Euthyphro
Outside the court of the King Archon, 399 BC. · Socrates and Euthyphro try, and fail, to define piety.
Euthyphroτί νεώτερον, ὦ Σώκρατες, γέγονεν, ὅτι σὺ τὰς ἐν Λυκείῳ καταλιπὼν διατριβὰς ἐνθάδε νῦν διατρίβεις περὶ τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοάν; οὐ γάρ που καὶ σοί γε δίκη τις οὖσα τυγχάνει πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα ὥσπερ ἐμοί.
EuthyphroWhat’s new, Socrates, that you’ve left your usual haunts in the Lyceum and are spending your time here now, around the King’s Porch? Surely you can’t have a case before the King as well, the way I do.
Socratesοὔτοι δὴ Ἀθηναῖοί γε, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, δίκην αὐτὴν καλοῦσιν ἀλλὰ γραφήν.
SocratesWell, Euthyphro, the Athenians at least don’t call it a lawsuit—they call it an indictment.
Euthyphroτί φῄς; γραφὴν σέ τις, ὡς ἔοικε, γέγραπται· οὐ γὰρ ἐκεῖνό γε καταγνώσομαι, ὡς σὺ ἕτερον.
EuthyphroWhat’s that? Someone has indicted you, it seems. I won’t accuse you of indicting someone else.
Socratesοὐ γὰρ οὖν.
SocratesNo, I haven’t.
Euthyphroἀλλὰ σὲ ἄλλος;
EuthyphroThen someone else has indicted you?
Socratesπάνυ γε.
SocratesExactly.
Euthyphroτίς οὗτος;
EuthyphroWho is he?
Socratesοὐδʼ αὐτὸς πάνυ τι γιγνώσκω, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, τὸν ἄνδρα, νέος γάρ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ ἀγνώς· ὀνομάζουσι μέντοι αὐτόν, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, Μέλητον. ἔστι δὲ τῶν δήμων Πιτθεύς, εἴ τινα νῷ ἔχεις Πιτθέα Μέλητον οἷον τετανότριχα καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐγένειον, ἐπίγρυπον δέ.
SocratesI don’t really know the man myself, Euthyphro. He seems to be young and unknown. They call him Meletus, I think. He’s from the deme of Pitthus—if you can picture a Meletus of Pitthus with straight hair, not much of a beard, and a bit of a hooked nose.
Euthyphroοὐκ ἐννοῶ, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλὰ δὴ τίνα γραφήν c σε γέγραπται;
EuthyphroI can’t picture him, Socrates. But what indictment has he c brought against you?
Socratesἥντινα; οὐκ ἀγεννῆ, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ· τὸ γὰρ νέον ὄντα τοσοῦτον πρᾶγμα ἐγνωκέναι οὐ φαῦλόν ἐστιν. ἐκεῖνος γάρ, ὥς φησιν, οἶδε τίνα τρόπον οἱ νέοι διαφθείρονται καὶ τίνες οἱ διαφθείροντες αὐτούς. καὶ κινδυνεύει σοφός τις εἶναι, καὶ τὴν ἐμὴν ἀμαθίαν κατιδὼν ὡς διαφθείροντος τοὺς ἡλικιώτας αὐτοῦ, ἔρχεται κατηγορήσων μου ὥσπερ πρὸς μητέρα πρὸς τὴν πόλιν. καὶ φαίνεταί μοι τῶν πολιτικῶν d μόνος ἄρχεσθαι ὀρθῶς· ὀρθῶς γάρ ἐστι τῶν νέων πρῶτον ἐπιμεληθῆναι ὅπως ἔσονται ὅτι ἄριστοι, ὥσπερ γεωργὸν ἀγαθὸν τῶν νέων φυτῶν εἰκὸς πρῶτον ἐπιμεληθῆναι, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
SocratesWhat indictment? Nothing shabby, I’d say. For someone so young to have grasped such an important matter is no small thing. He says he knows how the young are corrupted and who is corrupting them. He may well be something of a wise man. He has spotted my ignorance and how I’m corrupting people his own age, and now he’s going to the city to accuse me, like a child running to its mother. In fact he seems to me the only one of our politicians d who is starting out correctly. It’s correct to care for the young first, so that they turn out as good as possible—just as a good farmer naturally cares for the young plants first, and after that for the rest.
καὶ δὴ καὶ Μέλητος ἴσως πρῶτον a μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐκκαθαίρει τοὺς τῶν νέων τὰς βλάστας διαφθείροντας, ὥς φησιν· ἔπειτα μετὰ τοῦτο δῆλον ὅτι τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἐπιμεληθεὶς πλείστων καὶ μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν αἴτιος τῇ πόλει γενήσεται, ὥς γε τὸ εἰκὸς συμβῆναι ἐκ τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς ἀρξαμένῳ.
And so Meletus, perhaps, is first a clearing out those of us who, as he says, blight the young shoots. After that he’ll obviously turn his care to the older people and become the source of very many great goods for the city—which is the likely outcome, at any rate, for someone who starts from such a beginning.
Euthyphroβουλοίμην ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλʼ ὀρρωδῶ μὴ τοὐναντίον γένηται· ἀτεχνῶς γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀφʼ ἑστίας ἄρχεσθαι κακουργεῖν τὴν πόλιν, ἐπιχειρῶν ἀδικεῖν σέ. καί μοι λέγε, τί καὶ ποιοῦντά σέ φησι διαφθείρειν τοὺς νέους;
EuthyphroI wish he would, Socrates, but I’m afraid the opposite will happen. It seems to me that by trying to wrong you he is simply starting to harm the city at its very hearth. But tell me, what does he say you do that corrupts the young?
Socratesἄτοπα, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ὡς οὕτω γʼ ἀκοῦσαι. φησὶ γάρ με ποιητὴν εἶναι θεῶν, καὶ ὡς καινοὺς ποιοῦντα θεοὺς τοὺς δʼ ἀρχαίους οὐ νομίζοντα ἐγράψατο τούτων αὐτῶν ἕνεκα, ὥς φησιν.
SocratesStrange things, my remarkable friend, at least on first hearing. He says I’m a maker of gods: it’s for making new gods and not believing in the old ones that he has indicted me, so he says.
Euthyphroμανθάνω, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὅτι δὴ σὺ τὸ δαιμόνιον φῂς σαυτῷ ἑκάστοτε γίγνεσθαι. ὡς οὖν καινοτομοῦντός σου περὶ τὰ θεῖα γέγραπται ταύτην τὴν γραφήν, καὶ ὡς διαβαλῶν δὴ ἔρχεται εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, εἰδὼς ὅτι εὐδιάβολα τὰ τοιαῦτα πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς. καὶ ἐμοῦ γάρ τοι, c ὅταν τι λέγω ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ περὶ τῶν θείων, προλέγων αὐτοῖς τὰ μέλλοντα, καταγελῶσιν ὡς μαινομένου· καίτοι οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθὲς εἴρηκα ὧν προεῖπον, ἀλλʼ ὅμως φθονοῦσιν ἡμῖν πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. ἀλλʼ οὐδὲν αὐτῶν χρὴ φροντίζειν, ἀλλʼ ὁμόσε ἰέναι.
EuthyphroI understand, Socrates. It’s because you say the divine sign comes to you from time to time. So he has brought this indictment on the ground that you’re making innovations in religion, and he’s coming to court to slander you, knowing that such things are easily slandered before the many. It’s the same with me: c whenever I say something in the Assembly about religious matters and foretell the future for them, they laugh at me as if I were mad. And yet nothing I’ve predicted has failed to come true. Still, they’re jealous of all of us who are like that. But we mustn’t worry about them; we have to meet them head-on.
Socratesὦ φίλε Εὐθύφρων, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν καταγελασθῆναι ἴσως οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα. Ἀθηναίοις γάρ τοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐ σφόδρα μέλει ἄν τινα δεινὸν οἴωνται εἶναι, μὴ μέντοι διδασκαλικὸν τῆς αὑτοῦ σοφίας· ὃν δʼ ἂν καὶ ἄλλους οἴωνται d ποιεῖν τοιούτους, θυμοῦνται, εἴτʼ οὖν φθόνῳ ὡς σὺ λέγεις, εἴτε διʼ ἄλλο τι.
SocratesMy dear Euthyphro, being laughed at is perhaps no great matter. The Athenians, it seems to me, don’t much mind if they think someone is clever, so long as he doesn’t teach his wisdom. But if they think he’s d making others like himself, they get angry—whether out of jealousy, as you say, or for some other reason.
Euthyphroτούτου οὖν πέρι ὅπως ποτὲ πρὸς ἐμὲ ἔχουσιν, οὐ πάνυ ἐπιθυμῶ πειραθῆναι.
EuthyphroOn that point, then—how they feel toward me—I’m not at all eager to find out.
Socratesἴσως γὰρ σὺ μὲν δοκεῖς σπάνιον σεαυτὸν παρέχειν καὶ διδάσκειν οὐκ ἐθέλειν τὴν σεαυτοῦ σοφίαν· ἐγὼ δὲ φοβοῦμαι μὴ ὑπὸ φιλανθρωπίας δοκῶ αὐτοῖς ὅτιπερ ἔχω ἐκκεχυμένως παντὶ ἀνδρὶ λέγειν, οὐ μόνον ἄνευ μισθοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ προστιθεὶς ἂν ἡδέως εἴ τίς μου ἐθέλει ἀκούειν. εἰ μὲν οὖν, ὃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, μέλλοιέν μου καταγελᾶν ὥσπερ e σὺ φῂς σαυτοῦ, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη ἀηδὲς παίζοντας καὶ γελῶντας ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ διαγαγεῖν· εἰ δὲ σπουδάσονται, τοῦτʼ ἤδη ὅπῃ ἀποβήσεται ἄδηλον πλὴν ὑμῖν τοῖς μάντεσιν.
SocratesPerhaps that’s because you seem to make yourself scarce and to be unwilling to teach your wisdom. But I’m afraid that, because of my love for people, they think I pour out whatever I have to anyone at all—not only without charging a fee, but happy to pay extra if anyone is willing to listen to me. Now, if, as I was just saying, they were going to laugh at me, as e you say they laugh at you, it wouldn’t be unpleasant to spend our time in court joking and laughing. But if they’re going to be serious, how it will turn out is unclear—except to you prophets.
Euthyphroἀλλʼ ἴσως οὐδὲν ἔσται, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρᾶγμα, ἀλλὰ σύ τε κατὰ νοῦν ἀγωνιῇ τὴν δίκην, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τὴν ἐμήν.
EuthyphroWell, perhaps it will come to nothing, Socrates. You’ll handle your case as you see fit, and I think I’ll handle mine.
Socratesἔστιν δὲ δὴ σοί, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, τίς ἡ δίκη; φεύγεις αὐτὴν ἢ διώκεις;
SocratesAnd what is your case, Euthyphro? Are you defending or pursuing it?
Euthyphroδιώκω.
EuthyphroPursuing.
Socratesτίνα;
SocratesWhom?
Euthyphroὃν διώκων αὖ δοκῶ μαίνεσθαι.
EuthyphroSomeone I’m thought mad, once again, for pursuing.
Socratesτί δέ; πετόμενόν τινα διώκεις;
SocratesWhat? Are you pursuing someone who can fly?
Euthyphroπολλοῦ γε δεῖ πέτεσθαι, ὅς γε τυγχάνει ὢν εὖ μάλα πρεσβύτης.
EuthyphroFar from flying—he happens to be quite an old man.
Socratesτίς οὗτος;
SocratesWho is he?
Euthyphroὁ ἐμὸς πατήρ.
EuthyphroMy father.
Socratesὁ σός, ὦ βέλτιστε;
SocratesYour own father, my good man?
Euthyphroπάνυ μὲν οὖν.
EuthyphroCertainly.
Socratesἔστιν δὲ τί τὸ ἔγκλημα καὶ τίνος ἡ δίκη;
SocratesAnd what is the charge? What is the case about?
Euthyphroφόνου, ὦ Σώκρατες.
EuthyphroMurder, Socrates.
SocratesἩράκλεις. ἦ που, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, ἀγνοεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ὅπῃ ποτὲ ὀρθῶς ἔχει· οὐ γὰρ οἶμαί γε τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος b ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ πρᾶξαι ἀλλὰ πόρρω που ἤδη σοφίας ἐλαύνοντος.
SocratesHeracles! Surely, Euthyphro, most people have no idea how this could ever be right. I don’t think just anyone b could do it rightly—only someone already far advanced in wisdom.
Socratesἔστιν δὲ δὴ τῶν οἰκείων τις ὁ τεθνεὼς ὑπὸ τοῦ σοῦ πατρός; ἢ δῆλα δή; οὐ γὰρ ἄν που ὑπέρ γε ἀλλοτρίου ἐπεξῇσθα φόνου αὐτῷ.
SocratesIs the man your father killed one of your relatives, then? Obviously he must be. You surely wouldn’t prosecute him for murder on behalf of an outsider.
Euthyphroγελοῖον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οἴει τι διαφέρειν εἴτε ἀλλότριος εἴτε οἰκεῖος ὁ τεθνεώς, ἀλλʼ οὐ τοῦτο μόνον δεῖν φυλάττειν, εἴτε ἐν δίκῃ ἔκτεινεν ὁ κτείνας εἴτε μή, καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐν δίκῃ, ἐᾶν, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐπεξιέναι, ἐάνπερ ὁ κτείνας συνέστιός c σοι καὶ ὁμοτράπεζος ᾖ· ἴσον γὰρ τὸ μίασμα γίγνεται ἐὰν συνῇς τῷ τοιούτῳ συνειδὼς καὶ μὴ ἀφοσιοῖς σεαυτόν τε καὶ ἐκεῖνον τῇ δίκῃ ἐπεξιών. ἐπεὶ ὅ γε ἀποθανὼν πελάτης τις ἦν ἐμός, καὶ ὡς ἐγεωργοῦμεν ἐν τῇ Νάξῳ, ἐθήτευεν ἐκεῖ παρʼ ἡμῖν. παροινήσας οὖν καὶ ὀργισθεὶς τῶν οἰκετῶν τινι τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀποσφάττει αὐτόν. ὁ οὖν πατὴρ συνδήσας τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰς χεῖρας αὐτοῦ, καταβαλὼν εἰς τάφρον τινά, πέμπει δεῦρο ἄνδρα πευσόμενον τοῦ ἐξηγητοῦ ὅτι χρείη d ποιεῖν.
EuthyphroIt’s ridiculous, Socrates, that you think it makes any difference whether the dead man was an outsider or a relative, and not that the only thing to watch for is whether the killer killed justly or not. If justly, let him be; if not, prosecute him—even if the killer shares your hearth c and your table. For the pollution is just the same if you knowingly associate with such a person and don’t purify yourself and him by bringing him to justice. As it happens, the man who died was a laborer of mine; when we were farming on Naxos, he worked for us there for hire. Well, he got drunk, lost his temper with one of our household slaves, and cut his throat. So my father bound him hand and foot, threw him into a ditch, and sent a man here to ask the religious adviser what d should be done.
ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ τοῦ δεδεμένου ὠλιγώρει τε καὶ ἠμέλει ὡς ἀνδροφόνου καὶ οὐδὲν ὂν πρᾶγμα εἰ καὶ ἀποθάνοι, ὅπερ οὖν καὶ ἔπαθεν· ὑπὸ γὰρ λιμοῦ καὶ ῥίγους καὶ τῶν δεσμῶν ἀποθνῄσκει πρὶν τὸν ἄγγελον παρὰ τοῦ ἐξηγητοῦ ἀφικέσθαι. ταῦτα δὴ οὖν καὶ ἀγανακτεῖ ὅ τε πατὴρ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἰκεῖοι, ὅτι ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀνδροφόνου τῷ πατρὶ φόνου ἐπεξέρχομαι οὔτε ἀποκτείναντι, ὥς φασιν ἐκεῖνοι, οὔτʼ εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπέκτεινεν, ἀνδροφόνου γε ὄντος τοῦ ἀποθανόντος, οὐ δεῖν φροντίζειν ὑπὲρ τοῦ τοιούτου—ἀνόσιον e γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ὑὸν πατρὶ φόνου ἐπεξιέναι—κακῶς εἰδότες, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ θεῖον ὡς ἔχει τοῦ ὁσίου τε πέρι καὶ τοῦ ἀνοσίου.
In the meantime he paid little attention to the man lying bound and neglected him, since he was a killer and it was no great matter if he died—which is just what happened. Hunger, cold and the bonds killed him before the messenger got back from the adviser. And that is exactly why my father and the rest of my relatives are angry: because I’m prosecuting my father for murder on behalf of a killer. He didn’t kill him, they say; and even if he had killed him outright, the dead man was a killer, so one shouldn’t concern oneself on behalf of such a person—since it’s impious, e they say, for a son to prosecute his father for murder. They have a poor grasp, Socrates, of how the divine stands regarding the pious and the impious.
Socratesσὺ δὲ δὴ πρὸς Διός, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, οὑτωσὶ ἀκριβῶς οἴει ἐπίστασθαι περὶ τῶν θείων ὅπῃ ἔχει, καὶ τῶν ὁσίων τε καὶ ἀνοσίων, ὥστε τούτων οὕτω πραχθέντων ὡς σὺ λέγεις, οὐ φοβῇ δικαζόμενος τῷ πατρὶ ὅπως μὴ αὖ σὺ ἀνόσιον πρᾶγμα τυγχάνῃς πράττων;
SocratesBut you, Euthyphro—by Zeus!—do you think you know so precisely how things stand with the divine, and with what’s pious and impious, that, if things happened as you say, you’re not afraid that in taking your father to court you might turn out to be doing something impious yourself?
Euthyphroοὐδὲν γὰρ ἄν μου ὄφελος εἴη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδέ a τῳ ἂν διαφέροι Εὐθύφρων τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, εἰ μὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα ἀκριβῶς εἰδείην.
EuthyphroI’d be no use at all, Socrates, and a Euthyphro would be no different from the mass of people, if I didn’t know all such things precisely.
Socratesἆρʼ οὖν μοι, ὦ θαυμάσιε Εὐθύφρων, κράτιστόν ἐστι μαθητῇ σῷ γενέσθαι, καὶ πρὸ τῆς γραφῆς τῆς πρὸς Μέλητον αὐτὰ ταῦτα προκαλεῖσθαι αὐτόν, λέγοντα ὅτι ἔγωγε καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ τὰ θεῖα περὶ πολλοῦ ἐποιούμην εἰδέναι, καὶ νῦν ἐπειδή με ἐκεῖνος αὐτοσχεδιάζοντά φησι καὶ καινοτομοῦντα περὶ τῶν θείων ἐξαμαρτάνειν, μαθητὴς δὴ γέγονα σός — “καὶ εἰ μέν, ὦ Μέλητε,” φαίην ἄν, “Εὐθύφρονα ὁμολογεῖς b σοφὸν εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ ὀρθῶς νομίζειν καὶ ἐμὲ ἡγοῦ καὶ μὴ δικάζου· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐκείνῳ τῷ διδασκάλῳ λάχε δίκην πρότερον ἢ ἐμοί, ὡς τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους διαφθείροντι ἐμέ τε καὶ τὸν αὑτοῦ πατέρα, ἐμὲ μὲν διδάσκοντι, ἐκεῖνον δὲ νουθετοῦντί τε καὶ κολάζοντι” —καὶ ἂν μή μοι πείθηται μηδὲ ἀφίῃ τῆς δίκης ἢ ἀντʼ ἐμοῦ γράφηται σέ, αὐτὰ ταῦτα λέγειν ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἃ προυκαλούμην αὐτόν;
SocratesThen, my remarkable Euthyphro, isn’t the best thing for me to become your student, and to challenge Meletus on these very points before the indictment comes to trial? I could tell him that even in the past I always thought it important to know about divine matters, and that now, since he says I’m going wrong by improvising and innovating about the divine, I’ve become your student. “And if, Meletus,” I’d say, “you agree that Euthyphro b is wise in such matters, then consider that I believe correctly too, and don’t take me to court. But if not, bring your suit against that teacher of mine before you bring one against me, for corrupting the old—me and his own father: me by teaching me, and his father by admonishing and punishing him.” And if he won’t listen to me and won’t drop the case, or indicts you in my place, shouldn’t I say in court the very things I challenged him with?
Euthyphroναὶ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἄρα ἐμὲ ἐπιχειρήσειε c γράφεσθαι, εὕροιμʼ ἄν, ὡς οἶμαι, ὅπῃ σαθρός ἐστιν, καὶ πολὺ ἂν ἡμῖν πρότερον περὶ ἐκείνου λόγος ἐγένετο ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἢ περὶ ἐμοῦ.
EuthyphroYes, by Zeus, Socrates—if he tried to c indict me, I think I’d find where he’s rotten, and there’d be much more talk in court about him than about me.
What is the pious?
Euthyphro defines piety as prosecuting wrongdoers, then as what the gods love, and Socrates finds problems.
Socratesκαὶ ἐγώ τοι, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, ταῦτα γιγνώσκων μαθητὴς ἐπιθυμῶ γενέσθαι σός, εἰδὼς ὅτι καὶ ἄλλος πού τις καὶ ὁ Μέλητος οὗτος σὲ μὲν οὐδὲ δοκεῖ ὁρᾶν, ἐμὲ δὲ οὕτως ὀξέως ἀτεχνῶς καὶ ῥᾳδίως κατεῖδεν ὥστε ἀσεβείας ἐγράψατο. νῦν οὖν πρὸς Διὸς λέγε μοι ὃ νυνδὴ σαφῶς εἰδέναι διισχυρίζου, ποῖόν τι τὸ εὐσεβὲς φῂς εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἀσεβὲς d καὶ περὶ φόνου καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων; ἢ οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἐν πάσῃ πράξει τὸ ὅσιον αὐτὸ αὑτῷ, καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον αὖ τοῦ μὲν ὁσίου παντὸς ἐναντίον, αὐτὸ δὲ αὑτῷ ὅμοιον καὶ ἔχον μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν κατὰ τὴν ἀνοσιότητα πᾶν ὅτιπερ ἂν μέλλῃ ἀνόσιον εἶναι;
SocratesAnd that’s just why, my dear friend, knowing this, I’m eager to become your student. I know that other people, and this Meletus too, don’t even seem to notice you, whereas me he has seen through so keenly and easily that he has indicted me for impiety. So now, by Zeus, tell me what you were just insisting you know clearly: what sort of thing do you say the pious and the impious are, d both regarding murder and in other matters? Or isn’t the pious the same as itself in every action? And isn’t the impious, in turn, the opposite of everything pious, but like itself, so that everything that is going to be impious has a single form with respect to its impiety?
Socratesλέγε δή, τί φῂς εἶναι τὸ ὅσιον καὶ τί τὸ ἀνόσιον;
SocratesThen tell me: what do you say the pious is, and what the impious?
Euthyphroλέγω τοίνυν ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὅσιόν ἐστιν ὅπερ ἐγὼ νῦν ποιῶ, τῷ ἀδικοῦντι ἢ περὶ φόνους ἢ περὶ ἱερῶν κλοπὰς ἤ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων ἐξαμαρτάνοντι ἐπεξιέναι, ἐάντε πατὴρ e ὢν τυγχάνῃ ἐάντε μήτηρ ἐάντε ἄλλος ὁστισοῦν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐπεξιέναι ἀνόσιον· ἐπεί, ὦ Σώκρατες, θέασαι ὡς μέγα σοι ἐρῶ τεκμήριον τοῦ νόμου ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει—ὃ καὶ ἄλλοις ἤδη εἶπον, ὅτι ταῦτα ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴη οὕτω γιγνόμενα—μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν τῷ ἀσεβοῦντι μηδʼ ἂν ὁστισοῦν τυγχάνῃ ὤν.
EuthyphroWell, I say the pious is exactly what I’m doing now: prosecuting whoever does wrong, whether by murder or temple robbery or any other such offense, whether it happens to be your father e or your mother or anyone else at all; and not prosecuting is impious. Look, Socrates, at what strong evidence I’ll give you that this is the law—evidence I’ve already given others that this is the right way for things to be done: you mustn’t let the impious person off, whoever he happens to be.
αὐτοὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι τυγχάνουσι νομίζοντες τὸν Δία τῶν θεῶν ἄριστον καὶ δικαιότατον, a καὶ τοῦτον ὁμολογοῦσι τὸν αὑτοῦ πατέρα δῆσαι ὅτι τοὺς ὑεῖς κατέπινεν οὐκ ἐν δίκῃ, κἀκεῖνόν γε αὖ τὸν αὑτοῦ πατέρα ἐκτεμεῖν διʼ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα· ἐμοὶ δὲ χαλεπαίνουσιν ὅτι τῷ πατρὶ ἐπεξέρχομαι ἀδικοῦντι, καὶ οὕτως αὐτοὶ αὑτοῖς τὰ ἐναντία λέγουσι περί τε τῶν θεῶν καὶ περὶ ἐμοῦ.
People themselves believe that Zeus is the best and most just of the gods, a and yet they agree that he bound his own father for unjustly swallowing his sons, and that his father in turn castrated his own father for similar reasons. But they’re angry with me for prosecuting my father when he does wrong. So they contradict themselves, both about the gods and about me.
Socratesἆρά γε, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, τοῦτʼ ἔστιν οὗ οὕνεκα τὴν γραφὴν φεύγω, ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπειδάν τις περὶ τῶν θεῶν λέγῃ, δυσχερῶς πως ἀποδέχομαι; διὸ δή, ὡς ἔοικε, φήσει τίς με ἐξαμαρτάνειν. νῦν οὖν εἰ καὶ σοὶ ταῦτα συνδοκεῖ τῷ b εὖ εἰδότι περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ἀνάγκη δή, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ἡμῖν συγχωρεῖν. τί γὰρ καὶ φήσομεν, οἵ γε καὶ αὐτοὶ ὁμολογοῦμεν περὶ αὐτῶν μηδὲν εἰδέναι; ἀλλά μοι εἰπὲ πρὸς Φιλίου, σὺ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἡγῇ ταῦτα οὕτως γεγονέναι;
SocratesIs this, Euthyphro, the reason I’m being prosecuted—that whenever someone tells such stories about the gods, I somehow find them hard to accept? That, it seems, is why someone will say I’m going wrong. Now, if you too share these beliefs, you b who know about such things so well, then it seems we must accept them as well. For what can we say, when we ourselves admit we know nothing about them? But tell me, by Zeus, god of friendship, do you really believe these things happened this way?
Euthyphroκαὶ ἔτι γε τούτων θαυμασιώτερα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ οὐκ ἴσασιν.
EuthyphroYes, and things still more amazing than these, Socrates, which most people don’t know.
Socratesκαὶ πόλεμον ἆρα ἡγῇ σὺ εἶναι τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ ἔχθρας γε δεινὰς καὶ μάχας καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά, οἷα λέγεταί τε ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν c ἀγαθῶν γραφέων τά τε ἄλλα ἱερὰ ἡμῖν καταπεποίκιλται, καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῖς μεγάλοις Παναθηναίοις ὁ πέπλος μεστὸς τῶν τοιούτων ποικιλμάτων ἀνάγεται εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν; ταῦτα ἀληθῆ φῶμεν εἶναι, ὦ Εὐθύφρων;
SocratesAnd do you believe there really is war among the gods, and terrible hostilities and battles and many other such things—the kind the poets tell of, and that c good painters have used to decorate our sacred objects, and in particular the robe that is carried up to the Acropolis at the Great Panathenaea, which is covered with such embroidery? Are we to say these things are true, Euthyphro?
Euthyphroμὴ μόνον γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλʼ ὅπερ ἄρτι εἶπον, καὶ ἄλλα σοι ἐγὼ πολλά, ἐάνπερ βούλῃ, περὶ τῶν θείων διηγήσομαι, ἃ σὺ ἀκούων εὖ οἶδʼ ὅτι ἐκπλαγήσῃ.
EuthyphroNot only those, Socrates. As I said just now, I’ll tell you many other things about the gods too, if you like, and I’m sure you’ll be astounded to hear them.
Socratesοὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέν μοι εἰς αὖθις ἐπὶ σχολῆς διηγήσῃ· νυνὶ δὲ ὅπερ ἄρτι σε ἠρόμην πειρῶ d σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν. οὐ γάρ με, ὦ ἑταῖρε, τὸ πρότερον ἱκανῶς ἐδίδαξας ἐρωτήσαντα τὸ ὅσιον ὅτι ποτʼ εἴη, ἀλλά μοι εἶπες ὅτι τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὅσιον ὂν ὃ σὺ νῦν ποιεῖς, φόνου ἐπεξιὼν τῷ πατρί.
SocratesI wouldn’t be surprised. But you can tell me those some other time, when we have leisure. For now, try to answer d more clearly what I asked you just now. You didn’t teach me adequately before, my friend, when I asked what the pious is. You told me that what you are doing now is pious—prosecuting your father for murder.
Socratesἴσως. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ φῂς εἶναι ὅσια.
SocratesPerhaps. But, Euthyphro, you say many other things are pious too.
Euthyphroκαὶ γὰρ ἔστιν.
EuthyphroSo they are.
Socratesμέμνησαι οὖν ὅτι οὐ τοῦτό σοι διεκελευόμην, ἕν τι ἢ δύο με διδάξαι τῶν πολλῶν ὁσίων, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ᾧ πάντα τὰ ὅσια ὅσιά ἐστιν; ἔφησθα γάρ που μιᾷ ἰδέᾳ e τά τε ἀνόσια ἀνόσια εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὅσια ὅσια· ἢ οὐ μνημονεύεις;
SocratesThen do you remember that this isn’t what I asked you to do—to teach me one or two of the many pious things—but to teach me that form itself by which all pious things are pious? For you said, I think, that it is by one form e that impious things are impious and pious things pious. Or don’t you remember?
Socratesταύτην τοίνυν με αὐτὴν δίδαξον τὴν ἰδέαν τίς ποτέ ἐστιν, ἵνα εἰς ἐκείνην ἀποβλέπων καὶ χρώμενος αὐτῇ παραδείγματι, ὃ μὲν ἂν τοιοῦτον ᾖ ὧν ἂν ἢ σὺ ἢ ἄλλος τις πράττῃ φῶ ὅσιον εἶναι, ὃ δʼ ἂν μὴ τοιοῦτον, μὴ φῶ.
SocratesThen teach me what this form itself is, so that by looking to it and using it as a model, I can say that whatever you or anyone else does that is like it is pious, and that whatever is not like it is not.
Euthyphroἀλλʼ εἰ οὕτω βούλει, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὕτω σοι φράσω.
EuthyphroWell, if that’s what you want, Socrates, that’s how I’ll tell you.
Socratesἀλλὰ μὴν βούλομαί γε.
SocratesThat is certainly what I want.
Euthyphroἔστι τοίνυν τὸ μὲν τοῖς θεοῖς προσφιλὲς ὅσιον, τὸ a δὲ μὴ προσφιλὲς ἀνόσιον.
EuthyphroWell then: what is dear to the gods is pious, and a what is not dear to them is impious.
Socratesπαγκάλως, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, καὶ ὡς ἐγὼ ἐζήτουν ἀποκρίνασθαί σε, οὕτω νῦν ἀπεκρίνω. εἰ μέντοι ἀληθῶς, τοῦτο οὔπω οἶδα, ἀλλὰ σὺ δῆλον ὅτι ἐπεκδιδάξεις ὡς ἔστιν ἀληθῆ ἃ λέγεις.
SocratesSplendid, Euthyphro. Now you’ve answered in just the way I was looking for. Whether it’s true, I don’t know yet—but obviously you’ll go on to show me that what you say is true.
Euthyphroπάνυ μὲν οὖν.
EuthyphroCertainly.
Socratesφέρε δή, ἐπισκεψώμεθα τί λέγομεν. τὸ μὲν θεοφιλές τε καὶ θεοφιλὴς ἄνθρωπος ὅσιος, τὸ δὲ θεομισὲς καὶ ὁ θεομισὴς ἀνόσιος· οὐ ταὐτὸν δʼ ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐναντιώτατον, τὸ ὅσιον τῷ ἀνοσίῳ· οὐχ οὕτως;
SocratesCome, then, let’s examine what we’re saying. A thing loved by the gods, and a person loved by the gods, is pious; a thing hated by the gods, and a person hated by the gods, is impious. And the pious is not the same as the impious, but its complete opposite. Isn’t that so?
Euthyphroοὕτω μὲν οὖν.
EuthyphroIt is.
Socratesκαὶ εὖ γε φαίνεται εἰρῆσθαι;
SocratesAnd does that seem well said?
Socratesοὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι στασιάζουσιν οἱ θεοί, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, καὶ διαφέρονται ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἔχθρα ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ τοῦτο εἴρηται;
SocratesAnd wasn’t this said too, Euthyphro: that the gods are at odds, and disagree with one another, and that there is hostility among them toward one another?
Euthyphroεἴρηται γάρ.
EuthyphroYes, it was said.
Socratesἔχθραν δὲ καὶ ὀργάς, ὦ ἄριστε, ἡ περὶ τίνων διαφορὰ ποιεῖ; ὧδε δὲ σκοπῶμεν. ἆρʼ ἂν εἰ διαφεροίμεθα ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ περὶ ἀριθμοῦ ὁπότερα πλείω, ἡ περὶ τούτων διαφορὰ ἐχθροὺς ἂν ἡμᾶς ποιοῖ καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι ἀλλήλοις, ἢ ἐπὶ λογισμὸν ἐλθόντες περί γε τῶν τοιούτων ταχὺ ἂν c ἀπαλλαγεῖμεν;
SocratesBut disagreement about what, my good man, produces hostility and anger? Let’s look at it this way. If you and I disagreed about number—which of two amounts was larger—would our disagreement about this make us enemies and angry with each other? Or would we turn to counting and quickly c settle matters like that?
Socratesοὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μείζονος καὶ ἐλάττονος εἰ διαφεροίμεθα, ἐπὶ τὸ μετρεῖν ἐλθόντες ταχὺ παυσαίμεθʼ ἂν τῆς διαφορᾶς;
SocratesAnd if we disagreed about larger and smaller, we’d turn to measuring and quickly put an end to our disagreement?
Euthyphroἔστι ταῦτα.
EuthyphroThat’s right.
Socratesκαὶ ἐπί γε τὸ ἱστάναι ἐλθόντες, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, περὶ τοῦ βαρυτέρου τε καὶ κουφοτέρου διακριθεῖμεν ἄν;
SocratesAnd by turning to weighing, I suppose, we’d settle a question about heavier and lighter?
Euthyphroπῶς γὰρ οὔ;
EuthyphroOf course.
Socratesπερὶ τίνος δὲ δὴ διενεχθέντες καὶ ἐπὶ τίνα κρίσιν οὐ δυνάμενοι ἀφικέσθαι ἐχθροί γε ἂν ἀλλήλοις εἶμεν καὶ ὀργιζοίμεθα; ἴσως οὐ πρόχειρόν σοί ἐστιν, ἀλλʼ ἐμοῦ λέγοντος d σκόπει εἰ τάδε ἐστὶ τό τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν. ἆρα οὐ ταῦτά ἐστιν περὶ ὧν διενεχθέντες καὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐπὶ ἱκανὴν κρίσιν αὐτῶν ἐλθεῖν ἐχθροὶ ἀλλήλοις γιγνόμεθα, ὅταν γιγνώμεθα, καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ σὺ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι πάντες;
SocratesThen what would we have to disagree about, and be unable to reach a decision on, to become enemies and angry with each other? Perhaps you don’t have an answer ready, but as I name them, d see whether they are these: the just and the unjust, the fine and the shameful, and the good and the bad. Aren’t these the things we disagree about, and can’t reach a satisfactory decision on, so that we become enemies of one another, when we do—you and I and everyone else?
Euthyphroἀλλʼ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ διαφορά, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ περὶ τούτων.
EuthyphroYes, Socrates, that’s the disagreement, and it’s about these things.
Socratesτί δὲ οἱ θεοί, ὦ Εὐθύφρων; οὐκ εἴπερ τι διαφέρονται, διʼ αὐτὰ ταῦτα διαφέροιντʼ ἄν;
SocratesAnd what about the gods, Euthyphro? If they disagree at all, wouldn’t they disagree about these same things?
Euthyphroπολλὴ ἀνάγκη.
EuthyphroNecessarily.
Socratesκαὶ τῶν θεῶν ἄρα, ὦ γενναῖε Εὐθύφρων, ἄλλοι ἄλλα δίκαια ἡγοῦνται κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά· οὐ γὰρ ἄν που ἐστασίαζον ἀλλήλοις εἰ μὴ περὶ τούτων διεφέροντο· ἦ γάρ;
SocratesThen on your account, my noble Euthyphro, different gods consider different things just, and fine and shameful, and good and bad. For surely they wouldn’t be at odds with each other if they didn’t disagree about these. Right?
Euthyphroὀρθῶς λέγεις.
EuthyphroYou’re right.
Socratesοὐκοῦν ἅπερ καλὰ ἡγοῦνται ἕκαστοι καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ δίκαια, ταῦτα καὶ φιλοῦσιν, τὰ δὲ ἐναντία τούτων μισοῦσιν;
SocratesAnd what each of them considers fine and good and just, they also love, and they hate the opposite?
Euthyphroπάνυ γε.
EuthyphroCertainly.
Socratesταὐτὰ δέ γε, ὡς σὺ φῄς, οἱ μὲν δίκαια ἡγοῦνται, a οἱ δὲ ἄδικα, περὶ ἃ καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦντες στασιάζουσί τε καὶ πολεμοῦσιν ἀλλήλοις· ἆρα οὐχ οὕτω;
SocratesBut the same things, as you say, some consider just a and others unjust; and it’s in disputing about these that they are at odds and at war with one another. Isn’t that so?
Socratesταὔτʼ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, μισεῖταί τε ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν καὶ φιλεῖται, καὶ θεομισῆ τε καὶ θεοφιλῆ ταὔτʼ ἂν εἴη.
SocratesThen the same things, it seems, are both hated by the gods and loved by them, and the same things would be both hated by the gods and loved by the gods.
Euthyphroἔοικεν.
EuthyphroSo it seems.
Socratesκαὶ ὅσια ἄρα καὶ ἀνόσια τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν εἴη, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ.
SocratesSo by this argument, Euthyphro, the same things would be both pious and impious.
Euthyphroκινδυνεύει.
EuthyphroIt looks that way.
Socratesοὐκ ἄρα ὃ ἠρόμην ἀπεκρίνω, ὦ θαυμάσιε. οὐ γὰρ τοῦτό γε ἠρώτων, ὃ τυγχάνει ταὐτὸν ὂν ὅσιόν τε καὶ ἀνόσιον· ὃ δʼ ἂν θεοφιλὲς ᾖ καὶ θεομισές ἐστιν, ὡς ἔοικεν. b ὥστε, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, ὃ σὺ νῦν ποιεῖς τὸν πατέρα κολάζων, οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν εἰ τοῦτο δρῶν τῷ μὲν Διὶ προσφιλὲς ποιεῖς, τῷ δὲ Κρόνῳ καὶ τῷ Οὐρανῷ ἐχθρόν, καὶ τῷ μὲν Ἡφαίστῳ φίλον, τῇ δὲ Ἥρᾳ ἐχθρόν, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν θεῶν ἕτερος ἑτέρῳ διαφέρεται περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐκείνοις κατὰ τὰ αὐτά.
SocratesThen you didn’t answer what I asked, my remarkable friend. I wasn’t asking what happens to be one and the same thing, both pious and impious. Yet what is loved by the gods is also hated by the gods, it seems. b So, Euthyphro, as for what you’re doing now in punishing your father, it wouldn’t be at all surprising if in doing it you’re doing something dear to Zeus but hateful to Cronus and Uranus, and dear to Hephaestus but hateful to Hera—and the same with any other gods who disagree with one another about it.
Euthyphroἀλλʼ οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, περί γε τούτου τῶν θεῶν οὐδένα ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ διαφέρεσθαι, ὡς οὐ δεῖ δίκην διδόναι ἐκεῖνον ὃς ἂν ἀδίκως τινὰ ἀποκτείνῃ.
EuthyphroBut I think, Socrates, that on this point at least no god disagrees with any other: that someone who kills another unjustly must pay the penalty.
Socratesτί δέ; ἀνθρώπων, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, ἤδη τινὸς ἤκουσας c ἀμφισβητοῦντος ὡς τὸν ἀδίκως ἀποκτείναντα ἢ ἄλλο ἀδίκως ποιοῦντα ὁτιοῦν οὐ δεῖ δίκην διδόναι;
SocratesReally? Among human beings, Euthyphro, have you ever heard anyone c argue that someone who kills unjustly, or does anything else unjustly, need not pay the penalty?
Euthyphroοὐδὲν μὲν οὖν παύονται ταῦτα ἀμφισβητοῦντες καὶ ἄλλοθι καὶ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις· ἀδικοῦντες γὰρ πάμπολλα, πάντα ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι φεύγοντες τὴν δίκην.
EuthyphroWhy, they never stop arguing that, in the courts and everywhere else. They do a great deal of wrong, and then say and do everything to escape the penalty.
Socratesἦ καὶ ὁμολογοῦσιν, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, ἀδικεῖν, καὶ ὁμολογοῦντες ὅμως οὐ δεῖν φασὶ σφᾶς διδόναι δίκην;
SocratesBut do they admit doing wrong, Euthyphro, and then, while admitting it, still say they needn’t pay the penalty?
Euthyphroοὐδαμῶς τοῦτό γε.
EuthyphroNo, not that.
Socratesοὐκ ἄρα πᾶν γε ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι· τοῦτο γὰρ οἶμαι οὐ τολμῶσι λέγειν οὐδʼ ἀμφισβητεῖν, ὡς οὐχὶ εἴπερ d ἀδικοῦσί γε δοτέον δίκην, ἀλλʼ οἶμαι οὔ φασιν ἀδικεῖν· ἦ γάρ;
SocratesThen they don’t say and do everything. This, I think, they don’t dare say or argue—that if d they really do wrong, they needn’t pay the penalty. Rather, I think, they deny doing wrong. Isn’t that so?
Socratesοὐκ ἄρα ἐκεῖνό γε ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ὡς οὐ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα δεῖ διδόναι δίκην, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο ἴσως ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, τὸ τίς ἐστιν ὁ ἀδικῶν καὶ τί δρῶν καὶ πότε.
SocratesSo they don’t argue that the wrongdoer shouldn’t pay the penalty. What they argue about, perhaps, is who the wrongdoer is, and what he did, and when.
Euthyphroἀληθῆ λέγεις.
EuthyphroThat’s true.
Socratesοὐκοῦν αὐτά γε ταῦτα καὶ οἱ θεοὶ πεπόνθασιν, εἴπερ στασιάζουσι περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος, καὶ οἱ μέν φασιν ἀλλήλους ἀδικεῖν, οἱ δὲ οὔ φασιν; ἐπεὶ ἐκεῖνό γε δήπου, ὦ θαυμάσιε, οὐδεὶς οὔτε θεῶν οὔτε e ἀνθρώπων τολμᾷ λέγειν, ὡς οὐ τῷ γε ἀδικοῦντι δοτέον δίκην.
SocratesThen isn’t the same thing true of the gods, if they are at odds about just and unjust things, as your account has it—some saying that others do wrong, and others denying it? For surely, my remarkable friend, no one, whether god or e human, dares to say that the wrongdoer need not pay the penalty.
Euthyphroναί, τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθὲς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τό γε κεφάλαιον.
EuthyphroYes, what you say is true, Socrates, at least in the main.
Socratesἀλλʼ ἕκαστόν γε οἶμαι, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, τῶν πραχθέντων ἀμφισβητοῦσιν οἱ ἀμφισβητοῦντες, καὶ ἄνθρωποι καὶ θεοί, εἴπερ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν θεοί· πράξεώς τινος πέρι διαφερόμενοι οἱ μὲν δικαίως φασὶν αὐτὴν πεπρᾶχθαι, οἱ δὲ ἀδίκως· ἆρʼ οὐχ οὕτω;
SocratesBut I think, Euthyphro, that those who dispute—both humans and gods, if gods do dispute—dispute about each particular thing that was done. Disagreeing about some action, some say it was done justly, others unjustly. Isn’t that so?
Euthyphroπάνυ γε.
EuthyphroCertainly.
Socratesἴθι νυν, ὦ φίλε Εὐθύφρων, δίδαξον καὶ ἐμέ, ἵνα σοφώτερος γένωμαι, τί σοι τεκμήριόν ἐστιν ὡς πάντες θεοὶ ἡγοῦνται ἐκεῖνον ἀδίκως τεθνάναι, ὃς ἂν θητεύων ἀνδροφόνος γενόμενος, συνδεθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου τοῦ ἀποθανόντος, φθάσῃ τελευτήσας διὰ τὰ δεσμὰ πρὶν τὸν συνδήσαντα παρὰ τῶν ἐξηγητῶν περὶ αὐτοῦ πυθέσθαι τί χρὴ ποιεῖν, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ τοιούτου δὴ ὀρθῶς ἔχει ἐπεξιέναι καὶ ἐπισκήπτεσθαι φόνου τὸν ὑὸν τῷ πατρί; ἴθι, περὶ τούτων πειρῶ τί μοι b σαφὲς ἐνδείξασθαι ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον πάντες θεοὶ ἡγοῦνται ὀρθῶς ἔχειν ταύτην τὴν πρᾶξιν· κἄν μοι ἱκανῶς ἐνδείξῃ, ἐγκωμιάζων σε ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ οὐδέποτε παύσομαι.
SocratesCome then, my dear Euthyphro, teach me too, so that I can become wiser. What evidence do you have that all the gods consider that man to have died unjustly—a hired laborer who became a killer, was bound by the dead man’s master, and died from his bonds before the man who bound him could learn from the advisers what should be done with him—and that it’s right for a son to prosecute his father and denounce him for murder on behalf of such a man? Come, try to show me something b clear on this: that all the gods, beyond any doubt, consider this action right. If you show me adequately, I’ll never stop praising you for your wisdom.
Euthyphroἀλλʼ ἴσως οὐκ ὀλίγον ἔργον ἐστίν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπεὶ πάνυ γε σαφῶς ἔχοιμι ἂν ἐπιδεῖξαί σοι.
EuthyphroBut perhaps that’s no small task, Socrates—though I could certainly show you quite clearly.
Socratesμανθάνω· ὅτι σοι δοκῶ τῶν δικαστῶν δυσμαθέστερος εἶναι, ἐπεὶ ἐκείνοις γε ἐνδείξῃ δῆλον ὅτι ὡς ἄδικά τέ ἐστιν καὶ οἱ θεοὶ ἅπαντες τὰ τοιαῦτα μισοῦσιν.
SocratesI understand: you think I’m slower to learn than the jurors, since obviously you’ll show them that such things are unjust and that all the gods hate them.
Euthyphroπάνυ γε σαφῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐάνπερ ἀκούωσί γέ μου λέγοντος.
EuthyphroVery clearly, Socrates—provided they actually listen to me.
Socratesἀλλʼ ἀκούσονται. ἐάνπερ εὖ δοκῇς λέγειν. τόδε δέ σου ἐνενόησα ἅμα λέγοντος καὶ πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν σκοπῶ· “εἰ ὅτι μάλιστά με Εὐθύφρων διδάξειεν ὡς οἱ θεοὶ ἅπαντες τὸν τοιοῦτον θάνατον ἡγοῦνται ἄδικον εἶναι, τί μᾶλλον ἐγὼ μεμάθηκα παρʼ Εὐθύφρονος τί ποτʼ ἐστὶν τὸ ὅσιόν τε καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον; θεομισὲς μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴη ἄν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ τούτῳ ἐφάνη ἄρτι ὡρισμένα τὸ ὅσιον καὶ μή· τὸ γὰρ θεομισὲς ὂν καὶ θεοφιλὲς ἐφάνη.” ὥστε τούτου μὲν ἀφίημί σε, ὦ Εὐθύφρων· εἰ βούλει, πάντες αὐτὸ d ἡγείσθων θεοὶ ἄδικον καὶ πάντες μισούντων.
SocratesOh, they’ll listen, if you seem to be speaking well. But while you were talking, a thought struck me, and I’m turning it over in my mind: “Suppose Euthyphro taught me, as convincingly as you like, that all the gods consider a death like that unjust. How would that bring me any closer to learning from Euthyphro what the pious and the impious actually are? This deed, it seems, would be hated by the gods. But that turned out just now not to be how the pious and its opposite are defined, since what was hated by the gods proved to be loved by them too.” So I’ll let you off on that point, Euthyphro. If you like, let’s say all the gods d consider it unjust and all of them hate it.
ἀλλʼ ἆρα τοῦτο ὃ νῦν ἐπανορθούμεθα ἐν τῷ λόγῳ—ὡς ὃ μὲν ἂν πάντες οἱ θεοὶ μισῶσιν ἀνόσιόν ἐστιν, ὃ δʼ ἂν φιλῶσιν, ὅσιον· ὃ δʼ ἂν οἱ μὲν φιλῶσιν οἱ δὲ μισῶσιν, οὐδέτερα ἢ ἀμφότερα—ἆρʼ οὕτω βούλει ἡμῖν ὡρίσθαι νῦν περὶ τοῦ ὁσίου καὶ τοῦ ἀνοσίου;
But is this the correction we’re now making to the account—that whatever all the gods hate is impious, and whatever they love is pious, while whatever some love and others hate is neither or both? Is that how you want us to define the pious and the impious now?
Euthyphroτί γὰρ κωλύει, ὦ Σώκρατες;
EuthyphroWell, what’s to stop us, Socrates?
Socratesοὐδὲν ἐμέ γε, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, ἀλλὰ σὺ δὴ τὸ σὸν σκόπει, εἰ τοῦτο ὑποθέμενος οὕτω ῥᾷστά με διδάξεις ὃ ὑπέσχου.
SocratesNothing’s stopping me, Euthyphro. But look to your own part: see whether, if you take this as your starting point, you’ll find it easiest to teach me what you promised.
What all the gods love
Socrates asks whether the pious is loved by the gods because it is pious, or pious because loved.
Euthyphroἀλλʼ ἔγωγε φαίην ἂν τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ὅσιον ὃ ἂν πάντες οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσιν, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον, ὃ ἂν πάντες θεοὶ μισῶσιν, ἀνόσιον.
EuthyphroWell, I’d say that the pious is what all the gods love, and its opposite, what all the gods hate, is impious.
Socratesοὐκοῦν ἐπισκοπῶμεν αὖ τοῦτο, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, εἰ καλῶς λέγεται, ἢ ἐῶμεν καὶ οὕτω ἡμῶν τε αὐτῶν ἀποδεχώμεθα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἐὰν μόνον φῇ τίς τι ἔχειν οὕτω συγχωροῦντες ἔχειν; ἢ σκεπτέον τί λέγει ὁ λέγων;
SocratesThen shall we examine this in turn, Euthyphro, to see whether it’s well said? Or shall we let it go, and simply accept what we ourselves say, and what others say too, agreeing that a thing is so as soon as someone claims it is? Or should we look into what the speaker means?
Euthyphroσκεπτέον· οἶμαι μέντοι ἔγωγε τοῦτο νυνὶ καλῶς λέγεσθαι.
EuthyphroWe should look into it. Still, I do think this is well said now.
Socratesτάχʼ, ὠγαθέ, βέλτιον εἰσόμεθα. ἐννόησον γὰρ τὸ τοιόνδε· ἆρα τὸ ὅσιον ὅτι ὅσιόν ἐστιν φιλεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν, ἢ ὅτι φιλεῖται ὅσιόν ἐστιν;
SocratesWe’ll soon know better, my friend. Consider this: is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved?
Euthyphroοὐκ οἶδʼ ὅτι λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.
EuthyphroI don’t know what you mean, Socrates.
Socratesἀλλʼ ἐγὼ πειράσομαι σαφέστερον φράσαι. λέγομέν τι φερόμενον καὶ φέρον καὶ ἀγόμενον καὶ ἄγον καὶ ὁρώμενον καὶ ὁρῶν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μανθάνεις ὅτι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ἐστὶ καὶ ᾗ ἕτερα;
SocratesWell, I’ll try to put it more clearly. We speak of something being carried and something carrying, something being led and something leading, something being seen and something seeing. You understand that in all such cases the two are different from each other, and how they differ?
Euthyphroἔγωγέ μοι δοκῶ μανθάνειν.
EuthyphroYes, I think I understand.
Socratesοὐκοῦν καὶ φιλούμενόν τί ἐστιν καὶ τούτου ἕτερον τὸ φιλοῦν;
SocratesAnd isn’t there also something being loved, and, different from it, something doing the loving?
Euthyphroπῶς γὰρ οὔ;
EuthyphroOf course.
Socratesλέγε δή μοι, πότερον τὸ φερόμενον διότι φέρεται φερόμενόν ἐστιν, ἢ διʼ ἄλλο τι;
SocratesThen tell me: is a carried thing a carried thing because it’s carried, or for some other reason?
Euthyphroοὔκ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο.
EuthyphroNo, for that reason.
Socratesκαὶ τὸ ἀγόμενον δὴ διότι ἄγεται, καὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον διότι ὁρᾶται;
SocratesAnd a led thing is a led thing because it’s led, and a seen thing a seen thing because it’s seen?
Euthyphroπάνυ γε.
EuthyphroCertainly.
Socratesοὐκ ἄρα διότι ὁρώμενόν γέ ἐστιν, διὰ τοῦτο ὁρᾶται, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐναντίον διότι ὁρᾶται, διὰ τοῦτο ὁρώμενον· οὐδὲ διότι ἀγόμενόν ἐστιν, διὰ τοῦτο ἄγεται, ἀλλὰ διότι ἄγεται, διὰ τοῦτο ἀγόμενον· οὐδὲ διότι φερόμενον φέρεται, ἀλλὰ διότι φέρεται φερόμενον. ἆρα κατάδηλον, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, ὃ c βούλομαι λέγειν; βούλομαι δὲ τόδε, ὅτι εἴ τι γίγνεται ἤ τι πάσχει, οὐχ ὅτι γιγνόμενόν ἐστι γίγνεται, ἀλλʼ ὅτι γίγνεται γιγνόμενόν ἐστιν· οὐδʼ ὅτι πάσχον ἐστὶ πάσχει, ἀλλʼ ὅτι πάσχει πάσχον ἐστίν· ἢ οὐ συγχωρεῖς οὕτω;
SocratesSo it isn’t because it’s a seen thing that it’s seen; on the contrary, it’s a seen thing because it’s seen. Nor is it led because it’s a led thing; it’s a led thing because it’s led. Nor is it carried because it’s a carried thing; it’s a carried thing because it’s carried. Is it clear, Euthyphro, what c I’m trying to say? What I mean is this: if anything comes to be, or is affected by something, it doesn’t come to be because it’s something coming to be; it’s something coming to be because it comes to be. And it isn’t affected because it’s something affected; it’s something affected because it’s affected. Or don’t you agree?
Socratesοὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ φιλούμενον ἢ γιγνόμενόν τί ἐστιν ἢ πάσχον τι ὑπό του;
SocratesAnd isn’t a loved thing also either something coming to be or something being affected by something?
Euthyphroπάνυ γε.
EuthyphroCertainly.
Socratesκαὶ τοῦτο ἄρα οὕτως ἔχει ὥσπερ τὰ πρότερα· οὐχ ὅτι φιλούμενόν ἐστιν φιλεῖται ὑπὸ ὧν φιλεῖται, ἀλλʼ ὅτι φιλεῖται φιλούμενον;
SocratesThen this case is like the earlier ones: it isn’t because it’s a loved thing that it’s loved by those who love it; it’s a loved thing because it’s loved?
Euthyphroἀνάγκη.
EuthyphroNecessarily.
Socratesτί δὴ οὖν λέγομεν περὶ τοῦ ὁσίου, ὦ Εὐθύφρων; ἄλλο τι φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν πάντων, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος;
SocratesSo what do we say about the pious, Euthyphro? Isn’t it loved by all the gods, according to your account?
Euthyphroναί.
EuthyphroYes.
Socratesἆρα διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι ὅσιόν ἐστιν, ἢ διʼ ἄλλο τι;
SocratesBecause it’s pious, or for some other reason?
Euthyphroοὔκ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο.
EuthyphroNo, for that reason.
Socratesδιότι ἄρα ὅσιόν ἐστιν φιλεῖται, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὅτι φιλεῖται, διὰ τοῦτο ὅσιόν ἐστιν;
SocratesSo it’s loved because it’s pious; it isn’t pious because it’s loved?
Euthyphroἔοικεν.
EuthyphroIt seems so.
Socratesἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ διότι γε φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν φιλούμενόν ἐστι καὶ θεοφιλές.
SocratesBut surely it’s because the gods love it that a thing is a loved thing—a thing loved by the gods.
Euthyphroπῶς γὰρ οὔ;
EuthyphroOf course.
Socratesοὐκ ἄρα τὸ θεοφιλὲς ὅσιόν ἐστιν, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, οὐδὲ τὸ ὅσιον θεοφιλές, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, ἀλλʼ ἕτερον τοῦτο τούτου.
SocratesThen what’s loved by the gods is not the same as the pious, Euthyphro, nor is the pious the same as what’s loved by the gods, as you claim. The one is different from the other.
Socratesὅτι ὁμολογοῦμεν τὸ μὲν ὅσιον διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖσθαι, ὅτι ὅσιόν ἐστιν, ἀλλʼ οὐ διότι φιλεῖται ὅσιον εἶναι· ἦ γάρ;
SocratesBecause we agree that the pious is loved for this reason, that it’s pious, and not that it’s pious because it’s loved. Isn’t that so?
Euthyphroναί.
EuthyphroYes.
Socratesτὸ δέ γε θεοφιλὲς ὅτι φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν, αὐτῷ τούτῳ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι θεοφιλὲς εἶναι, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὅτι θεοφιλές, διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖσθαι.
SocratesWhereas what’s loved by the gods is a thing loved by the gods because they love it—by the very fact of being loved. It isn’t because it’s a thing loved by the gods that they love it.
Euthyphroἀληθῆ λέγεις.
EuthyphroThat’s true.
Socratesἀλλʼ εἴ γε ταὐτὸν ἦν, ὦ φίλε Εὐθύφρων, τὸ θεοφιλὲς καὶ τὸ ὅσιον, εἰ μὲν διὰ τὸ ὅσιον εἶναι ἐφιλεῖτο τὸ a ὅσιον, καὶ διὰ τὸ θεοφιλὲς εἶναι ἐφιλεῖτο ἂν τὸ θεοφιλές, εἰ δὲ διὰ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ θεῶν τὸ θεοφιλὲς θεοφιλὲς ἦν, καὶ τὸ ὅσιον ἂν διὰ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ὅσιον ἦν· νῦν δὲ ὁρᾷς ὅτι ἐναντίως ἔχετον, ὡς παντάπασιν ἑτέρω ὄντε ἀλλήλων. τὸ μὲν γάρ, ὅτι φιλεῖται, ἐστὶν οἷον φιλεῖσθαι· τὸ δʼ ὅτι ἐστὶν οἷον φιλεῖσθαι, διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖται. καὶ κινδυνεύεις, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, ἐρωτώμενος τὸ ὅσιον ὅτι ποτʼ ἐστίν, τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν μοι αὐτοῦ οὐ βούλεσθαι δηλῶσαι, πάθος δέ τι περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν, ὅτι πέπονθε τοῦτο τὸ ὅσιον, φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ πάντων b θεῶν· ὅτι δὲ ὄν, οὔπω εἶπες.
SocratesBut if they were the same, my dear Euthyphro—what’s loved by the gods and the pious—then if the pious were loved because it is a pious, what’s loved by the gods would also be loved because it is a thing loved by the gods; and if what’s loved by the gods were a thing loved by the gods because the gods love it, then the pious too would be pious because it is loved. As it is, you see that the two are related in opposite ways, as things entirely different from each other. The one is lovable because it is loved; the other is loved because it is lovable. It looks, Euthyphro, as though when you were asked what the pious is, you didn’t want to reveal its essence to me, but only told me something that happens to it: the pious has this happen to it, that it’s loved by all b the gods. But what it is, you haven’t said yet.
εἰ οὖν σοι φίλον, μή με ἀποκρύψῃ ἀλλὰ πάλιν εἰπὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τί ποτε ὂν τὸ ὅσιον εἴτε φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν εἴτε ὁτιδὴ πάσχει—οὐ γὰρ περὶ τούτου διοισόμεθα—ἀλλʼ εἰπὲ προθύμως τί ἐστιν τό τε ὅσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον;
So, if you don’t mind, don’t hide it from me. Tell me again from the beginning what the pious is—whether it’s loved by the gods or has anything else whatever happen to it, since we won’t quarrel about that. Just tell me, and be generous about it: what are the pious and the impious?
Euthyphroἀλλʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγε ὅπως σοι εἴπω ὃ νοῶ· περιέρχεται γάρ πως ἡμῖν ἀεὶ ὃ ἂν προθώμεθα καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει μένειν ὅπου ἂν ἱδρυσώμεθα αὐτό.
EuthyphroBut Socrates, I don’t know how to tell you what I have in mind. Somehow whatever we put forward keeps moving around on us and won’t stay where we set it down.
Socratesτοῦ ἡμετέρου προγόνου, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, ἔοικεν εἶναι c Δαιδάλου τὰ ὑπὸ σοῦ λεγόμενα. καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον καὶ ἐτιθέμην, ἴσως ἄν με ἐπέσκωπτες ὡς ἄρα καὶ ἐμοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνου συγγένειαν τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔργα ἀποδιδράσκει καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει μένειν ὅπου ἄν τις αὐτὰ θῇ· νῦν δὲ σαὶ γὰρ αἱ ὑποθέσεις εἰσίν. ἄλλου δή τινος δεῖ σκώμματος· οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλουσι σοὶ μένειν, ὡς καὶ αὐτῷ σοι δοκεῖ.
SocratesWhat you’re saying, Euthyphro, looks like the work of our ancestor c Daedalus. If I were the one saying these things and putting them forward, you might well tease me that it runs in the family: my creations in words run away too and won’t stay where anyone puts them. But as it is, the proposals are yours, so we need a different joke. They won’t stay put for you, as you can see for yourself.
Euthyphroἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖ σχεδόν τι τοῦ αὐτοῦ σκώμματος, ὦ Σώκρατες, δεῖσθαι τὰ λεγόμενα· τὸ γὰρ περιιέναι αὐτοῖς τοῦτο καὶ μὴ μένειν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οὐκ ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ἐντιθείς, d ἀλλὰ σύ μοι δοκεῖς ὁ Δαίδαλος, ἐπεὶ ἐμοῦ γε ἕνεκα ἔμενεν ἂν ταῦτα οὕτως.
EuthyphroBut I think what’s been said needs pretty much the same joke, Socrates. I’m not the one who gave these things their habit of moving around and not staying in the same place. d You’re the Daedalus, if you ask me; as far as I’m concerned, they’d have stayed where they were.
Socratesκινδυνεύω ἄρα, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δεινότερος γεγονέναι τὴν τέχνην τοσούτῳ, ὅσῳ ὁ μὲν τὰ αὑτοῦ μόνα ἐποίει οὐ μένοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ πρὸς τοῖς ἐμαυτοῦ, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια. καὶ δῆτα τοῦτό μοι τῆς τέχνης ἐστὶ κομψότατον, ὅτι ἄκων εἰμὶ σοφός· ἐβουλόμην γὰρ ἄν μοι τοὺς λόγους μένειν καὶ ἀκινήτως ἱδρῦσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τῇ e Δαιδάλου σοφίᾳ τὰ Ταντάλου χρήματα γενέσθαι. καὶ τούτων μὲν ἅδην· ἐπειδὴ δέ μοι δοκεῖς σὺ τρυφᾶν, αὐτός σοι συμπροθυμήσομαι δεῖξαι ὅπως ἄν με διδάξῃς περὶ τοῦ ὁσίου. καὶ μὴ προαποκάμῃς· ἰδὲ γὰρ εἰ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖόν σοι δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι πᾶν τὸ ὅσιον.
SocratesThen it looks, my friend, as if I’ve outdone the great man himself at his craft, and by this much: he made only his own works move, while I, apparently, make other people’s move as well as my own. And the neatest trick of my craft is that I’m wise against my will. I’d much rather have my arguments stay put and stand fixed than have Tantalus’ riches on top of e Daedalus’ wisdom. But enough of that. But since you seem to me to have gone soft, I’ll join you in the effort myself and show you how you might teach me about the pious. Don’t give up too soon. See whether you don’t think that everything pious is necessarily just.
Piety as a part of justice
Socrates suggests piety is part of justice, and Euthyphro calls it the care of the gods.
Socratesἆρʼ οὖν καὶ πᾶν τὸ δίκαιον ὅσιον; ἢ τὸ μὲν ὅσιον a πᾶν δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον οὐ πᾶν ὅσιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ ὅσιον, τὸ δέ τι καὶ ἄλλο;
SocratesThen is everything just also pious? Or is everything pious a just, but not everything just pious—part of it pious, and part something else?
Euthyphroοὐχ ἕπομαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῖς λεγομένοις.
EuthyphroI can’t follow what you’re saying, Socrates.
Socratesκαὶ μὴν νεώτερός γέ μου εἶ οὐκ ἔλαττον ἢ ὅσῳ σοφώτερος· ἀλλʼ, ὃ λέγω, τρυφᾷς ὑπὸ πλούτου τῆς σοφίας. ἀλλʼ, ὦ μακάριε, σύντεινε σαυτόν· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ χαλεπὸν κατανοῆσαι ὃ λέγω. λέγω γὰρ δὴ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ ὁ ποιητὴς ἐποίησεν ὁ ποιήσας—Ζῆνα δὲ τὸν θʼ ἔρξαντα καὶ ὃς τάδε πάντʼ ἐφύτευσεν b οὐκ ἐθέλει νεικεῖν· ἵνα γὰρ δέος ἔνθα καὶ αἰδώς. ἐγὼ οὖν τούτῳ διαφέρομαι τῷ ποιητῇ. εἴπω σοι ὅπῃ;
SocratesAnd yet you’re younger than me by no less than you’re wiser! But as I said, you’ve gone soft from the riches of your wisdom. Come on, my good friend, exert yourself. It isn’t even hard to grasp what I mean. What I mean is the opposite of what the poet said, the one who wrote: “Zeus, who did this, who brought all these things to be, / b he will not rebuke; for where there’s fear, there’s shame as well.” Now I disagree with this poet. Shall I tell you where?
Socratesοὐ δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι “ἵνα δέος ἔνθα καὶ αἰδώς” πολλοὶ γάρ μοι δοκοῦσι καὶ νόσους καὶ πενίας καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα δεδιότες δεδιέναι μέν, αἰδεῖσθαι δὲ μηδὲν ταῦτα ἃ δεδίασιν· οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ;
SocratesI don’t think that “where there’s fear, there’s shame as well.” Many people, it seems to me, who fear diseases and poverty and lots of other things like that are afraid of them, but feel no shame at all about the things they fear. Don’t you think so too?
Euthyphroπάνυ γε.
EuthyphroCertainly.
Socratesἀλλʼ ἵνα γε αἰδὼς ἔνθα καὶ δέος εἶναι· ἐπεὶ ἔστιν ὅστις αἰδούμενός τι πρᾶγμα καὶ αἰσχυνόμενος οὐ πεφόβηταί c τε καὶ δέδοικεν ἅμα δόξαν πονηρίας;
SocratesBut where there’s shame, there’s fear as well. Is there anyone who feels shame about some act and is embarrassed by it, who isn’t at the same time frightened c and afraid of getting a reputation for wickedness?
Socratesοὐκ ἄρʼ ὀρθῶς ἔχει λέγειν· “ἵνα γὰρ δέος ἔνθα καὶ αἰδώς,” ἀλλʼ ἵνα μὲν αἰδὼς ἔνθα καὶ δέος, οὐ μέντοι ἵνα γε δέος πανταχοῦ αἰδώς· ἐπὶ πλέον γὰρ οἶμαι δέος αἰδοῦς. μόριον γὰρ αἰδὼς δέους ὥσπερ ἀριθμοῦ περιττόν, ὥστε οὐχ ἵναπερ ἀριθμὸς ἔνθα καὶ περιττόν, ἵνα δὲ περιττὸν ἔνθα καὶ ἀριθμός. ἕπῃ γάρ που νῦν γε;
SocratesSo it isn’t right to say “for where there’s fear, there’s shame as well.” Rather, where there’s shame, there’s fear as well, but it’s not true that wherever there’s fear there’s shame. Fear, I think, covers more ground than shame. Shame is a part of fear, just as odd is a part of number: it’s not the case that wherever there’s number there’s odd as well, but wherever there’s odd there’s number as well. You follow me now, I take it?
Euthyphroπάνυ γε.
EuthyphroCertainly.
Socratesτὸ τοιοῦτον τοίνυν καὶ ἐκεῖ λέγων ἠρώτων· ἆρα ἵνα d δίκαιον ἔνθα καὶ ὅσιον; ἢ ἵνα μὲν ὅσιον ἔνθα καὶ δίκαιον, ἵνα δὲ δίκαιον οὐ πανταχοῦ ὅσιον· μόριον γὰρ τοῦ δικαίου τὸ ὅσιον; οὕτω φῶμεν ἢ ἄλλως σοι δοκεῖ;
SocratesWell, that’s the sort of thing I was getting at back there when I asked whether, where d there’s the just, there’s the pious as well. Or is it that where there’s the pious there’s the just as well, but where there’s the just there isn’t always the pious, since the pious is a part of the just? Shall we say that, or do you think otherwise?
Euthyphroοὔκ, ἀλλʼ οὕτω. φαίνῃ γάρ μοι ὀρθῶς λέγειν.
EuthyphroNo, that’s how it is. I think you’re right.
Socratesὅρα δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο. εἰ γὰρ μέρος τὸ ὅσιον τοῦ δικαίου, δεῖ δὴ ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐξευρεῖν τὸ ποῖον μέρος ἂν εἴη τοῦ δικαίου τὸ ὅσιον. εἰ μὲν οὖν σύ με ἠρώτας τι τῶν νυνδή, οἷον ποῖον μέρος ἐστὶν ἀριθμοῦ τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τίς ὢν τυγχάνει οὗτος ὁ ἀριθμός, εἶπον ἂν ὅτι ὃς ἂν μὴ σκαληνὸς ᾖ ἀλλʼ ἰσοσκελής· ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι;
SocratesThen look at what comes next. If the pious is a part of the just, then it seems we have to find out what part of the just the pious would be. Now if you were asking me about one of the things we mentioned just now—say, what part of number the even is, and what sort of number it turns out to be—I’d have said it’s the number that isn’t scalene but isosceles. Don’t you think so?
Euthyphroἔμοιγε.
EuthyphroI do.
Socratesπειρῶ δὴ καὶ σὺ ἐμὲ οὕτω διδάξαι τὸ ποῖον μέρος τοῦ δικαίου ὅσιόν ἐστιν, ἵνα καὶ Μελήτῳ λέγωμεν μηκέθʼ ἡμᾶς ἀδικεῖν μηδὲ ἀσεβείας γράφεσθαι, ὡς ἱκανῶς ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ μεμαθηκότας τά τε εὐσεβῆ καὶ ὅσια καὶ τὰ μή.
SocratesThen you try to teach me in the same way what part of the just is pious, so that we can tell Meletus to stop wronging us and indicting us for impiety, since by now we’ll have learned properly from you what is reverent and pious and what isn’t.
Euthyphroτοῦτο τοίνυν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ μέρος τοῦ δικαίου εἶναι εὐσεβές τε καὶ ὅσιον, τὸ περὶ τὴν τῶν θεῶν θεραπείαν, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι τοῦ δικαίου μέρος.
EuthyphroWell, Socrates, this is what I think: the part of the just that is reverent and pious is the part concerned with the care of the gods, while the part concerned with the care of human beings is the rest of the just.
Socratesκαὶ καλῶς γέ μοι, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, φαίνῃ λέγειν, ἀλλὰ a σμικροῦ τινος ἔτι ἐνδεής εἰμι· τὴν γὰρ θεραπείαν οὔπω συνίημι ἥντινα ὀνομάζεις. οὐ γάρ που λέγεις γε, οἷαίπερ καὶ αἱ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα θεραπεῖαί εἰσιν, τοιαύτην καὶ περὶ θεούς— λέγομεν γάρ που—οἷόν φαμεν ἵππους οὐ πᾶς ἐπίσταται θεραπεύειν ἀλλὰ ὁ ἱππικός· ἦ γάρ;
SocratesAnd I think you put that well, Euthyphro. But a there’s still one small thing I need, since I don’t yet understand what care you mean. Surely you don’t mean care of the gods in the same sense as care of other things—for we do use the word that way. We say, for instance, that not everyone knows how to care for horses, only the horseman. Isn’t that so?
Socratesἡ γάρ που ἱππικὴ ἵππων θεραπεία.
SocratesBecause horsemanship is the care of horses.
Euthyphroναί.
EuthyphroYes.
Socratesοὐδέ γε κύνας πᾶς ἐπίσταται θεραπεύειν ἀλλὰ ὁ κυνηγετικός.
SocratesAnd not everyone knows how to care for dogs either, only the huntsman.
Euthyphroοὕτω.
EuthyphroRight.
Socratesἡ γάρ που κυνηγετικὴ κυνῶν θεραπεία.
SocratesBecause the huntsman’s craft is the care of dogs.
Socratesἡ δέ γε βοηλατικὴ βοῶν.
SocratesAnd the cattle-driver’s craft is the care of cattle.
Euthyphroπάνυ γε.
EuthyphroCertainly.
Socratesἡ δὲ δὴ ὁσιότης τε καὶ εὐσέβεια θεῶν, ὦ Εὐθύφρων; οὕτω λέγεις;
SocratesAnd piety and reverence are the care of the gods, Euthyphro? Is that what you’re saying?
Euthyphroἔγωγε.
EuthyphroIt is.
Socratesοὐκοῦν θεραπεία γε πᾶσα ταὐτὸν διαπράττεται; οἷον τοιόνδε· ἐπʼ ἀγαθῷ τινί ἐστι καὶ ὠφελίᾳ τοῦ θεραπευομένου, ὥσπερ ὁρᾷς δὴ ὅτι οἱ ἵπποι ὑπὸ τῆς ἱππικῆς θεραπευόμενοι ὠφελοῦνται καὶ βελτίους γίγνονται· ἢ οὐ δοκοῦσί σοι;
SocratesNow doesn’t all care achieve the same thing? Something like this: it aims at some good and benefit for the one cared for. You see, for instance, that horses cared for by horsemanship are benefited and become better. Or don’t you think so?
Euthyphroἔμοιγε.
EuthyphroI do.
Socratesκαὶ οἱ κύνες γέ που ὑπὸ τῆς κυνηγετικῆς, καὶ οἱ c βόες ὑπὸ τῆς βοηλατικῆς, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ὡσαύτως· ἢ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ οἴει τοῦ θεραπευομένου τὴν θεραπείαν εἶναι;
SocratesAnd dogs, I suppose, by the huntsman’s craft, and c cattle by the cattle-driver’s, and everything else in the same way. Or do you think care aims at harming what’s cared for?
Socratesἀλλʼ ἐπʼ ὠφελίᾳ;
SocratesAt benefiting it, then?
Euthyphroπῶς δʼ οὔ;
EuthyphroOf course.
Socratesἦ οὖν καὶ ἡ ὁσιότης θεραπεία οὖσα θεῶν ὠφελία τέ ἐστι θεῶν καὶ βελτίους τοὺς θεοὺς ποιεῖ; καὶ σὺ τοῦτο συγχωρήσαις ἄν, ὡς ἐπειδάν τι ὅσιον ποιῇς, βελτίω τινὰ τῶν θεῶν ἀπεργάζῃ;
SocratesThen is piety too, since it’s care of the gods, a benefit to the gods, and does it make the gods better? Would you really agree that whenever you do something pious, you make one of the gods better?
Euthyphroμὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔγωγε.
EuthyphroBy Zeus, I would not.
Socratesοὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, οἶμαί σε τοῦτο λέγειν —πολλοῦ καὶ δέω—ἀλλὰ τούτου δὴ ἕνεκα καὶ ἀνηρόμην d τίνα ποτὲ λέγοις τὴν θεραπείαν τῶν θεῶν, οὐχ ἡγούμενός σε τοιαύτην λέγειν.
SocratesI don’t think that’s what you mean either, Euthyphro—far from it. That’s exactly why I asked d what on earth you meant by care of the gods: I didn’t think you meant that sort.
Euthyphroκαὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες· οὐ γὰρ τοιαύτην λέγω.
EuthyphroAnd you were right, Socrates. That’s not the sort I mean.
Socratesεἶεν· ἀλλὰ τίς δὴ θεῶν θεραπεία εἴη ἂν ἡ ὁσιότης;
SocratesVery well. But then what sort of care of the gods would piety be?
Euthyphroἥνπερ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ δοῦλοι τοὺς δεσπότας θεραπεύουσιν.
EuthyphroThe sort, Socrates, that slaves give their masters.
Socratesμανθάνω· ὑπηρετική τις ἄν, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴη θεοῖς.
SocratesI see. It would be a kind of service to the gods, it seems.
Euthyphroπάνυ μὲν οὖν.
EuthyphroExactly.
Socratesἔχοις ἂν οὖν εἰπεῖν ἡ ἰατροῖς ὑπηρετικὴ εἰς τίνος ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν τυγχάνει οὖσα ὑπηρετική; οὐκ εἰς ὑγιείας οἴει;
SocratesThen could you tell me this: service to doctors—what result does it serve to produce? Health, don’t you think?
Euthyphroἔγωγε.
EuthyphroI do.
Socratesτί δὲ ἡ ναυπηγοῖς ὑπηρετική; εἰς τίνος ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν ὑπηρετική ἐστιν;
SocratesAnd service to shipbuilders? What result does it serve to produce?
Euthyphroδῆλον ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς πλοίου.
EuthyphroA ship, obviously, Socrates.
Socratesκαὶ ἡ οἰκοδόμοις γέ που εἰς οἰκίας;
SocratesAnd service to housebuilders, I suppose, a house?
Euthyphroναί.
EuthyphroYes.
Socratesεἰπὲ δή, ὦ ἄριστε· ἡ δὲ θεοῖς ὑπηρετικὴ εἰς τίνος ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν ὑπηρετικὴ ἂν εἴη; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι σὺ οἶσθα, ἐπειδήπερ τά γε θεῖα κάλλιστα φῂς εἰδέναι ἀνθρώπων.
SocratesThen tell me, my excellent friend: service to the gods—what result would it serve to produce? You obviously know, since you say you know more about divine matters than anyone.
Euthyphroκαὶ ἀληθῆ γε λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες.
EuthyphroAnd what I say is true, Socrates.
Socratesεἰπὲ δὴ πρὸς Διὸς τί ποτέ ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο τὸ πάγκαλον ἔργον ὃ οἱ θεοὶ ἀπεργάζονται ἡμῖν ὑπηρέταις χρώμενοι;
SocratesThen tell me, for Zeus’ sake: what is that magnificent work the gods produce, using us as their servants?
Euthyphroπολλὰ καὶ καλά, ὦ Σώκρατες.
EuthyphroMany fine things, Socrates.
Socratesκαὶ γὰρ οἱ στρατηγοί, ὦ φίλε· ἀλλʼ ὅμως τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ῥᾳδίως ἂν εἴποις, ὅτι νίκην ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ἀπεργάζονται· ἢ οὔ;
SocratesSo do generals, my friend. Still, you could easily tell me the main one: they produce victory in war. Isn’t that right?
Euthyphroπῶς δʼ οὔ;
EuthyphroOf course.
Socratesπολλὰ δέ γʼ, οἶμαι, καὶ καλὰ καὶ οἱ γεωργοί· ἀλλʼ ὅμως τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ἐστιν τῆς ἀπεργασίας ἡ ἐκ τῆς γῆς τροφή.
SocratesAnd farmers too, I think, produce many fine things. Still, the main thing they produce is food from the earth.
Euthyphroπάνυ γε.
EuthyphroCertainly.
Socratesτί δὲ δὴ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν ἃ οἱ θεοὶ ἀπεργάζονται; τί τὸ κεφάλαιόν ἐστι τῆς ἐργασίας;
SocratesWell then, of the many fine things the gods produce, what’s the main one?
Euthyphroκαὶ ὀλίγον σοι πρότερον εἶπον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι b πλείονος ἔργου ἐστὶν ἀκριβῶς πάντα ταῦτα ὡς ἔχει μαθεῖν· τόδε μέντοι σοι ἁπλῶς λέγω, ὅτι ἐὰν μὲν κεχαρισμένα τις ἐπίστηται τοῖς θεοῖς λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν εὐχόμενός τε καὶ θύων, ταῦτʼ ἔστι τὰ ὅσια, καὶ σῴζει τὰ τοιαῦτα τούς τε ἰδίους οἴκους καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν πόλεων· τὰ δʼ ἐναντία τῶν κεχαρισμένων ἀσεβῆ, ἃ δὴ καὶ ἀνατρέπει ἅπαντα καὶ ἀπόλλυσιν.
EuthyphroI told you a little while ago, Socrates, that b it’s a big job to learn exactly how all these things stand. But I’ll tell you this much simply: if someone knows how to say and do what gratifies the gods when he prays and sacrifices, those are the pious things, and things like that preserve both private households and the public life of cities. The opposite of what gratifies them is impious, and that overturns and destroys everything.
Trading with the gods
Piety as knowledge of sacrifice and prayer becomes trade with the gods, and the argument circles back.
Socratesἦ πολύ μοι διὰ βραχυτέρων, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, εἰ ἐβούλου, εἶπες ἂν τὸ κεφάλαιον ὧν ἠρώτων· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ c πρόθυμός με εἶ διδάξαι—δῆλος εἶ. καὶ γὰρ νῦν ἐπειδὴ ἐπʼ αὐτῷ ἦσθα ἀπετράπου, ὃ εἰ ἀπεκρίνω, ἱκανῶς ἂν ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ τὴν ὁσιότητα ἐμεμαθήκη. νῦν δὲ ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν ἐρῶντα τῷ ἐρωμένῳ ἀκολουθεῖν ὅπῃ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ὑπάγῃ, τί δὴ αὖ λέγεις τὸ ὅσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὁσιότητα; οὐχὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ τοῦ θύειν τε καὶ εὔχεσθαι;
SocratesYou could have told me the main point of what I was asking far more briefly, Euthyphro, if you’d wanted to. But you’re not c keen to teach me—that’s clear. Just now, when you were right on the point, you turned aside. If you’d given that answer, I’d already have learned piety well enough from you. But as it is—since the lover has to follow his beloved wherever he leads—what do you say the pious and piety are this time? Isn’t it a kind of knowledge of how to sacrifice and pray?
Socratesοὐκοῦν τὸ θύειν δωρεῖσθαί ἐστι τοῖς θεοῖς, τὸ δʼ εὔχεσθαι αἰτεῖν τοὺς θεούς;
SocratesAnd isn’t sacrificing giving gifts to the gods, and praying asking things of the gods?
Euthyphroκαὶ μάλα, ὦ Σώκρατες.
EuthyphroVery much so, Socrates.
Socratesἐπιστήμη ἄρα αἰτήσεως καὶ δόσεως θεοῖς ὁσιότης ἂν εἴη ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου.
SocratesThen on this account piety would be knowledge of asking from the gods and giving to them.
Euthyphroπάνυ καλῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, συνῆκας ὃ εἶπον.
EuthyphroYou’ve grasped what I said perfectly, Socrates.
Socratesἐπιθυμητὴς γάρ εἰμι, ὦ φίλε, τῆς σῆς σοφίας καὶ προσέχω τὸν νοῦν αὐτῇ, ὥστε οὐ χαμαὶ πεσεῖται ὅτι ἂν εἴπῃς. ἀλλά μοι λέξον τίς αὕτη ἡ ὑπηρεσία ἐστὶ τοῖς θεοῖς; αἰτεῖν τε φῂς αὐτοὺς καὶ διδόναι ἐκείνοις;
SocratesThat’s because I’m in love with your wisdom, my friend, and I keep my mind on it, so nothing you say will fall to the ground. But tell me, what is this service to the gods? You say it’s asking them for things and giving things to them?
Euthyphroἔγωγε.
EuthyphroI do.
Socratesἆρʼ οὖν οὐ τό γε ὀρθῶς αἰτεῖν ἂν εἴη ὧν δεόμεθα παρʼ ἐκείνων, ταῦτα αὐτοὺς αἰτεῖν;
SocratesNow wouldn’t asking correctly be asking them for the things we need from them?
Euthyphroἀλλὰ τί;
EuthyphroWhat else?
Socratesκαὶ αὖ τὸ διδόναι ὀρθῶς, ὧν ἐκεῖνοι τυγχάνουσιν δεόμενοι παρʼ ἡμῶν, ταῦτα ἐκείνοις αὖ ἀντιδωρεῖσθαι; οὐ γάρ που τεχνικόν γʼ ἂν εἴη δωροφορεῖν διδόντα τῳ ταῦτα ὧν οὐδὲν δεῖται.
SocratesAnd giving correctly, in turn, would be giving them back the things they happen to need from us? It would hardly be skillful, I suppose, to bring someone gifts he has no need of.
Euthyphroἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.
EuthyphroThat’s true, Socrates.
Socratesἐμπορικὴ ἄρα τις ἂν εἴη, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, τέχνη ἡ ὁσιότης θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις παρʼ ἀλλήλων.
SocratesSo piety would be a kind of trading skill, Euthyphro, between gods and humans.
Euthyphroἐμπορική, εἰ οὕτως ἥδιόν σοι ὀνομάζειν.
EuthyphroTrading, if you like that name better.
Socratesἀλλʼ οὐδὲν ἥδιον ἔμοιγε, εἰ μὴ τυγχάνει ἀληθὲς ὄν. φράσον δέ μοι, τίς ἡ ὠφελία τοῖς θεοῖς τυγχάνει οὖσα ἀπὸ τῶν δώρων ὧν παρʼ ἡμῶν λαμβάνουσιν; ἃ μὲν γὰρ διδόασι a παντὶ δῆλον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν ὅτι ἂν μὴ ἐκεῖνοι δῶσιν. ἃ δὲ παρʼ ἡμῶν λαμβάνουσιν, τί ὠφελοῦνται; ἢ τοσοῦτον αὐτῶν πλεονεκτοῦμεν κατὰ τὴν ἐμπορίαν, ὥστε πάντα τὰ ἀγαθὰ παρʼ αὐτῶν λαμβάνομεν, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ παρʼ ἡμῶν οὐδέν;
SocratesI don’t like any name better unless it happens to be true. But tell me, what benefit do the gods actually get from the gifts they receive from us? What they give a is plain to everyone, since we have nothing good that they don’t give us. But what do they gain from what they get from us? Or do we get so much the better of them in this trade that we receive all good things from them and they get nothing from us?
Euthyphroἀλλʼ οἴει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὺς θεοὺς ὠφελεῖσθαι ἀπὸ τούτων ἃ παρʼ ἡμῶν λαμβάνουσιν;
EuthyphroBut Socrates, do you think the gods benefit from what they receive from us?
Socratesἀλλὰ τί δήποτʼ ἂν εἴη ταῦτα, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, τὰ παρʼ ἡμῶν δῶρα τοῖς θεοῖς;
SocratesWell then, what on earth could these gifts of ours to the gods be, Euthyphro?
Euthyphroτί δʼ οἴει ἄλλο ἢ τιμή τε καὶ γέρα καί, ὅπερ ἐγὼ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, χάρις;
EuthyphroWhat do you think, other than honor, tributes and—as I was saying just now—gratification?
Socratesκεχαρισμένον ἄρα ἐστίν, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, τὸ ὅσιον, ἀλλʼ οὐχὶ ὠφέλιμον οὐδὲ φίλον τοῖς θεοῖς;
SocratesSo the pious is gratifying to the gods, Euthyphro, but not beneficial or dear to them?
Euthyphroοἶμαι ἔγωγε πάντων γε μάλιστα φίλον.
EuthyphroI think it’s the dearest thing of all to them.
Socratesτοῦτο ἄρʼ ἐστὶν αὖ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ὅσιον, τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον.
SocratesSo once again, it seems, this is the pious: what’s dear to the gods.
Euthyphroμάλιστά γε.
EuthyphroAbsolutely.
Socratesθαυμάσῃ οὖν ταῦτα λέγων ἐάν σοι οἱ λόγοι φαίνωνται μὴ μένοντες ἀλλὰ βαδίζοντες, καὶ ἐμὲ αἰτιάσῃ τὸν Δαίδαλον βαδίζοντας αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν, αὐτὸς ὢν πολύ γε τεχνικώτερος τοῦ Δαιδάλου καὶ κύκλῳ περιιόντα ποιῶν; ἢ οὐκ αἰσθάνῃ ὅτι ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν περιελθὼν πάλιν εἰς ταὐτὸν c ἥκει; μέμνησαι γάρ που ὅτι ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν τό τε ὅσιον καὶ τὸ θεοφιλὲς οὐ ταὐτὸν ἡμῖν ἐφάνη ἀλλʼ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων· ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι;
SocratesThen when you say this, will you be surprised if your words don’t seem to stay put but go wandering off? And will you blame me for being the Daedalus who makes them wander, when you yourself are far more skillful than Daedalus and make them go round in a circle? Or don’t you notice that our argument has gone round and come back c to the same place? You remember, I’m sure, that earlier the pious and what’s loved by the gods turned out not to be the same but different from each other. Or don’t you remember?
Socratesνῦν οὖν οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον φῂς ὅσιον εἶναι; τοῦτο δʼ ἄλλο τι ἢ θεοφιλὲς γίγνεται; ἢ οὔ;
SocratesThen don’t you realize that now you’re saying that what’s dear to the gods is pious? And is that anything other than what’s loved by the gods? Or isn’t it?
Euthyphroπάνυ γε.
EuthyphroIt certainly is.
Socratesοὐκοῦν ἢ ἄρτι οὐ καλῶς ὡμολογοῦμεν, ἢ εἰ τότε καλῶς, νῦν οὐκ ὀρθῶς τιθέμεθα.
SocratesSo either we were wrong to agree earlier, or, if we were right then, we’re wrong to propose this now.
Euthyphroἔοικεν.
EuthyphroIt seems so.
Socratesἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄρα ἡμῖν πάλιν σκεπτέον τί ἐστι τὸ ὅσιον, ὡς ἐγὼ πρὶν ἂν μάθω ἑκὼν εἶναι οὐκ ἀποδειλιάσω. d ἀλλὰ μή με ἀτιμάσῃς ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ προσσχὼν τὸν νοῦν ὅτι μάλιστα νῦν εἰπὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν· οἶσθα γὰρ εἴπερ τις ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων, καὶ οὐκ ἀφετέος εἶ ὥσπερ ὁ Πρωτεὺς πρὶν ἂν εἴπῃς. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ᾔδησθα σαφῶς τό τε ὅσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἄν ποτε ἐπεχείρησας ὑπὲρ ἀνδρὸς θητὸς ἄνδρα πρεσβύτην πατέρα διωκάθειν φόνου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἂν ἔδεισας παρακινδυνεύειν μὴ οὐκ ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ ποιήσοις, καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ᾐσχύνθης· νῦν δὲ εὖ οἶδα ὅτι e σαφῶς οἴει εἰδέναι τό τε ὅσιον καὶ μή. εἰπὲ οὖν, ὦ βέλτιστε Εὐθύφρων, καὶ μὴ ἀποκρύψῃ ὅτι αὐτὸ ἡγῇ.
SocratesThen we have to go back to the beginning and examine what the pious is, since I won’t willingly lose heart before I learn it. d Don’t brush me aside. Give it your full attention in every way you can and tell me the truth now, more than ever. You know it if any human being does, and like Proteus you mustn’t be let go until you tell me. If you didn’t clearly know the pious and the impious, there’s no way you’d ever have taken it upon yourself to prosecute your elderly father for murder on behalf of a hired laborer. You’d have been afraid of the gods, afraid of the risk that you weren’t doing it rightly, and you’d have been ashamed before people. As it is, I’m sure e you think you know clearly what is pious and what isn’t. So tell me, my excellent Euthyphro, and don’t hide what you think it is.
Euthyphroεἰς αὖθις τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες· νῦν γὰρ σπεύδω ποι, καί μοι ὥρα ἀπιέναι.
EuthyphroSome other time, then, Socrates. I’m in a hurry to get somewhere right now, and it’s time for me to go.
Socratesοἷα ποιεῖς, ὦ ἑταῖρε. ἀπʼ ἐλπίδος με καταβαλὼν μεγάλης ἀπέρχῃ ἣν εἶχον, ὡς παρὰ σοῦ μαθὼν τά τε ὅσια καὶ μὴ καὶ τῆς πρὸς Μέλητον γραφῆς ἀπαλλάξομαι, ἐνδειξάμενος a ἐκείνῳ ὅτι σοφὸς ἤδη παρʼ Εὐθύφρονος τὰ θεῖα γέγονα καὶ ὅτι οὐκέτι ὑπʼ ἀγνοίας αὐτοσχεδιάζω οὐδὲ καινοτομῶ περὶ αὐτά, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ὅτι ἄμεινον βιωσοίμην.
SocratesWhat a thing to do, my friend! You’re going off and dashing the great hope I had: that I’d learn from you what is pious and what isn’t and get free of Meletus’ indictment, by showing a him that I’d now become wise in divine matters thanks to Euthyphro, that I no longer improvise and innovate about them out of ignorance—and, above all, that I’d live the rest of my life better.