Crito
Socrates' prison cell, before dawn. · Crito urges Socrates to escape, and Socrates argues that he must stay.
Socratesτί τηνικάδε ἀφῖξαι, ὦ Κρίτων; ἢ οὐ πρῲ ἔτι ἐστίν;
SocratesWhy have you come at this hour, Crito? Isn’t it still early?
Critoπάνυ μὲν οὖν.
CritoYes, very early.
Socratesπηνίκα μάλιστα;
SocratesWhat time is it, roughly?
Critoὄρθρος βαθύς.
CritoJust before dawn.
Socratesθαυμάζω ὅπως ἠθέλησέ σοι ὁ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου φύλαξ ὑπακοῦσαι.
SocratesI’m surprised the prison guard was willing to let you in.
Critoσυνήθης ἤδη μοί ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, διὰ τὸ πολλάκις δεῦρο φοιτᾶν, καί τι καὶ εὐεργέτηται ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ.
CritoHe’s used to me by now, Socrates, since I come here so often. And besides, I’ve done him a favor or two.
Socratesἄρτι δὲ ἥκεις ἢ πάλαι;
SocratesDid you just get here, or have you been here a while?
Critoἐπιεικῶς πάλαι.
CritoA fair while.
Socratesεἶτα πῶς οὐκ εὐθὺς ἐπήγειράς με, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ παρακάθησαι;
SocratesThen why didn’t you wake me right away, instead of sitting beside me in silence?
Critoοὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδʼ ἂν αὐτὸς ἤθελον ἐν τοσαύτῃ τε ἀγρυπνίᾳ καὶ λύπῃ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ σοῦ πάλαι θαυμάζω αἰσθανόμενος ὡς ἡδέως καθεύδεις· καὶ ἐπίτηδές σε οὐκ ἤγειρον ἵνα ὡς ἥδιστα διάγῃς. καὶ πολλάκις μὲν δή σε καὶ πρότερον ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ ηὐδαιμόνισα τοῦ τρόπου, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ νῦν παρεστώσῃ συμφορᾷ, ὡς ῥᾳδίως αὐτὴν καὶ πρᾴως φέρεις.
CritoNo, by Zeus, Socrates, I wouldn’t want to be so sleepless and so miserable myself. I’ve been marveling at you for a long time now, seeing how sweetly you sleep, and I deliberately didn’t wake you so that you could pass the time as pleasantly as possible. All through your life I’ve often thought you fortunate in your temperament, but never more than in this present misfortune, seeing how easily and calmly you bear it.
Socratesκαὶ γὰρ ἄν, ὦ Κρίτων, πλημμελὲς εἴη ἀγανακτεῖν τηλικοῦτον ὄντα εἰ δεῖ ἤδη τελευτᾶν.
SocratesWell, Crito, it would strike a false note for a man of my age to be upset that he has to die now.
Critoκαὶ ἄλλοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τηλικοῦτοι ἐν τοιαύταις συμφοραῖς ἁλίσκονται, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἐπιλύεται ἡ ἡλικία τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγανακτεῖν τῇ παρούσῃ τύχῃ.
CritoOther men just as old, Socrates, get caught in misfortunes like this, but their age does nothing to keep them from being upset at the fate that’s upon them.
Socratesἔστι ταῦτα. ἀλλὰ τί δὴ οὕτω πρῲ ἀφῖξαι;
SocratesThat’s true. But why have you come so early?
Critoἀγγελίαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φέρων χαλεπήν, οὐ σοί, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, ἀλλʼ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς σοῖς ἐπιτηδείοις πᾶσιν καὶ χαλεπὴν καὶ βαρεῖαν, ἣν ἐγώ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατʼ ἂν ἐνέγκαιμι.
CritoI bring news, Socrates, hard news. Not for you, as it seems to me, but for me and all your friends it’s hard and heavy news, and I think I’ll find it the heaviest of all to bear.
Socratesτίνα ταύτην; ἢ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφῖκται ἐκ Δήλου, οὗ δεῖ d ἀφικομένου τεθνάναι με;
SocratesWhat news? Has the ship arrived from Delos, the ship on whose d arrival I must die?
Critoοὔτοι δὴ ἀφῖκται, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖν μέν μοι ἥξει τήμερον ἐξ ὧν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ἥκοντές τινες ἀπὸ Σουνίου καὶ καταλιπόντες ἐκεῖ αὐτό. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων τῶν ἀγγέλων ὅτι ἥξει τήμερον, καὶ ἀνάγκη δὴ εἰς αὔριον ἔσται, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν βίον σε τελευτᾶν.
CritoNo, it hasn’t arrived yet, but I think it will come today, judging by what some people report who have come from Sunium, where they left it. So it’s clear from these messengers that it will come today, and then tomorrow, Socrates, you will have to end your life.
Socratesἀλλʼ, ὦ Κρίτων, τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ, εἰ ταύτῃ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον, ταύτῃ ἔστω· οὐ μέντοι οἶμαι ἥξειν αὐτὸ τήμερον.
SocratesWell, Crito, may it turn out for the best. If this is what pleases the gods, so be it. All the same, I don’t think it will come today.
Socratesἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ. τῇ γάρ που ὑστεραίᾳ δεῖ με ἀποθνῄσκειν ἢ ᾗ ἂν ἔλθῃ τὸ πλοῖον.
SocratesI’ll tell you. I’m to die, I believe, on the day after the ship arrives.
Critoφασί γέ τοι δὴ οἱ τούτων κύριοι.
CritoThat’s what the authorities say, anyway.
Socratesοὐ τοίνυν τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας οἶμαι αὐτὸ ἥξειν ἀλλὰ τῆς ἑτέρας. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἔκ τινος ἐνυπνίου ὃ ἑώρακα ὀλίγον πρότερον ταύτης τῆς νυκτός· καὶ κινδυνεύεις ἐν καιρῷ τινι οὐκ ἐγεῖραί με.
SocratesWell then, I don’t think it will come on the day that’s now dawning, but on the next. I infer this from a dream I had a little while ago tonight. It looks as if you picked a good moment not to wake me.
Critoἦν δὲ δὴ τί τὸ ἐνύπνιον;
CritoAnd what was the dream?
Socratesἐδόκει τίς μοι γυνὴ προσελθοῦσα καλὴ καὶ εὐειδής, b λευκὰ ἱμάτια ἔχουσα, καλέσαι με καὶ εἰπεῖν· “ὦ Σώκρατες, ἤματί κεν τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἵκοιο. ”
SocratesA beautiful, graceful woman seemed to come up to me, b dressed in white, and she called me and said: “Socrates, on the third day you would reach fertile Phthia.”
Socratesἐναργὲς μὲν οὖν, ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Κρίτων.
SocratesNo, a clear one, Crito—or so it seems to me.
Crito's case for escape
Crito urges Socrates to escape from prison, citing his reputation, his friends' money and Socrates' sons.
Critoλίαν γε, ὡς ἔοικεν. ἀλλʼ, ὦ δαιμόνιε Σώκρατες, ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐμοὶ πιθοῦ καὶ σώθητι· ὡς ἐμοί, ἐὰν σὺ ἀποθάνῃς, οὐ μία συμφορά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ χωρὶς μὲν τοῦ ἐστερῆσθαι τοιούτου ἐπιτηδείου οἷον ἐγὼ οὐδένα μή ποτε εὑρήσω, ἔτι δὲ καὶ πολλοῖς δόξω, οἳ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ μὴ σαφῶς ἴσασιν, c ὡς οἷός τʼ ὤν σε σῴζειν εἰ ἤθελον ἀναλίσκειν χρήματα, ἀμελῆσαι. καίτοι τίς ἂν αἰσχίων εἴη ταύτης δόξα ἢ δοκεῖν χρήματα περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι ἢ φίλους; οὐ γὰρ πείσονται οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς σὺ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἠθέλησας ἀπιέναι ἐνθένδε ἡμῶν προθυμουμένων.
CritoAll too clear, it seems. But my dear Socrates, even now, listen to me and save yourself. If you die, it won’t be just one misfortune for me. Apart from losing a friend such as I’ll never find again, many people who don’t know you and me well will think c that I could have saved you if I’d been willing to spend the money, but didn’t care to. And what reputation could be more shameful than being thought to value money more than friends? Most people will never believe that it was you who refused to leave this place, though we were eager for you to go.
Socratesἀλλὰ τί ἡμῖν, ὦ μακάριε Κρίτων, οὕτω τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλει; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιεικέστατοι, ὧν μᾶλλον ἄξιον φροντίζειν, ἡγήσονται αὐτὰ οὕτω πεπρᾶχθαι ὥσπερ ἂν πραχθῇ.
SocratesBut my dear Crito, why should we care so much about what the many think? The most reasonable people, who are more worth considering, will believe things were done just as they actually were.
Critoἀλλʼ ὁρᾷς δὴ ὅτι ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλειν. αὐτὰ δὲ δῆλα τὰ παρόντα νυνὶ ὅτι οἷοί τʼ εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ τὰ σμικρότατα τῶν κακῶν ἐξεργάζεσθαι ἀλλὰ τὰ μέγιστα σχεδόν, ἐάν τις ἐν αὐτοῖς διαβεβλημένος ᾖ.
CritoBut you can see, Socrates, that one has to care about the opinion of the many too. The present situation itself makes it plain that the many can bring about not the least of evils but nearly the greatest, if someone has been slandered among them.
Socratesεἰ γὰρ ὤφελον, ὦ Κρίτων, οἷοί τʼ εἶναι οἱ πολλοὶ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐργάζεσθαι, ἵνα οἷοί τʼ ἦσαν καὶ ἀγαθὰ τὰ μέγιστα, καὶ καλῶς ἂν εἶχεν. νῦν δὲ οὐδέτερα οἷοί τε· οὔτε γὰρ φρόνιμον οὔτε ἄφρονα δυνατοὶ ποιῆσαι, ποιοῦσι δὲ τοῦτο ὅτι ἂν τύχωσι.
SocratesIf only the many could bring about the greatest evils, Crito, so that they could also bring about the greatest goods—that would be fine. But as it is they can do neither. They can’t make a person wise or foolish; they just do whatever chance brings their way.
Critoταῦτα μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἐχέτω· τάδε δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπέ μοι. ἆρά γε μὴ ἐμοῦ προμηθῇ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων μή, ἐὰν σὺ ἐνθένδε ἐξέλθῃς, οἱ συκοφάνται ἡμῖν πράγματα παρέχωσιν ὡς σὲ ἐνθένδε ἐκκλέψασιν, καὶ ἀναγκασθῶμεν ἢ καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν ἀποβαλεῖν ἢ συχνὰ χρήματα, ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι πρὸς τούτοις παθεῖν;
CritoWell, let that be as it may. But tell me this, Socrates. You’re not worried, are you, about me and your other friends—that if you get out of here, the informers will make trouble for us for having smuggled you out, and we’ll be forced to lose all our property, or a lot of money, or suffer something else besides?
εἰ γάρ τι a τοιοῦτον φοβῇ, ἔασον αὐτὸ χαίρειν· ἡμεῖς γάρ που δίκαιοί ἐσμεν σώσαντές σε κινδυνεύειν τοῦτον τὸν κίνδυνον καὶ ἐὰν δέῃ ἔτι τούτου μείζω. ἀλλʼ ἐμοὶ πείθου καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει.
If you’re afraid of anything a like that, forget it. Surely it’s right for us to run this risk to save you, and a greater one than this if need be. So do as I say, and don’t refuse.
Socratesκαὶ ταῦτα προμηθοῦμαι, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά.
SocratesI am worried about these things, Crito, and many others too.
Critoμήτε τοίνυν ταῦτα φοβοῦ—καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ πολὺ τἀργύριόν ἐστιν ὃ θέλουσι λαβόντες τινὲς σῶσαί σε καὶ ἐξαγαγεῖν ἐνθένδε. ἔπειτα οὐχ ὁρᾷς τούτους τοὺς συκοφάντας ὡς εὐτελεῖς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἂν δέοι ἐπʼ αὐτοὺς πολλοῦ ἀργυρίου; b σοὶ δὲ ὑπάρχει μὲν τὰ ἐμὰ χρήματα, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἱκανά· ἔπειτα καὶ εἴ τι ἐμοῦ κηδόμενος οὐκ οἴει δεῖν ἀναλίσκειν τἀμά, ξένοι οὗτοι ἐνθάδε ἕτοιμοι ἀναλίσκειν· εἷς δὲ καὶ κεκόμικεν ἐπʼ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀργύριον ἱκανόν, Σιμμίας ὁ Θηβαῖος, ἕτοιμος δὲ καὶ Κέβης καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πάνυ.
CritoThen don’t be afraid of them. In fact, the sum some people are willing to take for rescuing you and getting you out of here isn’t large. And then, don’t you see how cheap these informers are, and that it wouldn’t take much money to deal with them? b My money is at your disposal, and I think it’s enough. And if, out of concern for me, you think you shouldn’t spend mine, there are these visitors from abroad here ready to spend theirs. One of them, Simmias of Thebes, has even brought enough money for this very purpose, and Cebes is ready too, and a great many others.
ὥστε, ὅπερ λέγω, μήτε ταῦτα φοβούμενος ἀποκάμῃς σαυτὸν σῶσαι, μήτε, ὃ ἔλεγες ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, δυσχερές σοι γενέσθω ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ἐξελθὼν ὅτι χρῷο σαυτῷ· πολλαχοῦ c μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοσε ὅποι ἂν ἀφίκῃ ἀγαπήσουσί σε· ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ εἰς Θετταλίαν ἰέναι, εἰσὶν ἐμοὶ ἐκεῖ ξένοι οἵ σε περὶ πολλοῦ ποιήσονται καὶ ἀσφάλειάν σοι παρέξονται, ὥστε σε μηδένα λυπεῖν τῶν κατὰ Θετταλίαν.
So, as I say, don’t let fear of these things make you give up on saving yourself, and don’t let it trouble you, as you said in court, that if you left you wouldn’t know what to do with yourself. There are many c other places you might go where people will welcome you. And if you want to go to Thessaly, I have friends there who will value you highly and keep you safe, so that no one in Thessaly will give you any trouble.
ἔτι δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδὲ δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖς ἐπιχειρεῖν πρᾶγμα, σαυτὸν προδοῦναι, ἐξὸν σωθῆναι, καὶ τοιαῦτα σπεύδεις περὶ σαυτὸν γενέσθαι ἅπερ ἂν καὶ οἱ ἐχθροί σου σπεύσαιέν τε καὶ ἔσπευσαν σὲ διαφθεῖραι βουλόμενοι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τοὺς ὑεῖς τοὺς σαυτοῦ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς προδιδόναι, οὕς σοι d ἐξὸν καὶ ἐκθρέψαι καὶ ἐκπαιδεῦσαι οἰχήσῃ καταλιπών, καὶ τὸ σὸν μέρος ὅτι ἂν τύχωσι τοῦτο πράξουσιν· τεύξονται δέ, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, τοιούτων οἷάπερ εἴωθεν γίγνεσθαι ἐν ταῖς ὀρφανίαις περὶ τοὺς ὀρφανούς. ἢ γὰρ οὐ χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι παῖδας ἢ συνδιαταλαιπωρεῖν καὶ τρέφοντα καὶ παιδεύοντα, σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς τὰ ῥᾳθυμότατα αἱρεῖσθαι.
Besides, Socrates, I don’t think what you’re undertaking is even just: to betray yourself when you could be saved. You’re hurrying to bring on yourself exactly what your enemies would hurry to bring on you—and did, wanting to destroy you. On top of this, I think you’re betraying your own sons too. You could d raise them and educate them, yet you’ll go off and abandon them, and as far as you’re concerned they’ll fare however chance has it. And they’ll probably meet the sort of fate that orphans usually meet when they’re left without parents. Either one shouldn’t have children at all, or one should share in the hard work of raising and educating them. But you seem to me to be choosing the laziest course.
χρὴ δέ, ἅπερ ἂν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἀνδρεῖος ἕλοιτο, ταῦτα αἱρεῖσθαι, φάσκοντά γε δὴ ἀρετῆς διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· ὡς ἔγωγε καὶ e ὑπὲρ σοῦ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τῶν σῶν ἐπιτηδείων αἰσχύνομαι μὴ δόξῃ ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ περὶ σὲ ἀνανδρίᾳ τινὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πεπρᾶχθαι, καὶ ἡ εἴσοδος τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ὡς εἰσῆλθεν ἐξὸν μὴ εἰσελθεῖν, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἀγὼν τῆς δίκης ὡς ἐγένετο, καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ τουτί, ὥσπερ κατάγελως τῆς πράξεως, κακίᾳ τινὶ καὶ ἀνανδρίᾳ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ διαπεφευγέναι a ἡμᾶς δοκεῖν, οἵτινές σε οὐχὶ ἐσώσαμεν οὐδὲ σὺ σαυτόν, οἷόν τε ὂν καὶ δυνατὸν εἴ τι καὶ μικρὸν ἡμῶν ὄφελος ἦν.
You should choose what a good and brave man would choose—especially when you claim to have cared about excellence all your life. For my part, I’m ashamed e both for you and for us, your friends, that this whole affair of yours will seem to have come about through some cowardice on our part: the way the case came to court when it needn’t have, the way the trial itself was conducted, and now this final act, the absurd climax of the whole business—it will seem that we let the chance slip a through some badness and cowardice of ours, since we didn’t save you, and you didn’t save yourself, though it was possible and could have been done if we’d been of even the slightest use.
ταῦτα οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅρα μὴ ἅμα τῷ κακῷ καὶ αἰσχρὰ ᾖ σοί τε καὶ ἡμῖν. ἀλλὰ βουλεύου—μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ βουλεύεσθαι ἔτι ὥρα ἀλλὰ βεβουλεῦσθαι—μία δὲ βουλή· τῆς γὰρ ἐπιούσης νυκτὸς πάντα ταῦτα δεῖ πεπρᾶχθαι, εἰ δʼ ἔτι περιμενοῦμεν, ἀδύνατον καὶ οὐκέτι οἷόν τε. ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πείθου μοι καὶ μηδαμῶς ἄλλως ποίει.
So see to it, Socrates, that all this isn’t shameful as well as bad, both for you and for us. Come, decide—or rather, it’s no longer time for deciding but for having decided. And there’s only one plan: all this has to be done this coming night. If we wait any longer, it will be impossible, out of the question. Please, Socrates, by all means do as I say, and don’t refuse.
Whose opinion counts
Socrates argues that only the expert's opinion counts, and that one must never do wrong in return.
Socratesὦ φίλε Κρίτων, ἡ προθυμία σου πολλοῦ ἀξία εἰ μετά τινος ὀρθότητος εἴη· εἰ δὲ μή, ὅσῳ μείζων τοσούτῳ χαλεπωτέρα. σκοπεῖσθαι οὖν χρὴ ἡμᾶς εἴτε ταῦτα πρακτέον εἴτε μή· ὡς ἐγὼ οὐ νῦν πρῶτον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀεὶ τοιοῦτος οἷος τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ πείθεσθαι ἢ τῷ λόγῳ ὃς ἄν μοι λογιζομένῳ βέλτιστος φαίνηται. τοὺς δὴ λόγους οὓς ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον οὐ δύναμαι νῦν ἐκβαλεῖν, ἐπειδή μοι ἥδε ἡ τύχη γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ὅμοιοι φαίνονταί μοι, c καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς πρεσβεύω καὶ τιμῶ οὕσπερ καὶ πρότερον· ὧν ἐὰν μὴ βελτίω ἔχωμεν λέγειν ἐν τῷ παρόντι, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι οὐ μή σοι συγχωρήσω, οὐδʼ ἂν πλείω τῶν νῦν παρόντων ἡ τῶν πολλῶν δύναμις ὥσπερ παῖδας ἡμᾶς μορμολύττηται, δεσμοὺς καὶ θανάτους ἐπιπέμπουσα καὶ χρημάτων ἀφαιρέσεις.
SocratesMy dear Crito, your eagerness would be worth a great deal if it had some rightness to it; if not, the greater it is, the harder it is to deal with. So we have to examine whether we should do this or not. For I am, not only now but always, the kind of person who listens to nothing in me except the argument that seems best to me when I reason it out. I can’t throw out the arguments I used to make now that this has happened to me; they seem to me much the same as before, c and I revere and honor the same ones as I did before. Unless we can find better ones to offer in the present situation, you can be sure I won’t give in to you—not even if the power of the many tries to frighten us like children with even more bogeymen than we face now, sending imprisonments and deaths and confiscations of property our way.
πῶς οὖν ἂν μετριώτατα σκοποίμεθα αὐτά; εἰ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἀναλάβοιμεν, ὃν σὺ λέγεις περὶ τῶν δοξῶν. πότερον καλῶς ἐλέγετο ἑκάστοτε ἢ οὔ, d ὅτι ταῖς μὲν δεῖ τῶν δοξῶν προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, ταῖς δὲ οὔ; ἢ πρὶν μὲν ἐμὲ δεῖν ἀποθνῄσκειν καλῶς ἐλέγετο, νῦν δὲ κατάδηλος ἄρα ἐγένετο ὅτι ἄλλως ἕνεκα λόγου ἐλέγετο, ἦν δὲ παιδιὰ καὶ φλυαρία ὡς ἀληθῶς; ἐπιθυμῶ δʼ ἔγωγʼ ἐπισκέψασθαι, ὦ Κρίτων, κοινῇ μετὰ σοῦ εἴ τί μοι ἀλλοιότερος φανεῖται, ἐπειδὴ ὧδε ἔχω, ἢ ὁ αὐτός, καὶ ἐάσομεν χαίρειν ἢ πεισόμεθα αὐτῷ. ἐλέγετο δέ πως, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἑκάστοτε ὧδε ὑπὸ τῶν οἰομένων τὶ λέγειν, ὥσπερ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι τῶν δοξῶν ἃς οἱ ἄνθρωποι e δοξάζουσιν δέοι τὰς μὲν περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι, τὰς δὲ μή.
So how might we examine this most reasonably? Suppose we first take up this argument you’re making about opinions. Were we right or not, each time we said d that we should pay attention to some opinions but not to others? Or was it right before I had to die, while now it’s become obvious that it was said just for the sake of talking, and was really play and nonsense? I’d like to look into it together with you, Crito, and see whether the argument will look any different to me now that I’m in this situation, or the same, and whether we’ll dismiss it or be persuaded by it. As I recall, people who thought they were talking sense always used to say something like what I was saying just now: that of the opinions people e hold, some should be taken very seriously and others not.
τοῦτο πρὸς θεῶν, ὦ Κρίτων, οὐ δοκεῖ καλῶς σοι λέγεσθαι;
In heaven’s name, Crito, don’t you think that’s rightly said?
—σὺ γάρ, ὅσα γε τἀνθρώπεια, ἐκτὸς εἶ τοῦ μέλλειν ἀποθνῄσκειν a αὔριον, καὶ οὐκ ἂν σὲ παρακρούοι ἡ παροῦσα συμφορά· σκόπει δή—οὐχ ἱκανῶς δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι ὅτι οὐ πάσας χρὴ τὰς δόξας τῶν ἀνθρώπων τιμᾶν ἀλλὰ τὰς μέν, τὰς δʼ οὔ, οὐδὲ πάντων ἀλλὰ τῶν μέν, τῶν δʼ οὔ; τί φῄς; ταῦτα οὐχὶ καλῶς λέγεται;
—For you, humanly speaking, are in no danger of dying a tomorrow, and the present misfortune won’t lead your judgment astray. So consider—don’t you think it’s rightly said that we shouldn’t respect all the opinions people hold, but only some and not others, and not the opinions of everyone, but of some people and not others? What do you say? Isn’t that rightly said?
Socratesοὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς τιμᾶν, τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς μή;
SocratesSo we should respect the good ones, and not the bad ones?
Critoναί.
CritoYes.
Socratesχρησταὶ δὲ οὐχ αἱ τῶν φρονίμων, πονηραὶ δὲ αἱ τῶν ἀφρόνων;
SocratesAnd the good ones are those of people with understanding, and the bad ones those of people without it?
Critoπῶς δʼ οὔ;
CritoOf course.
Socratesφέρε δή, πῶς αὖ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐλέγετο; γυμναζόμενος b ἀνὴρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττων πότερον παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐπαίνῳ καὶ ψόγῳ καὶ δόξῃ τὸν νοῦν προσέχει, ἢ ἑνὸς μόνου ἐκείνου ὃς ἂν τυγχάνῃ ἰατρὸς ἢ παιδοτρίβης ὤν;
SocratesCome then, how did we put things like this? When a man is in training b and takes it seriously, does he pay attention to the praise and blame and opinion of every man, or only of the one man who happens to be a doctor or a trainer?
Socratesοὐκοῦν φοβεῖσθαι χρὴ τοὺς ψόγους καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους τοὺς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐκείνου ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν.
SocratesSo he should fear the blame and welcome the praise of that one man, and not those of the many.
Critoδῆλα δή.
CritoClearly.
Socratesταύτῃ ἄρα αὐτῷ πρακτέον καὶ γυμναστέον καὶ ἐδεστέον γε καὶ ποτέον, ᾗ ἂν τῷ ἑνὶ δοκῇ, τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαΐοντι, μᾶλλον ἢ ᾗ σύμπασι τοῖς ἄλλοις.
SocratesSo he should act and exercise, and eat and drink too, in whatever way seems right to the one man who supervises him and knows the subject, rather than as seems right to all the others put together.
Critoἔστι ταῦτα.
CritoThat’s so.
Socratesεἶεν. ἀπειθήσας δὲ τῷ ἑνὶ καὶ ἀτιμάσας αὐτοῦ τὴν δόξαν καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους, τιμήσας δὲ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν λόγους καὶ μηδὲν ἐπαϊόντων, ἆρα οὐδὲν κακὸν πείσεται;
SocratesVery well. And if he disobeys that one man and disregards his opinion and his praise, and instead respects what the many say, who know nothing about it, won’t he suffer some harm?
Critoπῶς γὰρ οὔ;
CritoOf course he will.
Socratesτί δʼ ἔστι τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο, καὶ ποῖ τείνει, καὶ εἰς τί τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθοῦντος;
SocratesAnd what is this harm? What does it aim at, and what part of the disobedient man does it affect?
Critoδῆλον ὅτι εἰς τὸ σῶμα· τοῦτο γὰρ διόλλυσι.
CritoHis body, obviously. That’s what it ruins.
Socratesκαλῶς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν καὶ τἆλλα, ὦ Κρίτων, οὕτως, ἵνα μὴ πάντα διΐωμεν, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ αἰσχρῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, περὶ ὧν νῦν ἡ βουλὴ ἡμῖν ἐστιν, πότερον τῇ τῶν πολλῶν δόξῃ d δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἕπεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτὴν ἢ τῇ τοῦ ἑνός, εἴ τίς ἐστιν ἐπαΐων, ὃν δεῖ καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ σύμπαντας τοὺς ἄλλους; ᾧ εἰ μὴ ἀκολουθήσομεν, διαφθεροῦμεν ἐκεῖνο καὶ λωβησόμεθα, ὃ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπώλλυτο. ἢ οὐδέν ἐστι τοῦτο;
SocratesWell said. And isn’t it the same with everything else, Crito—not to go through them all—and in particular with things just and unjust, shameful and fine, good and bad, which are what we’re deliberating about now? Should we follow the opinion of the many d and fear it, or the opinion of the one, if there is someone who knows about them, whom we should feel shame before and fear more than all the others put together? If we don’t follow him, we’ll corrupt and maim that part of us which, as we used to say, is made better by what is just and destroyed by what is unjust. Or is there nothing to this?
Socratesφέρε δή, ἐὰν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ μὲν βέλτιον γιγνόμενον, ὑπὸ τοῦ νοσώδους δὲ διαφθειρόμενον διολέσωμεν πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαϊόντων δόξῃ, ἆρα βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστιν e διεφθαρμένου αὐτοῦ; ἔστι δέ που τοῦτο σῶμα· ἢ οὐχί;
SocratesCome then: if, by not following the opinion of those who know, we ruin the part of us that is made better by what’s healthy and corrupted by what’s diseased, is life worth living for us once e it’s been corrupted? And that part, I take it, is the body, isn’t it?
Socratesἆρʼ οὖν βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστιν μετὰ μοχθηροῦ καὶ διεφθαρμένου σώματος;
SocratesSo is life worth living with a wretched, corrupted body?
Critoοὐδαμῶς.
CritoNot at all.
Socratesἀλλὰ μετʼ ἐκείνου ἄρʼ ἡμῖν βιωτὸν διεφθαρμένου, ᾧ τὸ ἄδικον μὲν λωβᾶται, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ὀνίνησιν; ἢ φαυλότερον ἡγούμεθα εἶναι τοῦ σώματος ἐκεῖνο, ὅτι ποτʼ ἐστὶ τῶν a ἡμετέρων, περὶ ὃ ἥ τε ἀδικία καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἐστίν;
SocratesBut is life worth living for us when that part of us is corrupted which injustice maims and justice benefits? Or do we think that part of a us, whatever it is, that justice and injustice concern, is of less worth than the body?
Socratesἀλλὰ τιμιώτερον;
SocratesOf more worth, rather?
Critoπολύ γε.
CritoMuch more.
Socratesοὐκ ἄρα, ὦ βέλτιστε, πάνυ ἡμῖν οὕτω φροντιστέον τί ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλʼ ὅτι ὁ ἐπαΐων περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, ὁ εἷς καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια. ὥστε πρῶτον μὲν ταύτῃ οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἰσηγῇ, εἰσηγούμενος τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης δεῖν ἡμᾶς φροντίζειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων. “ἀλλὰ μὲν δή,” φαίη γʼ ἄν τις, “οἷοί τέ εἰσιν ἡμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ ἀποκτεινύναι.”
SocratesThen, my good friend, we shouldn’t care so very much what the many will say about us, but what the one who knows about just and unjust things will say—the one man, and the truth itself. So in the first place you’re wrong to propose that we should care about the opinion of the many regarding what is just and fine and good, and their opposites. “But still,” someone might say, “the many are able to put us to death.”
Critoδῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα· φαίη γὰρ ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
CritoThat’s clear too. Someone might well say that, Socrates. You’re right.
Socratesἀλλʼ, ὦ θαυμάσιε, οὗτός τε ὁ λόγος ὃν διεληλύθαμεν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἔτι ὅμοιος εἶναι καὶ πρότερον· καὶ τόνδε δὲ αὖ σκόπει εἰ ἔτι μένει ἡμῖν ἢ οὔ, ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζῆν περὶ πλείστου ποιητέον ἀλλὰ τὸ εὖ ζῆν.
SocratesBut my remarkable friend, the argument we’ve just been through still seems to me the same as before. And now consider this one in turn, whether it still holds for us or not: that what we should value most is not living, but living well.
Critoἀλλὰ μένει.
CritoIt holds.
Socratesτὸ δὲ εὖ καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὅτι ταὐτόν ἐστιν, μένει ἢ οὐ μένει;
SocratesAnd that living well is the same as living finely and justly—does that hold, or not?
Critoμένει.
CritoIt holds.
Socratesοὐκοῦν ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων τοῦτο σκεπτέον, πότερον δίκαιον ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε πειρᾶσθαι ἐξιέναι μὴ ἀφιέντων c Ἀθηναίων ἢ οὐ δίκαιον· καὶ ἐὰν μὲν φαίνηται δίκαιον, πειρώμεθα, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐῶμεν. ἃς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις περί τε ἀναλώσεως χρημάτων καὶ δόξης καὶ παίδων τροφῆς, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων, σκέμματα ᾖ τῶν ῥᾳδίως ἀποκτεινύντων καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων γʼ ἄν, εἰ οἷοί τʼ ἦσαν, οὐδενὶ ξὺν νῷ, τούτων τῶν πολλῶν.
SocratesThen on the basis of what we’ve agreed, we must consider whether it’s just for me to try to get out of here without the Athenians’ c permission, or not just. If it appears just, let’s try; if not, let’s let it go. As for the considerations you raise about spending money, and reputation, and raising children, I suspect, Crito, that they’re really the considerations of people who put others to death lightly, and would bring them back to life just as lightly if they could, without a thought—the many.
ἡμῖν δʼ, ἐπειδὴ ὁ λόγος οὕτως αἱρεῖ, μὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκεπτέον ᾖ ἢ ὅπερ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, πότερον δίκαια πράξομεν καὶ χρήματα τελοῦντες τούτοις d τοῖς ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε ἐξάξουσιν καὶ χάριτας, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐξάγοντές τε καὶ ἐξαγόμενοι, ἢ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἀδικήσομεν πάντα ταῦτα ποιοῦντες· κἂν φαινώμεθα ἄδικα αὐτὰ ἐργαζόμενοι, μὴ οὐ δέῃ ὑπολογίζεσθαι οὔτʼ εἰ ἀποθνῄσκειν δεῖ παραμένοντας καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντας, οὔτε ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πάσχειν πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν.
But for us, since the argument compels it, I suspect there’s nothing else to consider except what we were saying just now: whether we’ll be acting justly in paying money and doing favors to those d who will get me out of here, and in getting out and being got out ourselves, or whether in truth we’ll be doing wrong in doing all this. And if it turns out that we’d be acting unjustly, I suspect we shouldn’t weigh against doing wrong either the fact that we must die if we stay here and keep quiet, or anything else we might suffer.
Critoκαλῶς μέν μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅρα δὲ τί δρῶμεν.
CritoI think you’re right, Socrates. But consider what we should do.
Socratesσκοπῶμεν, ὦ ἀγαθέ, κοινῇ, καὶ εἴ πῃ ἔχεις ἀντιλέγειν e ἐμοῦ λέγοντος, ἀντίλεγε καί σοι πείσομαι· εἰ δὲ μή, παῦσαι ἤδη, ὦ μακάριε, πολλάκις μοι λέγων τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὡς χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἀκόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐμὲ ἀπιέναι· ὡς ἐγὼ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῦμαι πείσας σε ταῦτα πράττειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντος. ὅρα δὲ δὴ τῆς σκέψεως τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐάν σοι a ἱκανῶς λέγηται, καὶ πειρῶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ᾗ ἂν μάλιστα οἴῃ.
SocratesLet’s consider it together, my good friend, and if you can object to anything e I say, object, and I’ll be persuaded by you. If not, then stop, my dear friend, telling me the same thing over and over, that I must leave here against the Athenians’ will. I think it very important to persuade you before I act, and not to act against your will. So look at the starting point of the inquiry and see whether it’s a stated to your satisfaction, and try to answer my questions as you really think best.
Socratesοὐδενὶ τρόπῳ φαμὲν ἑκόντας ἀδικητέον εἶναι, ἢ τινὶ μὲν ἀδικητέον τρόπῳ τινὶ δὲ οὔ; ἢ οὐδαμῶς τό γε ἀδικεῖν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε καλόν, ὡς πολλάκις ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ὡμολογήθη; ὅπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο ἢ πᾶσαι ἡμῖν ἐκεῖναι αἱ πρόσθεν ὁμολογίαι ἐν ταῖσδε ταῖς ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις ἐκκεχυμέναι εἰσίν, καὶ πάλαι, ὦ Κρίτων, ἄρα τηλικοίδε γέροντες ἄνδρες πρὸς ἀλλήλους σπουδῇ διαλεγόμενοι b ἐλάθομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς παίδων οὐδὲν διαφέροντες; ἢ παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτως ἔχει ὥσπερ τότε ἐλέγετο ἡμῖν· εἴτε φασὶν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴτε μή, καὶ εἴτε δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἔτι τῶνδε χαλεπώτερα πάσχειν εἴτε καὶ πρᾳότερα, ὅμως τό γε ἀδικεῖν τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν τυγχάνει ὂν παντὶ τρόπῳ; φαμὲν ἢ οὔ;
SocratesDo we say that one must never willingly do wrong in any way, or that one may do wrong in some ways and not in others? Or is doing wrong never good or fine in any way, as we’ve often agreed in the past? That’s what we were saying just now too. Or have all those earlier agreements of ours been poured away in these few days, and have we, Crito, old men that we are, been discussing things seriously with each other all this time b without noticing that we’re no different from children? Or is it, more than anything, just as we used to say: whether the many agree or not, and whether we must suffer still harsher things than these or gentler ones, doing wrong is nevertheless bad and shameful for the one who does it, in every way? Do we say so or not?
Socratesοὐδαμῶς ἄρα δεῖ ἀδικεῖν.
SocratesSo one must never do wrong.
Critoοὐ δῆτα.
CritoCertainly not.
Socratesοὐδὲ ἀδικούμενον ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται, ἐπειδή γε οὐδαμῶς δεῖ ἀδικεῖν.
SocratesThen one mustn’t do wrong in return when wronged either, as the many think, since one must never do wrong.
Socratesτί δὲ δή; κακουργεῖν δεῖ, ὦ Κρίτων, ἢ οὔ;
SocratesAnd what about this? Should one do injury, Crito, or not?
Critoοὐ δεῖ δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.
CritoSurely not, Socrates.
Socratesτί δέ; ἀντικακουργεῖν κακῶς πάσχοντα, ὡς οἱ πολλοί φασιν, δίκαιον ἢ οὐ δίκαιον;
SocratesAnd what about doing injury in return when one has been badly treated, as the many say? Is that just or not just?
Critoοὐδαμῶς.
CritoNot at all.
Socratesτὸ γάρ που κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲν διαφέρει.
SocratesFor doing people harm, I take it, is no different from doing them wrong.
Critoἀληθῆ λέγεις.
CritoThat’s true.
Socratesοὔτε ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν δεῖ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὐδʼ ἂν ὁτιοῦν πάσχῃ ὑπʼ αὐτῶν. καὶ ὅρα, ὦ d Κρίτων, ταῦτα καθομολογῶν, ὅπως μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ὁμολογῇς· οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ὀλίγοις τισὶ ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει. οἷς οὖν οὕτω δέδοκται καὶ οἷς μή, τούτοις οὐκ ἔστι κοινὴ βουλή, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη τούτους ἀλλήλων καταφρονεῖν ὁρῶντας ἀλλήλων τὰ βουλεύματα. σκόπει δὴ οὖν καὶ σὺ εὖ μάλα πότερον κοινωνεῖς καὶ συνδοκεῖ σοι καὶ ἀρχώμεθα ἐντεῦθεν βουλευόμενοι, ὡς οὐδέποτε ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος οὔτε τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὔτε τοῦ ἀνταδικεῖν οὔτε κακῶς πάσχοντα ἀμύνεσθαι ἀντιδρῶντα κακῶς, ἢ ἀφίστασαι καὶ οὐ κοινωνεῖς τῆς ἀρχῆς; e ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάλαι οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ, σοὶ δὲ εἴ πῃ ἄλλῃ δέδοκται, λέγε καὶ δίδασκε.
SocratesSo one must neither do wrong in return nor do harm to any human being, whatever one may suffer at their hands. And watch out, d Crito, in agreeing to this, that you’re not agreeing against what you really believe. For I know that only a few people believe this, or ever will. Those who hold this view and those who don’t have no common ground for deliberation; they can’t help despising each other when they see each other’s decisions. So consider very carefully whether you share this view and agree with it, and whether we can begin our deliberation from here: that it’s never right to do wrong, or to do wrong in return, or, when one suffers harm, to defend oneself by doing harm back. Or do you part ways with me and not share this starting point? e I’ve thought this way for a long time and still do now. But if you’ve come to think otherwise, tell me and explain.
εἰ δʼ ἐμμένεις τοῖς πρόσθε, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἄκουε.
But if you stand by what we said before, hear what comes next.
Critoἀλλʼ ἐμμένω τε καὶ συνδοκεῖ μοι· ἀλλὰ λέγε.
CritoI do stand by it, and I agree with you. Go on.
Socratesλέγω δὴ αὖ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, μᾶλλον δʼ ἐρωτῶ· πότερον ἃ ἄν τις ὁμολογήσῃ τῳ δίκαια ὄντα ποιητέον ἢ ἐξαπατητέον;
SocratesThen I’ll say what comes next—or rather, ask it. When someone has made an agreement with another, and it’s a just one, should he keep it, or cheat?
Critoποιητέον.
CritoHe should keep it.
Socratesἐκ τούτων δὴ ἄθρει. ἀπιόντες ἐνθένδε ἡμεῖς μὴ a πείσαντες τὴν πόλιν πότερον κακῶς τινας ποιοῦμεν, καὶ ταῦτα οὓς ἥκιστα δεῖ, ἢ οὔ; καὶ ἐμμένομεν οἷς ὡμολογήσαμεν δικαίοις οὖσιν ἢ οὔ;
SocratesThen look at what follows. If we leave here without a persuading the city, are we doing harm to some people, and to those we should least harm, or not? And are we standing by what we agreed was just, or not?
Critoοὐκ ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς ὃ ἐρωτᾷς· οὐ γὰρ ἐννοῶ.
CritoI can’t answer your question, Socrates. I don’t understand it.
The Laws speak
Socrates imagines the Laws of Athens arguing that escape would break his agreement with the city.
Socratesἀλλʼ ὧδε σκόπει. εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνθένδε εἴτε ἀποδιδράσκειν, εἴθʼ ὅπως δεῖ ὀνομάσαι τοῦτο, ἐλθόντες οἱ νόμοι καὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως ἐπιστάντες ἔροιντο· “εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τί ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ποιεῖν; ἄλλο τι ἢ τούτῳ b τῷ ἔργῳ ᾧ ἐπιχειρεῖς διανοῇ τούς τε νόμους ἡμᾶς ἀπολέσαι καὶ σύμπασαν τὴν πόλιν τὸ σὸν μέρος; ἢ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τε ἔτι ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀνατετράφθαι, ἐν ᾗ ἂν αἱ γενόμεναι δίκαι μηδὲν ἰσχύωσιν ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ ἰδιωτῶν ἄκυροί τε γίγνωνται καὶ διαφθείρωνται;” τί ἐροῦμεν, ὦ Κρίτων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα; πολλὰ γὰρ ἄν τις ἔχοι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ῥήτωρ, εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ τούτου τοῦ νόμου ἀπολλυμένου ὃς τὰς δίκας τὰς δικασθείσας προστάττει κυρίας εἶναι.
SocratesLook at it this way, then. Suppose we were about to run away from here—or whatever we should call it—and the Laws and the city as a whole came and stood before us and asked: “Tell me, Socrates, what do you have in mind to do? By this deed b you’re attempting, what else are you planning than to destroy us, the Laws, and the whole city, as far as it lies with you? Or do you think a city can go on existing and not be overturned, in which the verdicts that are reached have no force, but are made void and undone by private individuals?” What shall we say, Crito, to this and other things like it? A great deal could be said, especially by an orator, on behalf of this law we’d be destroying, the one that requires verdicts once reached to be binding.
ἢ ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὅτι “ἠδίκει γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην ἔκρινεν;” ταῦτα ἢ τί ἐροῦμεν;
Or shall we say to them, “Yes, because the city wronged us and didn’t judge the case correctly”? Is that what we’ll say, or what?
Critoταῦτα νὴ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες.
CritoYes, by Zeus, Socrates, that’s what we’ll say!
Socratesτί οὖν ἂν εἴπωσιν οἱ νόμοι· “ὦ Σώκρατες, ἦ καὶ ταῦτα ὡμολόγητο ἡμῖν τε καὶ σοί, ἢ ἐμμενεῖν ταῖς δίκαις αἷς ἂν ἡ πόλις δικάζῃ;” εἰ οὖν αὐτῶν θαυμάζοιμεν λεγόντων, ἴσως ἂν εἴποιεν ὅτι “ὦ Σώκρατες, μὴ θαύμαζε τὰ λεγόμενα ἀλλʼ ἀποκρίνου, ἐπειδὴ καὶ εἴωθας χρῆσθαι τῷ ἐρωτᾶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. φέρε γάρ, τί ἐγκαλῶν d ἡμῖν καὶ τῇ πόλει ἐπιχειρεῖς ἡμᾶς ἀπολλύναι; οὐ πρῶτον μέν σε ἐγεννήσαμεν ἡμεῖς, καὶ διʼ ἡμῶν ἔλαβε τὴν μητέρα σου ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ἐφύτευσέν σε; φράσον οὖν, τούτοις ἡμῶν, τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς περὶ τοὺς γάμους, μέμφῃ τι ὡς οὐ καλῶς ἔχουσιν;” “οὐ μέμφομαι,” φαίην ἄν. “ἀλλὰ τοῖς περὶ τὴν τοῦ γενομένου τροφήν τε καὶ παιδείαν ἐν ᾗ καὶ σὺ ἐπαιδεύθης;
SocratesThen what if the Laws say: Socrates, was that really what was agreed between us and you, or was it that you would abide by whatever verdicts the city reaches? And if we were surprised at their words, they might say: Socrates, don’t be surprised at what we’re saying, but answer, since you’re in the habit of using question and answer. Come now, what complaint do you have d against us and the city that you’re trying to destroy us? In the first place, didn’t we give you birth? Wasn’t it through us that your father married your mother and begot you? So tell us: do you find fault with those of us that concern marriage, as not being good? “I don’t,” I’d say. Well then, with those concerning the upbringing and education of a child once born, under which you too were educated?
ἢ οὐ καλῶς προσέταττον ἡμῶν οἱ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τεταγμένοι νόμοι, παραγγέλλοντες τῷ πατρὶ τῷ σῷ σε ἐν e μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδεύειν;” “καλῶς,” φαίην ἄν. “εἶεν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐγένου τε καὶ ἐξετράφης καὶ ἐπαιδεύθης, ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν πρῶτον μὲν ὡς οὐχὶ ἡμέτερος ἦσθα καὶ ἔκγονος καὶ δοῦλος, αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ σοὶ πρόγονοι; καὶ εἰ τοῦθʼ οὕτως ἔχει, ἆρʼ ἐξ ἴσου οἴει εἶναι σοὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἡμῖν, καὶ ἅττʼ ἂν ἡμεῖς σε ἐπιχειρῶμεν ποιεῖν, καὶ σοὶ ταῦτα ἀντιποιεῖν οἴει δίκαιον εἶναι;”
Or did those of us who were assigned to this not give good instructions, when they directed your father to educate you in e the arts and in physical training? “They did,” I’d say. Very well. Since you were born, raised, and educated, could you claim, first of all, that you weren’t ours, our offspring and our slave, both you and your ancestors? And if that’s so, do you think that justice is on an equal footing between you and us, and that it’s just for you to do back to us whatever we try to do to you?
“ἢ πρὸς μὲν ἄρα σοι τὸν πατέρα οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου ἦν τὸ δίκαιον καὶ πρὸς δεσπότην, εἴ σοι ὢν ἐτύγχανεν, ὥστε ἅπερ πάσχοις ταῦτα καὶ ἀντιποιεῖν, οὔτε κακῶς ἀκούοντα a ἀντιλέγειν οὔτε τυπτόμενον ἀντιτύπτειν οὔτε ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά· πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα ἄρα καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἐξέσται σοι, ὥστε, ἐάν σε ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἡμεῖς ἀπολλύναι δίκαιον ἡγούμενοι εἶναι, καὶ σὺ δὲ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν πατρίδα καθʼ ὅσον δύνασαι ἐπιχειρήσεις ἀνταπολλύναι, καὶ φήσεις ταῦτα ποιῶν δίκαια πράττειν, ὁ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελόμενος;
Or was justice not on an equal footing between you and your father, or your master if you happened to have one, so that you could do back to them whatever was done to you—talking back when a abused, striking back when struck, and many other things like that—whereas against your country and its laws you’ll be allowed to, so that if we try to destroy you, believing it just, you in turn will try, as far as you can, to destroy us, the Laws, and your country, and claim that in doing this you’re acting justly—you, the man who truly cares about excellence?
ἢ οὕτως εἶ σοφὸς ὥστε λέληθέν σε ὅτι μητρός τε καὶ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων προγόνων ἁπάντων τιμιώτερόν ἐστιν πατρὶς καὶ σεμνότερον καὶ ἁγιώτερον b καὶ ἐν μείζονι μοίρᾳ καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρʼ ἀνθρώποις τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσι, καὶ σέβεσθαι δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ὑπείκειν καὶ θωπεύειν πατρίδα χαλεπαίνουσαν ἢ πατέρα, καὶ ἢ πείθειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἃ ἂν κελεύῃ, καὶ πάσχειν ἐάν τι προστάττῃ παθεῖν ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντα, ἐάντε τύπτεσθαι ἐάντε δεῖσθαι, ἐάντε εἰς πόλεμον ἄγῃ τρωθησόμενον ἢ ἀποθανούμενον, ποιητέον ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ οὐχὶ ὑπεικτέον οὐδὲ ἀναχωρητέον οὐδὲ λειπτέον τὴν τάξιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ πανταχοῦ ποιητέον ἃ ἂν κελεύῃ ἡ c πόλις καὶ ἡ πατρίς, ἢ πείθειν αὐτὴν ᾗ τὸ δίκαιον πέφυκε· βιάζεσθαι δὲ οὐχ ὅσιον οὔτε μητέρα οὔτε πατέρα, πολὺ δὲ τούτων ἔτι ἧττον τὴν πατρίδα;” τί φήσομεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων;
Or are you so wise that it has escaped you that your country is more to be honored than your mother and father and all your other ancestors, more revered and more holy, b and held in higher esteem among gods and among men of sense; and that you must revere your country, and yield to it and humor it when it’s angry, more than a father; and either persuade it or do what it orders, and suffer quietly whatever it commands you to suffer, whether to be beaten or imprisoned; and if it leads you to war to be wounded or killed, you must do it, and that is what justice is; and you must not give way or retreat or leave your post, but in war and in court and everywhere you must do what your c city and your country order, or else persuade it of where justice naturally lies; and that it’s impious to use force against your mother or your father, and far more so against your country? What shall we say to this, Crito?
Critoἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
CritoI think they are.
Socrates“σκόπει τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες,” φαῖεν ἂν ἴσως οἱ νόμοι, “εἰ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγομεν, ὅτι οὐ δίκαια ἡμᾶς ἐπιχειρεῖς δρᾶν ἃ νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς. ἡμεῖς γάρ σε γεννήσαντες, ἐκθρέψαντες, παιδεύσαντες, μεταδόντες ἁπάντων ὧν οἷοί τʼ d ἦμεν καλῶν σοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν πολίταις, ὅμως προαγορεύομεν τῷ ἐξουσίαν πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίων τῷ βουλομένῳ, ἐπειδὰν δοκιμασθῇ καὶ ἴδῃ τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει πράγματα καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους, ᾧ ἂν μὴ ἀρέσκωμεν ἡμεῖς, ἐξεῖναι λαβόντα τὰ αὑτοῦ ἀπιέναι ὅποι ἂν βούληται. καὶ οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐμποδών ἐστιν οὐδʼ ἀπαγορεύει, ἐάντε τις βούληται ὑμῶν εἰς ἀποικίαν ἰέναι, εἰ μὴ ἀρέσκοιμεν ἡμεῖς τε καὶ ἡ πόλις, ἐάντε μετοικεῖν ἄλλοσέ ποι ἐλθών, ἰέναι ἐκεῖσε ὅποι e ἂν βούληται, ἔχοντα τὰ αὑτοῦ.
SocratesThen consider, Socrates—the Laws might say—whether we’re telling the truth when we say that what you’re now attempting to do to us isn’t just. We gave you birth, raised you, educated you, gave you and all the other citizens a share in every good thing we d could; and yet we proclaim, by granting permission to any Athenian who wishes, that once he has been admitted as an adult and has seen how the city’s affairs are run and seen us, the Laws, if we don’t please him he may take his property and go wherever he likes. None of us Laws stands in his way or forbids it: if any of you wants to go to a colony, if we and the city don’t please him, or to go and settle somewhere else, he may go wherever e he likes, keeping his property.
ὃς δʼ ἂν ὑμῶν παραμείνῃ, ὁρῶν ὃν τρόπον ἡμεῖς τάς τε δίκας δικάζομεν καὶ τἆλλα τὴν πόλιν διοικοῦμεν, ἤδη φαμὲν τοῦτον ὡμολογηκέναι ἔργῳ ἡμῖν ἃ ἂν ἡμεῖς κελεύωμεν ποιήσειν ταῦτα, καὶ τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον τριχῇ φαμεν ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι τε γεννηταῖς οὖσιν ἡμῖν οὐ πείθεται, καὶ ὅτι τροφεῦσι, καὶ ὅτι ὁμολογήσας ἡμῖν πείσεσθαι οὔτε πείθεται οὔτε πείθει ἡμᾶς, εἰ μὴ καλῶς τι ποιοῦμεν, a προτιθέντων ἡμῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀγρίως ἐπιταττόντων ποιεῖν ἃ ἂν κελεύωμεν, ἀλλὰ ἐφιέντων δυοῖν θάτερα, ἢ πείθειν ἡμᾶς ἢ ποιεῖν, τούτων οὐδέτερα ποιεῖ.”
But whoever of you stays, seeing the way we decide cases and manage the city in other respects, we say that he has thereby agreed with us in deed to do whatever we command. And we say that whoever disobeys does wrong in three ways: he disobeys us who gave him birth; he disobeys us who raised him; and having agreed to obey us, he neither obeys us nor persuades us if we’re doing something wrong— a though we propose our orders and don’t harshly insist that he do whatever we command, but offer him a choice of two things, either to persuade us or to do as we say. He does neither.
“ταύταις δή φαμεν καὶ σέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῖς αἰτίαις ἐνέξεσθαι, εἴπερ ποιήσεις ἃ ἐπινοεῖς, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα Ἀθηναίων σέ, ἀλλʼ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα.” εἰ οὖν ἐγὼ εἴποιμι· “διὰ τί δή;” ἴσως ἄν μου δικαίως καθάπτοιντο λέγοντες ὅτι ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα Ἀθηναίων ἐγὼ αὐτοῖς ὡμολογηκὼς τυγχάνω ταύτην τὴν ὁμολογίαν.
These are the charges, Socrates, that we say you too will be liable to if you do what you have in mind—and you not least of the Athenians, but more than almost anyone. And if I were to say, “Why is that?” they might justly take me to task, saying that I, more than almost any Athenian, have in fact made this agreement with them.
φαῖεν γὰρ ἂν ὅτι b “ὦ Σώκρατες, μεγάλα ἡμῖν τούτων τεκμήριά ἐστιν, ὅτι σοι καὶ ἡμεῖς ἠρέσκομεν καὶ ἡ πόλις· οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἁπάντων διαφερόντως ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπεδήμεις εἰ μή σοι διαφερόντως ἤρεσκεν, καὶ οὔτʼ ἐπὶ θεωρίαν πώποτʼ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξῆλθες, ὅτι μὴ ἅπαξ εἰς Ἰσθμόν, οὔτε ἄλλοσε οὐδαμόσε, εἰ μή ποι στρατευσόμενος, οὔτε ἄλλην ἀποδημίαν ἐποιήσω πώποτε ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι, οὐδʼ ἐπιθυμία σε ἄλλης πόλεως οὐδὲ ἄλλων νόμων ἔλαβεν εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ ἡμεῖς c σοι ἱκανοὶ ἦμεν καὶ ἡ ἡμετέρα πόλις· οὕτω σφόδρα ἡμᾶς ᾑροῦ καὶ ὡμολόγεις καθʼ ἡμᾶς πολιτεύσεσθαι, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ παῖδας ἐν αὐτῇ ἐποιήσω, ὡς ἀρεσκούσης σοι τῆς πόλεως.
For they’d say: b Socrates, we have strong evidence that we and the city pleased you. You would never have stayed at home in it more than all the other Athenians if it hadn’t pleased you more than it did them. You never left the city to attend a festival, except once to the Isthmus, nor went anywhere else except on military service, nor made any other trip abroad as other people do. You never felt a desire to know another city or other laws; we c and our city were enough for you. So strongly did you choose us and agree to live as a citizen under us; and in particular you had children in it, since the city pleased you.
ἔτι τοίνυν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ δίκῃ ἐξῆν σοι φυγῆς τιμήσασθαι εἰ ἐβούλου, καὶ ὅπερ νῦν ἀκούσης τῆς πόλεως ἐπιχειρεῖς, τότε ἑκούσης ποιῆσαι. σὺ δὲ τότε μὲν ἐκαλλωπίζου ὡς οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν εἰ δέοι τεθνάναι σε, ἀλλὰ ᾑροῦ, ὡς ἔφησθα, πρὸ τῆς φυγῆς θάνατον· νῦν δὲ οὔτʼ ἐκείνους τοὺς λόγους αἰσχύνῃ, οὔτε ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐντρέπῃ, ἐπιχειρῶν διαφθεῖραι, πράττεις d τε ἅπερ ἂν δοῦλος ὁ φαυλότατος πράξειεν, ἀποδιδράσκειν ἐπιχειρῶν παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας τε καὶ τὰς ὁμολογίας καθʼ ἃς ἡμῖν συνέθου πολιτεύεσθαι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ ἀπόκριναι, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγομεν φάσκοντές σε ὡμολογηκέναι πολιτεύσεσθαι καθʼ ἡμᾶς ἔργῳ ἀλλʼ οὐ λόγῳ, ἢ οὐκ ἀληθῆ.” τί φῶμεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων; ἄλλο τι ἢ ὁμολογῶμεν;
What’s more, at the trial itself you could have proposed exile as your penalty if you’d wished, and done then, with the city’s consent, what you’re now attempting against its will. But then you made a fine show of not being upset if you had to die, and you chose, as you said, death before exile. Now you’re not ashamed of those words, and you show no respect for us, the Laws, as you try to destroy us. You’re doing d what the meanest slave would do, trying to run away in breach of the terms and agreements by which you contracted with us to live as a citizen. So first answer us this very question: are we telling the truth when we say that you agreed, in deed and not just in word, to live as a citizen under us, or not? What shall we say to this, Crito? Can we do anything but agree?
Socrates“ἄλλο τι οὖν,” ἂν φαῖεν, “ἢ συνθήκας τὰς πρὸς e ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ ὁμολογίας παραβαίνεις, οὐχ ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης ὁμολογήσας οὐδὲ ἀπατηθεὶς οὐδὲ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ ἀναγκασθεὶς βουλεύσασθαι, ἀλλʼ ἐν ἔτεσιν ἑβδομήκοντα, ἐν οἷς ἐξῆν σοι ἀπιέναι, εἰ μὴ ἠρέσκομεν ἡμεῖς μηδὲ δίκαιαι ἐφαίνοντό σοι αἱ ὁμολογίαι εἶναι.”
SocratesThen aren’t you—they’d say—breaking the terms and agreements e you made with us yourself—agreements you made not under compulsion, nor deceived, nor forced to decide in a short time, but over seventy years, during which you could have left if we didn’t please you or the agreements didn’t seem just to you?
“σὺ δὲ οὔτε Λακεδαίμονα προῃροῦ οὔτε Κρήτην, ἃς δὴ ἑκάστοτε φῂς εὐνομεῖσθαι, οὔτε ἄλλην οὐδεμίαν a τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων οὐδὲ τῶν βαρβαρικῶν, ἀλλὰ ἐλάττω ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀπεδήμησας ἢ οἱ χωλοί τε καὶ τυφλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνάπηροι· οὕτω σοι διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἤρεσκεν ἡ πόλις τε καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ νόμοι δῆλον ὅτι· τίνι γὰρ ἂν πόλις ἀρέσκοι ἄνευ νόμων; νῦν δὲ δὴ οὐκ ἐμμενεῖς τοῖς ὡμολογημένοις; ἐὰν ἡμῖν γε πείθῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ οὐ καταγέλαστός γε ἔσῃ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξελθών.
You didn’t prefer Sparta or Crete, which you’re always saying are well governed, or any other a city, Greek or foreign. You went abroad less often than the lame and the blind and others with disabilities. That’s how much more than other Athenians the city pleased you, and we the Laws, obviously—for who would be pleased by a city without laws? And now will you not stand by what you agreed? You will, Socrates, if you listen to us; and then at least you won’t make yourself a laughingstock by leaving the city.
σκόπει γὰρ δή, ταῦτα παραβὰς καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνων τι τούτων τί ἀγαθὸν ἐργάσῃ σαυτὸν ἢ τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους τοὺς b σαυτοῦ. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ κινδυνεύσουσί γέ σου οἱ ἐπιτήδειοι καὶ αὐτοὶ φεύγειν καὶ στερηθῆναι τῆς πόλεως ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπολέσαι, σχεδόν τι δῆλον· αὐτὸς δὲ πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰς τῶν ἐγγύτατά τινα πόλεων ἔλθῃς, ἢ Θήβαζε ἢ Μέγαράδε— εὐνομοῦνται γὰρ ἀμφότεραι—πολέμιος ἥξεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ τούτων πολιτείᾳ, καὶ ὅσοιπερ κήδονται τῶν αὑτῶν πόλεων ὑποβλέψονταί σε διαφθορέα ἡγούμενοι τῶν νόμων, καὶ βεβαιώσεις τοῖς δικασταῖς τὴν δόξαν, ὥστε δοκεῖν ὀρθῶς τὴν c δίκην δικάσαι· ὅστις γὰρ νόμων διαφθορεύς ἐστιν σφόδρα που δόξειεν ἂν νέων γε καὶ ἀνοήτων ἀνθρώπων διαφθορεὺς εἶναι. πότερον οὖν φεύξῃ τάς τε εὐνομουμένας πόλεις καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς κοσμιωτάτους;
Just consider: if you break these agreements and go wrong in this way, what good will you do yourself or your b friends? That your friends will risk being exiled themselves and losing their city, or losing their property, is pretty clear. As for you, first, if you go to one of the nearest cities, Thebes or Megara—both are well governed—you’ll arrive as an enemy of their constitution, Socrates, and all who care about their own cities will eye you with suspicion, thinking you a corrupter of laws. You’ll confirm the jurors in their opinion, so that they’ll seem to have judged the c case correctly. For whoever corrupts laws would surely be thought to corrupt young and foolish people as well. So will you avoid well-governed cities and the most orderly of men?
καὶ τοῦτο ποιοῦντι ἆρα ἄξιόν σοι ζῆν ἔσται; ἢ πλησιάσεις τούτοις καὶ ἀναισχυντήσεις διαλεγόμενος—τίνας λόγους, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἢ οὕσπερ ἐνθάδε, ὡς ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη πλείστου ἄξιον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ οἱ νόμοι; καὶ οὐκ οἴει ἄσχημον ἂν d φανεῖσθαι τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα; οἴεσθαί γε χρή. ἀλλʼ ἐκ μὲν τούτων τῶν τόπων ἀπαρεῖς, ἥξεις δὲ εἰς Θετταλίαν παρὰ τοὺς ξένους τοὺς Κρίτωνος;
And if you do, will your life be worth living? Or will you go among them and shamelessly converse with them—saying what, Socrates? The same things as here, that excellence and justice are what’s most valuable for human beings, along with lawful customs and laws? And don’t you think the affair of Socrates will d look disgraceful? You surely must. Or will you get away from these places and go to Thessaly, to Crito’s friends?
ἐκεῖ γὰρ δὴ πλείστη ἀταξία καὶ ἀκολασία, καὶ ἴσως ἂν ἡδέως σου ἀκούοιεν ὡς γελοίως ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἀπεδίδρασκες σκευήν τέ τινα περιθέμενος, ἢ διφθέραν λαβὼν ἢ ἄλλα οἷα δὴ εἰώθασιν ἐνσκευάζεσθαι οἱ ἀποδιδράσκοντες, καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τὸ σαυτοῦ μεταλλάξας· ὅτι δὲ γέρων ἀνήρ, σμικροῦ χρόνου τῷ βίῳ λοιποῦ ὄντος ὡς τὸ e εἰκός, ἐτόλμησας οὕτω γλίσχρως ἐπιθυμεῖν ζῆν, νόμους τοὺς μεγίστους παραβάς, οὐδεὶς ὃς ἐρεῖ; ἴσως, ἂν μή τινα λυπῇς· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀκούσῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια σαυτοῦ. ὑπερχόμενος δὴ βιώσῃ πάντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ δουλεύων— τί ποιῶν ἢ εὐωχούμενος ἐν Θετταλίᾳ, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ἀποδεδημηκὼς εἰς Θετταλίαν;”
For there, after all, disorder and license are at their worst, and perhaps they’d enjoy hearing from you how comically you ran away from prison, putting on some disguise—a peasant’s leather cloak or the other sorts of things runaways usually dress up in—and changing your appearance. But that an old man, with little time left to live, in all e likelihood, dared to cling so greedily to life that he broke the most important laws—will no one say that? Perhaps not, if you don’t annoy anyone. Otherwise, Socrates, you’ll hear many things unworthy of you. So you’ll live fawning on everyone and at their beck and call—doing what, besides feasting in Thessaly, as if you’d traveled to Thessaly for a dinner?
“λόγοι δὲ ἐκεῖνοι οἱ περὶ a δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς ποῦ ἡμῖν ἔσονται; ἀλλὰ δὴ τῶν παίδων ἕνεκα βούλει ζῆν, ἵνα αὐτοὺς ἐκθρέψῃς καὶ παιδεύσῃς; τί δέ; εἰς Θετταλίαν αὐτοὺς ἀγαγὼν θρέψεις τε καὶ παιδεύσεις, ξένους ποιήσας, ἵνα καὶ τοῦτο ἀπολαύσωσιν; ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὔ, αὐτοῦ δὲ τρεφόμενοι σοῦ ζῶντος βέλτιον θρέψονται καὶ παιδεύσονται μὴ συνόντος σοῦ αὐτοῖς; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιτήδειοι οἱ σοὶ ἐπιμελήσονται αὐτῶν. πότερον ἐὰν μὲν εἰς Θετταλίαν ἀποδημήσῃς, ἐπιμελήσονται, ἐὰν δὲ εἰς Ἅιδου ἀποδημήσῃς, οὐχὶ ἐπιμελήσονται; εἴπερ γέ τι ὄφελος αὐτῶν b ἐστιν τῶν σοι φασκόντων ἐπιτηδείων εἶναι, οἴεσθαί γε χρή.
And those arguments of yours about a justice and the rest of excellence—where will they be for us then? But perhaps you want to live for your children’s sake, to raise and educate them? What? Will you take them to Thessaly and raise and educate them there, making them foreigners, so they can enjoy that benefit too? Or not that, but if they’re raised here while you’re alive, will they be better raised and educated with you not there with them? Your friends will take care of them, you’ll say. Will they take care of them if you go away to Thessaly, but not if you go away to Hades? If those who claim to be your friends are b of any use at all, you must believe they will.
ἀλλʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πειθόμενος ἡμῖν τοῖς σοῖς τροφεῦσι μήτε παῖδας περὶ πλείονος ποιοῦ μήτε τὸ ζῆν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου, ἵνα εἰς Ἅιδου ἐλθὼν ἔχῃς πάντα ταῦτα ἀπολογήσασθαι τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἄρχουσιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐνθάδε σοι φαίνεται ταῦτα πράττοντι ἄμεινον εἶναι οὐδὲ δικαιότερον οὐδὲ ὁσιώτερον, οὐδὲ ἄλλῳ τῶν σῶν οὐδενί, οὔτε ἐκεῖσε ἀφικομένῳ ἄμεινον ἔσται.
No, Socrates, listen to us who raised you, and don’t put children or life or anything else ahead of what is just, so that when you reach Hades you’ll have all this to say in your defense to those who rule there. For it’s plain that doing this won’t be better, or more just, or more holy for you here, or for any of your people, nor will it be better for you when you arrive there.
ἀλλὰ νῦν μὲν ἠδικημένος ἄπει, c ἐὰν ἀπίῃς, οὐχ ὑφʼ ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἀλλὰ ὑπʼ ἀνθρώπων· ἐὰν δὲ ἐξέλθῃς οὕτως αἰσχρῶς ἀνταδικήσας τε καὶ ἀντικακουργήσας, τὰς σαυτοῦ ὁμολογίας τε καὶ συνθήκας τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς παραβὰς καὶ κακὰ ἐργασάμενος τούτους οὓς ἥκιστα ἔδει, σαυτόν τε καὶ φίλους καὶ πατρίδα καὶ ἡμᾶς, ἡμεῖς τέ σοι χαλεπανοῦμεν ζῶντι, καὶ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἀδελφοὶ οἱ ἐν Ἅιδου νόμοι οὐκ εὐμενῶς σε ὑποδέξονται, εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπεχείρησας ἀπολέσαι τὸ σὸν μέρος. ἀλλὰ μή σε d πείσῃ Κρίτων ποιεῖν ἃ λέγει μᾶλλον ἢ ἡμεῖς.”
As it is, you’ll depart, if you depart, c as one wronged not by us, the Laws, but by men. But if you leave so shamefully, returning wrong for wrong and injury for injury, breaking your own agreements and terms with us, and doing harm to those you should least harm—yourself, your friends, your country, and us—then we’ll be angry with you while you live, and there our brothers, the Laws in Hades, won’t receive you kindly, knowing that you tried to destroy us too, as far as it lay with you. So don’t let d Crito persuade you to do what he says rather than what we say.
ταῦτα, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε Κρίτων, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ἐγὼ δοκῶ ἀκούειν, ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες τῶν αὐλῶν δοκοῦσιν ἀκούειν, καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ αὕτη ἡ ἠχὴ τούτων τῶν λόγων βομβεῖ καὶ ποιεῖ μὴ δύνασθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν· ἀλλὰ ἴσθι, ὅσα γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα, ἐὰν λέγῃς παρὰ ταῦτα, μάτην ἐρεῖς. ὅμως μέντοι εἴ τι οἴει πλέον ποιήσειν, λέγε.
This, Crito, my dear friend, you can be sure, is what I seem to hear, just as people in a Corybantic frenzy seem to hear the pipes; and the sound of these words booms inside me and makes me unable to hear anything else. So be aware that, as far as my present views go, if you speak against them you’ll speak in vain. All the same, if you think you’ll accomplish anything, speak.
Critoἀλλʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.
CritoNo, Socrates, I have nothing to say.
Socratesἔα τοίνυν, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ πράττωμεν ταύτῃ, ἐπειδὴ ταύτῃ ὁ θεὸς ὑφηγεῖται.
SocratesThen let it be, Crito, and let’s act this way, since this is the way the god is leading.