so, we will call blessed those among the living who have, and will have, the things we have described—but blessed as human beings. On these matters, let this much be settled.
τὰς δὲ τῶν ἀπογόνων τύχας καὶ τῶν φίλων ἁπάντων τὸ μὲν μηδοτιοῦν συμβάλλεσθαι λίαν ἄφιλον φαίνεται καὶ ταῖς δόξαις ἐναντίον· πολλῶν δὲ καὶ παντοίας ἐχόντων διαφορὰς τῶν συμβαινόντων, καὶ τῶν μὲν μᾶλλον συνικνουμένων τῶν δʼ ἧττον, καθʼ ἕκαστον μὲν διαιρεῖν μακρὸν καὶ ἀπέραντον φαίνεται, καθόλου δὲ λεχθὲν καὶ τύπῳ τάχʼ ἂν ἱκανῶς ἔχοι.
That the fortunes of one’s descendants and of all one’s friends should contribute nothing at all seems a very unfriendly view, and contrary to what people believe. But since what happens is so various and differs in all sorts of ways, some things touching us more closely and others less, to distinguish each case would evidently be a long, indeed endless, task; a general account in outline may perhaps be enough.
εἰ δή, καθάπερ καὶ τῶν περὶ αὑτὸν ἀτυχημάτων τὰ μὲν ἔχει τι βρῖθος καὶ ῥοπὴν πρὸς τὸν βίον τὰ δʼ ἐλαφροτέροις ἔοικεν, οὕτω καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς φίλους ὁμοίως ἅπαντας, διαφέρει δὲ τῶν παθῶν ἕκαστον περὶ ζῶντας ἢ τελευτήσαντας συμβαίνειν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ παράνομα καὶ δεινὰ προϋπάρχειν ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις ἢ πράττεσθαι, συλλογιστέον δὴ καὶ ταύτην τὴν διαφοράν, μᾶλλον δʼ ἴσως τὸ διαπορεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς κεκμηκότας εἴ τινος ἀγαθοῦ κοινωνοῦσιν ἢ τῶν ἀντικειμένων. 1101b ἔοικε γὰρ ἐκ τούτων εἰ καὶ διικνεῖται πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὁτιοῦν, εἴτʼ ἀγαθὸν εἴτε τοὐναντίον, ἀφαυρόν τι καὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ἐκείνοις εἶναι, εἰ δὲ μή, τοσοῦτόν γε καὶ τοιοῦτον ὥστε μὴ ποιεῖν εὐδαίμονας τοὺς μὴ ὄντας μηδὲ τοὺς ὄντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὸ μακάριον.
Among one’s own misfortunes, some have a certain weight and influence on one’s life, while others seem lighter; suppose it is the same with those that befall one’s friends in general. Suppose, too, that it makes much more difference whether a given misfortune befalls the living or the dead than whether the lawless and terrible deeds in tragedies are presupposed or actually performed on stage. Then we must take this difference into account as well—or rather, perhaps, the puzzle whether the departed share in any good or its opposite. 1101b For it seems from these considerations that even if anything, good or the opposite, does get through to them, it is something faint and small, either in itself or to them; or if not, then at least of such a size and kind as not to make happy those who are not, nor to take away blessedness from those who are.
συμβάλλεσθαι μὲν οὖν τι φαίνονται τοῖς κεκμηκόσιν αἱ εὐπραξίαι τῶν φίλων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ δυσπραξίαι, τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ τηλικαῦτα ὥστε μήτε τοὺς εὐδαίμονας μὴ εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν μήτʼ ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων μηδέν.
The good fortunes of friends, then, and likewise their misfortunes, do seem to contribute something to the dead, but of such a kind and size as neither to make the happy unhappy nor to do anything else of that sort.
Happiness is honored, not praised
Aristotle argues that happiness is honored as something divine rather than praised.
διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων ἐπισκεψώμεθα περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας πότερα τῶν ἐπαινετῶν ἐστὶν ἢ μᾶλλον τῶν τιμίων· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τῶν γε δυνάμεων οὐκ ἔστιν. φαίνεται δὴ πᾶν τὸ ἐπαινετὸν τῷ ποιόν τι εἶναι καὶ πρός τι πῶς ἔχειν ἐπαινεῖσθαι· τὸν γὰρ δίκαιον καὶ τὸν ἀνδρεῖον καὶ ὅλως τὸν ἀγαθόν τε καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπαινοῦμεν διὰ τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰ ἔργα, καὶ τὸν ἰσχυρὸν δὲ καὶ τὸν δρομικὸν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον τῷ ποιόν τινα πεφυκέναι καὶ ἔχειν πως πρὸς ἀγαθόν τι καὶ σπουδαῖον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐπαίνων· γελοῖοι γὰρ φαίνονται πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀναφερόμενοι, τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους διʼ ἀναφορᾶς, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν.
With these points settled, let us consider whether happiness is among the things that are praised or rather among those that are honored; for clearly it is not among capacities. Everything praised seems to be praised for being of a certain quality and standing in some relation to something. We praise the just person, the brave person, and in general the good person and excellence, because of their actions and deeds; and we praise the strong person, the good runner and each of the rest for being naturally of a certain kind and standing in some relation to something good and excellent. This is clear also from praises of the gods: they look ridiculous when measured against us, and this happens because praise involves reference to something else, as we said.
εἰ δʼ ἐστὶν ὁ ἔπαινος τῶν τοιούτων, δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἀρίστων οὐκ ἔστιν ἔπαινος, ἀλλὰ μεῖζόν τι καὶ βέλτιον, καθάπερ καὶ φαίνεται· τούς τε γὰρ θεοὺς μακαρίζομεν καὶ εὐδαιμονίζομεν καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς θειοτάτους μακαρίζομεν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐπαινεῖ καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλʼ ὡς θειότερόν τι καὶ βέλτιον μακαρίζει. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ Εὔδοξος καλῶς συνηγορῆσαι περὶ τῶν ἀριστείων τῇ ἡδονῇ· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐπαινεῖσθαι τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὖσαν μηνύειν ᾤετο ὅτι κρεῖττόν ἐστι τῶν ἐπαινετῶν, τοιοῦτον δʼ εἶναι τὸν θεὸν καὶ τἀγαθόν· πρὸς ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τἆλλα ἀναφέρεσθαι. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔπαινος τῆς ἀρετῆς· πρακτικοὶ γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ἀπὸ ταύτης· τὰ δʼ ἐγκώμια τῶν ἔργων ὁμοίως καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν καὶ τῶν ψυχικῶν.
If praise belongs to things like these, then clearly there is no praise of the best things, but something greater and better—as indeed appears to be the case. For we call the gods blessed and happy, and we call the most godlike of men blessed. So too with goods: no one praises happiness as he praises justice; he calls it blessed, as something more divine and better. Eudoxus, too, seems to have pleaded well for pleasure’s claim to first prize: he thought that the fact that it is not praised, though it is a good, shows that it is superior to the things that are praised, and that the god and the good are like this, since everything else is referred to them. For praise belongs to excellence, since it is from excellence that people do fine things, while encomia are for deeds, of body and soul alike.
ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως οἰκειότερον ἐξακριβοῦν τοῖς περὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια πεπονημένοις· ἡμῖν δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων 1102a ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τῶν τιμίων καὶ τελείων. ἔοικε δʼ οὕτως ἔχειν καὶ διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἀρχή· ταύτης γὰρ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα πάντες πράττομεν, τὴν ἀρχὴν δὲ καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τῶν ἀγαθῶν τίμιόν τι καὶ θεῖον τίθεμεν.
But perhaps working these points out precisely belongs more to those who have made a study of encomia. For us it is clear from what has been said 1102a that happiness is among the things that are honored and complete. It seems to be so also because it is a first principle: it is for its sake that all of us do everything else, and we take the principle and cause of goods to be something honored and divine.
The parts of the soul
Aristotle divides the soul into rational and non-rational parts, yielding intellectual and character excellences.
ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις κατʼ ἀρετὴν τελείαν, περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκεπτέον ἂν εἴη· τάχα γὰρ οὕτως ἂν βέλτιον καὶ περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας θεωρήσαιμεν. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ κατʼ ἀλήθειαν πολιτικὸς περὶ ταύτην μάλιστα πεπονῆσθαι· βούλεται γὰρ τοὺς πολίτας ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν καὶ τῶν νόμων ὑπηκόους. παράδειγμα δὲ τούτων ἔχομεν τοὺς Κρητῶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων νομοθέτας, καὶ εἴ τινες ἕτεροι τοιοῦτοι γεγένηνται. εἰ δὲ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἡ σκέψις αὕτη, δῆλον ὅτι γίνοιτʼ ἂν ἡ ζήτησις κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς προαίρεσιν. περὶ ἀρετῆς δὲ ἐπισκεπτέον ἀνθρωπίνης δῆλον ὅτι· καὶ γὰρ τἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπινον ἐζητοῦμεν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀνθρωπίνην. ἀρετὴν δὲ λέγομεν ἀνθρωπίνην οὐ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς· καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν λέγομεν.
Since happiness is a certain activity of soul in accordance with complete excellence, we should examine excellence; perhaps in this way we will also get a better view of happiness. The true statesman, too, seems to have worked hardest at this, since he wants to make the citizens good and obedient to the laws. As examples of this we have the lawgivers of the Cretans and the Spartans, and any others of that kind there have been. And if this inquiry belongs to political science, clearly our investigation will be in keeping with our original plan. It is clear that the excellence we must examine is human excellence; for it was the human good we were seeking, and human happiness. By human excellence we mean not that of the body but that of the soul; and happiness too we call an activity of the soul.
εἰ δὲ ταῦθʼ οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ τὸν πολιτικὸν εἰδέναι πως τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν ὀφθαλμοὺς θεραπεύσοντα καὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα, καὶ μᾶλλον ὅσῳ τιμιωτέρα καὶ βελτίων ἡ πολιτικὴ τῆς ἰατρικῆς· τῶν δʼ ἰατρῶν οἱ χαρίεντες πολλὰ πραγματεύονται περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος γνῶσιν. θεωρητέον δὴ καὶ τῷ πολιτικῷ περὶ ψυχῆς, θεωρητέον δὲ τούτων χάριν, καὶ ἐφʼ ὅσον ἱκανῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰ ζητούμενα· τὸ γὰρ ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἐξακριβοῦν ἐργωδέστερον ἴσως ἐστὶ τῶν προκειμένων. λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις ἀρκούντως ἔνια, καὶ χρηστέον αὐτοῖς· οἷον τὸ μὲν ἄλογον αὐτῆς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ λόγον ἔχον.
If this is so, clearly the statesman must know in some way about the soul, just as someone who is going to treat eyes, or the body as a whole, must know about them—and all the more so since political science is more honorable and better than medicine; and the more accomplished doctors take a great deal of trouble to know about the body. So the statesman must study the soul, but study it for the sake of these ends, and only as far as is sufficient for what we are seeking; to go into more precise detail is perhaps more laborious than our present purposes require. Some things are said adequately about the soul in our external discussions as well, and we should make use of them: for instance, that one part of it is non-rational and another has reason.
ταῦτα δὲ πότερον διώρισται καθάπερ τὰ τοῦ σώματος μόρια καὶ πᾶν τὸ μεριστόν, ἢ τῷ λόγῳ δύο ἐστὶν ἀχώριστα πεφυκότα καθάπερ ἐν τῇ περιφερείᾳ τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον, οὐθὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ παρόν. τοῦ ἀλόγου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἔοικε κοινῷ καὶ φυτικῷ, λέγω δὲ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ τρέφεσθαι καὶ αὔξεσθαι· τὴν τοιαύτην γὰρ δύναμιν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς τρεφομένοις θείη τις ἂν 1102b καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμβρύοις, τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ταύτην καὶ ἐν τοῖς τελείοις· εὐλογώτερον γὰρ ἢ ἄλλην τινά.
Whether these are distinct like the parts of the body and everything divisible, or are two in definition but by nature inseparable, like the convex and the concave in the circumference of a circle, makes no difference for present purposes. Of the non-rational part, one division seems to be common to all living things and vegetative—I mean what causes nourishment and growth. For one would posit this sort of capacity of the soul in everything that takes nourishment, 1102b including embryos, and this same one in fully grown creatures; that is more reasonable than positing some other.
ταύτης μὲν οὖν κοινή τις ἀρετὴ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνη φαίνεται· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις ἐνεργεῖν μάλιστα τὸ μόριον τοῦτο καὶ ἡ δύναμις αὕτη, ὁ δʼ ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς ἥκιστα διάδηλοι καθʼ ὕπνον (ὅθεν φασὶν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ βίου τοὺς εὐδαίμονας τῶν ἀθλίων· συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο εἰκότως· ἀργία γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ὕπνος τῆς ψυχῆς ᾗ λέγεται σπουδαία καὶ φαύλη), πλὴν εἰ μὴ κατὰ μικρὸν καὶ διικνοῦνταί τινες τῶν κινήσεων, καὶ ταύτῃ βελτίω γίνεται τὰ φαντάσματα τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἢ τῶν τυχόντων. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἅλις, καὶ τὸ θρεπτικὸν ἐατέον, ἐπειδὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπικῆς ἀρετῆς ἄμοιρον πέφυκεν. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἄλλη τις φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλογος εἶναι, μετέχουσα μέντοι πῃ λόγου.
The excellence of this part, then, appears to be common to all and not specifically human. For this part and this capacity seem to be most active in sleep, while the good and the bad person are least distinguishable in sleep (hence the saying that for half their lives the happy are no different from the wretched; and this is to be expected, since sleep is an inactivity of the soul in the respect in which it is called excellent or bad)—unless some movements do to a small extent get through, and in this way the dreams of decent people become better than those of ordinary people. But enough of this; we should leave the nutritive part aside, since by nature it has no share in human excellence. There seems also to be another nature in the soul that is non-rational, though it shares in reason in a way.
τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς τὸν λόγον καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ λόγον ἔχον ἐπαινοῦμεν· ὀρθῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ βέλτιστα παρακαλεῖ· φαίνεται δʼ ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον πεφυκός, ὃ μάχεται καὶ ἀντιτείνει τῷ λόγῳ. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ καθάπερ τὰ παραλελυμένα τοῦ σώματος μόρια εἰς τὰ δεξιὰ προαιρουμένων κινῆσαι τοὐναντίον εἰς τὰ ἀριστερὰ παραφέρεται, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς οὕτως· ἐπὶ τἀναντία γὰρ αἱ ὁρμαὶ τῶν ἀκρατῶν. ἀλλʼ ἐν τοῖς σώμασι μὲν ὁρῶμεν τὸ παραφερόμενον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐχ ὁρῶμεν. ἴσως δʼ οὐδὲν ἧττον καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ νομιστέον εἶναί τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐναντιούμενον τούτῳ καὶ ἀντιβαῖνον. πῶς δʼ ἕτερον, οὐδὲν διαφέρει.
For in the self-controlled and the uncontrolled person we praise their reason, the part of the soul that has reason, since it urges them rightly and toward what is best. But there also appears in them something else that is by nature contrary to reason, which fights and strains against reason. Just as paralyzed limbs, when we decide to move them to the right, swing the opposite way, to the left, so it is in the soul: the impulses of uncontrolled people go in contrary directions. But in bodies we see what swings away, whereas in the soul we do not. Still, perhaps we should think no less that in the soul too there is something contrary to reason, opposing and resisting it. In what way it is distinct makes no difference.
λόγου δὲ καὶ τοῦτο φαίνεται μετέχειν, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν· πειθαρχεῖ γοῦν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς—ἔτι δʼ ἴσως εὐηκοώτερόν ἐστι τὸ τοῦ σώφρονος καὶ ἀνδρείου· πάντα γὰρ ὁμοφωνεῖ τῷ λόγῳ. φαίνεται δὴ καὶ τὸ ἄλογον διττόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φυτικὸν οὐδαμῶς κοινωνεῖ λόγου, τὸ δʼ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικὸν μετέχει πως, ᾗ κατήκοόν ἐστιν αὐτοῦ καὶ πειθαρχικόν· οὕτω δὴ καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν φίλων φαμὲν ἔχειν λόγον, καὶ οὐχὥσπερ τῶν μαθηματικῶν. ὅτι δὲ πείθεταί πως ὑπὸ λόγου τὸ ἄλογον, μηνύει καὶ ἡ νουθέτησις καὶ πᾶσα ἐπιτίμησίς τε καὶ παράκλησις. 1103a εἰ δὲ χρὴ καὶ τοῦτο φάναι λόγον ἔχειν, διττὸν ἔσται καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον, τὸ μὲν κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὑτῷ, τὸ δʼ ὥσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι.
But this part too appears to share in reason, as we said. At any rate, in the self-controlled person it obeys reason—and in the moderate and brave person it is perhaps still more ready to listen, since there it agrees with reason in everything. So the non-rational part too appears to be twofold. The vegetative part has no share in reason at all, while the appetitive, and in general the desiring, part shares in it in a way, insofar as it listens to it and obeys it. This is the sense in which we say we “heed the reason” of our father or our friends, not the sense in which we grasp the reasoning of mathematics. That the non-rational part is in some way persuaded by reason is shown also by admonition and by every sort of rebuke and encouragement. 1103a And if we should say that this part too has reason, then the part that has reason will also be twofold: one having it in the strict sense and in itself, the other as something that listens to it, as one listens to a father.
διορίζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην· λέγομεν γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς μὲν διανοητικὰς τὰς δὲ ἠθικάς, σοφίαν μὲν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν διανοητικάς, ἐλευθεριότητα δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην ἠθικάς. λέγοντες γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἤθους οὐ λέγομεν ὅτι σοφὸς ἢ συνετὸς ἀλλʼ ὅτι πρᾶος ἢ σώφρων· ἐπαινοῦμεν δὲ καὶ τὸν σοφὸν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν· τῶν ἕξεων δὲ τὰς ἐπαινετὰς ἀρετὰς λέγομεν.
Excellence too is divided according to this difference. We call some excellences intellectual and others excellences of character: wisdom, comprehension and practical wisdom are intellectual, while generosity and moderation are excellences of character. For when we speak of someone’s character we do not say that he is wise or has comprehension, but that he is gentle or moderate. Yet we praise the wise person too for his state; and the praiseworthy states are the ones we call excellences.