Socratesοἱ μὲν δὴ φιλόσοφοι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, καὶ οἱ μὴ διὰ μακροῦ τινος διεξελθόντες λόγου μόγις πως ἀνεφάνησαν οἵ εἰσιν ἑκάτεροι.
ἴσως γάρ, ἔφη, διὰ βραχέος οὐ ῥᾴδιον.
οὐ φαίνεται, εἶπον· ἐμοὶ γοῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ ἂν βελτιόνως φανῆναι εἰ περὶ τούτου μόνου ἔδει ῥηθῆναι, καὶ μὴ πολλὰ τὰ λοιπὰ διελθεῖν μέλλοντι κατόψεσθαι τί διαφέρει βίος 484b δίκαιος ἀδίκου.
τί οὖν, ἔφη, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἡμῖν;
Socrates“So, Glaucon,” I said, “after going through a long argument, we’ve managed, with some difficulty, to bring to light who the philosophers are and who the non-philosophers are.”
“Perhaps,” he said, “it wasn’t easy to do in a short one.”
“Apparently not,” I said. “At any rate, I think it would have come out still better if we had only this to discuss, and didn’t have many other things left to go through if we’re to see how a just life differs 484b from an unjust one.”
“So what comes next for us?” he said.
τί δʼ ἄλλο, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἢ τὸ ἑξῆς; ἐπειδὴ φιλόσοφοι μὲν οἱ τοῦ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος δυνάμενοι ἐφάπτεσθαι, οἱ δὲ μὴ ἀλλʼ ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ παντοίως ἴσχουσιν πλανώμενοι οὐ φιλόσοφοι, ποτέρους δὴ δεῖ πόλεως ἡγεμόνας εἶναι;
πῶς οὖν λέγοντες ἂν αὐτό, ἔφη, μετρίως λέγοιμεν;
ὁπότεροι ἄν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, δυνατοὶ φαίνωνται φυλάξαι νόμους τε καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα πόλεων, τούτους καθιστάναι 484c φύλακας.
ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.
τόδε δέ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἆρα δῆλον, εἴτε τυφλὸν εἴτε ὀξὺ ὁρῶντα χρὴ φύλακα τηρεῖν ὁτιοῦν;
“What else,” I said, “but the next step? Since philosophers are those who can grasp what is always the same in the same respects, while those who can’t, but wander among many things of every sort, are not philosophers, which of them should be the leaders of a city?”
“What could we say about it,” he said, “that would be reasonable?”
“Whichever of them,” I said, “appear capable of guarding the laws and practices of cities, those are the ones we should appoint 484c as guardians.”
“Right,” he said.
“And is this clear,” I said, “whether a guardian who is to keep watch over anything should be blind or sharp-sighted?”
καὶ πῶς, ἔφη, οὐ δῆλον;
ἦ οὖν δοκοῦσί τι τυφλῶν διαφέρειν οἱ τῷ ὄντι τοῦ ὄντος ἑκάστου ἐστερημένοι τῆς γνώσεως, καὶ μηδὲν ἐναργὲς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔχοντες παράδειγμα, μηδὲ δυνάμενοι ὥσπερ γραφῆς εἰς τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἀποβλέποντες κἀκεῖσε ἀεὶ ἀναφέροντές τε 484d καὶ θεώμενοι ὡς οἷόν τε ἀκριβέστατα, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε νόμιμα καλῶν τε πέρι καὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀγαθῶν τίθεσθαί τε, ἐὰν δέῃ τίθεσθαι, καὶ τὰ κείμενα φυλάττοντες σῴζειν;
οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἦ δʼ ὅς, οὐ πολύ τι διαφέρει.
“Of course it’s clear,” he said.
“Well, do you think the blind differ at all from those who are really deprived of the knowledge of each thing that is, who have no clear model in their soul, and can’t, like painters, look to what is most true, always referring back to it 484d and studying it as closely as possible, and so establish here too conventions about what is beautiful and just and good, when they need establishing, and guard and preserve those already established?”
“No, by Zeus,” he said, “they don’t differ much.”
τούτους οὖν μᾶλλον φύλακας στησόμεθα ἢ τοὺς ἐγνωκότας μὲν ἕκαστον τὸ ὄν, ἐμπειρίᾳ δὲ μηδὲν ἐκείνων ἐλλείποντας μηδʼ ἐν ἄλλῳ μηδενὶ μέρει ἀρετῆς ὑστεροῦντας;
ἄτοπον μεντἄν, ἔφη, εἴη ἄλλους αἱρεῖσθαι, εἴ γε τἆλλα μὴ ἐλλείποιντο· τούτῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ σχεδόν τι τῷ μεγίστῳ ἂν προέχοιεν.
οὐκοῦν τοῦτο δὴ λέγωμεν, τίνα τρόπον οἷοί τʼ ἔσονται οἱ αὐτοὶ κἀκεῖνα καὶ ταῦτα ἔχειν;
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
“Shall we make these our guardians, then, rather than those who have come to know each thing that is, and who don’t lag behind the others in experience or fall short of them in any other part of excellence?”
“It would be absurd,” he said, “to choose the others, if these didn’t fall short in other respects, since in this very point, which is perhaps the most important, they would have the advantage.”
“Then shouldn’t we say how the same people will be able to have both this and that?”
“Certainly.”
ὃ τοίνυν ἀρχόμενοι τούτου τοῦ λόγου ἐλέγομεν, τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν πρῶτον δεῖ καταμαθεῖν· καὶ οἶμαι, ἐὰν ἐκείνην ἱκανῶς ὁμολογήσωμεν, ὁμολογήσειν καὶ ὅτι οἷοί τε ταῦτα ἔχειν οἱ αὐτοί, ὅτι τε οὐκ ἄλλους πόλεων ἡγεμόνας δεῖ εἶναι ἢ τούτους.
πῶς;
τοῦτο μὲν δὴ τῶν φιλοσόφων φύσεων πέρι ὡμολογήσθω 485b ἡμῖν ὅτι μαθήματός γε ἀεὶ ἐρῶσιν ὃ ἂν αὐτοῖς δηλοῖ ἐκείνης τῆς οὐσίας τῆς ἀεὶ οὔσης καὶ μὴ πλανωμένης ὑπὸ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς.
ὡμολογήσθω.
“Well, as we said at the beginning of this discussion, we must first understand their nature. And I think that if we reach adequate agreement about that, we’ll also agree that the same people can have both, and that no one but these should be leaders of cities.”
“How so?”
“Let’s take this as agreed about philosophic natures: 485b that they always love any learning that reveals to them something of that being which always is, and doesn’t wander between coming to be and passing away.”
“Let it be agreed.”
καὶ μήν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καὶ ὅτι πάσης αὐτῆς, καὶ οὔτε σμικροῦ οὔτε μείζονος οὔτε τιμιωτέρου οὔτε ἀτιμοτέρου μέρους ἑκόντες ἀφίενται, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν περί τε τῶν φιλοτίμων καὶ ἐρωτικῶν διήλθομεν.
ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.
τόδε τοίνυν μετὰ τοῦτο σκόπει εἰ ἀνάγκη ἔχειν πρὸς 485c τούτῳ ἐν τῇ φύσει οἳ ἂν μέλλωσιν ἔσεσθαι οἵους ἐλέγομεν.
τὸ ποῖον;
τὴν ἀψεύδειαν καὶ τὸ ἑκόντας εἶναι μηδαμῇ προσδέχεσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος ἀλλὰ μισεῖν, τὴν δʼ ἀλήθειαν στέργειν.
εἰκός γʼ, ἔφη.
“And further,” I said, “that they love the whole of it, and don’t willingly give up any part of it, small or larger, more valued or less, as we described earlier in the case of lovers of honor and people in love.”
“You’re right,” he said.
“Next, then, consider whether those who are to be as we described must also have this in their nature besides 485c the rest.”
“What?”
“Truthfulness: never willingly accepting what is false, but hating it, and cherishing the truth.”
“That’s likely,” he said.
οὐ μόνον γε, ὦ φίλε, εἰκός, ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τὸν ἐρωτικῶς του φύσει ἔχοντα πᾶν τὸ συγγενές τε καὶ οἰκεῖον τῶν παιδικῶν ἀγαπᾶν.
ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.
ἦ οὖν οἰκειότερον σοφίᾳ τι ἀληθείας ἂν εὕροις;
καὶ πῶς; ἦ δʼ ὅς.
ἦ οὖν δυνατὸν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν φιλόσοφόν τε καὶ 485d φιλοψευδῆ;
οὐδαμῶς γε.
τὸν ἄρα τῷ ὄντι φιλομαθῆ πάσης ἀληθείας δεῖ εὐθὺς ἐκ νέου ὅτι μάλιστα ὀρέγεσθαι.
παντελῶς γε.
“Not just likely, my friend: it’s entirely necessary that someone who is by nature in love with someone should cherish everything related and akin to his beloved.”
“Right,” he said.
“And could you find anything more akin to wisdom than truth?”
“How could I?” he said.
“Then can the same nature be a lover of wisdom and 485d a lover of falsehood?”
“Not at all.”
“So the real lover of learning must, from earliest youth, reach out as far as he can for every kind of truth.”
“Absolutely.”
ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτῳ γε εἰς ἕν τι αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι σφόδρα ῥέπουσιν, ἴσμεν που ὅτι εἰς τἆλλα τούτῳ ἀσθενέστεραι, ὥσπερ ῥεῦμα ἐκεῖσε ἀπωχετευμένον.
τί μήν;
ὧι δὴ πρὸς τὰ μαθήματα καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐρρυήκασιν, περὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς οἶμαι ἡδονὴν αὐτῆς καθʼ αὑτὴν εἶεν ἄν, τὰς δὲ διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐκλείποιεν, εἰ μὴ πεπλασμένως ἀλλʼ 485e ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφός τις εἴη.
μεγάλη ἀνάγκη.
σώφρων μὴν ὅ γε τοιοῦτος καὶ οὐδαμῇ φιλοχρήματος· ὧν γὰρ ἕνεκα χρήματα μετὰ πολλῆς δαπάνης σπουδάζεται, ἄλλῳ τινὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τούτῳ προσήκει σπουδάζειν.
οὕτω.
“But we surely know that when someone’s desires lean strongly toward one thing, they are weaker toward everything else, like a stream channeled off in that direction.”
“Of course.”
“So when someone’s desires have flowed toward learning and everything of that kind, I think they will be concerned with the pleasure of the soul itself by itself, and will leave behind the pleasures that come through the body—if he is a philosopher not in pretense but 485e in truth.”
“That’s quite necessary.”
“Such a person will be moderate, then, and not at all a lover of money. The things for which money is so eagerly pursued, at such great expense, are for anyone but him to take seriously.”
“Yes.”
καὶ μήν που καὶ τόδε δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ὅταν κρίνειν μέλλῃς φύσιν φιλόσοφόν τε καὶ μή.
τὸ ποῖον;
μή σε λάθῃ μετέχουσα ἀνελευθερίας· ἐναντιώτατον γάρ που σμικρολογία ψυχῇ μελλούσῃ τοῦ ὅλου καὶ παντὸς ἀεὶ ἐπορέξεσθαι θείου τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνου.
ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.
ἧι οὖν ὑπάρχει διανοίᾳ μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ θεωρία παντὸς μὲν χρόνου, πάσης δὲ οὐσίας, οἷόν τε οἴει τούτῳ μέγα τι δοκεῖν εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον;
ἀδύνατον, ἦ δʼ ὅς. 486b
οὐκοῦν καὶ θάνατον οὐ δεινόν τι ἡγήσεται ὁ τοιοῦτος;
ἥκιστά γε.
“And there’s surely this to consider too, when you’re going to judge whether a nature is philosophic or not.”
“What?”
“That you don’t miss any trace of meanness in it. Pettiness is surely the thing most opposed to a soul that is always going to reach out for the whole and for everything, divine and human.”
“Very true,” he said.
“Then if a mind has grandeur and contemplates all time and all being, do you think it possible for such a person to regard human life as anything great?”
“Impossible,” he said. 486b
“So such a person won’t think death anything terrible either?”
“Not in the least.”
δειλῇ δὴ καὶ ἀνελευθέρῳ φύσει φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινῆς, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ἂν μετείη.
οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.
τί οὖν; ὁ κόσμιος καὶ μὴ φιλοχρήματος μηδʼ ἀνελεύθερος μηδʼ ἀλαζὼν μηδὲ δειλὸς ἔσθʼ ὅπῃ ἂν δυσσύμβολος ἢ ἄδικος γένοιτο;
οὐκ ἔστιν.
καὶ τοῦτο δὴ ψυχὴν σκοπῶν φιλόσοφον καὶ μὴ εὐθὺς νέου ὄντος ἐπισκέψῃ, εἰ ἄρα δικαία τε καὶ ἥμερος ἢ δυσκοινώνητος καὶ ἀγρία.
πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 486c
οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τόδε παραλείψεις, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι.
τὸ ποῖον;
“Then a cowardly and mean nature, it seems, would have no share in true philosophy.”
“I don’t think so.”
“Well then, could an orderly person, who isn’t a lover of money, or mean, or a braggart, or a coward, ever turn out hard to deal with, or unjust?”
“He couldn’t.”
“So when you’re examining whether a soul is philosophic or not, you’ll look at this too, right from its youth: whether it is just and gentle, or unsociable and savage.”
“Certainly.” 486c
“Nor, I think, will you leave out this.”
“What?”
εὐμαθὴς ἢ δυσμαθής. ἢ προσδοκᾷς ποτέ τινά τι ἱκανῶς ἂν στέρξαι, ὃ πράττων ἂν ἀλγῶν τε πράττοι καὶ μόγις σμικρὸν ἀνύτων;
οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο.
τί δʼ εἰ μηδὲν ὧν μάθοι σῴζειν δύναιτο, λήθης ὢν πλέως; ἆρʼ ἂν οἷός τʼ εἴη ἐπιστήμης μὴ κενὸς εἶναι;
καὶ πῶς;
ἀνόνητα δὴ πονῶν οὐκ οἴει ἀναγκασθήσεται τελευτῶν αὑτόν τε μισεῖν καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην πρᾶξιν;
πῶς δʼ οὔ; 486d
ἐπιλήσμονα ἄρα ψυχὴν ἐν ταῖς ἱκανῶς φιλοσόφοις μή ποτε ἐγκρίνωμεν, ἀλλὰ μνημονικὴν αὐτὴν ζητῶμεν δεῖν εἶναι.
παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
“Whether it learns easily or with difficulty. Or do you ever expect anyone to be properly fond of something that pains him to do, and in which he barely accomplishes a little?”
“That couldn’t happen.”
“And what if he couldn’t retain anything he learned, being full of forgetfulness? Could he avoid being empty of knowledge?”
“How could he?”
“Laboring to no profit, don’t you think he’ll be forced in the end to hate both himself and that activity?”
“Of course.” 486d
“Then let’s never admit a forgetful soul among those who are properly philosophic; let’s insist on looking for one with a good memory.”
“Absolutely.”
ἀλλʼ οὐ μὴν τό γε τῆς ἀμούσου τε καὶ ἀσχήμονος φύσεως ἄλλοσέ ποι ἂν φαῖμεν ἕλκειν ἢ εἰς ἀμετρίαν.
τί μήν;
ἀλήθειαν δʼ ἀμετρίᾳ ἡγῇ συγγενῆ εἶναι ἢ ἐμμετρίᾳ;
ἐμμετρίᾳ.
ἔμμετρον ἄρα καὶ εὔχαριν ζητῶμεν πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις διάνοιαν φύσει, ἣν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος ἰδέαν ἑκάστου τὸ αὐτοφυὲς εὐάγωγον παρέξει.
πῶς δʼ οὔ; 486e
τί οὖν; μή πῃ δοκοῦμέν σοι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα ἕκαστα διεληλυθέναι καὶ ἑπόμενα ἀλλήλοις τῇ μελλούσῃ τοῦ ὄντος ἱκανῶς τε καὶ τελέως ψυχῇ μεταλήψεσθαι;
ἀναγκαιότατα μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.
“And surely we would say that an unmusical and graceless nature tends in only one direction: toward disproportion.”
“Of course.”
“And do you think truth is akin to disproportion or to proportion?”
“To proportion.”
“Then, in addition to the rest, let’s look for a mind that is by nature well proportioned and graceful, whose innate disposition will make it easy to lead toward the form of each thing that is.”
“Of course.” 486e
“Well then? Do you think that the qualities we’ve gone through are in any way not necessary, or not bound up with one another, for a soul that is to have an adequate and complete share in what is?”
“They’re absolutely necessary,” he said.
ἔστιν οὖν ὅπῃ μέμψῃ τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα, ὃ μή ποτʼ ἄν τις οἷός τε γένοιτο ἱκανῶς ἐπιτηδεῦσαι, εἰ μὴ φύσει εἴη μνήμων, εὐμαθής, μεγαλοπρεπής, εὔχαρις, φίλος τε καὶ συγγενὴς ἀληθείας, δικαιοσύνης, ἀνδρείας, σωφροσύνης;
οὐδʼ ἂν ὁ Μῶμος, ἔφη, τό γε τοιοῦτον μέμψαιτο.
ἀλλʼ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τελειωθεῖσι τοῖς τοιούτοις παιδείᾳ τε καὶ ἡλικίᾳ ἆρα οὐ μόνοις ἂν τὴν πόλιν ἐπιτρέποις; 487b
“Then is there any way you could find fault with a pursuit that no one could ever practice adequately unless he were by nature good at remembering, quick to learn, high-minded, graceful, a friend and kinsman of truth, justice, courage and moderation?”
“Not even Momus,” he said, “could find fault with that.”
“Well,” I said, “when such people have been perfected by education and age, wouldn’t you entrust the city to them alone?” 487b
Why philosophers seem useless
Adeimantus objects that philosophers are useless, and Socrates answers with the image of the ship.
καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαντος, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, πρὸς μὲν ταῦτά σοι οὐδεὶς ἂν οἷός τʼ εἴη ἀντειπεῖν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοιόνδε τι πάσχουσιν οἱ ἀκούοντες ἑκάστοτε ἃ νῦν λέγεις· ἡγοῦνται διʼ ἀπειρίαν τοῦ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου παρʼ ἕκαστον τὸ ἐρώτημα σμικρὸν παραγόμενοι, ἁθροισθέντων τῶν σμικρῶν ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τῶν λόγων μέγα τὸ σφάλμα καὶ ἐναντίον τοῖς πρώτοις ἀναφαίνεσθαι, καὶ ὥσπερ ὑπὸ τῶν πεττεύειν δεινῶν οἱ μὴ τελευτῶντες ἀποκλείονται καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅτι 487c φέρωσιν, οὕτω καὶ σφεῖς τελευτῶντες ἀποκλείεσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἔχειν ὅτι λέγωσιν ὑπὸ πεττείας αὖ ταύτης τινὸς ἑτέρας, οὐκ ἐν ψήφοις ἀλλʼ ἐν λόγοις· ἐπεὶ τό γε ἀληθὲς οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ταύτῃ ἔχειν. λέγω δʼ εἰς τὸ παρὸν ἀποβλέψας.
“Socrates,” said Adeimantus, “no one could argue against you on these points. But this is what happens to the people who hear you say what you’re saying now, every time. They think that because they’re inexperienced at question and answer, they’re led a little astray by the argument at each question, and when the little steps are added up at the end of the discussion, a big slip comes to light, contrary to what they said at first. And just as, against people who are clever at draughts, the unskilled players end up hemmed in, with no move to 487c make, so they too end up hemmed in and with nothing to say, by this other kind of draughts, played not with counters but with words. Yet the truth isn’t any more on that side for all that. I say this with an eye to the present case.
νῦν γὰρ φαίη ἄν τίς σοι λόγῳ μὲν οὐκ ἔχειν καθʼ ἕκαστον τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἐναντιοῦσθαι, ἔργῳ δὲ ὁρᾶν, ὅσοι ἂν ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν ὁρμήσαντες μὴ τοῦ πεπαιδεῦσθαι ἕνεκα ἁψάμενοι νέοι ὄντες 487d ἀπαλλάττωνται, ἀλλὰ μακρότερον ἐνδιατρίψωσιν, τοὺς μὲν πλείστους καὶ πάνυ ἀλλοκότους γιγνομένους, ἵνα μὴ παμπονήρους εἴπωμεν, τοὺς δʼ ἐπιεικεστάτους δοκοῦντας ὅμως τοῦτό γε ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος οὗ σὺ ἐπαινεῖς πάσχοντας, ἀχρήστους ταῖς πόλεσι γιγνομένους.
“For right now someone might say to you that in words he can’t oppose you at each question you ask, but in fact he can see that of those who launch into philosophy—not those who take it up while young for the sake of their education and then 487d leave it, but those who spend longer in it—most become very odd, not to say thoroughly wicked, while even those who seem the most decent are still affected by the pursuit you praise to this extent: they become useless to their cities.”
καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας, οἴει οὖν, εἶπον, τοὺς ταῦτα λέγοντας ψεύδεσθαι;
οὐκ οἶδα, ἦ δʼ ὅς, ἀλλὰ τὸ σοὶ δοκοῦν ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούοιμι.
ἀκούοις ἂν ὅτι ἔμοιγε φαίνονται τἀληθῆ λέγειν. 487e
πῶς οὖν, ἔφη, εὖ ἔχει λέγειν ὅτι οὐ πρότερον κακῶν παύσονται αἱ πόλεις, πρὶν ἂν ἐν αὐταῖς οἱ φιλόσοφοι ἄρξωσιν, οὓς ἀχρήστους ὁμολογοῦμεν αὐταῖς εἶναι;
ἐρωτᾷς, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἐρώτημα δεόμενον ἀποκρίσεως διʼ εἰκόνος λεγομένης.
σὺ δέ γε, ἔφη, οἶμαι οὐκ εἴωθας διʼ εἰκόνων λέγειν.
When I heard this, I said, “Do you think the people who say this are lying?”
“I don’t know,” he said, “but I’d be glad to hear what you think.”
“You’d hear that to me they seem to be telling the truth.” 487e
“Then how can it be right,” he said, “to say that cities will have no rest from their evils until philosophers rule in them, when we agree that philosophers are useless to them?”
“You’re asking a question,” I said, “that needs an answer given through an image.”
“And you, I suppose,” he said, “aren’t in the habit of talking in images!”
εἶεν, εἶπον· σκώπτεις ἐμβεβληκώς με εἰς λόγον οὕτω 488a δυσαπόδεικτον; ἄκουε δʼ οὖν τῆς εἰκόνος, ἵνʼ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἴδῃς ὡς γλίσχρως εἰκάζω. οὕτω γὰρ χαλεπὸν τὸ πάθος τῶν ἐπιεικεστάτων, ὃ πρὸς τὰς πόλεις πεπόνθασιν, ὥστε οὐδʼ ἔστιν ἓν οὐδὲν ἄλλο τοιοῦτον πεπονθός, ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἐκ πολλῶν αὐτὸ συναγαγεῖν εἰκάζοντα καὶ ἀπολογούμενον ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν, οἷον οἱ γραφῆς τραγελάφους καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μειγνύντες γράφουσιν.
“Very well,” I said. “Are you making fun of me, after pushing me into an argument so 488a hard to prove? Anyway, listen to the image, so that you can see even better how hard I have to strain for my images. What the most decent people suffer in their relation to their cities is so harsh that there is no single thing that has suffered anything like it. To make an image of it and speak in their defense, one has to assemble it from many sources, the way painters paint goat-stags and such creatures by mixing things together.
νόησον γὰρ τοιουτονὶ γενόμενον εἴτε πολλῶν νεῶν πέρι εἴτε μιᾶς·
“Imagine something like this happening, whether on many ships or on one:
ναύκληρον μεγέθει μὲν καὶ 488b ῥώμῃ ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἐν τῇ νηὶ πάντας, ὑπόκωφον δὲ καὶ ὁρῶντα ὡσαύτως βραχύ τι καὶ γιγνώσκοντα περὶ ναυτικῶν ἕτερα τοιαῦτα, τοὺς δὲ ναύτας στασιάζοντας πρὸς ἀλλήλους περὶ τῆς κυβερνήσεως, ἕκαστον οἰόμενον δεῖν κυβερνᾶν, μήτε μαθόντα πώποτε τὴν τέχνην μέτε ἔχοντα ἀποδεῖξαι διδάσκαλον ἑαυτοῦ μηδὲ χρόνον ἐν ᾧ ἐμάνθανεν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις φάσκοντας μηδὲ διδακτὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν λέγοντα ὡς διδακτὸν ἑτοίμους κατατέμνειν, αὐτοὺς δὲ αὐτῷ ἀεὶ τῷ 488c ναυκλήρῳ περικεχύσθαι δεομένους καὶ πάντα ποιοῦντας ὅπως ἂν σφίσι τὸ πηδάλιον ἐπιτρέψῃ, ἐνίοτε δʼ ἂν μὴ πείθωσιν ἀλλὰ ἄλλοι μᾶλλον, τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἢ ἀποκτεινύντας ἢ ἐκβάλλοντας ἐκ τῆς νεώς, τὸν δὲ γενναῖον ναύκληρον μανδραγόρᾳ ἢ μέθῃ ἤ τινι ἄλλῳ συμποδίσαντας τῆς νεὼς ἄρχειν χρωμένους τοῖς ἐνοῦσι, καὶ πίνοντάς τε καὶ εὐωχουμένους πλεῖν ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς τοὺς τοιούτους, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐπαινοῦντας 488d ναυτικὸν μὲν καλοῦντας καὶ κυβερνητικὸν καὶ ἐπιστάμενον τὰ κατὰ ναῦν, ὃς ἂν συλλαμβάνειν δεινὸς ᾖ ὅπως ἄρξουσιν ἢ πείθοντες ἢ βιαζόμενοι τὸν ναύκληρον, τὸν δὲ μὴ τοιοῦτον ψέγοντας ὡς ἄχρηστον, τοῦ δὲ ἀληθινοῦ κυβερνήτου πέρι μηδʼ ἐπαΐοντες, ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι ἐνιαυτοῦ καὶ ὡρῶν καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ ἄστρων καὶ πνευμάτων καὶ πάντων τῶν τῇ τέχνῃ προσηκόντων, εἰ μέλλει τῷ ὄντι νεὼς ἀρχικὸς ἔσεσθαι, ὅπως δὲ κυβερνήσει 488e ἐάντε τινες βούλωνται ἐάντε μή, μήτε τέχνην τούτου μήτε μελέτην οἰόμενοι δυνατὸν εἶναι λαβεῖν ἅμα καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικήν.
“There is a shipowner who is bigger and 488b stronger than everyone else on board, but somewhat deaf, similarly short-sighted, and with a knowledge of seamanship to match. The sailors are quarreling with one another over the navigation, each thinking he ought to navigate, though he has never learned the art and can’t point to a teacher or to a time when he learned it. What’s more, they claim it can’t even be taught, and they’re ready to cut to pieces anyone who says it can. They’re forever crowding around the 488c shipowner himself, begging him and doing everything they can to get him to hand them the tiller. Sometimes, if they fail to persuade him and others succeed instead, they kill the others or throw them overboard. Then they tie up their noble shipowner with mandrake or drink or something else, take command of the ship, help themselves to its stores, and, drinking and feasting, sail the way you’d expect such people to sail. On top of this they praise anyone 488d who is clever at helping them take command, by persuading or forcing the shipowner, calling him a real seaman, a navigator, a man who knows ships; anyone who isn’t like that they denounce as useless. They don’t even understand that the true navigator must pay attention to the year and the seasons, the sky, the stars, the winds, and everything that belongs to his art, if he is really going to be fit to command a ship. As for how he will take the helm, 488e whether anyone wants him to or not, they don’t think it possible to acquire an art or practice of that and, at the same time, the art of navigation.
τοιούτων δὴ περὶ τὰς ναῦς γιγνομένων τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς κυβερνητικὸν οὐχ ἡγῇ ἂν τῷ ὄντι μετεωροσκόπον 489a τε καὶ ἀδολέσχην καὶ ἄχρηστόν σφισι καλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς οὕτω κατεσκευασμέναις ναυσὶ πλωτήρων;
καὶ μάλα, ἔφη ὁ Ἀδείμαντος.
οὐ δή, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, οἶμαι δεῖσθαί σε ἐξεταζομένην τὴν εἰκόνα ἰδεῖν, ὅτι ταῖς πόλεσι πρὸς τοὺς ἀληθινοὺς φιλοσόφους τὴν διάθεσιν ἔοικεν, ἀλλὰ μανθάνειν ὃ λέγω.
καὶ μάλʼ, ἔφη.
“When this is what goes on aboard ships, don’t you think the real navigator would be called a stargazer, 489a a babbler, and useless to them by those who sail on ships run this way?”
“Very much so,” said Adeimantus.
“I don’t think,” I said, “that you need to see the image examined in detail to see that it resembles the attitude of cities toward true philosophers. I think you understand what I mean.”
“I certainly do,” he said.
πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν ἐκεῖνον τὸν θαυμάζοντα ὅτι οἱ φιλόσοφοι οὐ τιμῶνται ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι δίδασκέ τε τὴν εἰκόνα καὶ πειρῶ πείθειν ὅτι πολὺ ἂν θαυμαστότερον ἦν 489b εἰ ἐτιμῶντο.
ἀλλὰ διδάξω, ἔφη.
“First, then, teach this image to the man who is surprised that philosophers aren’t honored in cities, and try to persuade him that it would be far more surprising 489b if they were.”
“I will teach him,” he said.
καὶ ὅτι τοίνυν τἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὡς ἄχρηστοι τοῖς πολλοῖς οἱ ἐπιεικέστατοι τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ· τῆς μέντοι ἀχρηστίας τοὺς μὴ χρωμένους κέλευε αἰτιᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς. οὐ γὰρ ἔχει φύσιν κυβερνήτην ναυτῶν δεῖσθαι ἄρχεσθαι ὑφʼ αὑτοῦ οὐδὲ τοὺς σοφοὺς ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν πλουσίων θύρας ἰέναι, ἀλλʼ ὁ τοῦτο κομψευσάμενος ἐψεύσατο, τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς πέφυκεν, ἐάντε πλούσιος ἐάντε πένης κάμνῃ, ἀναγκαῖον 489c εἶναι ἐπὶ ἰατρῶν θύρας ἰέναι καὶ πάντα τὸν ἄρχεσθαι δεόμενον ἐπὶ τὰς τοῦ ἄρχειν δυναμένου, οὐ τὸν ἄρχοντα δεῖσθαι τῶν ἀρχομένων ἄρχεσθαι, οὗ ἂν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τι ὄφελος ᾖ. ἀλλὰ τοὺς νῦν πολιτικοὺς ἄρχοντας ἀπεικάζων οἷς ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν ναύταις οὐχ ἁμαρτήσῃ, καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τούτων ἀχρήστους λεγομένους καὶ μετεωρολέσχας τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς κυβερνήταις.
“And tell him he’s right that the most decent people in philosophy are useless to the many. But tell him to blame their uselessness on those who don’t make use of them, and not on the decent ones. It isn’t natural for a navigator to beg the sailors to be ruled by him, or for the wise to go to the doors of the rich; whoever came up with that witticism was lying. The truth of the matter is that when someone is sick, rich or poor, he has 489c to go to the doctor’s door, and anyone who needs to be ruled must go to the door of the one who can rule. It isn’t for the ruler, if he is really any use, to beg those he rules to be ruled. You won’t go wrong if you liken our present political rulers to the sailors we were just describing, and those they call useless stargazing babblers to the true navigators.”
ὀρθότατα, ἔφη.
ἔκ τε τοίνυν τούτων καὶ ἐν τούτοις οὐ ῥᾴδιον εὐδοκιμεῖν τὸ βέλτιστον ἐπιτήδευμα ὑπὸ τῶν τἀναντία ἐπιτηδευόντων· 489d πολὺ δὲ μεγίστη καὶ ἰσχυροτάτη διαβολὴ γίγνεται φιλοσοφίᾳ διὰ τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα φάσκοντας ἐπιτηδεύειν, οὓς δὴ σὺ φῂς τὸν ἐγκαλοῦντα τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ λέγειν ὡς παμπόνηροι οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἰόντων ἐπʼ αὐτήν, οἱ δὲ ἐπιεικέστατοι ἄχρηστοι, καὶ ἐγὼ συνεχώρησα ἀληθῆ σε λέγειν. ἦ γάρ;
ναί.
οὐκοῦν τῆς μὲν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἀχρηστίας τὴν αἰτίαν διεληλύθαμεν;
καὶ μάλα.
“Quite right,” he said.
“For these reasons, then, and in these conditions, it isn’t easy for the best pursuit to be well thought of by those who pursue the opposite. 489d But by far the greatest and most damaging slander comes upon philosophy through those who claim to pursue it—the ones you had in mind when you said that philosophy’s accuser claims most of those who go in for it are thoroughly wicked, and the most decent are useless. And I agreed that you were telling the truth, didn’t I?”
“Yes.”
“Well, we’ve gone through the reason why the decent ones are useless?”
“We certainly have.”
τῆς δὲ τῶν πολλῶν πονηρίας τὴν ἀνάγκην βούλει τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο διέλθωμεν, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲ τούτου φιλοσοφία αἰτία, 489e ἂν δυνώμεθα, πειραθῶμεν δεῖξαι;
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ἀκούωμεν δὴ καὶ λέγωμεν ἐκεῖθεν ἀναμνησθέντες, ὅθεν διῇμεν τὴν φύσιν οἷον ἀνάγκη φῦναι τὸν καλόν τε κἀγαθὸν 490a ἐσόμενον. ἡγεῖτο δʼ αὐτῷ, εἰ νῷ ἔχεις, πρῶτον μὲν ἀλήθεια, ἣν διώκειν αὐτὸν πάντως καὶ πάντῃ ἔδει ἢ ἀλαζόνι ὄντι μηδαμῇ μετεῖναι φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινῆς.
ἦν γὰρ οὕτω λεγόμενον.
οὐκοῦν ἓν μὲν τοῦτο σφόδρα οὕτω παρὰ δόξαν τοῖς νῦν δοκουμένοις περὶ αὐτοῦ;
“Next, then, shall we go through why the wickedness of the majority is inevitable, and try to show, if we can, that philosophy isn’t to blame for this either?” 489e
“Certainly.”
“Then let’s listen and speak, going back in memory to where we described the nature that someone who is to be fine and good must 490a have by birth. Leading him, if you remember, was first of all truth, which he had to pursue wholly and in every way; otherwise he would be a braggart with no share at all in true philosophy.”
“Yes, that’s what was said.”
“Isn’t this one point, at least, flatly at odds with current opinion about him?”
καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.
ἆρʼ οὖν δὴ οὐ μετρίως ἀπολογησόμεθα ὅτι πρὸς τὸ ὂν πεφυκὼς εἴη ἁμιλλᾶσθαι ὅ γε ὄντως φιλομαθής, καὶ οὐκ 490b ἐπιμένοι ἐπὶ τοῖς δοξαζομένοις εἶναι πολλοῖς ἑκάστοις, ἀλλʼ ἴοι καὶ οὐκ ἀμβλύνοιτο οὐδʼ ἀπολήγοι τοῦ ἔρωτος, πρὶν αὐτοῦ ὃ ἔστιν ἑκάστου τῆς φύσεως ἅψασθαι ᾧ προσήκει ψυχῆς ἐφάπτεσθαι τοῦ τοιούτου—προσήκει δὲ συγγενεῖ— ᾧ πλησιάσας καὶ μιγεὶς τῷ ὄντι ὄντως, γεννήσας νοῦν καὶ ἀλήθειαν, γνοίη τε καὶ ἀληθῶς ζῴη καὶ τρέφοιτο καὶ οὕτω λήγοι ὠδῖνος, πρὶν δʼ οὔ;
ὡς οἷόν τʼ, ἔφη, μετριώτατα.
“Very much so,” he said.
“Then won’t we be making a reasonable defense if we say that the real lover of learning is naturally inclined to strive toward what is, and doesn’t 490b linger among the many particular things that are believed to be, but goes on, without losing his edge or giving up his love, until he grasps the nature of each thing that is, itself, with the part of the soul fitted to grasp such a thing—and the part fitted to it is the part akin to it; and that, having drawn near to what really is and coupled with it, and begotten intelligence and truth, he knows, and truly lives and is nourished, and only then is released from his labor pains, but not before?”
“That would be as reasonable a defense as possible,” he said.
τί οὖν; τούτῳ τι μετέσται ψεῦδος ἀγαπᾶν ἢ πᾶν τοὐναντίον μισεῖν; 490c
μισεῖν, ἔφη.
ἡγουμένης δὴ ἀληθείας οὐκ ἄν ποτε οἶμαι φαμὲν αὐτῇ χορὸν κακῶν ἀκολουθῆσαι.
πῶς γάρ;
ἀλλʼ ὑγιές τε καὶ δίκαιον ἦθος, ᾧ καὶ σωφροσύνην ἕπεσθαι.
ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.
“Well then? Will such a person have any part in loving falsehood, or will he do quite the opposite and hate it?” 490c
“Hate it,” he said.
“And when truth leads the way, I don’t think we’d ever say that a chorus of evils follows.”
“How could it?”
“Rather, a healthy and just character, with moderation following too.”
“Right,” he said.
καὶ δὴ τὸν ἄλλον τῆς φιλοσόφου φύσεως χορὸν τί δεῖ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀναγκάζοντα τάττειν; μέμνησαι γάρ που ὅτι συνέβη προσῆκον τούτοις ἀνδρεία, μεγαλοπρέπεια, εὐμάθεια, μνήμη· καὶ σοῦ ἐπιλαβομένου ὅτι πᾶς μὲν ἀναγκασθήσεται 490d ὁμολογεῖν οἷς λέγομεν, ἐάσας δὲ τοὺς λόγους, εἰς αὐτοὺς ἀποβλέψας περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος, φαίη ὁρᾶν αὐτῶν τοὺς μὲν ἀχρήστους, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς κακοὺς πᾶσαν κακίαν, τῆς διαβολῆς τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπισκοποῦντες ἐπὶ τούτῳ νῦν γεγόναμεν, τί ποθʼ οἱ πολλοὶ κακοί, καὶ τούτου δὴ ἕνεκα πάλιν ἀνειλήφαμεν τὴν τῶν ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφων φύσιν καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὡρισάμεθα. 490e
“And why should I marshal the rest of the chorus of the philosophic nature all over again from the start? You remember, I suppose, that courage, high-mindedness, ease of learning and memory turned out to belong to these people. You objected that anyone would be compelled to 490d agree with what we’re saying, but that if he left the arguments aside and looked at the very people the argument is about, he would say he saw that some of them were useless, and most of them bad with every kind of badness. Looking into the cause of this slander, we have now arrived at the question of why most of them are bad; and that is why we have taken up the nature of true philosophers again and have had to define it.” 490e
How the philosophic nature is corrupted
Socrates explains how gifted natures are corrupted by the crowd and how impostors disgrace philosophy.
ἔστιν, ἔφη, ταῦτα.
ταύτης δή, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τῆς φύσεως δεῖ θεάσασθαι τὰς φθοράς, ὡς διόλλυται ἐν πολλοῖς, σμικρὸν δέ τι ἐκφεύγει, οὓς δὴ καὶ οὐ πονηρούς, ἀχρήστους δὲ καλοῦσι· καὶ μετὰ 491a τοῦτο αὖ τὰς μιμουμένας ταύτην καὶ εἰς τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα καθισταμένας αὐτῆς, οἷαι οὖσαι φύσεις ψυχῶν εἰς ἀνάξιον καὶ μεῖζον ἑαυτῶν ἀφικνούμεναι ἐπιτήδευμα, πολλαχῇ πλημμελοῦσαι, πανταχῇ καὶ ἐπὶ πάντας δόξαν οἵαν λέγεις φιλοσοφίᾳ προσῆψαν.
τίνας δέ, ἔφη, τὰς διαφθορὰς λέγεις;
“That’s so,” he said.
“Then we must look at how this nature is corrupted,” I said, “how it’s ruined in many people, while only a few escape—the ones people call not wicked but useless. And after 491a that, we must look in turn at the natures that imitate it and set themselves up in its pursuit: what sort of souls they are that, arriving at a pursuit they’re unworthy of, one too big for them, go wrong in many ways and have attached to philosophy, everywhere and in everyone’s eyes, the reputation you describe.”
“What corruptions do you mean?” he said.
ἐγώ σοι, εἶπον, ἂν οἷός τε γένωμαι, πειράσομαι διελθεῖν. τόδε μὲν οὖν οἶμαι πᾶς ἡμῖν ὁμολογήσει, τοιαύτην φύσιν καὶ πάντα ἔχουσαν ὅσα προσετάξαμεν νυνδή, εἰ τελέως 491b μέλλοι φιλόσοφος γενέσθαι, ὀλιγάκις ἐν ἀνθρώποις φύεσθαι καὶ ὀλίγας. ἢ οὐκ οἴει;
σφόδρα γε.
τούτων δὴ τῶν ὀλίγων σκόπει ὡς πολλοὶ ὄλεθροι καὶ μεγάλοι.
τίνες δή;
ὃ μὲν πάντων θαυμαστότατον ἀκοῦσαι, ὅτι ἓν ἕκαστον ὧν ἐπῃνέσαμεν τῆς φύσεως ἀπόλλυσι τὴν ἔχουσαν ψυχὴν καὶ ἀποσπᾷ φιλοσοφίας. λέγω δὲ ἀνδρείαν, σωφροσύνην καὶ πάντα ἃ διήλθομεν.
ἄτοπον, ἔφη, ἀκοῦσαι. 491c
“I’ll try to go through them for you,” I said, “if I can. I think everyone will agree with us on this much: a nature like this, with everything we just prescribed for it if it is to become a complete 491b philosopher, is born rarely among human beings, and in few. Don’t you think so?”
“Very much.”
“Then consider how many and how great are the forces that destroy these few.”
“What are they?”
“The most surprising thing of all to hear is that each of the qualities of that nature which we praised destroys the soul that has it and drags it away from philosophy. I mean courage, moderation and all the rest we went through.”
“That’s strange to hear,” he said. 491c
ἔτι τοίνυν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, πρὸς τούτοις τὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ πάντα φθείρει καὶ ἀποσπᾷ, κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ ἰσχὺς σώματος καὶ συγγένεια ἐρρωμένη ἐν πόλει καὶ πάντα τὰ τούτων οἰκεῖα· ἔχεις γὰρ τὸν τύπον ὧν λέγω.
ἔχω, ἔφη· καὶ ἡδέως γʼ ἂν ἀκριβέστερον ἃ λέγεις πυθοίμην.
λαβοῦ τοίνυν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὅλου αὐτοῦ ὀρθῶς, καί σοι εὔδηλόν τε φανεῖται καὶ οὐκ ἄτοπα δόξει τὰ προειρημένα περὶ αὐτῶν.
πῶς οὖν, ἔφη, κελεύεις; 491d
“What’s more,” I said, “besides these, all the so-called good things corrupt it and drag it away: beauty, wealth, bodily strength, powerful family connections in the city, and everything that goes with them. You have the general outline of what I mean.”
“I do,” he said, “and I’d be glad to learn more precisely what you mean.”
“Then grasp the whole thing correctly,” I said, “and it will be perfectly clear to you, and what I said about them just now won’t seem strange.”
“So what are you telling me to do?” he said. 491d
παντός, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, σπέρματος πέρι ἢ φυτοῦ, εἴτε ἐγγείων εἴτε τῶν ζῴων, ἴσμεν ὅτι τὸ μὴ τυχὸν τροφῆς ἧς προσήκει ἑκάστῳ μηδʼ ὥρας μηδὲ τόπου, ὅσῳ ἂν ἐρρωμενέστερον ᾖ, τοσούτῳ πλειόνων ἐνδεῖ τῶν πρεπόντων· ἀγαθῷ γάρ που κακὸν ἐναντιώτερον ἢ τῷ μὴ ἀγαθῷ.
πῶς δʼ οὔ;
ἔχει δὴ οἶμαι λόγον τὴν ἀρίστην φύσιν ἐν ἀλλοτριωτέρᾳ οὖσαν τροφῇ κάκιον ἀπαλλάττειν τῆς φαύλης.
ἔχει. 491e
“With every seed or growing thing,” I said, “whether plant or animal, we know that if it doesn’t get the nourishment, climate or place that suits it, the more vigorous it is, the more it falls short of what it should be. For bad is surely more opposed to good than to what is not good.”
“Of course.”
“So it makes sense, I think, that the best nature, when it gets nurture alien to it, turns out worse than an inferior one.”
“It does.” 491e
οὐκοῦν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς οὕτω φῶμεν τὰς εὐφυεστάτας κακῆς παιδαγωγίας τυχούσας διαφερόντως κακὰς γίγνεσθαι; ἢ οἴει τὰ μεγάλα ἀδικήματα καὶ τὴν ἄκρατον πονηρίαν ἐκ φαύλης ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐκ νεανικῆς φύσεως τροφῇ διολομένης γίγνεσθαι, ἀσθενῆ δὲ φύσιν μεγάλων οὔτε ἀγαθῶν οὔτε κακῶν αἰτίαν ποτὲ ἔσεσθαι;
οὔκ, ἀλλά, ἦ δʼ ὅς, οὕτως.
“Then, Adeimantus,” I said, “shall we say the same of souls: that the most gifted, if they get a bad upbringing, become exceptionally bad? Or do you think great crimes and unmixed wickedness come from an inferior nature rather than from a vigorous one ruined by its upbringing, and that a weak nature will ever be the cause of great things, either good or bad?”
“No,” he said, “it’s as you say.”
ἣν τοίνυν ἔθεμεν τοῦ φιλοσόφου φύσιν, ἂν μὲν οἶμαι μαθήσεως προσηκούσης τύχῃ, εἰς πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἀνάγκη αὐξανομένην ἀφικνεῖσθαι, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἐν προσηκούσῃ σπαρεῖσά τε καὶ φυτευθεῖσα τρέφηται, εἰς πάντα τἀναντία αὖ, ἐὰν μή τις αὐτῇ βοηθήσας θεῶν τύχῃ. ἢ καὶ σὺ ἡγῇ, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, διαφθειρομένους τινὰς εἶναι ὑπὸ σοφιστῶν νέους, διαφθείροντας δέ τινας σοφιστὰς ἰδιωτικούς, ὅτι καὶ ἄξιον λόγου, ἀλλʼ οὐκ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ταῦτα λέγοντας μεγίστους 492b μὲν εἶναι σοφιστάς, παιδεύειν δὲ τελεώτατα καὶ ἀπεργάζεσθαι οἵους βούλονται εἶναι καὶ νέους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας;
“Then the nature we assigned to the philosopher, if it gets the learning that suits it, must grow and arrive at every excellence; but if it is sown and planted and grows up in surroundings that don’t suit it, it will arrive at every opposite, unless one of the gods happens to come to its rescue. Or do you too believe, like the many, that some young people are corrupted by sophists, and that there are private sophists who corrupt them to any extent worth mentioning? Don’t you think rather that the people who say this are themselves the greatest 492b sophists, who educate most thoroughly and turn out young and old, men and women, to be just the sort they want?”
ὅταν, εἶπον, συγκαθεζόμενοι ἁθρόοι πολλοὶ εἰς ἐκκλησίας ἢ εἰς δικαστήρια ἢ θέατρα ἢ στρατόπεδα ἤ τινα ἄλλον κοινὸν πλήθους σύλλογον σὺν πολλῷ θορύβῳ τὰ μὲν ψέγωσι τῶν λεγομένων ἢ πραττομένων, τὰ δὲ ἐπαινῶσιν, ὑπερβαλλόντως ἑκάτερα, καὶ ἐκβοῶντες καὶ κροτοῦντες, πρὸς δʼ 492c αὐτοῖς αἵ τε πέτραι καὶ ὁ τόπος ἐν ᾧ ἂν ὦσιν ἐπηχοῦντες διπλάσιον θόρυβον παρέχωσι τοῦ ψόγου καὶ ἐπαίνου. ἐν δὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ τὸν νέον, τὸ λεγόμενον, τίνα οἴει καρδίαν ἴσχειν; ἢ ποίαν ἂν αὐτῷ παιδείαν ἰδιωτικὴν ἀνθέξειν, ἣν οὐ κατακλυσθεῖσαν ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιούτου ψόγου ἢ ἐπαίνου οἰχήσεσθαι φερομένην κατὰ ῥοῦν ᾗ ἂν οὗτος φέρῃ, καὶ φήσειν τε τὰ αὐτὰ τούτοις καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ εἶναι, καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσειν ἅπερ ἂν οὗτοι, καὶ ἔσεσθαι τοιοῦτον; 492d
“When,” I said, “many of them sit crowded together in assemblies, law courts, theaters, army camps or any other public gathering of the crowd, and with a great uproar censure some of the things said or done and praise others, both to excess, shouting and clapping, while 492c the rocks and the place around them echo back and double the uproar of blame and praise. In a situation like that, what do you think becomes of a young man’s heart, as the saying goes? What private education will hold out for him, and not be swept away by such blame and praise and go off, carried by the current wherever it carries it? Won’t he call the same things fine and shameful as they do, pursue what they pursue, and become just like them?” 492d
πολλή, ἦ δʼ ὅς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀνάγκη.
καὶ μήν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, οὔπω τὴν μεγίστην ἀνάγκην εἰρήκαμεν.
ποίαν; ἔφη.
ἣν ἔργῳ προστιθέασι λόγῳ μὴ πείθοντες οὗτοι οἱ παιδευταί τε καὶ σοφισταί. ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον ἀτιμίαις τε καὶ χρήμασι καὶ θανάτοις κολάζουσι;
καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, σφόδρα.
τίνα οὖν ἄλλον σοφιστὴν οἴει ἢ ποίους ἰδιωτικοὺς λόγους ἐναντία τούτοις τείνοντας κρατήσειν; 492e
οἶμαι μὲν οὐδένα, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
οὐ γάρ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐπιχειρεῖν πολλὴ ἄνοια.
“He’ll have no choice at all, Socrates,” he said.
“And yet,” I said, “we haven’t yet mentioned the strongest compulsion.”
“What’s that?” he said.
“The one these educators and sophists add in deeds when they fail to persuade with words. Or don’t you know that they punish anyone who isn’t persuaded with loss of civic rights, with fines, and with death?”
“They most certainly do,” he said.
“Then what other sophist, or what private teachings, do you think will prevail when pulling against them?” 492e
“None, I think,” he said.
“No,” I said, “and even to try is great folly.
οὔτε γὰρ γίγνεται οὔτε γέγονεν οὐδὲ οὖν μὴ γένηται ἀλλοῖον ἦθος πρὸς ἀρετὴν παρὰ τὴν τούτων παιδείαν πεπαιδευμένον, ἀνθρώπειον, ὦ ἑταῖρε—θεῖον μέντοι κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἐξαιρῶμεν λόγου· εὖ γὰρ χρὴ εἰδέναι, ὅτιπερ ἂν σωθῇ τε 493a καὶ γένηται οἷον δεῖ ἐν τοιαύτῃ καταστάσει πολιτειῶν, θεοῦ μοῖραν αὐτὸ σῶσαι λέγων οὐ κακῶς ἐρεῖς.
οὐδʼ ἐμοὶ ἄλλως, ἔφη, δοκεῖ.
ἔτι τοίνυν σοι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, πρὸς τούτοις καὶ τόδε δοξάτω.
τὸ ποῖον;
“No character ever does, ever has, or ever will turn out differently with respect to excellence by being educated against the education these people give—no human character, that is, my friend. The divine, as the proverb says, we should leave out of the account. You can be quite sure that whatever is saved 493a and turns out as it should in cities constituted as they are now, you won’t be wrong to say a divine dispensation saved it.”
“That’s how it seems to me too,” he said.
“Then here’s something else you should think, besides,” I said.
“What’s that?”
ἕκαστος τῶν μισθαρνούντων ἰδιωτῶν, οὓς δὴ οὗτοι σοφιστὰς καλοῦσι καὶ ἀντιτέχνους ἡγοῦνται, μὴ ἄλλα παιδεύειν ἢ ταῦτα τὰ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματα, ἃ δοξάζουσιν ὅταν ἁθροισθῶσιν, καὶ σοφίαν ταύτην καλεῖν·
“That each of the private teachers who work for fees—the ones these people call sophists and regard as their rivals—teaches nothing but the convictions of the many, the opinions they hold when they’re gathered together, and calls this wisdom.
οἷόνπερ ἂν εἰ θρέμματος μεγάλου καὶ ἰσχυροῦ τρεφομένου τὰς ὀργάς τις καὶ 493b ἐπιθυμίας κατεμάνθανεν, ὅπῃ τε προσελθεῖν χρὴ καὶ ὅπῃ ἅψασθαι αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὁπότε χαλεπώτατον ἢ πρᾳότατον καὶ ἐκ τίνων γίγνεται, καὶ φωνὰς δὴ ἐφʼ οἷς ἑκάστας εἴωθεν φθέγγεσθαι, καὶ οἵας αὖ ἄλλου φθεγγομένου ἡμεροῦταί τε καὶ ἀγριαίνει, καταμαθὼν δὲ ταῦτα πάντα συνουσίᾳ τε καὶ χρόνου τριβῇ σοφίαν τε καλέσειεν καὶ ὡς τέχνην συστησάμενος ἐπὶ διδασκαλίαν τρέποιτο, μηδὲν εἰδὼς τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τούτων τῶν δογμάτων τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ὅτι καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν 493c ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, ὀνομάζοι δὲ πάντα ταῦτα ἐπὶ ταῖς τοῦ μεγάλου ζῴου δόξαις, οἷς μὲν χαίροι ἐκεῖνο ἀγαθὰ καλῶν, οἷς δὲ ἄχθοιτο κακά, ἄλλον δὲ μηδένα ἔχοι λόγον περὶ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τἀναγκαῖα δίκαια καλοῖ καὶ καλά, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν, ὅσον διαφέρει τῷ ὄντι, μήτε ἑωρακὼς εἴη μήτε ἄλλῳ δυνατὸς δεῖξαι.
“It’s as if someone were rearing a great, powerful beast and had learned its moods and 493b appetites: how to approach it and where to touch it, when it’s most savage or most gentle and what makes it so, what sounds it tends to make on each occasion, and what sounds from someone else soothe it or make it wild. Having learned all this through long association and time spent, he calls it wisdom, organizes it into a craft, and turns to teaching it, though he knows nothing in truth about which of these convictions and appetites is fine or shameful, 493c good or bad, just or unjust. He applies all these names according to the great animal’s opinions, calling what pleases it good and what annoys it bad. He has no other account of them; he calls what’s necessary just and fine, but he has never seen how much the nature of the necessary really differs from that of the good, and he couldn’t show it to anyone else.
τοιοῦτος δὴ ὢν πρὸς Διὸς οὐκ ἄτοπος ἄν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι παιδευτής;
“Wouldn’t a man like that, by Zeus, seem to you a strange educator?”
ἔμοιγʼ, ἔφη.
ἦ οὖν τι τούτου δοκεῖ διαφέρειν ὁ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν καὶ 493d παντοδαπῶν συνιόντων ὀργὴν καὶ ἡδονὰς κατανενοηκέναι σοφίαν ἡγούμενος, εἴτʼ ἐν γραφικῇ εἴτʼ ἐν μουσικῇ εἴτε δὴ ἐν πολιτικῇ; ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἄν τις τούτοις ὁμιλῇ ἐπιδεικνύμενος, ἢ ποίησιν ἤ τινα ἄλλην δημιουργίαν ἢ πόλει διακονίαν, κυρίους αὑτοῦ ποιῶν τοὺς πολλούς, πέρα τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ἡ Διομηδεία λεγομένη ἀνάγκη ποιεῖν αὐτῷ ταῦτα ἃ ἂν οὗτοι ἐπαινῶσιν· ὡς δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ ταῦτα τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ἤδη πώποτέ του ἤκουσας αὐτῶν λόγον διδόντος οὐ καταγέλαστον; 493e
“He would to me,” he said.
“Well, does he seem any different from the man who thinks it wisdom to have figured out the moods and pleasures of the many and 493d varied people gathered together, whether in painting or music or, for that matter, in politics? If someone associates with the many and shows them a poem, or some other piece of craftsmanship, or a service to the city, making the many his masters beyond what’s necessary, the so-called necessity of Diomedes will compel him to produce whatever they praise. But as for these things being truly good and fine—have you ever yet heard any of them give an argument for that which wasn’t ridiculous?” 493e
οἶμαι δέ γε, ἦ δʼ ὅς, οὐδʼ ἀκούσομαι.
ταῦτα τοίνυν πάντα ἐννοήσας ἐκεῖνο ἀναμνήσθητι· αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ πολλὰ καλά, ἢ αὐτό τι ἕκαστον καὶ 494a μὴ τὰ πολλὰ ἕκαστα, ἔσθʼ ὅπως πλῆθος ἀνέξεται ἢ ἡγήσεαι εἶναι;
ἥκιστά γʼ, ἔφη.
φιλόσοφον μὲν ἄρα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, πλῆθος ἀδύνατον εἶναι.
ἀδύνατον.
καὶ τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας ἄρα ἀνάγκη ψέγεσθαι ὑπʼ αὐτῶν.
ἀνάγκη.
καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων δὴ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, ὅσοι προσομιλοῦντες ὄχλῳ ἀρέσκειν αὐτῷ ἐπιθυμοῦσι.
δῆλον.
“No, and I don’t suppose I ever will,” he said.
“Keep all this in mind, then, and recall the earlier point. Can the multitude possibly accept or believe that the beautiful itself exists, rather than the many beautiful things, or each thing itself 494a rather than the many particular things?”
“Not in the least,” he said.
“Then it’s impossible,” I said, “for the multitude to be philosophical.”
“Impossible.”
“So those who do philosophy are bound to be criticized by them.”
“Bound to be.”
“And by those private individuals who associate with the crowd and want to please it.”
“Clearly.”
ἐκ δὴ τούτων τίνα ὁρᾷς σωτηρίαν φιλοσόφῳ φύσει, ὥστʼ ἐν τῷ ἐπιτηδεύματι μείνασαν πρὸς τέλος ἐλθεῖν; ἐννόει δʼ 494b ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν. ὡμολόγηται γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν εὐμάθεια καὶ μνήμη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ μεγαλοπρέπεια ταύτης εἶναι τῆς φύσεως.
ναί.
οὐκοῦν εὐθὺς ἐν παισὶν ὁ τοιοῦτος πρῶτος ἔσται ἐν ἅπασιν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐὰν τὸ σῶμα φυῇ προσφερὴς τῇ ψυχῇ;
τί δʼ οὐ μέλλει; ἔφη.
βουλήσονται δὴ οἶμαι αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι, ἐπειδὰν πρεσβύτερος γίγνηται, ἐπὶ τὰ αὑτῶν πράγματα οἵ τε οἰκεῖοι καὶ οἱ πολῖται.
πῶς δʼ οὔ; 494c
“Given all this, what salvation do you see for a philosophical nature, so that it stays in its pursuit and reaches the end? Think about it in light 494b of what we said before. We agreed that quickness at learning, memory, courage and high-mindedness belong to this nature.”
“Yes.”
“Then won’t such a person be first in everything right from childhood, especially if his body grows to match his soul?”
“Why wouldn’t he?” he said.
“And when he gets older, I imagine, his family and fellow citizens will want to use him for their own affairs.”
“Of course.” 494c
ὑποκείσονται ἄρα δεόμενοι καὶ τιμῶντες, προκαταλαμβάνοντες καὶ προκολακεύοντες τὴν μέλλουσαν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν.
φιλεῖ γοῦν, ἔφη, οὕτω γίγνεσθαι.
τί οὖν οἴει, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τὸν τοιοῦτον ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ποιήσειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐὰν τύχῃ μεγάλης πόλεως ὢν καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ πλούσιός τε καὶ γενναῖος, καὶ ἔτι εὐειδὴς καὶ μέγας; ἆρʼ οὐ πληρωθήσεσθαι ἀμηχάνου ἐλπίδος, ἡγούμενον καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων ἱκανὸν ἔσεσθαι 494d πράττειν, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ὑψηλὸν ἐξαρεῖν αὑτόν, σχηματισμοῦ καὶ φρονήματος κενοῦ ἄνευ νοῦ ἐμπιμπλάμενον;
καὶ μάλʼ, ἔφη.
“So they’ll lie at his feet with requests and honors, getting hold of his future power in advance and flattering it ahead of time.”
“That’s certainly how it usually goes,” he said.
“So what do you think such a person will do in such circumstances,” I said, “especially if he happens to be from a great city, rich and well-born in it, and handsome and tall besides? Won’t he be filled with boundless hope, believing he’ll be capable of managing the affairs of Greeks and non-Greeks alike, 494d and won’t he exalt himself on that account, filling up with posturing and empty pride, without any sense?”
“He certainly will,” he said.
τῷ δὴ οὕτω διατιθεμένῳ ἐάν τις ἠρέμα προσελθὼν τἀληθῆ λέγῃ, ὅτι νοῦς οὐκ ἔνεστιν αὐτῷ, δεῖται δέ, τὸ δὲ οὐ κτητὸν μὴ δουλεύσαντι τῇ κτήσει αὐτοῦ, ἆρʼ εὐπετὲς οἴει εἶναι εἰσακοῦσαι διὰ τοσούτων κακῶν;
πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
“Now if someone gently approaches a person in this condition and tells him the truth—that there’s no sense in him, that he needs it, and that it can’t be acquired unless he slaves to acquire it—do you think it will be easy for him to listen, surrounded by so many bad influences?”
“Far from it,” he said.
ἐὰν δʼ οὖν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, διὰ τὸ εὖ πεφυκέναι καὶ τὸ συγγενὲς 494e τῶν λόγων εἰσαισθάνηταί τέ πῃ καὶ κάμπτηται καὶ ἕλκηται πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν, τί οἰόμεθα δράσειν ἐκείνους τοὺς ἡγουμένους ἀπολλύναι αὐτοῦ τὴν χρείαν τε καὶ ἑταιρίαν; οὐ πᾶν μὲν ἔργον, πᾶν δʼ ἔπος λέγοντάς τε καὶ πράττοντας καὶ περὶ αὐτόν, ὅπως ἂν μὴ πεισθῇ, καὶ περὶ τὸν πείθοντα, ὅπως ἂν μὴ οἷός τʼ ᾖ, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐπιβουλεύοντας καὶ δημοσίᾳ εἰς ἀγῶνας καθιστάντας;
πολλή, ἦ δʼ ὅς, ἀνάγκη.
ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως ὁ τοιοῦτος φιλοσοφήσει;
οὐ πάνυ.
“But suppose,” I said, “that because of his good nature and his kinship 494e with the arguments he does somehow perceive something, and is turned and drawn toward philosophy. What do we think those people will do who believe they’re losing his usefulness and his companionship? Won’t they stop at nothing, in word or deed, both with him, so that he won’t be persuaded, and with the one persuading him, so that he won’t be able to—plotting against him in private and hauling him into court in public?”
“They’re bound to,” he said.
“So is there any way such a person will do philosophy?”
“Hardly.”
ὁρᾷς οὖν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὅτι οὐ κακῶς ἐλέγομεν ὡς ἄρα καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ τῆς φιλοσόφου φύσεως μέρη, ὅταν ἐν κακῇ τροφῇ γένηται, αἴτια τρόπον τινὰ τοῦ ἐκπεσεῖν ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος, καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθά, πλοῦτοί τε καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη παρασκευή;
οὐ γάρ, ἀλλʼ ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, ἐλέχθη.
“So you see,” I said, “that we weren’t wrong to say that the very components of the philosophical nature, when it gets a bad upbringing, are in a way responsible for its falling away from the pursuit—and so are the so-called goods, wealth and all such resources?”
“No, we weren’t,” he said. “What we said was right.”
οὗτος δή, εἶπον, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ὄλεθρός τε καὶ διαφθορὰ 495b τοσαύτη τε καὶ τοιαύτη τῆς βελτίστης φύσεως εἰς τὸ ἄριστον ἐπιτήδευμα, ὀλίγης καὶ ἄλλως γιγνομένης, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμεν. καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὴ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ οἱ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐργαζόμενοι τὰς πόλεις γίγνονται καὶ τοὺς ἰδιώτας, καὶ οἱ τἀγαθά, οἳ ἂν ταύτῃ τύχωσι ῥυέντες· σμικρὰ δὲ φύσις οὐδὲν μέγα οὐδέποτε οὐδένα οὔτε ἰδιώτην οὔτε πόλιν δρᾷ.
ἀληθέστατα, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
“This, then, my remarkable friend,” I said, “is the ruin and corruption, 495b so great and of such a kind, of the best nature with respect to the best pursuit—a nature that’s rare enough anyway, as we say. And it’s from among these men that there come both those who do the greatest harm to cities and to individuals, and those who do them good, if they happen to be swept in that direction. A small nature never does anything great to anyone, individual or city.”
“Very true,” he said.
οὗτοι μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἐκπίπτοντες, οἷς μάλιστα προσήκει, 495c ἔρημον καὶ ἀτελῆ φιλοσοφίαν λείποντες αὐτοί τε βίον οὐ προσήκοντα οὐδʼ ἀληθῆ ζῶσιν, τὴν δέ, ὥσπερ ὀρφανὴν συγγενῶν, ἄλλοι ἐπεισελθόντες ἀνάξιοι ᾔσχυνάν τε καὶ ὀνείδη περιῆψαν, οἷα καὶ σὺ φῂς ὀνειδίζειν τοὺς ὀνειδίζοντας, ὡς οἱ συνόντες αὐτῇ οἱ μὲν οὐδενός, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ πολλῶν κακῶν ἄξιοί εἰσιν.
καὶ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη, τά γε λεγόμενα ταῦτα.
“So the people she most belongs with fall away like this, 495c leaving philosophy deserted and unfulfilled. They themselves live a life that doesn’t suit them and isn’t true, while others, unworthy of her, move in on her as if she were an orphan with no kin, and disgrace her and fasten reproaches on her—the very ones you say her critics make: that of those who spend time with her, some are worthless and most deserve all sorts of bad things.”
“Yes,” he said, “that’s certainly what people say.”
εἰκότως γε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, λεγόμενα. καθορῶντες γὰρ ἄλλοι ἀνθρωπίσκοι κενὴν τὴν χώραν ταύτην γιγνομένην, καλῶν 495d δὲ ὀνομάτων καὶ προσχημάτων μεστήν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐκ τῶν εἱργμῶν εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ ἀποδιδράσκοντες, ἅσμενοι καὶ οὗτοι ἐκ τῶν τεχνῶν ἐκπηδῶσιν εἰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, οἳ ἂν κομψότατοι ὄντες τυγχάνωσι περὶ τὸ αὑτῶν τεχνίον. ὅμως γὰρ δὴ πρός γε τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας καίπερ οὕτω πραττούσης φιλοσοφίας τὸ ἀξίωμα μεγαλοπρεπέστερον λείπεται, οὗ δὴ ἐφιέμενοι πολλοὶ ἀτελεῖς μὲν τὰς φύσεις, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν τε καὶ δημιουργιῶν ὥσπερ τὰ σώματα λελώβηνται, οὕτω 495e καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς συγκεκλασμένοι τε καὶ ἀποτεθρυμμένοι διὰ τὰς βαναυσίας τυγχάνουσιν—ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη;
“And it’s natural that they say it,” I said. “Other little men see this territory emptying out, though it’s full of fine 495d names and pretensions, and like people who escape from prison into temples, they gladly leap out of their crafts into philosophy—those, that is, who happen to be cleverest at their own little craft. For even faring as she does, philosophy still keeps a grander prestige than the other crafts, and many people with imperfect natures aspire to it: people whose bodies have been deformed by their crafts and trades, and whose souls 495e have likewise been cramped and crushed by their menial work. Or isn’t that inevitable?”
καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.
δοκεῖς οὖν τι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, διαφέρειν αὐτοὺς ἰδεῖν ἀργύριον κτησαμένου χαλκέως φαλακροῦ καὶ σμικροῦ, νεωστὶ μὲν ἐκ δεσμῶν λελυμένου, ἐν βαλανείῳ δὲ λελουμένου, νεουογὸν ἱμάτιον ἔχοντος, ὡς νυμφίου παρεσκευασμένου, διὰ πενίαν καὶ ἐρημίαν τοῦ δεσπότου τὴν θυγατέρα μέλλοντος γαμεῖν;
οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη, διαφέρει.
ποῖʼ ἄττα οὖν εἰκὸς γεννᾶν τοὺς τοιούτους; οὐ νόθα καὶ φαῦλα;
πολλὴ ἀνάγκη.
“It certainly is,” he said.
“Do you think,” I said, “that they look any different from a bald little metalworker who’s come into some money, just released from prison, freshly washed at the bathhouse, wearing a brand-new cloak, all dressed up like a bridegroom, about to marry his master’s daughter because she’s poor and has been left without anyone?”
“No different at all,” he said.
“And what sort of offspring are such people likely to father? Won’t they be illegitimate and inferior?”
“That’s inevitable.”
τί δέ; τοὺς ἀναξίους παιδεύσεως, ὅταν αὐτῇ πλησιάζοντες ὁμιλῶσι μὴ κατʼ ἀξίαν, ποῖʼ ἄττα φῶμεν γεννᾶν διανοήματά τε καὶ δόξας; ἆρʼ οὐχ ὡς ἀληθῶς προσήκοντα ἀκοῦσαι σοφίσματα, καὶ οὐδὲν γνήσιον οὐδὲ φρονήσεως ἄξιον ἀληθινῆς ἐχόμενον;
παντελῶς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.
“What about this? When those unworthy of education draw near it and consort with it unworthily, what sort of thoughts and opinions should we say they father? Won’t they be what can truly be called sophisms, with nothing genuine about them, nothing that has any share in true understanding?”
“Absolutely,” he said.
πάνσμικρον δή τι, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, λείπεται τῶν 496b κατʼ ἀξίαν ὁμιλούντων φιλοσοφίᾳ, ἤ που ὑπὸ φυγῆς καταληφθὲν γενναῖον καὶ εὖ τεθραμμένον ἦθος, ἀπορίᾳ τῶν διαφθερούντων κατὰ φύσιν μεῖναν ἐπʼ αὐτῇ, ἢ ἐν σμικρᾷ πόλει ὅταν μεγάλη ψυχὴ φυῇ καὶ ἀτιμάσασα τὰ τῆς πόλεως ὑπερίδῃ· βραχὺ δέ πού τι καὶ ἀπʼ ἄλλης τέχνης δικαίως ἀτιμάσαν εὐφυὲς ἐπʼ αὐτὴν ἂν ἔλθοι. εἴη δʼ ἂν καὶ ὁ τοῦ ἡμετέρου ἑταίρου Θεάγους χαλινὸς οἷος κατασχεῖν· καὶ γὰρ 496c Θεάγει τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα παρεσκεύασται πρὸς τὸ ἐκπεσεῖν φιλοσοφίας, ἡ δὲ τοῦ σώματος νοσοτροφία ἀπείργουσα αὐτὸν τῶν πολιτικῶν κατέχει. τὸ δʼ ἡμέτερον οὐκ ἄξιον λέγειν, τὸ δαιμόνιον σημεῖον· ἢ γάρ πού τινι ἄλλῳ ἢ οὐδενὶ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν γέγονεν.
“Then there remains, Adeimantus,” I said, “only a very small group of those 496b who consort with philosophy worthily. Perhaps a noble, well-brought-up character held back by exile, who, with no one around to corrupt him, stays with her as his nature leads; or a great soul born in a small city, who disdains the city’s affairs and looks down on them. And a few, perhaps, with good natures might come to her from some other craft that they rightly disdain. Then there’s the bridle of our friend Theages, which could also hold someone back: for 496c Theages had everything else in place for falling away from philosophy, but his sickly body keeps him out of politics and holds him back. My own case, the divine sign, isn’t worth mentioning; it has happened to perhaps one other person before me, or to no one.
καὶ τούτων δὴ τῶν ὀλίγων οἱ γενόμενοι καὶ γευσάμενοι ὡς ἡδὺ καὶ μακάριον τὸ κτῆμα, καὶ τῶν πολλῶν αὖ ἱκανῶς ἰδόντες τὴν μανίαν, καὶ ὅτι οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν περὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων πράττει οὐδʼ ἔστι 496d σύμμαχος μεθʼ ὅτου τις ἰὼν ἐπὶ τὴν τῷ δικαίῳ βοήθειαν σῴζοιτʼ ἄν, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ εἰς θηρία ἄνθρωπος ἐμπεσών, οὔτε συναδικεῖν ἐθέλων οὔτε ἱκανὸς ὢν εἷς πᾶσιν ἀγρίοις ἀντέχειν, πρίν τι τὴν πόλιν ἢ φίλους ὀνῆσαι προαπολόμενος ἀνωφελὴς αὑτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν γένοιτο—ταῦτα πάντα λογισμῷ λαβών, ἡσυχίαν ἔχων καὶ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττων, οἷον ἐν χειμῶνι κονιορτοῦ καὶ ζάλης ὑπὸ πνεύματος φερομένου ὑπὸ τειχίον ἀποστάς, ὁρῶν τοὺς ἄλλους καταπιμπλαμένους ἀνομίας, ἀγαπᾷ εἴ πῃ αὐτὸς καθαρὸς ἀδικίας τε καὶ ἀνοσίων 496e ἔργων τόν τε ἐνθάδε βίον βιώσεται καὶ τὴν ἀπαλλαγὴν αὐτοῦ μετὰ καλῆς ἐλπίδος ἵλεώς τε καὶ εὐμενὴς ἀπαλλάξεται.
“Someone who has become one of these few and has tasted how sweet and blessed a possession it is, and who has also seen clearly enough the madness of the many—that practically no one does anything sound in public affairs, and that there’s no 496d ally with whom one could go to the aid of justice and survive; that he’d be like a man fallen among wild beasts, unwilling to join in their wrongdoing and unable to hold out alone against all these wild creatures, and would perish before he could benefit his city or his friends, useless to himself and to everyone else—taking all this into account, he keeps quiet and minds his own business. Like someone who shelters behind a little wall in a storm, when the wind drives dust and rain along, he watches others filled with lawlessness and is content if he can somehow live his life here pure of injustice and unholy 496e deeds, and take his leave of it with good hope, calm and kindly.”
ἀλλά τοι, ἦ δʼ ὅς, οὐ τὰ ἐλάχιστα ἂν διαπραξάμενος ἀπαλλάττοιτο.
οὐδέ γε, εἶπον, τὰ μέγιστα, μὴ τυχὼν πολιτείας προσηκούσης· ἐν γὰρ προσηκούσῃ αὐτός τε μᾶλλον αὐξήσεται καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἰδίων τὰ κοινὰ σώσει.
τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φιλοσοφίας ὧν ἕνεκα διαβολὴν εἴληφεν καὶ ὅτι οὐ δικαίως, ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ μετρίως εἰρῆσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἔτʼ ἄλλο λέγεις τι σύ.
ἀλλʼ οὐδέν, ἦ δʼ ὅς, ἔτι λέγω περὶ τούτου· ἀλλὰ τὴν προσήκουσαν αὐτῇ τίνα τῶν νῦν λέγεις πολιτειῶν; 497b
“Well,” he said, “that’s no small accomplishment to take his leave with.”
“Nor the greatest,” I said, “if he doesn’t find a constitution that suits him. In a suitable one he himself will grow more, and will preserve the common good along with his own.
“As for philosophy, then—why it has got its bad reputation, and that the reputation is unjust—I think that’s been adequately said, unless you have something more to say.”
“No, I’ve nothing more to say about that,” he said. “But which of today’s constitutions do you say suits her?” 497b
οὐδʼ ἡντινοῦν, εἶπον, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπαιτιῶμαι, μηδεμίαν ἀξίαν εἶναι τῶν νῦν κατάστασιν πόλεως φιλοσόφου φύσεως· διὸ καὶ στρέφεσθαί τε καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι αὐτήν, ὥσπερ ξενικὸν σπέρμα ἐν γῇ ἄλλῃ σπειρόμενον ἐξίτηλον εἰς τὸ ἐπιχώριον φιλεῖ κρατούμενον ἰέναι, οὕτω καὶ τοῦτο τὸ γένος νῦν μὲν οὐκ ἴσχειν τὴν αὑτοῦ δύναμιν, ἀλλʼ εἰς ἀλλότριον ἦθος ἐκπίπτειν· εἰ δὲ λήψεται τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν, ὥσπερ 497c καὶ αὐτὸ ἄριστόν ἐστιν, τότε δηλώσει ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν τῷ ὄντι θεῖον ἦν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἀνθρώπινα, τά τε τῶν φύσεων καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων. δῆλος δὴ οὖν εἶ ὅτι μετὰ τοῦτο ἐρήσῃ τίς αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία.
“None at all,” I said. “That’s exactly my complaint: no city constitution of today is worthy of the philosophical nature. That’s why it gets twisted and altered. Just as a foreign seed sown in other soil tends to be overpowered and fade into the local kind, so this breed too does not now keep its own power, but degenerates into an alien character. But if it finds the best constitution, just 497c as it is itself the best, then it will make plain that it was really divine, and everything else human, both natures and pursuits. Clearly, then, you’re going to ask next what this constitution is.”
οὐκ ἔγνως, ἔφη· οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο ἔμελλον, ἀλλʼ εἰ αὑτὴ ἣν ἡμεῖς διεληλύθαμεν οἰκίζοντες τὴν πόλιν ἢ ἄλλη.
τὰ μὲν ἄλλα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, αὕτη· τοῦτο δὲ αὐτὸ ἐρρήθη μὲν καὶ τότε, ὅτι δεήσοι τι ἀεὶ ἐνεῖναι ἐν τῇ πόλει λόγον 497d ἔχον τῆς πολιτείας τὸν αὐτὸν ὅνπερ καὶ σὺ ὁ νομοθέτης ἔχων τοὺς νόμους ἐτίθεις.
ἐρρήθη γάρ, ἔφη.
ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἱκανῶς, εἶπον, ἐδηλώθη, φόβῳ ὧν ὑμεῖς ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι δεδηλώκατε μακρὰν καὶ χαλεπὴν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν οὐ πάντων ῥᾷστον διελθεῖν.
τὸ ποῖον;
“You guessed wrong,” he said. “That wasn’t what I was going to ask, but whether it’s the one we described in founding our city, or another.”
“In other respects it’s that one,” I said. “But this very point was mentioned then too: that there would always need to be something in the city with the same rationale 497d for the constitution that you, the lawgiver, had when you laid down the laws.”
“Yes, it was mentioned,” he said.
“But it wasn’t made sufficiently clear,” I said, “because I was afraid of the objections you all have seized on to show that its demonstration would be long and difficult. And what remains isn’t the easiest thing to go through, either.”
“What is it?”
τίνα τρόπον μεταχειριζομένη πόλις φιλοσοφίαν οὐ διολεῖται. τὰ γὰρ δὴ μεγάλα πάντα ἐπισφαλῆ, καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον τὰ καλὰ τῷ ὄντι χαλεπά. 497e
ἀλλʼ ὅμως, ἔφη, λαβέτω τέλος ἡ ἀπόδειξις τούτου φανεροῦ γενομένου.
οὐ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἀλλʼ εἴπερ, τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι διακωλύσει· παρὼν δὲ τήν γʼ ἐμὴν προθυμίαν εἴσῃ. σκόπει δὲ καὶ νῦν ὡς προθύμως καὶ παρακινδυνευτικῶς μέλλω λέγειν, ὅτι τοὐναντίον ἢ νῦν δεῖ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος τούτου πόλιν ἅπτεσθαι.
πῶς;
“How a city can take up philosophy without being destroyed. For all great things are precarious, and, as the saying goes, fine things really are hard.” 497e
“All the same,” he said, “let the demonstration be completed by making this clear.”
“It won’t be lack of will that stops me,” I said, “but, if anything, lack of ability. You’ll be here to see my eagerness for yourself. And notice even now how eagerly and recklessly I’m about to say that a city should take up this pursuit in the opposite way from how it does now.”
“How so?”
νῦν μέν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, οἱ καὶ ἁπτόμενοι μειράκια ὄντα ἄρτι 498a ἐκ παίδων τὸ μεταξὺ οἰκονομίας καὶ χρηματισμοῦ πλησιάσαντες αὐτοῦ τῷ χαλεπωτάτῳ ἀπαλλάττονται, οἱ φιλοσοφώτατοι ποιούμενοι—λέγω δὲ χαλεπώτατον τὸ περὶ τοὺς λόγους —ἐν δὲ τῷ ἔπειτα, ἐὰν καὶ ἄλλων τοῦτο πραττόντων παρακαλούμενοι ἐθέλωσιν ἀκροαταὶ γίγνεσθαι, μεγάλα ἡγοῦνται, πάρεργον οἰόμενοι αὐτὸ δεῖν πράττειν· πρὸς δὲ τὸ γῆρας ἐκτὸς δή τινων ὀλίγων ἀποσβέννυνται πολὺ μᾶλλον τοῦ 498b Ἡρακλειτείου ἡλίου, ὅσον αὖθις οὐκ ἐξάπτονται.
δεῖ δὲ πῶς; ἔφη.
“Now,” I said, “those who take it up at all are youngsters just out 498a of childhood, who approach it in the interval before running a household and making money, and then, just when they’ve come to its hardest part, they drop it—and these are counted the most philosophical. By the hardest part I mean the part about arguments. Later, if they’re invited to listen when others are doing it, and they agree to, they think that’s a great thing, since they believe it should be done as a sideline. And toward old age, with a few exceptions, they’re extinguished much more thoroughly than 498b Heraclitus’ sun, in that they’re never rekindled.”
“So how should it be?” he said.
πᾶν τοὐναντίον· μειράκια μὲν ὄντα καὶ παῖδας μειρακιώδη παιδείαν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν μεταχειρίζεσθαι, τῶν τε σωμάτων, ἐν ᾧ βλαστάνει τε καὶ ἀνδροῦται, εὖ μάλα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ὑπηρεσίαν φιλοσοφίᾳ κτωμένους· προϊούσης δὲ τῆς ἡλικίας, ἐν ᾗ ἡ ψυχὴ τελεοῦσθαι ἄρχεται, ἐπιτείνειν τὰ ἐκείνης γυμνάσια· ὅταν δὲ λήγῃ μὲν ἡ ῥώμη, πολιτικῶν δὲ καὶ 498c στρατειῶν ἐκτὸς γίγνηται, τότε ἤδη ἀφέτους νέμεσθαι καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο πράττειν, ὅτι μὴ πάρεργον, τοὺς μέλλοντας εὐδαιμόνως βιώσεσθαι καὶ τελευτήσαντας τῷ βίῳ τῷ βεβιωμένῳ τὴν ἐκεῖ μοῖραν ἐπιστήσειν πρέπουσαν.
“Quite the opposite. While they’re youngsters and children, they should engage in an education and philosophy suited to youth, and take very good care of their bodies while these are growing and becoming a man’s, securing them as servants for philosophy. As they advance in age, when the soul begins to reach maturity, they should intensify its exercises. And when their strength fails and they’re past political 498c and military service, then at last they should be let loose to graze, and do nothing else except as a sideline—those, that is, who are going to live happily and, after death, crown the life they’ve lived with a fitting lot in the other world.”
ὡς ἀληθῶς μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη, λέγειν γε προθύμως, ὦ Σώκρατες· οἶμαι μέντοι τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν ἀκουόντων προθυμότερον ἔτι ἀντιτείνειν οὐδʼ ὁπωστιοῦν πεισομένους, ἀπὸ Θρασυμάχου ἀρξαμένους.
μὴ διάβαλλε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἐμὲ καὶ Θρασύμαχον ἄρτι 498d φίλους γεγονότας, οὐδὲ πρὸ τοῦ ἐχθροὺς ὄντας. πείρας γὰρ οὐδὲν ἀνήσομεν, ἕως ἂν ἢ πείσωμεν καὶ τοῦτον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἢ προὔργου τι ποιήσωμεν εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν βίον, ὅταν αὖθις γενόμενοι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐντύχωσι λόγοις.
εἰς μικρόν γʼ, ἔφη, χρόνον εἴρηκας.
“You really do seem to be speaking eagerly, Socrates,” he said. “But I think most of your listeners will resist you even more eagerly and won’t be persuaded in the slightest—starting with Thrasymachus.”
“Don’t stir up trouble,” I said, “between Thrasymachus and me, when we’ve just 498d become friends—not that we were enemies before. We won’t give up trying until we either persuade him and the others, or do something to help them in that other life, when they’re born again and come across arguments like these.”
“That’s a short time you’re talking about,” he said.
εἰς οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν, ἔφην, ὥς γε πρὸς τὸν ἅπαντα. τὸ μέντοι μὴ πείθεσθαι τοῖς λεγομένοις τοὺς πολλοὺς θαῦμα οὐδέν· οὐ γὰρ πώποτε εἶδον γενόμενον τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον, 498e ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον τοιαῦτʼ ἄττα ῥήματα ἐξεπίτηδες ἀλλήλοις ὡμοιωμένα, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ὥσπερ νῦν συμπεσόντα.
ἄνδρα δὲ ἀρετῇ παρισωμένον καὶ ὡμοιωμένον μέχρι τοῦ δυνατοῦ τελέως ἔργῳ τε καὶ λόγῳ, δυναστεύοντα 499a ἐν πόλει ἑτέρᾳ τοιαύτῃ, οὐ πώποτε ἑωράκασιν, οὔτε ἕνα οὔτε πλείους. ἢ οἴει;
οὐδαμῶς γε.
“No time at all,” I said, “compared with the whole. Still, it’s no wonder that most people aren’t persuaded by what we say. They’ve never seen the thing we’re now stating actually come into being, 498e but rather phrases like these, deliberately made to match one another, not falling together by chance as they did just now.
“But a man matched and made like to excellence as perfectly as possible in deed and word, ruling 499a in a city of the same kind—that they have never seen, not one or more than one. Or do you think they have?”
“Not at all.”
οὐδέ γε αὖ λόγων, ὦ μακάριε, καλῶν τε καὶ ἐλευθέρων ἱκανῶς ἐπήκοοι γεγόνασιν, οἵων ζητεῖν μὲν τὸ ἀληθὲς συντεταμένως ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου τοῦ γνῶναι χάριν, τὰ δὲ κομψά τε καὶ ἐριστικὰ καὶ μηδαμόσε ἄλλοσε τείνοντα ἢ πρὸς δόξαν καὶ ἔριν καὶ ἐν δίκαις καὶ ἐν ἰδίαις συνουσίαις πόρρωθεν ἀσπαζομένων.
οὐδὲ τούτων, ἔφη.
“Nor, my good friend, have they listened enough to fine and free discussions, the kind that search strenuously and in every way for the truth for the sake of knowing it, and that keep their distance from the clever, contentious stuff that aims at nothing but reputation and strife, whether in lawsuits or in private gatherings.”
“No, they haven’t,” he said.
τούτων τοι χάριν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καὶ ταῦτα προορώμενοι 499b ἡμεῖς τότε καὶ δεδιότες ὅμως ἐλέγομεν, ὑπὸ τἀληθοῦς ἠναγκασμένοι, ὅτι οὔτε πόλις οὔτε πολιτεία οὐδέ γʼ ἀνὴρ ὁμοίως μή ποτε γένηται τέλεος, πρὶν ἂν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις τούτοις τοῖς ὀλίγοις καὶ οὐ πονηροῖς, ἀχρήστοις δὲ νῦν κεκλημένοις, ἀνάγκη τις ἐκ τύχης περιβάλῃ, εἴτε βούλονται εἴτε μή, πόλεως ἐπιμεληθῆναι, καὶ τῇ πόλει κατηκόῳ γενέσθαι, ἢ τῶν νῦν ἐν δυναστείαις ἢ βασιλείαις ὄντων ὑέσιν ἢ αὐτοῖς 499c ἔκ τινος θείας ἐπιπνοίας ἀληθινῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινὸς ἔρως ἐμπέσῃ. τούτων δὲ πότερα γενέσθαι ἢ ἀμφότερα ὡς ἄρα ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐδένα φημὶ ἔχειν λόγον. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἡμεῖς δικαίως καταγελῴμεθα, ὡς ἄλλως εὐχαῖς ὅμοια λέγοντες. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως;
“That’s why,” I said, “even though we foresaw this then 499b and were afraid, we still said, compelled by the truth, that no city or constitution, nor any man either, will ever become perfect until some necessity by chance compels these few philosophers—the ones who aren’t wicked but are now called useless—to take charge of a city, whether they want to or not, and compels the city to obey them; or until the sons of those now holding power or kingship, or the rulers 499c themselves, are struck by some divine inspiration with a true passion for true philosophy. I say there’s no reason to think that either or both of these is impossible. If it were, we’d rightly be laughed at for saying things that are no better than wishful prayers. Or isn’t that so?”
οὕτως.
εἰ τοίνυν ἄκροις εἰς φιλοσοφίαν πόλεώς τις ἀνάγκη ἐπιμεληθῆναι ἢ γέγονεν ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ τῷ παρεληλυθότι χρόνῳ ἢ καὶ νῦν ἔστιν ἔν τινι βαρβαρικῷ τόπῳ, πόρρω που 499d ἐκτὸς ὄντι τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐπόψεως, ἢ καὶ ἔπειτα γενήσεται, περὶ τούτου ἕτοιμοι τῷ λόγῳ διαμάχεσθαι, ὡς γέγονεν ἡ εἰρημένη πολιτεία καὶ ἔστιν καὶ γενήσεταί γε, ὅταν αὕτη ἡ Μοῦσα πόλεως ἐγκρατὴς γένηται. οὐ γὰρ ἀδύνατος γενέσθαι, οὐδʼ ἡμεῖς ἀδύνατα λέγομεν· χαλεπὰ δὲ καὶ παρʼ ἡμῶν ὁμολογεῖται.
καὶ ἐμοί, ἔφη, οὕτω δοκεῖ.
“It is.”
“So if, in the infinite time that has passed, some necessity has compelled those who are supreme in philosophy to take charge of a city, or does so now in some non-Greek land far 499d beyond our view, or will do so hereafter, we’re ready to fight it out in argument that the constitution we’ve described has existed, exists, and will exist whenever this Muse gains control of a city. It isn’t impossible for it to come about, and we’re not talking about impossibilities. That it’s difficult, we ourselves admit.”
“I think so too,” he said.
τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὅτι οὐκ αὖ δοκεῖ, ἐρεῖς;
ἴσως, ἔφη.
ὦ μακάριε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, μὴ πάνυ οὕτω τῶν πολλῶν κατηγόρει. 499e ἀλλοίαν τοι δόξαν ἕξουσιν, ἐὰν αὐτοῖς μὴ φιλονικῶν ἀλλὰ παραμυθούμενος καὶ ἀπολυόμενος τὴν τῆς φιλομαθείας διαβολὴν ἐνδεικνύῃ οὓς λέγεις τοὺς φιλοσόφους, καὶ διορίζῃ 500a ὥσπερ ἄρτι τήν τε φύσιν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ἐπιτήδευσιν, ἵνα μὴ ἡγῶνταί σε λέγειν οὓς αὐτοὶ οἴονται.
“But you’ll tell me,” I said, “that most people don’t think so?”
“Perhaps,” he said.
“My good friend,” I said, “don’t be so very hard on the many. 499e They’ll have a different opinion if, instead of picking a fight, you soothe them and try to clear away the slander against the love of learning, pointing out whom you mean by philosophers and defining, 500a as we did just now, their nature and their pursuit, so that they don’t think you mean the people they have in mind.
ἢ καὶ ἐὰν οὕτω θεῶνται, ἀλλοίαν τοι φήσεις αὐτοὺς δόξαν λήψεσθαι καὶ ἄλλα ἀποκρινεῖσθαι. ἢ οἴει τινὰ χαλεπαίνειν τῷ μὴ χαλεπῷ ἢ φθονεῖν τῷ μὴ φθονερῷ ἄφθονόν τε καὶ πρᾷον ὄντα; ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ σε προφθάσας λέγω ὅτι ἐν ὀλίγοις τισὶν ἡγοῦμαι, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐν τῷ πλήθει, χαλεπὴν οὕτω φύσιν γίγνεσθαι.
καὶ ἐγὼ ἀμέλει, ἔφη, συνοίομαι. 500b
“Or even if they do look at it that way, won’t you say they’ll take a different view and give different answers? Do you think anyone is harsh toward someone who isn’t harsh, or envious of someone who isn’t envious, when he himself is free of envy and gentle? I’ll get in ahead of you and say that I think such a harsh nature is found in a few people, not in the majority.”
“And I certainly agree,” he said. 500b
Philosophers as rulers
Socrates argues philosopher-rulers are possible and must take the longer way of study.
οὐκοῦν καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο συνοίει, τοῦ χαλεπῶς πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν τοὺς πολλοὺς διακεῖσθαι ἐκείνους αἰτίους εἶναι τοὺς ἔξωθεν οὐ προσῆκον ἐπεισκεκωμακότας, λοιδορουμένους τε αὑτοῖς καὶ φιλαπεχθημόνως ἔχοντας καὶ ἀεὶ περὶ ἀνθρώπων τοὺς λόγους ποιουμένους, ἥκιστα φιλοσοφίᾳ πρέπον ποιοῦντας;
πολύ γʼ, ἔφη.
“Then do you also agree about this: that the cause of the many’s hostility toward philosophy is those outsiders who have crashed in where they don’t belong, like drunken revelers, abusing one another, spoiling for a fight, and always making people the subject of their talk—doing what least befits philosophy?”
“Very much so,” he said.
οὐδὲ γάρ που, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, σχολὴ τῷ γε ὡς ἀληθῶς πρὸς τοῖς οὖσι τὴν διάνοιαν ἔχοντι κάτω βλέπειν εἰς ἀνθρώπων 500c πραγματείας, καὶ μαχόμενον αὐτοῖς φθόνου τε καὶ δυσμενείας ἐμπίμπλασθαι, ἀλλʼ εἰς τεταγμένα ἄττα καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἀεὶ ἔχοντα ὁρῶντας καὶ θεωμένους οὔτʼ ἀδικοῦντα οὔτʼ ἀδικούμενα ὑπʼ ἀλλήλων, κόσμῳ δὲ πάντα καὶ κατὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ταῦτα μιμεῖσθαί τε καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα ἀφομοιοῦσθαι. ἢ οἴει τινὰ μηχανὴν εἶναι, ὅτῳ τις ὁμιλεῖ ἀγάμενος, μὴ μιμεῖσθαι ἐκεῖνο;
ἀδύνατον, ἔφη.
“For surely, Adeimantus, someone whose thought is truly directed toward the things that are has no leisure to look down at human 500c affairs, and to fight with people and be filled with envy and ill will. Instead, looking at and contemplating things that are ordered and always the same, that neither do wrong nor are wronged by one another, but are all in order and in accordance with reason, he imitates them and makes himself as like them as he can. Or do you think there’s any way someone can avoid imitating what he admires and associates with?”
“Impossible,” he said.
θείῳ δὴ καὶ κοσμίῳ ὅ γε φιλόσοφος ὁμιλῶν κόσμιός τε 500d καὶ θεῖος εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ γίγνεται· διαβολὴ δʼ ἐν πᾶσι πολλή.
παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
ἂν οὖν τις, εἶπον, αὐτῷ ἀνάγκη γένηται ἃ ἐκεῖ ὁρᾷ μελετῆσαι εἰς ἀνθρώπων ἤθη καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ τιθέναι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἑαυτὸν πλάττειν, ἆρα κακὸν δημιουργὸν αὐτὸν οἴει γενήσεσθαι σωφροσύνης τε καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ συμπάσης τῆς δημοτικῆς ἀρετῆς;
ἥκιστά γε, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
“So the philosopher, associating with what is divine and orderly, becomes orderly 500d and divine himself, as far as a human being can. But there’s plenty of slander everywhere.”
“Absolutely.”
“Now if some necessity arises for him,” I said, “to practice putting what he sees there into people’s characters, both privately and publicly, instead of shaping only himself, do you think he’ll prove a poor craftsman of moderation, justice and civic excellence as a whole?”
“Not at all,” he said.
ἀλλʼ ἐὰν δὴ αἴσθωνται οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἀληθῆ περὶ αὐτοῦ 500e λέγομεν, χαλεπανοῦσι δὴ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις καὶ ἀπιστήσουσιν ἡμῖν λέγουσιν ὡς οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἄλλως εὐδαιμονήσειε πόλις, εἰ μὴ αὐτὴν διαγράψειαν οἱ τῷ θείῳ παραδείγματι χρώμενοι ζωγράφοι;
οὐ χαλεπανοῦσιν, ἦ δʼ ὅς, ἐάνπερ αἴσθωνται.
ἀλλὰ δὴ 501a τίνα λέγεις τρόπον τῆς διαγραφῆς;
“But if the many realize that what we’re saying about him 500e is true, will they really be harsh with philosophers and distrust us when we say that a city could never be happy unless its outlines were drawn by painters using the divine model?”
“They won’t be harsh,” he said, “if they do realize it.
“But 501a what way of drawing it do you mean?”
λαβόντες, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὥσπερ πίνακα πόλιν τε καὶ ἤθη ἀνθρώπων, πρῶτον μὲν καθαρὰν ποιήσειαν ἄν, ὃ οὐ πάνυ ῥᾴδιον· ἀλλʼ οὖν οἶσθʼ ὅτι τούτῳ ἂν εὐθὺς τῶν ἄλλων διενέγκοιεν, τῷ μήτε ἰδιώτου μήτε πόλεως ἐθελῆσαι ἂν ἅψασθαι μηδὲ γράφειν νόμους, πρὶν ἢ παραλαβεῖν καθαρὰν ἢ αὐτοὶ ποιῆσαι.
καὶ ὀρθῶς γʼ, ἔφη.
οὐκοῦν μετὰ ταῦτα οἴει ὑπογράψασθαι ἂν τὸ σχῆμα τῆς πολιτείας;
τί μήν; 501b
“They would take a city and people’s characters,” I said, “as if they were a painter’s panel, and first wipe it clean—which isn’t at all easy. But you know that right away they’d differ from everyone else in this: they’d be unwilling to touch either an individual or a city, or to write laws, until they had either received it clean or made it clean themselves.”
“And rightly,” he said.
“Then after that, don’t you think they’d sketch in the outline of the constitution?”
“Of course.” 501b
ἔπειτα οἶμαι ἀπεργαζόμενοι πυκνὰ ἂν ἑκατέρωσʼ ἀποβλέποιεν, πρός τε τὸ φύσει δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν καὶ σῶφρον καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνʼ αὖ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐμποιοῖεν, συμμειγνύντες τε καὶ κεραννύντες ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων τὸ ἀνδρείκελον, ἀπʼ ἐκείνου τεκμαιρόμενοι, ὃ δὴ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐκάλεσεν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐγγιγνόμενον θεοειδές τε καὶ θεοείκελον.
ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.
καὶ τὸ μὲν ἂν οἶμαι ἐξαλείφοιεν, τὸ δὲ πάλιν ἐγγράφοιεν, 501c ἕως ὅτι μάλιστα ἀνθρώπεια ἤθη εἰς ὅσον ἐνδέχεται θεοφιλῆ ποιήσειαν.
καλλίστη γοῦν ἄν, ἔφη, ἡ γραφὴ γένοιτο.
“Next, I imagine, as they work, they’d look often in both directions: toward what is by nature just, beautiful, moderate and all such things, and in turn toward what they’re putting into human beings, mixing and blending the pursuits into a man-like tint, taking their cue from what Homer, too, called ‘godlike’ and ‘the image of the gods’ when it appears in human beings.”
“Right,” he said.
“And I suppose they’d rub out one thing and paint another in again, 501c until they had made human characters as dear to the gods as they can possibly be.”
“That would certainly make a very beautiful painting,” he said.
ἆρʼ οὖν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, πείθομέν πῃ ἐκείνους, οὓς διατεταμένους ἐφʼ ἡμᾶς ἔφησθα ἰέναι, ὡς τοιοῦτός ἐστι πολιτειῶν ζωγράφος ὃν τότʼ ἐπῃνοῦμεν πρὸς αὐτούς, διʼ ὃν ἐκεῖνοι ἐχαλέπαινον ὅτι τὰς πόλεις αὐτῷ παρεδίδομεν, καί τι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ νῦν ἀκούοντες πραΰνονται;
καὶ πολύ γε, ἦ δʼ ὅς, εἰ σωφρονοῦσιν. 501d
πῇ γὰρ δὴ ἕξουσιν ἀμφισβητῆσαι; πότερον μὴ τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ ἀληθείας ἐραστὰς εἶναι τοὺς φιλοσόφους;
ἄτοπον μεντἄν, ἔφη, εἴη.
ἀλλὰ μὴ τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν οἰκείαν εἶναι τοῦ ἀρίστου, ἣν ἡμεῖς διήλθομεν;
οὐδὲ τοῦτο.
“So are we somehow persuading those you said were charging at us with all their might,” I said, “that this is the sort of painter of constitutions we were praising to them before—the one they were angry about because we were handing cities over to him? Are they any calmer hearing it now?”
“Much calmer,” he said, “if they’re sensible.” 501d
“Yes, for on what ground will they be able to dispute it? That philosophers aren’t lovers of what is and of truth?”
“That would be absurd,” he said.
“Or that their nature, as we described it, isn’t akin to the best?”
“Not that either.”
τί δέ; τὴν τοιαύτην τυχοῦσαν τῶν προσηκόντων ἐπιτηδευμάτων οὐκ ἀγαθὴν τελέως ἔσεσθαι καὶ φιλόσοφον, εἴπερ τινὰ ἄλλην; ἢ ἐκείνους φήσει μᾶλλον, οὓς ἡμεῖς ἀφωρίσαμεν; 501e
οὐ δήπου.
ἔτι οὖν ἀγριανοῦσι λεγόντων ἡμῶν ὅτι πρὶν ἂν πόλεως τὸ φιλόσοφον γένος ἐγκρατὲς γένηται, οὔτε πόλει οὔτε πολίταις κακῶν παῦλα ἔσται, οὐδὲ ἡ πολιτεία ἣν μυθολογοῦμεν λόγῳ ἔργῳ τέλος λήψεται;
ἴσως, ἔφη, ἧττον.
βούλει οὖν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, μὴ ἧττον φῶμεν αὐτοὺς ἀλλὰ 502a παντάπασι πρᾴους γεγονέναι καὶ πεπεῖσθαι, ἵνα, εἰ μή τι, ἀλλὰ αἰσχυνθέντες ὁμολογήσωσιν;
“Well then, won’t such a nature, when it gets the pursuits suited to it, be completely good and philosophical, if any is? Or will anyone say that the ones we excluded are more so?” 501e
“Surely not.”
“So will they still be enraged when we say that until the philosophical class gains control of a city, there will be no rest from evils for city or citizens, and the constitution we’re telling as a story in words will not be completed in fact?”
“Less so, perhaps,” he said.
“Would you like us to say not that they’re less enraged but 502a that they’ve become completely gentle and been persuaded, so that, if nothing else, they’ll agree out of shame?”
πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.
οὗτοι μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τοῦτο πεπεισμένοι ἔστων· τοῦδε δὲ πέρι τις ἀμφισβητήσει, ὡς οὐκ ἂν τύχοιεν γενόμενοι βασιλέων ἔκγονοι ἢ δυναστῶν τὰς φύσεις φιλόσοφοι;
οὐδʼ ἂν εἷς, ἔφη.
τοιούτους δὲ γενομένους ὡς πολλὴ ἀνάγκη διαφθαρῆναι, ἔχει τις λέγειν; ὡς μὲν γὰρ χαλεπὸν σωθῆναι, καὶ ἡμεῖς 502b συγχωροῦμεν· ὡς δὲ ἐν παντὶ τῷ χρόνῳ τῶν πάντων οὐδέποτε οὐδʼ ἂν εἷς σωθείη, ἔσθʼ ὅστις ἀμφισβητήσειε;
καὶ πῶς;
“Certainly,” he said.
“Then let’s take it that they’ve been persuaded of this,” I said. “Now will anyone dispute this: that the offspring of kings or rulers might happen to be born philosophers by nature?”
“Not a single person,” he said.
“And can anyone claim that once born such, they’re absolutely bound to be corrupted? That it’s hard for them to be saved, we too 502b admit. But that in all of time not a single one of them all could ever be saved—is there anyone who would argue that?”
“How could there be?”
ἀλλὰ μήν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, εἷς ἱκανὸς γενόμενος, πόλιν ἔχων πειθομένην, πάντʼ ἐπιτελέσαι τὰ νῦν ἀπιστούμενα.
ἱκανὸς γάρ, ἔφη.
ἄρχοντος γάρ που, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τιθέντος τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα ἃ διεληλύθαμεν, οὐ δήπου ἀδύνατον ἐθέλειν ποιεῖν τοὺς πολίτας.
οὐδʼ ὁπωστιοῦν.
ἀλλὰ δή, ἅπερ ἡμῖν δοκεῖ, δόξαι καὶ ἄλλοις θαυμαστόν τι καὶ ἀδύνατον; 502c
οὐκ οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε βέλτιστα, εἴπερ δυνατά, ἱκανῶς ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, διήλθομεν.
ἱκανῶς γάρ.
“But surely,” I said, “one is enough, if he has a city that obeys him, to accomplish everything that’s now disbelieved.”
“Yes, one is enough,” he said.
“For if a ruler lays down the laws and pursuits we’ve described,” I said, “it’s surely not impossible that the citizens will be willing to carry them out.”
“Not at all.”
“And would it be astonishing or impossible that what we think should seem right to others too?” 502c
“I don’t think so,” he said.
“And that these things are best, if they’re possible, we’ve gone through adequately earlier, I believe.”
“Yes, adequately.”
νῦν δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, συμβαίνει ἡμῖν περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας ἄριστα μὲν εἶναι ἃ λέγομεν, εἰ γένοιτο, χαλεπὰ δὲ γενέσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ἀδύνατά γε.
συμβαίνει γάρ, ἔφη.
οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο μόγις τέλος ἔσχεν, τὰ ἐπίλοιπα δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο λεκτέον, τίνα τρόπον ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκ τίνων μαθημάτων 502d τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων οἱ σωτῆρες ἐνέσονται τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ κατὰ ποίας ἡλικίας ἕκαστοι ἑκάστων ἁπτόμενοι;
λεκτέον μέντοι, ἔφη.
“So now, it seems, our conclusion about the legislation is that what we’re describing is best, if it could come about, and that it’s difficult to bring about, but not impossible.”
“That is the conclusion,” he said.
“Then since this has finally, with difficulty, been brought to an end, we must discuss what remains: in what way, and through what studies 502d and pursuits, the saviors of the constitution will come to be present in it for us, and at what ages each will take up each.”
“Yes, we must discuss that,” he said.
οὐδέν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τὸ σοφόν μοι ἐγένετο τήν τε τῶν γυναικῶν τῆς κτήσεως δυσχέρειαν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν παραλιπόντι καὶ παιδογονίαν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀρχόντων κατάστασιν, εἰδότι ὡς ἐπίφθονός τε καὶ χαλεπὴ γίγνεσθαι ἡ παντελῶς ἀληθής· νῦν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἦλθεν τὸ δεῖν αὐτὰ διελθεῖν. 502e καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ τῶν γυναικῶν τε καὶ παίδων πεπέρανται, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀρχόντων ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μετελθεῖν δεῖ.
“My cleverness got me nowhere,” I said, “when I left aside earlier the troublesome business of the possession of women, and of producing children, and the appointment of rulers, knowing that the completely true arrangement would provoke envy and be hard to bring about. For now the need to go through them has come around no less. 502e The matters concerning women and children have been finished, but the question of the rulers has to be taken up again as if from the beginning.
ἐλέγομεν 503a δʼ, εἰ μνημονεύεις, δεῖν αὐτοὺς φιλοπόλιδάς τε φαίνεσθαι, βασανιζομένους ἐν ἡδοναῖς τε καὶ λύπαις, καὶ τὸ δόγμα τοῦτο μήτʼ ἐν πόνοις μήτʼ ἐν φόβοις μήτʼ ἐν ἄλλῃ μηδεμιᾷ μεταβολῇ φαίνεσθαι ἐκβάλλοντας, ἢ τὸν ἀδυνατοῦντα ἀποκριτέον, τὸν δὲ πανταχοῦ ἀκήρατον ἐκβαίνοντα ὥσπερ χρυσὸν ἐν πυρὶ βασανιζόμενον, στατέον ἄρχοντα καὶ γέρα δοτέον καὶ ζῶντι καὶ τελευτήσαντι καὶ ἆθλα. τοιαῦτʼ ἄττα ἦν τὰ λεγόμενα παρεξιόντος καὶ παρακαλυπτομένου τοῦ 503b λόγου, πεφοβημένου κινεῖν τὸ νῦν παρόν.
ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις· μέμνημαι γάρ.
“We said, 503a if you remember, that they must show themselves lovers of their city, tested in pleasures and pains, and must be seen not to throw away this conviction in labors or fears or any other reversal. Whoever can’t do this must be rejected, but whoever comes through pure in every way, like gold tested in fire, must be appointed ruler and given privileges and prizes both while alive and after death. Something like this is what was said, while the argument slipped past with its face veiled, 503b afraid to stir up the question now before us.”
“What you say is very true,” he said. “I remember.”
ὄκνος γάρ, ἔφην, ὦ φίλε, ἐγώ, εἰπεῖν τὰ νῦν ἀποτετολμημένα· νῦν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τετολμήσθω εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τοὺς ἀκριβεστάτους φύλακας φιλοσόφους δεῖ καθιστάναι.
εἰρήσθω γάρ, ἔφη.
νόησον δὴ ὡς εἰκότως ὀλίγοι ἔσονταί σοι· ἣν γὰρ διήλθομεν φύσιν δεῖν ὑπάρχειν αὐτοῖς, εἰς ταὐτὸν συμφύεσθαι αὐτῆς τὰ μέρη ὀλιγάκις ἐθέλει, τὰ πολλὰ δὲ διεσπασμένη φύεται. 503c
πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις;
“Yes, my friend,” I said, “I shrank from saying what I’ve now dared to say. But now let this be ventured: that we must establish philosophers as the guardians in the strictest sense.”
“Let it be said,” he said.
“Consider, then, how few you’re likely to have. For the parts of the nature we described, which they must have, seldom tend to grow together into one; mostly it grows up torn apart.” 503c
“How do you mean?” he said.
εὐμαθεῖς καὶ μνήμονες καὶ ἀγχίνοι καὶ ὀξεῖς καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τούτοις ἕπεται οἶσθʼ ὅτι οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ἅμα φύεσθαι καὶ νεανικοί τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τὰς διανοίας οἷοι κοσμίως μετὰ ἡσυχίας καὶ βεβαιότητος ἐθέλειν ζῆν, ἀλλʼ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ὑπὸ ὀξύτητος φέρονται ὅπῃ ἂν τύχωσιν, καὶ τὸ βέβαιον ἅπαν αὐτῶν ἐξοίχεται.
ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.
“You know that people who are quick to learn, have good memories, and are shrewd and sharp, with all that goes along with these, don’t usually grow up to be at the same time youthfully vigorous and grand in their thinking and the kind who are willing to live in an orderly way, with quiet and stability. Instead, such people are carried wherever their sharpness takes them, and all stability goes out of them.”
“That’s true,” he said.
οὐκοῦν τὰ βέβαια αὖ ταῦτα ἤθη καὶ οὐκ εὐμετάβολα, οἷς 503d ἄν τις μᾶλλον ὡς πιστοῖς χρήσαιτο, καὶ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ πρὸς τοὺς φόβους δυσκίνητα ὄντα, πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις αὖ ποιεῖ ταὐτόν· δυσκινήτως ἔχει καὶ δυσμαθῶς ὥσπερ ἀπονεναρκωμένα, καὶ ὕπνου τε καὶ χάσμης ἐμπίμπλανται, ὅταν τι δέῃ τοιοῦτον διαπονεῖν.
ἔστι ταῦτα, ἔφη.
ἡμεῖς δέ γέ φαμεν ἀμφοτέρων δεῖν εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς μετέχειν, ἢ μήτε παιδείας τῆς ἀκριβεστάτης δεῖν αὐτῷ μεταδιδόναι μήτε τιμῆς μήτε ἀρχῆς.
ὀρθῶς, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
οὐκοῦν σπάνιον αὐτὸ οἴει ἔσεσθαι;
“And again, those steady characters that don’t change easily, whom 503d one would rather rely on as trustworthy, and who in war are hard to move to fear—they do the same thing when it comes to learning. They’re hard to move and slow to learn, as if they’d been numbed, and they’re filled with sleep and yawning whenever they have to work hard at anything of that sort.”
“That’s so,” he said.
“But we say that one must have a good and fine share of both, or else he must not be given the most rigorous education, or honor, or rule.”
“Right,” he said.
“Don’t you think this will be rare?”
πῶς δʼ οὔ; 503e
βασανιστέον δὴ ἔν τε οἷς τότε ἐλέγομεν πόνοις τε καὶ φόβοις καὶ ἡδοναῖς, καὶ ἔτι δὴ ὃ τότε παρεῖμεν νῦν λέγομεν, ὅτι καὶ ἐν μαθήμασι πολλοῖς γυμνάζειν δεῖ, σκοποῦντας εἰ καὶ τὰ μέγιστα μαθήματα δυνατὴ ἔσται ἐνεγκεῖν εἴτε καὶ 504a ἀποδειλιάσει, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀποδειλιῶντες.
πρέπει γέ τοι δή, ἔφη, οὕτω σκοπεῖν. ἀλλὰ ποῖα δὴ λέγεις μαθήματα μέγιστα;
μνημονεύεις μέν που, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὅτι τριττὰ εἴδη ψυχῆς διαστησάμενοι συνεβιβάζομεν δικαιοσύνης τε πέρι καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ σοφίας ὃ ἕκαστον εἴη.
“Of course.” 503e
“So he must be tested in the labors, fears and pleasures we mentioned then, and we now add what we passed over then: he must also be exercised in many studies, as we watch whether his nature will be able to bear the greatest studies or will 504a lose heart, like those who lose heart in the other trials.”
“It’s certainly right to examine it that way,” he said. “But which do you mean by the greatest studies?”
“You remember, I suppose,” I said, “that we distinguished three forms in the soul and pieced together what justice, moderation, courage and wisdom each are.”
μὴ γὰρ μνημονεύων, ἔφη, τὰ λοιπὰ ἂν εἴην δίκαιος μὴ ἀκούειν.
ἦ καὶ τὸ προρρηθὲν αὐτῶν;
τὸ ποῖον δή; 504b
ἐλέγομέν που ὅτι ὡς μὲν δυνατὸν ἦν κάλλιστα αὐτὰ κατιδεῖν ἄλλη μακροτέρα εἴη περίοδος, ἣν περιελθόντι καταφανῆ γίγνοιτο, τῶν μέντοι ἔμπροσθεν προειρημένων ἑπομένας ἀποδείξεις οἷόν τʼ εἴη προσάψαι. καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐξαρκεῖν ἔφατε, καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἐρρήθη τὰ τότε τῆς μὲν ἀκριβείας, ὡς ἐμοὶ ἐφαίνετο, ἐλλιπῆ, εἰ δὲ ὑμῖν ἀρεσκόντως, ὑμεῖς ἂν τοῦτο εἴποιτε.
ἀλλʼ ἔμοιγε, ἔφη, μετρίως· ἐφαίνετο μὴν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις. 504c
“If I didn’t remember,” he said, “I’d deserve not to hear the rest.”
“And what was said before that, too?”
“What was that?” 504b
“We said, I think, that to see them in the finest way possible there was another, longer road, and that they would become clear to someone who had traveled it, but that it was possible to add demonstrations in keeping with what had been said before. You all said that was enough, and so what was said then was, as it seemed to me, lacking in precision; whether it satisfied you, you’d be the ones to say.”
“Well, to me it seemed a fair measure,” he said, “and to the others too.” 504c
ἀλλʼ, ὦ φίλε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, μέτρον τῶν τοιούτων ἀπολεῖπον καὶ ὁτιοῦν τοῦ ὄντος οὐ πάνυ μετρίως γίγνεται· ἀτελὲς γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς μέτρον. δοκεῖ δʼ ἐνίοτέ τισιν ἱκανῶς ἤδη ἔχειν καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖν περαιτέρω ζητεῖν.
καὶ μάλʼ, ἔφη, συχνοὶ πάσχουσιν αὐτὸ διὰ ῥᾳθυμίαν.
τούτου δέ γε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τοῦ παθήματος ἥκιστα προσδεῖ φύλακι πόλεώς τε καὶ νόμων.
εἰκός, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
“But, my friend,” I said, “a measure of such things that falls short of what is in any way at all is no fair measure. Nothing incomplete is the measure of anything. Yet people sometimes think they already have enough and there’s no need to look any further.”
“Yes,” he said, “plenty of people feel that way, out of laziness.”
“But that’s a feeling,” I said, “that a guardian of a city and its laws can least afford.”
“That makes sense,” he said.
τὴν μακροτέραν τοίνυν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἔφην, περιιτέον τῷ 504d τοιούτῳ, καὶ οὐχ ἧττον μανθάνοντι πονητέον ἢ γυμναζομένῳ· ἤ, ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, τοῦ μεγίστου τε καὶ μάλιστα προσήκοντος μαθήματος ἐπὶ τέλος οὔποτε ἥξει.
οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα, ἔφη, μέγιστα, ἀλλʼ ἔτι τι μεῖζον δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ὧν διήλθομεν;
“Then someone like that, my friend,” I said, “has to go the longer way round, 504d and has to work as hard at learning as at physical training. Otherwise, as we were just saying, he’ll never reach the end of the greatest and most fitting subject of study.”
“What?” he said. “Aren’t these the greatest? Is there something still greater than justice and the other things we went through?”
The form of the good
Socrates says the form of the good is the greatest object of study, but will not define it.
καὶ μεῖζον, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων οὐχ ὑπογραφὴν δεῖ ὥσπερ νῦν θεάσασθαι, ἀλλὰ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀπεργασίαν μὴ παριέναι. ἢ οὐ γελοῖον ἐπὶ μὲν ἄλλοις σμικροῦ ἀξίοις 504e πᾶν ποιεῖν συντεινομένους ὅπως ὅτι ἀκριβέστατα καὶ καθαρώτατα ἕξει, τῶν δὲ μεγίστων μὴ μεγίστας ἀξιοῦν εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἀκριβείας;
καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, ἄξιον τὸ διανόημα· ὃ μέντοι μέγιστον μάθημα καὶ περὶ ὅτι αὐτὸ λέγεις, οἴει τινʼ ἄν σε, ἔφη, ἀφεῖναι μὴ ἐρωτήσαντα τί ἐστιν;
οὐ πάνυ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ ἐρώτα.
“There is something greater,” I said. “And even with these themselves, we mustn’t look at a sketch, as we did just now; we mustn’t settle for anything short of the most finished work. Isn’t it absurd to strain every nerve over other things of little worth 504e so as to get them as precise and pure as possible, and not to think that the greatest things deserve the greatest precision?”
“A thought very much worth having,” he said. “But as for what you call the greatest subject of study, and what it’s about—do you think anyone’s going to let you go without asking what it is?”
“Not at all,” I said. “Go ahead and ask it yourself.
πάντως αὐτὸ οὐκ ὀλιγάκις ἀκήκοας, νῦν δὲ ἢ οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ἢ αὖ διανοῇ 505a ἐμοὶ πράγματα παρέχειν ἀντιλαμβανόμενος. οἶμαι δὲ τοῦτο μᾶλλον· ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα μέγιστον μάθημα, πολλάκις ἀκήκοας, ᾗ δὴ καὶ δίκαια καὶ τἆλλα προσχρησάμενα χρήσιμα καὶ ὠφέλιμα γίγνεται. καὶ νῦν σχεδὸν οἶσθʼ ὅτι μέλλω τοῦτο λέγειν, καὶ πρὸς τούτῳ ὅτι αὐτὴν οὐχ ἱκανῶς ἴσμεν· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἴσμεν, ἄνευ δὲ ταύτης εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα τἆλλα ἐπισταίμεθα, οἶσθʼ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἡμῖν ὄφελος, ὥσπερ οὐδʼ εἰ 505b κεκτῄμεθά τι ἄνευ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἢ οἴει τι πλέον εἶναι πᾶσαν κτῆσιν ἐκτῆσθαι, μὴ μέντοι ἀγαθήν; ἢ πάντα τἆλλα φρονεῖν ἄνευ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, καλὸν δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν φρονεῖν;
“You’ve certainly heard it many times. But right now either you’re not paying attention, or else you mean 505a to make trouble for me by seizing on what I say. I think it’s more the latter. You’ve often heard that the form of the good is the greatest subject of study: it is by making use of it that just things and everything else become useful and beneficial. And you pretty well know by now that this is what I’m going to say, and in addition that we don’t know it adequately. And if we don’t know it, then even if we knew everything else as well as could be, without it—you know this—it would do us no good, just as it would do us no good 505b to possess anything without the good. Or do you think there’s any advantage in possessing every possession, if it isn’t good? Or in understanding everything else without the good, while understanding nothing fine and good?”
μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη.
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε γε οἶσθα, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν πολλοῖς ἡδονὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ κομψοτέροις φρόνησις.
πῶς δʼ οὔ;
καὶ ὅτι γε, ὦ φίλε, οἱ τοῦτο ἡγούμενοι οὐκ ἔχουσι δεῖξαι ἥτις φρόνησις, ἀλλʼ ἀναγκάζονται τελευτῶντες τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φάναι.
καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, γελοίως. 505c
“No, by Zeus, I don’t,” he said.
“But you surely also know this: most people think the good is pleasure, while the more refined think it’s understanding.”
“Of course.”
“And, my friend, that those who hold the latter view can’t show what understanding it is, but end up being forced to say it’s understanding of the good.”
“Yes,” he said, “which is quite ridiculous.” 505c
πῶς γὰρ οὐχί, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, εἰ ὀνειδίζοντές γε ὅτι οὐκ ἴσμεν τὸ ἀγαθὸν λέγουσι πάλιν ὡς εἰδόσιν; φρόνησιν γὰρ αὐτό φασιν εἶναι ἀγαθοῦ, ὡς αὖ συνιέντων ἡμῶν ὅτι λέγουσιν, ἐπειδὰν τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φθέγξωνται ὄνομα.
ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.
τί δὲ οἱ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν ὁριζόμενοι; μῶν μή τι ἐλάττονος πλάνης ἔμπλεῳ τῶν ἑτέρων; ἢ οὐ καὶ οὗτοι ἀναγκάζονται ὁμολογεῖν ἡδονὰς εἶναι κακάς;
σφόδρα γε.
συμβαίνει δὴ αὐτοῖς οἶμαι ὁμολογεῖν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι καὶ κακὰ ταὐτά. ἦ γάρ; 505d
τί μήν;
“How could it not be,” I said, “when they reproach us for not knowing the good and then talk to us as though we did know it? They say it’s understanding of the good, as if we understood what they mean as soon as they utter the word ‘good.’”
“Very true,” he said.
“And what about those who define the good as pleasure? Are they any less full of confusion than the others? Aren’t they forced to agree, too, that there are bad pleasures?”
“They certainly are.”
“So the result, I think, is that they have to agree that the same things are both good and bad. Isn’t that so?” 505d
“Of course.”
οὐκοῦν ὅτι μὲν μεγάλαι καὶ πολλαὶ ἀμφισβητήσεις περὶ αὐτοῦ, φανερόν;
πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
τί δέ; τόδε οὐ φανερόν, ὡς δίκαια μὲν καὶ καλὰ πολλοὶ ἂν ἕλοιντο τὰ δοκοῦντα, κἂν εἰ μὴ εἴη, ὅμως ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ κεκτῆσθαι καὶ δοκεῖν, ἀγαθὰ δὲ οὐδενὶ ἔτι ἀρκεῖ τὰ δοκοῦντα κτᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὄντα ζητοῦσιν, τὴν δὲ δόξαν ἐνταῦθα ἤδη πᾶς ἀτιμάζει;
καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.
“Then it’s clear that there are many great disputes about it?”
“Of course.”
“And what about this? Isn’t it clear that with just and fine things, many people would choose what seems so—and even if it isn’t, they’d still do and have them and have the reputation for them—but with good things nobody is satisfied any more to get what only seems so? They look for what really is, and here everyone has contempt for mere seeming.”
“Very much so,” he said.
ὃ δὴ διώκει μὲν ἅπασα ψυχὴ καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα πάντα 505e πράττει, ἀπομαντευομένη τι εἶναι, ἀποροῦσα δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσα λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς τί ποτʼ ἐστὶν οὐδὲ πίστει χρήσασθαι μονίμῳ οἵᾳ καὶ περὶ τἆλλα, διὰ τοῦτο δὲ ἀποτυγχάνει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἴ τι ὄφελος ἦν, περὶ δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ τοσοῦτον 506a οὕτω φῶμεν δεῖν ἐσκοτῶσθαι καὶ ἐκείνους τοὺς βελτίστους ἐν τῇ πόλει, οἷς πάντα ἐγχειριοῦμεν;
ἥκιστά γʼ, ἔφη.
“This is what every soul pursues, and for its sake it does everything. 505e It divines that it is something, but it’s at a loss and can’t adequately grasp what it is, or have a stable conviction about it as it can about other things, and for that reason it misses whatever benefit there was in the other things as well. About something of this kind and this importance, 506a are we to say that even the best people in the city, into whose hands we’ll put everything, should be left in the dark like this?”
“Least of all,” he said.
οἶμαι γοῦν, εἶπον, δίκαιά τε καὶ καλὰ ἀγνοούμενα ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἀγαθά ἐστιν, οὐ πολλοῦ τινος ἄξιον φύλακα κεκτῆσθαι ἂν ἑαυτῶν τὸν τοῦτο ἀγνοοῦντα· μαντεύομαι δὲ μηδένα αὐτὰ πρότερον γνώσεσθαι ἱκανῶς.
καλῶς γάρ, ἔφη, μαντεύῃ.
οὐκοῦν ἡμῖν ἡ πολιτεία τελέως κεκοσμήσεται, ἐὰν ὁ 506b τοιοῦτος αὐτὴν ἐπισκοπῇ φύλαξ, ὁ τούτων ἐπιστήμων;
ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ σὺ δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, πότερον ἐπιστήμην τὸ ἀγαθὸν φῂς εἶναι ἢ ἡδονήν, ἢ ἄλλο τι παρὰ ταῦτα;
“At any rate, I think,” I said, “that if it isn’t known in what way just and fine things are good, they won’t have acquired a guardian worth much in someone who doesn’t know this. And I divine that no one will know them adequately before that.”
“Yes, and you divine well,” he said.
“So our constitution will be perfectly ordered if a 506b guardian of this kind watches over it, one who has knowledge of these things?”
“Necessarily,” he said. “But you yourself, Socrates—do you say that the good is knowledge, or pleasure, or something else besides these?”
οὗτος, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἀνήρ, καλῶς ἦσθα καὶ πάλαι καταφανὴς ὅτι σοι οὐκ ἀποχρήσοι τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦν περὶ αὐτῶν.
οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιόν μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνεται τὰ τῶν ἄλλων μὲν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν δόγματα, τὸ δʼ αὑτοῦ μή, τοσοῦτον 506c χρόνον περὶ ταῦτα πραγματευόμενον.
τί δέ; ἦν δʼ ἐγώ· δοκεῖ σοι δίκαιον εἶναι περὶ ὧν τις μὴ οἶδεν λέγειν ὡς εἰδότα;
οὐδαμῶς γʼ, ἔφη, ὡς εἰδότα, ὡς μέντοι οἰόμενον ταῦθʼ ἃ οἴεται ἐθέλειν λέγειν.
“What a man!” I said. “You made it very plain long ago that other people’s views on these things wouldn’t satisfy you.”
“Well, Socrates,” he said, “it doesn’t seem just to me for someone to be able to state other people’s beliefs but not his own, after spending so much 506c time on these matters.”
“What?” I said. “Do you think it’s just to talk about things one doesn’t know as though one knew them?”
“Not at all as though one knew them,” he said, “but one should be willing to say what one thinks, as what one thinks.”
τί δέ; εἶπον· οὐκ ᾔσθησαι τὰς ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης δόξας, ὡς πᾶσαι αἰσχραί; ὧν αἱ βέλτισται τυφλαί—ἢ δοκοῦσί τί σοι τυφλῶν διαφέρειν ὁδὸν ὀρθῶς πορευομένων οἱ ἄνευ νοῦ ἀληθές τι δοξάζοντες;
οὐδέν, ἔφη.
βούλει οὖν αἰσχρὰ θεάσασθαι, τυφλά τε καὶ σκολιά, ἐξὸν 506d παρʼ ἄλλων ἀκούειν φανά τε καὶ καλά;
μὴ πρὸς Διός, ἦ δʼ ὅς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Γλαύκων, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τέλει ὢν ἀποστῇς. ἀρκέσει γὰρ ἡμῖν, κἂν ὥσπερ δικαιοσύνης πέρι καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων διῆλθες, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ διέλθῃς.
“What?” I said. “Haven’t you noticed that opinions without knowledge are all ugly? The best of them are blind—or do you think people who hold some true opinion without intelligence are any different from blind people traveling the right road?”
“No different,” he said.
“So do you want to look at ugly things, blind and crooked, when you could 506d hear bright and beautiful ones from others?”
“For Zeus’s sake, Socrates,” said Glaucon, “don’t back off now, as if you were at the finish line. We’ll be satisfied if you go through the good the way you went through justice and moderation and the rest.”
The sun
Socrates compares the good to the sun, which gives both light for seeing and life to things.
καὶ γὰρ ἐμοί, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, καὶ μάλα ἀρκέσει· ἀλλʼ ὅπως μὴ οὐχ οἷός τʼ ἔσομαι, προθυμούμενος δὲ ἀσχημονῶν γέλωτα ὀφλήσω. ἀλλʼ, ὦ μακάριοι, αὐτὸ μὲν τί ποτʼ 506e ἐστὶ τἀγαθὸν ἐάσωμεν τὸ νῦν εἶναι—πλέον γάρ μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν παροῦσαν ὁρμὴν ἐφικέσθαι τοῦ γε δοκοῦντος ἐμοὶ τὰ νῦν—ὃς δὲ ἔκγονός τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φαίνεται καὶ ὁμοιότατος ἐκείνῳ, λέγειν ἐθέλω, εἰ καὶ ὑμῖν φίλον, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐᾶν.
ἀλλʼ, ἔφη, λέγε· εἰς αὖθις γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀποτείσεις τὴν διήγησιν.
“So will I, my friend,” I said, “very much satisfied. But I’m afraid I won’t be up to it, and that in my eagerness I’ll make a fool of myself and be laughed at. No, my dear friends, let’s leave aside for now what the good 506e itself is. Even to reach my own present view of it seems too much for our present effort. But I’m willing to talk about what appears to be the offspring of the good and most like it, if you’d like; if not, we’ll let it go.”
“No, tell us,” he said. “You can pay us the account of the father another time.”
βουλοίμην ἄν, εἶπον, ἐμέ τε δύνασθαι αὐτὴν ἀποδοῦναι καὶ ὑμᾶς κομίσασθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὥσπερ νῦν τοὺς τόκους μόνον. τοῦτον δὲ δὴ οὖν τὸν τόκον τε καὶ ἔκγονον αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κομίσασθε. εὐλαβεῖσθε μέντοι μή πῃ ἐξαπατήσω ὑμᾶς ἄκων, κίβδηλον ἀποδιδοὺς τὸν λόγον τοῦ τόκου.
εὐλαβησόμεθα, ἔφη, κατὰ δύναμιν· ἀλλὰ μόνον λέγε.
διομολογησάμενός γʼ ἔφην ἐγώ, καὶ ἀναμνήσας ὑμᾶς τά τʼ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ῥηθέντα καὶ ἄλλοτε ἤδη πολλάκις εἰρημένα. 507b
τὰ ποῖα; ἦ δʼ ὅς.
“I wish,” I said, “that I could pay it and you could collect it, and not just the interest, as now. Still, take this interest, this offspring of the good itself. But be careful I don’t somehow cheat you without meaning to, by paying you a counterfeit account of the interest.”
“We’ll be as careful as we can,” he said. “Just tell us.”
“Once we’ve come to an agreement,” I said, “and I’ve reminded you of what was said earlier, and has often been said at other times too.” 507b
“What’s that?” he said.
πολλὰ καλά, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καὶ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἕκαστα οὕτως εἶναί φαμέν τε καὶ διορίζομεν τῷ λόγῳ.
φαμὲν γάρ.
καὶ αὐτὸ δὴ καλὸν καὶ αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ οὕτω περὶ πάντων ἃ τότε ὡς πολλὰ ἐτίθεμεν, πάλιν αὖ κατʼ ἰδέαν μίαν ἑκάστου ὡς μιᾶς οὔσης τιθέντες, “ὃ ἔστιν” ἕκαστον προσαγορεύομεν.
ἔστι ταῦτα.
καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ ὁρᾶσθαί φαμεν, νοεῖσθαι δʼ οὔ, τὰς δʼ αὖ ἰδέας νοεῖσθαι μέν, ὁρᾶσθαι δʼ οὔ.
παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. 507c
τῷ οὖν ὁρῶμεν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὰ ὁρώμενα;
τῇ ὄψει, ἔφη.
“We say that there are many beautiful things,” I said, “and many good things, and so on for each kind, and we distinguish them in our account.”
“We do.”
“And we also speak of the beautiful itself and the good itself. And so with all the things we then posited as many: we posit them in turn according to a single form of each, on the view that there is one, and call each ‘what it is.’”
“That’s so.”
“And we say that the many things are seen but not grasped by intelligence, while the forms are grasped by intelligence but not seen.”
“Absolutely.” 507c
“Now with what part of ourselves do we see the things that are seen?”
“With sight,” he said.
οὐκοῦν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καὶ ἀκοῇ τὰ ἀκουόμενα, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσι πάντα τὰ αἰσθητά;
τί μήν;
ἆρʼ οὖν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἐννενόηκας τὸν τῶν αἰσθήσεων δημιουργὸν ὅσῳ πολυτελεστάτην τὴν τοῦ ὁρᾶν τε καὶ ὁρᾶσθαι δύναμιν ἐδημιούργησεν;
οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη.
ἀλλʼ ὧδε σκόπει. ἔστιν ὅτι προσδεῖ ἀκοῇ καὶ φωνῇ γένους ἄλλου εἰς τὸ τὴν μὲν ἀκούειν, τὴν δὲ ἀκούεσθαι, ὃ 507d ἐὰν μὴ παραγένηται τρίτον, ἡ μὲν οὐκ ἀκούσεται, ἡ δὲ οὐκ ἀκουσθήσεται;
οὐδενός, ἔφη.
“And with hearing the things that are heard,” I said, “and with the other senses all the things that are perceived?”
“Of course.”
“Well,” I said, “have you noticed how lavishly the craftsman of the senses crafted the power of seeing and being seen?”
“Not really,” he said.
“Then look at it this way. Do hearing and sound need some further kind of thing, for the one to hear and the other to be heard—a third thing such that, 507d if it isn’t present, the one won’t hear and the other won’t be heard?”
“They need nothing,” he said.
οἶμαι δέ γε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, οὐδʼ ἄλλαις πολλαῖς, ἵνα μὴ εἴπω ὅτι οὐδεμιᾷ, τοιούτου προσδεῖ οὐδενός. ἢ σύ τινα ἔχεις εἰπεῖν;
οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
τὴν δὲ τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι προσδεῖται;
πῶς;
ἐνούσης που ἐν ὄμμασιν ὄψεως καὶ ἐπιχειροῦντος τοῦ ἔχοντος χρῆσθαι αὐτῇ, παρούσης δὲ χρόας ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἐὰν μὴ 507e παραγένηται γένος τρίτον ἰδίᾳ ἐπʼ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πεφυκός, οἶσθα ὅτι ἥ τε ὄψις οὐδὲν ὄψεται, τά τε χρώματα ἔσται ἀόρατα.
τίνος δὴ λέγεις, ἔφη, τούτου;
“And I think,” I said, “that many of the others—not to say all of them—need nothing of the kind either. Or can you name one that does?”
“I can’t,” he said.
“But don’t you realize that sight and the visible do need something?”
“How so?”
“Sight may be present in the eyes, and its owner may try to use it, and color may be present in things; but unless 507e a third kind of thing is present, one naturally suited to this very purpose, you know that sight will see nothing and the colors will be invisible.”
“What is this thing you mean?” he said.
ὃ δὴ σὺ καλεῖς, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, φῶς.
ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.
οὐ σμικρᾷ ἄρα ἰδέᾳ ἡ τοῦ ὁρᾶν αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὁρᾶσθαι 508a δύναμις τῶν ἄλλων συζεύξεων τιμιωτέρῳ ζυγῷ ἐζύγησαν, εἴπερ μὴ ἄτιμον τὸ φῶς.
ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, πολλοῦ γε δεῖ ἄτιμον εἶναι.
τίνα οὖν ἔχεις αἰτιάσασθαι τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ θεῶν τούτου κύριον, οὗ ἡμῖν τὸ φῶς ὄψιν τε ποιεῖ ὁρᾶν ὅτι κάλλιστα καὶ τὰ ὁρώμενα ὁρᾶσθαι;
ὅνπερ καὶ σύ, ἔφη, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι· τὸν ἥλιον γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι ἐρωτᾷς.
“What you call light,” I said.
“True,” he said.
“Then the sense of seeing and the power of being 508a seen are yoked together by a yoke more precious than the other pairings, and by no small measure—unless light is something without value.”
“Far from it,” he said.
“So which of the gods in heaven can you name as master of this, whose light makes our sight see as well as possible and the things seen be seen?”
“The same one you and everyone else would,” he said. “Obviously you’re asking about the sun.”
ἆρʼ οὖν ὧδε πέφυκεν ὄψις πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν θεόν;
πῶς;
οὐκ ἔστιν ἥλιος ἡ ὄψις οὔτε αὐτὴ οὔτʼ ἐν ᾧ ἐγγίγνεται, ὃ 508b δὴ καλοῦμεν ὄμμα.
οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
ἀλλʼ ἡλιοειδέστατόν γε οἶμαι τῶν περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ὀργάνων.
πολύ γε.
οὐκοῦν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἣν ἔχει ἐκ τούτου ταμιευομένην ὥσπερ ἐπίρρυτον κέκτηται;
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ καὶ ὁ ἥλιος ὄψις μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, αἴτιος δʼ ὢν αὐτῆς ὁρᾶται ὑπʼ αὐτῆς ταύτης;
οὕτως, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
“Now is sight related to this god in the following way?”
“What way?”
“Neither sight itself nor the thing it comes to be in, which 508b we call the eye, is the sun.”
“No, it isn’t.”
“But I think it’s the most sunlike of the sense organs.”
“By far.”
“And doesn’t it get the power it has from the sun, dispensed to it like an inflowing stream?”
“Certainly.”
“Then isn’t the sun, too, not sight, but, as the cause of sight, seen by sight itself?”
“That’s so,” he said.
τοῦτον τοίνυν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, φάναι με λέγειν τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔκγονον, ὃν τἀγαθὸν ἐγέννησεν ἀνάλογον ἑαυτῷ, ὅτιπερ αὐτὸ 508c ἐν τῷ νοητῷ τόπῳ πρός τε νοῦν καὶ τὰ νοούμενα, τοῦτο τοῦτον ἐν τῷ ὁρατῷ πρός τε ὄψιν καὶ τὰ ὁρώμενα.
πῶς; ἔφη· ἔτι δίελθέ μοι.
ὀφθαλμοί, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, οἶσθʼ ὅτι, ὅταν μηκέτι ἐπʼ ἐκεῖνά τις αὐτοὺς τρέπῃ ὧν ἂν τὰς χρόας τὸ ἡμερινὸν φῶς ἐπέχῃ, ἀλλὰ ὧν νυκτερινὰ φέγγη, ἀμβλυώττουσί τε καὶ ἐγγὺς φαίνονται τυφλῶν, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐνούσης καθαρᾶς ὄψεως;
καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. 508d
“The sun, then,” I said, “is what you should say I mean by the offspring of the good, which the good begot in proportion to itself: as the good itself is 508c in the intelligible realm in relation to intelligence and the things grasped by intelligence, so the sun is in the visible realm in relation to sight and the things seen.”
“How?” he said. “Explain it to me further.”
“You know,” I said, “that when someone no longer turns his eyes toward things whose colors are lit by daylight, but toward things lit by the glimmers of night, they grow dim and seem nearly blind, as though there were no clear sight in them?”
“Very much so,” he said. 508d
ὅταν δέ γʼ οἶμαι ὧν ὁ ἥλιος καταλάμπει, σαφῶς ὁρῶσι, καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις ὄμμασιν ἐνοῦσα φαίνεται.
τί μήν;
οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὧδε νόει· ὅταν μὲν οὗ καταλάμπει ἀλήθειά τε καὶ τὸ ὄν, εἰς τοῦτο ἀπερείσηται, ἐνόησέν τε καὶ ἔγνω αὐτὸ καὶ νοῦν ἔχειν φαίνεται· ὅταν δὲ εἰς τὸ τῷ σκότῳ κεκραμένον, τὸ γιγνόμενόν τε καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, δοξάζει τε καὶ ἀμβλυώττει ἄνω καὶ κάτω τὰς δόξας μεταβάλλον, καὶ ἔοικεν αὖ νοῦν οὐκ ἔχοντι.
ἔοικε γάρ. 508e
“But when, I think, they’re turned toward things the sun shines on, they see clearly, and sight appears to be present in those very same eyes.”
“Of course.”
“Then think of the soul in the same way. When it fixes itself on what truth and what is shine upon, it grasps and knows it and appears to have intelligence. But when it fixes on what is mixed with darkness, on what comes to be and passes away, it opines and grows dim, changing its opinions up and down, and seems in turn to have no intelligence.”
“Yes, it does seem so.” 508e
τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρέχον τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γιγνώσκοντι τὴν δύναμιν ἀποδιδὸν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν φάθι εἶναι· αἰτίαν δʼ ἐπιστήμης οὖσαν καὶ ἀληθείας, ὡς γιγνωσκομένης μὲν διανοοῦ, οὕτω δὲ καλῶν ἀμφοτέρων ὄντων, γνώσεώς τε καὶ ἀληθείας, ἄλλο καὶ κάλλιον ἔτι τούτων ἡγούμενος αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς ἡγήσῃ·
“So say that what gives truth to the things known, and gives the knower the power to know, is the form of the good. And since it is the cause of knowledge and truth, think of it as known too; but beautiful as both of these are, knowledge and truth, you’ll be right to think of it as something other than them and still more beautiful.
ἐπιστήμην 509a δὲ καὶ ἀλήθειαν, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ φῶς τε καὶ ὄψιν ἡλιοειδῆ μὲν νομίζειν ὀρθόν, ἥλιον δʼ ἡγεῖσθαι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀγαθοειδῆ μὲν νομίζειν ταῦτʼ ἀμφότερα ὀρθόν, ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἡγεῖσθαι ὁπότερον αὐτῶν οὐκ ὀρθόν, ἀλλʼ ἔτι μειζόνως τιμητέον τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕξιν.
ἀμήχανον κάλλος, ἔφη, λέγεις, εἰ ἐπιστήμην μὲν καὶ ἀλήθειαν παρέχει, αὐτὸ δʼ ὑπὲρ ταῦτα κάλλει ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ δήπου σύ γε ἡδονὴν αὐτὸ λέγεις.
εὐφήμει, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ· ἀλλʼ ὧδε μᾶλλον τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ ἔτι ἐπισκόπει. 509b
πῶς;
“As for knowledge 509a and truth: just as in the other case it’s right to think of light and sight as sunlike, but wrong to believe they’re the sun, so here it’s right to think of both of these as goodlike, but wrong to believe that either of them is the good. The good’s condition must be honored still more highly.”
“You’re talking about an extraordinary beauty,” he said, “if it provides knowledge and truth but is itself above them in beauty. Surely you don’t mean it’s pleasure.”
“Hush!” I said. “Look at its image further, this way, instead.” 509b
“How?”
τὸν ἥλιον τοῖς ὁρωμένοις οὐ μόνον οἶμαι τὴν τοῦ ὁρᾶσθαι δύναμιν παρέχειν φήσεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ αὔξην καὶ τροφήν, οὐ γένεσιν αὐτὸν ὄντα.
πῶς γάρ;
καὶ τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις τοίνυν μὴ μόνον τὸ γιγνώσκεσθαι φάναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρεῖναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναί τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπʼ ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλʼ ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος. 509c
καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων μάλα γελοίως, Ἄπολλον, ἔφη, δαιμονίας ὑπερβολῆς.
“The sun, I think you’ll say, not only gives the things that are seen the power of being seen, but also their coming to be and growth and nourishment, though it isn’t itself coming to be.”
“Of course not.”
“Then say likewise that the things known not only get their being known from the good, but also have their existence and their being from it, though the good is not being, but is still beyond being, surpassing it in dignity and power.” 509c
And Glaucon, very comically, said, “Apollo! What superhuman hyperbole!”
σὺ γάρ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, αἴτιος, ἀναγκάζων τὰ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν.
καὶ μηδαμῶς γʼ, ἔφη, παύσῃ, εἰ μή τι, ἀλλὰ τὴν περὶ τὸν ἥλιον ὁμοιότητα αὖ διεξιών, εἴ πῃ ἀπολείπεις.
ἀλλὰ μήν, εἶπον, συχνά γε ἀπολείπω.
μηδὲ σμικρὸν τοίνυν, ἔφη, παραλίπῃς.
οἶμαι μέν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καὶ πολύ· ὅμως δέ, ὅσα γʼ ἐν τῷ παρόντι δυνατόν, ἑκὼν οὐκ ἀπολείψω.
μὴ γάρ, ἔφη. 509d
“Well, it’s your fault,” I said, “for forcing me to say what I think about it.”
“And don’t stop on any account,” he said, “or if nothing else, at least go through the likeness with the sun again, in case you’re leaving anything out.”
“Well, I’m certainly leaving out a lot,” I said.
“Then don’t skip even a little,” he said.
“I expect I’ll skip a great deal,” I said. “Still, as far as is possible at present, I won’t leave anything out on purpose.”
“Don’t,” he said. 509d
The divided line
Socrates divides reality with the image of a line and describes prisoners in a cave.
νόησον τοίνυν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, δύο αὐτὼ εἶναι, καὶ βασιλεύειν τὸ μὲν νοητοῦ γένους τε καὶ τόπου, τὸ δʼ αὖ ὁρατοῦ, ἵνα μὴ οὐρανοῦ εἰπὼν δόξω σοι σοφίζεσθαι περὶ τὸ ὄνομα. ἀλλʼ οὖν ἔχεις ταῦτα διττὰ εἴδη, ὁρατόν, νοητόν;
ἔχω.
ὥσπερ τοίνυν γραμμὴν δίχα τετμημένην λαβὼν ἄνισα τμήματα, πάλιν τέμνε ἑκάτερον τὸ τμῆμα ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, τό τε τοῦ ὁρωμένου γένους καὶ τὸ τοῦ νοουμένου, καί σοι ἔσται σαφηνείᾳ καὶ ἀσαφείᾳ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐν μὲν τῷ ὁρωμένῳ 509e τὸ μὲν ἕτερον τμῆμα εἰκόνες—
“Then think of it,” I said, “as we say: there are these two, and one rules over the intelligible kind and realm, the other over the visible—I won’t say ‘the heavens,’ in case you think I’m playing the sophist with the word. Anyway, do you have these two kinds, visible and intelligible?”
“I do.”
“Then take a line cut into two unequal sections, and cut each section again in the same ratio, the section of the visible kind and that of the intelligible. Then, in terms of relative clarity and unclarity, in the visible section 509e one subsection will be images—
λέγω δὲ τὰς εἰκόνας πρῶτον 510a μὲν τὰς σκιάς, ἔπειτα τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι φαντάσματα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὅσα πυκνά τε καὶ λεῖα καὶ φανὰ συνέστηκεν, καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον, εἰ κατανοεῖς.
ἀλλὰ κατανοῶ.
τὸ τοίνυν ἕτερον τίθει ᾧ τοῦτο ἔοικεν, τά τε περὶ ἡμᾶς ζῷα καὶ πᾶν τὸ φυτευτὸν καὶ τὸ σκευαστὸν ὅλον γένος.
τίθημι, ἔφη.
ἦ καὶ ἐθέλοις ἂν αὐτὸ φάναι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, διῃρῆσθαι ἀληθείᾳ τε καὶ μή, ὡς τὸ δοξαστὸν πρὸς τὸ γνωστόν, οὕτω τὸ ὁμοιωθὲν πρὸς τὸ ᾧ ὡμοιώθη; 510b
“by images I mean first 510a shadows, then reflections in water and in everything that is dense, smooth and bright, and everything of that sort, if you follow me.”
“I do.”
“Then take as the other subsection the things these images resemble: the animals around us, and everything that grows, and the whole class of manufactured things.”
“I’ll take it so,” he said.
“Would you also be willing to say,” I said, “that it has been divided in terms of truth and its lack, so that as the object of opinion is to the object of knowledge, so the likeness is to what it is a likeness of?” 510b
ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη, καὶ μάλα.
σκόπει δὴ αὖ καὶ τὴν τοῦ νοητοῦ τομὴν ᾗ τμητέον.
πῇ;
ἧι τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ τοῖς τότε μιμηθεῖσιν ὡς εἰκόσιν χρωμένη ψυχὴ ζητεῖν ἀναγκάζεται ἐξ ὑποθέσεων, οὐκ ἐπʼ ἀρχὴν πορευομένη ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ τελευτήν, τὸ δʼ αὖ ἕτερον—τὸ ἐπʼ ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον—ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἰοῦσα καὶ ἄνευ τῶν περὶ ἐκεῖνο εἰκόνων, αὐτοῖς εἴδεσι διʼ αὐτῶν τὴν μέθοδον ποιουμένη.
ταῦτʼ, ἔφη, ἃ λέγεις, οὐχ ἱκανῶς ἔμαθον. 510c
“I certainly would,” he said.
“Now consider in turn how the intelligible section should be cut.”
“How?”
“Like this. In one part of it the soul, using as images the things that were imitated before, is forced to inquire from hypotheses, proceeding not to a first principle but to a conclusion. In the other it proceeds from a hypothesis to a first principle that is not hypothetical, without the images used in the first part, making its way by means of forms themselves, through them.”
“I didn’t quite understand what you’re saying,” he said. 510c
ἀλλʼ αὖθις, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ· ῥᾷον γὰρ τούτων προειρημένων μαθήσῃ. οἶμαι γάρ σε εἰδέναι ὅτι οἱ περὶ τὰς γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογισμοὺς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πραγματευόμενοι, ὑποθέμενοι τό τε περιττὸν καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ γωνιῶν τριττὰ εἴδη καὶ ἄλλα τούτων ἀδελφὰ καθʼ ἑκάστην μέθοδον, ταῦτα μὲν ὡς εἰδότες, ποιησάμενοι ὑποθέσεις αὐτά, οὐδένα λόγον οὔτε αὑτοῖς οὔτε ἄλλοις ἔτι ἀξιοῦσι περὶ αὐτῶν διδόναι 510d ὡς παντὶ φανερῶν, ἐκ τούτων δʼ ἀρχόμενοι τὰ λοιπὰ ἤδη διεξιόντες τελευτῶσιν ὁμολογουμένως ἐπὶ τοῦτο οὗ ἂν ἐπὶ σκέψιν ὁρμήσωσι.
“Let’s try again,” I said. “You’ll understand more easily with this said first. I think you know that people who work on geometry and arithmetic and that sort of thing hypothesize the odd and the even, the figures, three kinds of angle, and other things akin to these in each line of inquiry. They treat these as known, making them hypotheses, and don’t think fit to give any further account of them either to themselves or to others, 510d as though they were clear to everyone. Starting from these, they go through the rest and arrive, consistently, at the conclusion they set out to investigate.”
πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε οἶδα.
οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι τοῖς ὁρωμένοις εἴδεσι προσχρῶνται καὶ τοὺς λόγους περὶ αὐτῶν ποιοῦνται, οὐ περὶ τούτων διανοούμενοι, ἀλλʼ ἐκείνων πέρι οἷς ταῦτα ἔοικε, τοῦ τετραγώνου αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα τοὺς λόγους ποιούμενοι καὶ διαμέτρου αὐτῆς, ἀλλʼ οὐ 510e ταύτης ἣν γράφουσιν, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως, αὐτὰ μὲν ταῦτα ἃ πλάττουσίν τε καὶ γράφουσιν, ὧν καὶ σκιαὶ καὶ ἐν ὕδασιν εἰκόνες εἰσίν, τούτοις μὲν ὡς εἰκόσιν αὖ χρώμενοι, ζητοῦντες 511a δὲ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα ἰδεῖν ἃ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἴδοι τις ἢ τῇ διανοίᾳ.
ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.
“Yes,” he said, “I certainly know that.”
“Then you also know that they make use of visible figures and argue about them, though they aren’t thinking about these, but about the things these resemble. They argue for the sake of the square itself and the diagonal itself, not 510e the one they draw, and so on. These very things they model and draw, which themselves have shadows and reflections in water, they use in turn as images, seeking 511a to see those other things themselves, which one can’t see except by thought.”
“That’s true,” he said.
τοῦτο τοίνυν νοητὸν μὲν τὸ εἶδος ἔλεγον, ὑποθέσεσι δʼ ἀναγκαζομένην ψυχὴν χρῆσθαι περὶ τὴν ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ, οὐκ ἐπʼ ἀρχὴν ἰοῦσαν, ὡς οὐ δυναμένην τῶν ὑποθέσεων ἀνωτέρω ἐκβαίνειν, εἰκόσι δὲ χρωμένην αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεικασθεῖσιν καὶ ἐκείνοις πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ὡς ἐναργέσι δεδοξασμένοις τε καὶ τετιμημένοις. 511b
μανθάνω, ἔφη, ὅτι τὸ ὑπὸ ταῖς γεωμετρίαις τε καὶ ταῖς ταύτης ἀδελφαῖς τέχναις λέγεις.
“This, then, is what I was calling intelligible. The soul is forced to use hypotheses in investigating it, not going to a first principle, since it can’t climb above the hypotheses; and it uses as images the very things of which the things below are likenesses, things regarded and valued as clear in comparison with those likenesses.” 511b
“I understand,” he said, “that you mean what falls under geometry and its sister arts.”
τὸ τοίνυν ἕτερον μάνθανε τμῆμα τοῦ νοητοῦ λέγοντά με τοῦτο οὗ αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ἅπτεται τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμει, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ποιούμενος οὐκ ἀρχὰς ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ὑποθέσεις, οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὁρμάς, ἵνα μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν ἰών, ἁψάμενος αὐτῆς, πάλιν αὖ ἐχόμενος τῶν ἐκείνης ἐχομένων, οὕτως ἐπὶ τελευτὴν καταβαίνῃ, 511c αἰσθητῷ παντάπασιν οὐδενὶ προσχρώμενος, ἀλλʼ εἴδεσιν αὐτοῖς διʼ αὐτῶν εἰς αὐτά, καὶ τελευτᾷ εἰς εἴδη.
“Then understand that by the other section of the intelligible I mean what reason itself grasps by the power of dialectic. It treats its hypotheses not as first principles but as genuinely hypotheses—stepping-stones and springboards, as it were—so that it can go all the way up to what is unhypothetical, to the first principle of everything. Having grasped this, it turns back, holding on to what follows from it, and so comes down to a conclusion, 511c making no use of anything perceptible at all, but only of forms themselves, through forms, to forms; and it ends in forms.”
μανθάνω, ἔφη, ἱκανῶς μὲν οὔ—δοκεῖς γάρ μοι συχνὸν ἔργον λέγειν—ὅτι μέντοι βούλει διορίζειν σαφέστερον εἶναι τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιστήμης τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ νοητοῦ θεωρούμενον ἢ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν καλουμένων, αἷς αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαὶ καὶ διανοίᾳ μὲν ἀναγκάζονται ἀλλὰ μὴ αἰσθήσεσιν αὐτὰ θεᾶσθαι οἱ θεώμενοι, διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ ἐπʼ ἀρχὴν 511d ἀνελθόντες σκοπεῖν ἀλλʼ ἐξ ὑποθέσεων, νοῦν οὐκ ἴσχειν περὶ αὐτὰ δοκοῦσί σοι, καίτοι νοητῶν ὄντων μετὰ ἀρχῆς. διάνοιαν δὲ καλεῖν μοι δοκεῖς τὴν τῶν γεωμετρικῶν τε καὶ τὴν τῶν τοιούτων ἕξιν ἀλλʼ οὐ νοῦν, ὡς μεταξύ τι δόξης τε καὶ νοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν οὖσαν.
“I understand,” he said, “though not adequately—it seems an enormous task you’re describing. But I understand that you want to mark off what is contemplated of what is and is intelligible by the knowledge of dialectic as clearer than what is contemplated by the so-called arts, for which hypotheses are first principles. Those who contemplate their objects are forced to do so by thought and not by the senses; but because they don’t go back up to a first principle 511d in their investigation, but proceed from hypotheses, you think they don’t have intelligence about them, even though these things are intelligible when taken with a first principle. And I think you call the state of geometers and people like them thought, not intelligence, as though thought were something between opinion and intelligence.”
ἱκανώτατα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἀπεδέξω. καί μοι ἐπὶ τοῖς τέτταρσι τμήμασι τέτταρα ταῦτα παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γιγνόμενα λαβέ, νόησιν μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀνωτάτω, διάνοιαν 511e δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ δευτέρῳ, τῷ τρίτῳ δὲ πίστιν ἀπόδος καὶ τῷ τελευταίῳ εἰκασίαν, καὶ τάξον αὐτὰ ἀνὰ λόγον, ὥσπερ ἐφʼ οἷς ἐστιν ἀληθείας μετέχει, οὕτω ταῦτα σαφηνείας ἡγησάμενος μετέχειν.
μανθάνω, ἔφη, καὶ συγχωρῶ καὶ τάττω ὡς λέγεις.
“You’ve taken it in very adequately,” I said. “Now take these four conditions that arise in the soul, corresponding to the four sections: understanding for the highest, thought 511e for the second; assign belief to the third and imagination to the last. And arrange them in proportion, considering that each shares in clarity to the degree that its objects share in truth.”
“I understand,” he said, “and I agree, and I’ll arrange them as you say.”