ἐν πάσαις δὲ ταῖς ἀνομοιοειδέσι φιλίαις τὸ ἀνάλογον ἰσάζει καὶ σῴζει τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, οἷον καὶ ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ τῷ σκυτοτόμῳ ἀντὶ τῶν ὑποδημάτων ἀμοιβὴ γίνεται κατʼ ἀξίαν, καὶ τῷ ὑφάντῃ καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς. 1164a ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν πεπόρισται κοινὸν μέτρον τὸ νόμισμα, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο δὴ πάντα ἀναφέρεται καὶ τούτῳ μετρεῖται· ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐρωτικῇ ἐνίοτε μὲν ὁ ἐραστὴς ἐγκαλεῖ ὅτι ὑπερφιλῶν οὐκ ἀντιφιλεῖται, οὐδὲν ἔχων φιλητόν, εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, πολλάκις δʼ ὁ ἐρώμενος ὅτι πρότερον ἐπαγγελλόμενος πάντα νῦν οὐδὲν ἐπιτελεῖ. συμβαίνει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐπειδὰν ὃ μὲν διʼ ἡδονὴν τὸν ἐρώμενον φιλῇ, ὃ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον τὸν ἐραστήν, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχῃ.
In all friendships between partners of unlike kinds, it is proportion that equalizes and preserves the friendship, as has been said. In the political kind, for example, the shoemaker gets a return for his shoes according to worth, and so do the weaver and the rest. 1164a Here, then, a common measure has been provided, namely money, and everything is referred to it and measured by it. But in love affairs the lover sometimes complains that his surpassing love is not returned, though he may, as it happens, have nothing lovable about him; while the beloved often complains that the lover, who once promised everything, now delivers nothing. Such things happen when the lover loves the beloved for pleasure and the beloved loves the lover for usefulness, and they don’t both have what is wanted.
διὰ ταῦτα γὰρ τῆς φιλίας οὔσης διάλυσις γίνεται, ἐπειδὰν μὴ γίνηται ὧν ἕνεκα ἐφίλουν· οὐ γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἔστεργον ἀλλὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, οὐ μόνιμα ὄντα· διὸ τοιαῦται καὶ αἱ φιλίαι. ἡ δὲ τῶν ἠθῶν καθʼ αὑτὴν οὖσα μένει, καθάπερ εἴρηται. διαφέρονται δʼ ὅταν ἕτερα γίνηται αὐτοῖς καὶ μὴ ὧν ὀρέγονται· ὅμοιον γὰρ τῷ μηδὲν γίνεσθαι, ὅταν οὗ ἐφίεται μὴ τυγχάνῃ, οἷον καὶ τῷ κιθαρῳδῷ ὁ ἐπαγγελλόμενος, καὶ ὅσῳ ἄμεινον ᾄσειεν, τοσούτῳ πλείω· εἰς ἕω δʼ ἀπαιτοῦντι τὰς ὑποσχέσεις ἀνθʼ ἡδονῆς ἡδονὴν ἀποδεδωκέναι ἔφη.
For since the friendship was based on these things, it dissolves when the things for which they loved each other no longer come about. They didn’t love each other but what each had, which was not lasting; so these friendships are not lasting either. But friendship of character, being based on the people themselves, endures, as has been said. People also quarrel when they get something different and not what they desire; for not getting what one aims at is like getting nothing. Take the man who made promises to a lyre singer: the better he sang, the more he would get. In the morning, when the singer asked him to keep his promises, he said he had repaid pleasure with pleasure.
εἰ μὲν οὖν ἑκάτερος τοῦτο ἐβούλετο, ἱκανῶς ἂν εἶχεν· εἰ δʼ ὃ μὲν τέρψιν ὃ δὲ κέρδος, καὶ ὃ μὲν ἔχει ὃ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὰ κατὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν καλῶς· ὧν γὰρ δεόμενος τυγχάνει, τούτοις καὶ προσέχει, κἀκείνου γε χάριν ταῦτα δώσει. τὴν ἀξίαν δὲ ποτέρου τάξαι ἐστί, τοῦ προϊεμένου ἢ τοῦ προλαβόντος; ὁ γὰρ προϊέμενος ἔοικʼ ἐπιτρέπειν ἐκείνῳ. ὅπερ φασὶ καὶ Πρωταγόραν ποιεῖν· ὅτε γὰρ διδάξειεν ἁδήποτε, τιμῆσαι τὸν μαθόντα ἐκέλευεν ὅσου δοκεῖ ἄξια ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ ἐλάμβανε τοσοῦτον. ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δʼ ἐνίοις ἀρέσκει τὸ μισθὸς δʼ ἀνδρί. οἱ δὲ προλαμβάνοντες τὸ ἀργύριον, εἶτα μηδὲν ποιοῦντες ὧν ἔφασαν διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν, εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήμασι γίνονται· οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτελοῦσιν ἃ ὡμολόγησαν.
If this is what each of them had wanted, it would have been fine. But if one wants enjoyment and the other gain, and one has it and the other doesn’t, their association will not be on a good footing; for what a person needs is what he sets his mind on, and it is for that that he will give what he gives. But whose place is it to fix the value — the one who gives first, or the one who receives first? The one who gives first seems to leave it to the other. This is what they say Protagoras used to do: whenever he taught anything, he would tell the learner to assess how much he thought his knowledge was worth, and he took that much. In such cases some people are content with “a wage for a friend.” But those who take the money in advance and then, because of their extravagant promises, do none of what they said they would, understandably face complaints, since they don’t fulfill what they agreed to.
τοῦτο δʼ ἴσως ποιεῖν οἱ σοφισταὶ ἀναγκάζονται διὰ τὸ μηδένα ἂν δοῦναι ἀργύριον ὧν ἐπίστανται. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ὧν ἔλαβον τὸν μισθόν, μὴ ποιοῦντες εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήμασίν εἰσιν. ἐν οἷς δὲ μὴ γίνεται διομολογία τῆς ὑπουργίας, οἱ μὲν διʼ αὐτοὺς προϊέμενοι εἴρηται ὅτι ἀνέγκλητοι (τοιαύτη γὰρ ἡ κατʼ ἀρετὴν φιλία), 1164b τὴν ἀμοιβήν τε ποιητέον κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν (αὕτη γὰρ τοῦ φίλου καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς)· οὕτω δʼ ἔοικε καὶ τοῖς φιλοσοφίας κοινωνήσασιν· οὐ γὰρ πρὸς χρήμαθʼ ἡ ἀξία μετρεῖται, τιμή τʼ ἰσόρροπος οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, ἀλλʼ ἴσως ἱκανόν, καθάπερ καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ πρὸς γονεῖς, τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον.
Perhaps the sophists are forced to do this because no one would give money for what they know. These people, then, understandably face complaints, since they don’t do what they took the fee for. But where there is no prior agreement about the service, those who give first for the other’s own sake are beyond complaint, as has been said (for friendship based on excellence is like that), 1164b and the return should be made according to the giver’s decision (for decision is what belongs to a friend and to excellence). It seems that it is this way too with those who have shared in philosophy together. Its worth is not measured in money, and no honor could balance it; but perhaps it is enough, as with the gods and with parents, to give what one can.
μὴ τοιαύτης δʼ οὔσης τῆς δόσεως ἀλλʼ ἐπί τινι, μάλιστα μὲν ἴσως δεῖ τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν γίνεσθαι δοκοῦσαν ἀμφοῖν κατʼ ἀξίαν εἶναι, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ συμβαίνοι, οὐ μόνον ἀναγκαῖον δόξειεν ἂν τὸν προέχοντα τάττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δίκαιον· ὅσον γὰρ οὗτος ὠφελήθη ἢ ἀνθʼ ὅσου τὴν ἡδονὴν εἵλετʼ ἄν, τοσοῦτον ἀντιλαβὼν ἕξει τὴν παρὰ τούτου ἀξίαν. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὠνίοις οὕτω φαίνεται γινόμενον, ἐνιαχοῦ τʼ εἰσὶ νόμοι τῶν ἑκουσίων συμβολαίων δίκας μὴ εἶναι, ὡς δέον, ᾧ ἐπίστευσε, διαλυθῆναι πρὸς τοῦτον καθάπερ ἐκοινώνησεν. ᾧ γὰρ ἐπετράφθη, τοῦτον οἴεται δικαιότερον εἶναι τάξαι τοῦ ἐπιτρέψαντος.
But if the gift was not of this kind but was made with a return in view, the best thing, perhaps, is for the repayment to be one that both think accords with worth. If that doesn’t happen, it would seem not only necessary but also just for the one who received first to fix it. For if the giver gets back as much as the other was benefited, or as much as he would have paid for the pleasure, he will have the value due from him. This is evidently what happens in buying and selling too. And in some places there are laws that there be no lawsuits over voluntary contracts, on the grounds that one should settle with the person one trusted in the same spirit in which one entered into dealings with him. For it is thought more just for the person who was trusted to fix the value than for the one who trusted him.
τὰ πολλὰ γὰρ οὐ τοῦ ἴσου τιμῶσιν οἱ ἔχοντες καὶ οἱ βουλόμενοι λαβεῖν· τὰ γὰρ οἰκεῖα καὶ ἃ διδόασιν ἑκάστοις φαίνεται πολλοῦ ἄξια· ἀλλʼ ὅμως ἡ ἀμοιβὴ γίνεται πρὸς τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἂν τάττωσιν οἱ λαμβάνοντες. δεῖ δʼ ἴσως οὐ τοσούτου τιμᾶν ὅσου ἔχοντι φαίνεται ἄξιον, ἀλλʼ ὅσου πρὶν ἔχειν ἐτίμα.
For in most cases those who have a thing and those who want to get it do not value it equally, since what is one’s own, and what one gives, always seems worth a great deal to each person. Nevertheless the return is made at whatever amount the recipients fix. But perhaps one should value a thing not at what it seems worth once one has it, but at what one valued it at before having it.
Conflicting obligations
Aristotle weighs conflicting obligations to parents, friends and benefactors, and when to end a friendship.
ἀπορίαν δʼ ἔχει καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, οἷον πότερον δεῖ πάντα τῷ πατρὶ ἀπονέμειν καὶ πείθεσθαι, ἢ κάμνοντα μὲν ἰατρῷ πιστεύειν, στρατηγὸν δὲ χειροτονητέον τὸν πολεμικόν· ὁμοίως δὲ φίλῳ μᾶλλον ἢ σπουδαίῳ ὑπηρετητέον, καὶ εὐεργέτῃ ἀνταποδοτέον χάριν μᾶλλον ἢ ἑταίρῳ προετέον, ἐὰν ἄμφω μὴ ἐνδέχηται. ἆρʼ οὖν πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκριβῶς μὲν διορίσαι οὐ ῥᾴδιον; πολλὰς γὰρ καὶ παντοίας ἔχει διαφορὰς καὶ μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι καὶ τῷ καλῷ καὶ ἀναγκαίῳ. ὅτι δʼ οὐ πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀποδοτέον, οὐκ ἄδηλον· καὶ τὰς μὲν εὐεργεσίας ἀνταποδοτέον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ χαριστέον ἑταίροις, ὥσπερ καὶ δάνειον ᾧ ὀφείλει ἀποδοτέον μᾶλλον ἢ ἑταίρῳ δοτέον.
Questions like these also raise difficulties: whether one should give one’s father everything and obey him in everything, or whether one should trust a doctor when ill, and elect a skilled soldier as general; and similarly whether one should serve a friend rather than an excellent person, and repay a benefactor’s kindness rather than make a gift to a comrade, if one can’t do both. Isn’t it true that it’s not easy to determine all such things precisely? For they involve many differences of every kind — in how great or small the matter is, and in what is fine and what is necessary. But it is clear enough that one shouldn’t give everything to the same person; and that, for the most part, one should return benefits rather than do favors for comrades, just as one should repay a loan to one’s creditor rather than give the money to a comrade.
ἴσως δʼ οὐδὲ τοῦτʼ ἀεί, οἷον τῷ λυτρωθέντι παρὰ λῃστῶν πότερα τὸν λυσάμενον ἀντιλυτρωτέον, κἂν ὁστισοῦν ᾖ, ἢ μὴ ἑαλωκότι ἀπαιτοῦντι δὲ ἀποδοτέον, 1165a ἢ τὸν πατέρα λυτρωτέον; δόξειε γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ μᾶλλον τὸν πατέρα. ὅπερ οὖν εἴρηται, καθόλου μὲν τὸ ὀφείλημα ἀποδοτέον, ἐὰν δʼ ὑπερτείνῃ ἡ δόσις τῷ καλῷ ἢ τῷ ἀναγκαίῳ, πρὸς ταῦτʼ ἀποκλιτέον. ἐνίοτε γὰρ οὐδʼ ἐστὶν ἴσον τὸ τὴν προϋπαρχὴν ἀμείψασθαι, ἐπειδὰν ὃ μὲν σπουδαῖον εἰδὼς εὖ ποιήσῃ, τῷ δὲ ἡ ἀνταπόδοσις γίνηται ὃν οἴεται μοχθηρὸν εἶναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ δανείσαντι ἐνίοτε ἀντιδανειστέον· ὃ μὲν γὰρ οἰόμενος κομιεῖσθαι ἐδάνεισεν ἐπιεικεῖ ὄντι, ὃ δʼ οὐκ ἐλπίζει κομιεῖσθαι παρὰ πονηροῦ. εἴτε τοίνυν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἴσον τὸ ἀξίωμα· εἴτʼ ἔχει μὲν μὴ οὕτως οἴονται δέ, οὐκ ἂν δόξαιεν ἄτοπα ποιεῖν.
But perhaps not even this holds always. For example, should someone who has been ransomed from bandits ransom his ransomer in turn, whoever he may be — or repay him if he asks for it, even though he hasn’t been captured — 1165a or should he ransom his own father? For it would seem that one should ransom one’s father even before oneself. As has been said, then, in general one should repay the debt; but if giving instead outweighs it in fineness or necessity, one should lean toward that. For sometimes it isn’t even fair to return the original favor, when one person benefited another knowing him to be excellent, while the return would go to someone the other thinks is wicked. Sometimes one shouldn’t even lend in return to someone who has lent to one: he lent to a decent person expecting to get it back, while the other has no hope of getting it back from a scoundrel. If that is really how things are, then the claim is not equal; and if it isn’t so but they think it is, they would not seem to be acting strangely.
ὅπερ οὖν πολλάκις εἴρηται, οἱ περὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγοι ὁμοίως ἔχουσι τὸ ὡρισμένον τοῖς περὶ ἅ εἰσιν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ ταὐτὰ πᾶσιν ἀποδοτέον, οὐδὲ τῷ πατρὶ πάντα, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τῷ Διὶ θύεται, οὐκ ἄδηλον· ἐπεὶ δʼ ἕτερα γονεῦσι καὶ ἀδελφοῖς καὶ ἑταίροις καὶ εὐεργέταις, ἑκάστοις τὰ οἰκεῖα καὶ τὰ ἁρμόττοντα ἀπονεμητέον. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ποιεῖν φαίνονται· εἰς γάμους μὲν γὰρ καλοῦσι τοὺς συγγενεῖς· τούτοις γὰρ κοινὸν τὸ γένος καὶ αἱ περὶ τοῦτο δὴ πράξεις· καὶ εἰς τὰ κήδη δὲ μάλιστʼ οἴονται δεῖν τοὺς συγγενεῖς ἀπαντᾶν διὰ ταὐτό.
As has often been said, then, accounts of feelings and actions have just as much definiteness as the things they are about. That we should not render the same things to everyone, nor everything to our father — just as we don’t sacrifice everything to Zeus — is clear enough. And since different things are due to parents, brothers, companions and benefactors, we should render to each what is proper and fitting for them. This is in fact what people seem to do. They invite their relatives to weddings, since these share the family and so the actions that concern it; and it is relatives above all, people think, who should attend funerals, for the same reason.
δόξειε δʼ ἂν τροφῆς μὲν γονεῦσι δεῖν μάλιστʼ ἐπαρκεῖν, ὡς ὀφείλοντας, καὶ τοῖς αἰτίοις τοῦ εἶναι κάλλιον ὂν ἢ ἑαυτοῖς εἰς ταῦτʼ ἐπαρκεῖν· καὶ τιμὴν δὲ γονεῦσι καθάπερ θεοῖς, οὐ πᾶσαν δέ· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν πατρὶ καὶ μητρί, οὐδʼ αὖ τὴν τοῦ σοφοῦ ἢ τὴν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὴν πατρικήν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ μητρικήν. καὶ παντὶ δὲ τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ τιμὴν καθʼ ἡλικίαν, ὑπαναστάσει καὶ κατακλίσει καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις· πρὸς ἑταίρους δʼ αὖ καὶ ἀδελφοὺς παρρησίαν καὶ ἁπάντων κοινότητα. καὶ συγγενέσι δὲ καὶ φυλέταις καὶ πολίταις καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἅπασιν ἀεὶ πειρατέον τὸ οἰκεῖον ἀπονέμειν, καὶ συγκρίνειν τὰ ἑκάστοις ὑπάρχοντα κατʼ οἰκειότητα καὶ ἀρετὴν ἢ χρῆσιν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ὁμογενῶν ῥᾴων ἡ σύγκρισις, τῶν δὲ διαφερόντων ἐργωδεστέρα.
It would seem that we should above all provide for our parents’ sustenance, since we owe it to them, and that it is finer to provide in this way for those who are the causes of our existence than for ourselves. And we should give honor to parents as to gods — but not every kind of honor. Not the same honor to father and mother, nor again the honor due to a wise man or to a general, but to a father the honor proper to a father, and likewise to a mother the honor proper to a mother. To every older person, too, we should give the honor due to their age, by standing up for them, offering them a place at table, and the like. To companions and brothers, on the other hand, we owe frankness and a sharing of everything. And to relatives, fellow tribesmen, fellow citizens and all the rest we should always try to render what is proper, and to compare what belongs to each according to closeness of relation and excellence or usefulness. Comparing people of the same kind is easier; comparing those who differ is more laborious.
οὐ μὴν διά γε τοῦτο ἀποστατέον, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἂν ἐνδέχηται, οὕτω διοριστέον.
Still, that is no reason to give up; we must draw the distinctions as far as it is possible to do so.
ἔχει δʼ ἀπορίαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ διαλύεσθαι τὰς φιλίας 1165b ἢ μὴ πρὸς τοὺς μὴ διαμένοντας. ἢ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ φίλους ὄντας, ὅταν μηκέτι ταῦτʼ ἔχωσιν, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον διαλύεσθαι; ἐκείνων γὰρ ἦσαν φίλοι· ὧν ἀπολιπόντων εὔλογον τὸ μὴ φιλεῖν. ἐγκαλέσειε δʼ ἄν τις, εἰ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαπῶν προσεποιεῖτο διὰ τὸ ἦθος. ὃ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴπομεν, πλεῖσται διαφοραὶ γίνονται τοῖς φίλοις, ὅταν μὴ ὁμοίως οἴωνται καὶ ὦσι φίλοι. ὅταν μὲν οὖν διαψευσθῇ τις καὶ ὑπολάβῃ φιλεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ ἦθος, μηδὲν τοιοῦτον ἐκείνου πράττοντος, ἑαυτὸν αἰτιῷτʼ ἄν· ὅταν δʼ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου προσποιήσεως ἀπατηθῇ, δίκαιον ἐγκαλεῖν τῷ ἀπατήσαντι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς τὸ νόμισμα κιβδηλεύουσιν, ὅσῳ περὶ τιμιώτερον ἡ κακουργία.
There is also a puzzle about whether friendships should be dissolved 1165b or not, in the case of friends who do not stay as they were. Or is there nothing strange in breaking off with those who were friends because of usefulness or pleasure, once these are no longer there? It was these things they were friends of, and when they have gone it is reasonable that the love should go too. But someone might complain if the other, who liked him for usefulness or pleasure, pretended to like him for his character. For, as we said at the beginning, most disagreements between friends arise when they are not friends in the way they think they are. So when someone has deceived himself and supposed he was loved for his character, though the other did nothing of the kind to suggest it, he would have himself to blame; but when he has been deceived by the other’s pretense, it is just to complain against the deceiver — more so than against counterfeiters of coinage, inasmuch as the wrongdoing concerns something more precious.
ἐὰν δʼ ἀποδέχηται ὡς ἀγαθόν, γένηται δὲ μοχθηρὸς καὶ δοκῇ, ἆρʼ ἔτι φιλητέον; ἢ οὐ δυνατόν, εἴπερ μὴ πᾶν φιλητὸν ἀλλὰ τἀγαθόν; οὔτε δὲ φιλητὸν τὸ πονηρὸν οὔτε δεῖ· φιλοπόνηρον γὰρ οὐ χρὴ εἶναι, οὐδʼ ὁμοιοῦσθαι φαύλῳ· εἴρηται δʼ ὅτι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον. ἆρʼ οὖν εὐθὺς διαλυτέον; ἢ οὐ πᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνιάτοις κατὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν; ἐπανόρθωσιν δʼ ἔχουσι μᾶλλον βοηθητέον εἰς τὸ ἦθος ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν, ὅσῳ βέλτιον καὶ τῆς φιλίας οἰκειότερον. δόξειε δʼ ἂν ὁ διαλυόμενος οὐδὲν ἄτοπον ποιεῖν· οὐ γὰρ τῷ τοιούτῳ φίλος ἦν· ἀλλοιωθέντα οὖν ἀδυνατῶν ἀνασῶσαι ἀφίσταται. εἰ δʼ ὃ μὲν διαμένοι ὃ δʼ ἐπιεικέστερος γίνοιτο καὶ πολὺ διαλλάττοι τῇ ἀρετῇ, ἆρα χρηστέον φίλῳ; ἢ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται;
But if one accepts another as good, and he turns bad and is seen to be so, should one still love him? Or is that impossible, if not everything is lovable but only the good? What is bad is not lovable, and ought not to be; for one should not be a lover of the bad, nor become like someone base — and it has been said that like is friend to like. Should one then break off at once? Or not in every case, but only with those who are incurable in their wickedness? Those who can be set right should be helped with their character even more than with their property, inasmuch as this is better and more proper to friendship. Yet the person who breaks off would not seem to be doing anything strange, since it was not to someone like this that he was a friend; so when his friend has changed and he cannot restore him, he withdraws. But if one stayed the same while the other became better and far surpassed him in excellence, should the latter still treat him as a friend? Or is that not possible?
ἐν μεγάλῃ δὲ διαστάσει μάλιστα δῆλον γίνεται, οἷον ἐν ταῖς παιδικαῖς φιλίαις· εἰ γὰρ ὃ μὲν διαμένοι τὴν διάνοιαν παῖς ὃ δʼ ἀνὴρ εἴη οἷος κράτιστος, πῶς ἂν εἶεν φίλοι μήτʼ ἀρεσκόμενοι τοῖς αὐτοῖς μήτε χαίροντες καὶ λυπούμενοι; οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ ἀλλήλους ταῦθʼ ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς, ἄνευ δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἦν φίλους εἶναι· συμβιοῦν γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν τε. εἴρηται δὲ περὶ τούτων. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐθὲν ἀλλοιότερον πρὸς αὐτὸν ἑκτέον ἢ εἰ μὴ ἐγεγόνει φίλος μηδέποτε; ἢ δεῖ μνείαν ἔχειν τῆς γενομένης συνηθείας, καὶ καθάπερ φίλοις μᾶλλον ἢ ὀθνείοις οἰόμεθα δεῖν χαρίζεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς γενομένοις ἀπονεμητέον τι διὰ τὴν προγενομένην φιλίαν, ὅταν μὴ διʼ ὑπερβολὴν μοχθηρίας διάλυσις γένηται.
This becomes clearest when the gap is large, as in friendships from childhood. If one stayed a child in his thinking while the other became a man of the very best kind, how could they be friends, when they neither approve of the same things nor take pleasure and pain in the same things? They will not even have these in common regarding each other, and without them, as we saw, they cannot be friends, since they cannot share a life. But this has been discussed. Should one, then, behave toward him no differently than if he had never been a friend at all? Or should one keep in mind the intimacy there once was, and, just as we think we should do favors for friends rather than for strangers, so too render something to former friends because of the friendship that existed before — provided the break did not come about through an excess of wickedness?
Friendship and one's relation to oneself
Aristotle argues that the marks of friendship derive from the good person's relation to himself.
τὰ φιλικὰ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς πέλας, καὶ οἷς αἱ φιλίαι ὁρίζονται, ἔοικεν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐληλυθέναι. τιθέασι γὰρ φίλον τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ πράττοντα τἀγαθὰ ἢ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, ἢ τὸν βουλόμενον εἶναι καὶ ζῆν τὸν φίλον αὐτοῦ χάριν· ὅπερ αἱ μητέρες πρὸς τὰ τέκνα πεπόνθασι, καὶ τῶν φίλων οἱ προσκεκρουκότες. οἳ δὲ τὸν συνδιάγοντα καὶ ταὐτὰ αἱρούμενον, ἢ τὸν συναλγοῦντα καὶ συγχαίροντα τῷ φίλῳ· μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς μητέρας συμβαίνει. τούτων δέ τινι καὶ τὴν φιλίαν ὁρίζονται.
The features of friendship toward our neighbors, and those by which friendships are defined, seem to have come from the features of a person’s relation to himself. People take a friend to be someone who wishes and does good things, or apparent goods, for the other’s sake; or someone who wishes his friend to exist and live for the friend’s own sake — which is how mothers feel toward their children, and how friends feel who have had a falling-out. Others take a friend to be someone who spends time with the other and chooses the same things, or who shares his friend’s pains and joys — and this too happens most of all with mothers. And it is by one of these features that people define friendship as well.
πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δὲ τούτων ἕκαστον τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ ὑπάρχει (τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς, ᾗ τοιοῦτοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι· ἔοικε δέ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, μέτρον ἑκάστων ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος εἶναι)· οὗτος γὰρ ὁμογνωμονεῖ ἑαυτῷ, καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὀρέγεται κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχήν· καὶ βούλεται δὴ ἑαυτῷ τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πράττει (τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τἀγαθὸν διαπονεῖν) καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα (τοῦ γὰρ διανοητικοῦ χάριν, ὅπερ ἕκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ)· καὶ ζῆν δὲ βούλεται ἑαυτὸν καὶ σῴζεσθαι, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτο ᾧ φρονεῖ. ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τὸ εἶναι, ἕκαστος δʼ ἑαυτῷ βούλεται τἀγαθά, γενόμενος δʼ ἄλλος αἱρεῖται οὐδεὶς πάντʼ ἔχειν ἐκεῖνο τὸ γενόμενον (ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ θεὸς τἀγαθόν) ἀλλʼ ὢν ὅ τι ποτʼ ἐστίν· δόξειε δʼ ἂν τὸ νοοῦν ἕκαστος εἶναι ἢ μάλιστα.
Each of these holds of the decent person in relation to himself (and of everyone else insofar as they suppose themselves to be decent; for, as has been said, excellence and the excellent person seem to be the measure in each case). He is of one mind with himself, and desires the same things with his whole soul. He wishes for himself what is good and what appears so, and does it (for it belongs to the good person to work hard at the good), and does it for his own sake — that is, for the sake of the thinking part of him, which is what each person seems to be. He also wishes himself to live and be preserved, and above all the part with which he thinks. For existence is good for the excellent person, and each person wishes good things for himself; but no one would choose to have everything on condition of becoming someone else, so that it is that new being that has it (after all, the god possesses the good even now); he wants it while remaining whatever he is. And it would seem that the thinking part is what each person is, or is most of all.
συνδιάγειν τε ὁ τοιοῦτος ἑαυτῷ βούλεται· ἡδέως γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ· τῶν τε γὰρ πεπραγμένων ἐπιτερπεῖς αἱ μνῆμαι, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐλπίδες ἀγαθαί, αἱ τοιαῦται δʼ ἡδεῖαι. καὶ θεωρημάτων δʼ εὐπορεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ. συναλγεῖ τε καὶ συνήδεται μάλισθʼ ἑαυτῷ· πάντοτε γάρ ἐστι τὸ αὐτὸ λυπηρόν τε καὶ ἡδύ, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλοτʼ ἄλλο· ἀμεταμέλητος γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν. τῷ δὴ πρὸς αὑτὸν ἕκαστα τούτων ὑπάρχειν τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ, πρὸς δὲ τὸν φίλον ἔχειν ὥσπερ πρὸς αὑτόν (ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός), καὶ ἡ φιλία τούτων εἶναί τι δοκεῖ, καὶ φίλοι οἷς ταῦθʼ ὑπάρχει.
Such a person also wishes to spend time with himself, since he does so with pleasure: his memories of what he has done are delightful, and his hopes for the future are good, and such things are pleasant. His mind is also well stocked with objects of contemplation. He shares his own pains and pleasures more than anyone, since it is always the same thing that is painful or pleasant to him, not one thing at one time and another at another; he has, so to speak, nothing to regret. Since each of these, then, holds of the decent person in relation to himself, and he is related to his friend as he is to himself (for the friend is another self), friendship too seems to be one of these things, and those who have them seem to be friends.
πρὸς αὑτὸν δὲ πότερον ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστι φιλία, ἀφείσθω ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος· δόξειε δʼ ἂν ταύτῃ εἶναι φιλία, ᾗ ἐστὶ δύο ἢ πλείω, ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, 1166b καὶ ὅτι ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς φιλίας τῇ πρὸς αὑτὸν ὁμοιοῦται. φαίνεται δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν, καίπερ οὖσι φαύλοις. ἆρʼ οὖν ᾗ τʼ ἀρέσκουσιν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι, ταύτῃ μετέχουσιν αὐτῶν; ἐπεὶ τῶν γε κομιδῇ φαύλων καὶ ἀνοσιουργῶν οὐδενὶ ταῦθʼ ὑπάρχει, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ φαίνεται. σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς φαύλοις· διαφέρονται γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ ἑτέρων μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἄλλα δὲ βούλονται, οἷον οἱ ἀκρατεῖς· αἱροῦνται γὰρ ἀντὶ τῶν δοκούντων ἑαυτοῖς ἀγαθῶν εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα βλαβερὰ ὄντα· οἳ δʼ αὖ διὰ δειλίαν καὶ ἀργίαν ἀφίστανται τοῦ πράττειν ἃ οἴονται ἑαυτοῖς βέλτιστα εἶναι.
Whether there is or is not friendship toward oneself may be set aside for the present. Judging from what has been said, it would seem to be friendship insofar as a person is two or more parts, 1166b and because the extreme of friendship resembles one’s friendship toward oneself. But the features we have described seem to belong to most people too, base though they are. Is it, then, insofar as they are pleased with themselves and suppose themselves to be decent that they share in them? Certainly none of those who are utterly base and who commit impious deeds has them, or even seems to. But they hardly belong even to the base: such people are at odds with themselves, and have appetites for some things while wishing for others, like the uncontrolled, who choose pleasant things that are harmful instead of what seems to them to be good. Others again, through cowardice and laziness, shrink from doing what they think best for themselves.
οἷς δὲ πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ πέπρακται καὶ διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν μισοῦνται, καὶ φεύγουσι τὸ ζῆν καὶ ἀναιροῦσιν ἑαυτούς. ζητοῦσί τε οἱ μοχθηροὶ μεθʼ ὧν συνημερεύσουσιν, ἑαυτοὺς δὲ φεύγουσιν· ἀναμιμνήσκονται γὰρ πολλῶν καὶ δυσχερῶν, καὶ τοιαῦθʼ ἕτερα ἐλπίζουσι, καθʼ ἑαυτοὺς ὄντες, μεθʼ ἑτέρων δʼ ὄντες ἐπιλανθάνονται. οὐδέν τε φιλητὸν ἔχοντες οὐδὲν φιλικὸν πάσχουσι πρὸς ἑαυτούς. οὐδὲ δὴ συγχαίρουσιν οὐδὲ συναλγοῦσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς· στασιάζει γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡ ψυχή, καὶ τὸ μὲν διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀλγεῖ ἀπεχόμενόν τινων, τὸ δʼ ἥδεται, καὶ τὸ μὲν δεῦρο τὸ δʼ ἐκεῖσε ἕλκει ὥσπερ διασπῶντα. εἰ δὲ μὴ οἷόν τε ἅμα λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ἥδεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μετὰ μικρόν γε λυπεῖται ὅτι ἥσθη, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐβούλετο ἡδέα ταῦτα γενέσθαι αὑτῷ· μεταμελείας γὰρ οἱ φαῦλοι γέμουσιν.
And those who have done many terrible deeds and are hated for their wickedness even flee from life and do away with themselves. Wicked people seek others to spend their days with, and flee from themselves; for when they are by themselves they recall many disagreeable things and anticipate others like them, but in others’ company they forget. Having nothing lovable about them, they feel nothing friendly toward themselves. Nor, then, do such people share their own joys or pains. Their soul is at war with itself: one part, because of its wickedness, is pained at holding back from certain things, while another part is pleased, and one pulls this way and the other that, as if tearing the person apart. And even if it is not possible to be pained and pleased at the same time, still after a little while he is pained that he was pleased, and wishes these things had never been pleasant to him; for base people are full of regret.
οὐ δὴ φαίνεται ὁ φαῦλος οὐδὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς διακεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν φιλητόν. εἰ δὴ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν λίαν ἐστὶν ἄθλιον, φευκτέον τὴν μοχθηρίαν διατεταμένως καὶ πειρατέον ἐπιεικῆ εἶναι· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς ἂν ἔχοι καὶ ἑτέρῳ φίλος γένοιτο.
So the base person does not appear to be disposed in a friendly way even toward himself, because he has nothing lovable about him. If being in this condition is utterly wretched, we should strain every nerve to flee wickedness and try to be decent; for in that way one would be both friendly toward oneself and a friend to another.
Goodwill and concord
Aristotle distinguishes goodwill and concord from friendship and asks why benefactors love those they help.
ἡ δʼ εὔνοια φιλικῷ μὲν ἔοικεν, οὐ μὴν ἔστι γε φιλία· γίνεται γὰρ εὔνοια καὶ πρὸς ἀγνῶτας καὶ λανθάνουσα, φιλία δʼ οὔ. καὶ πρότερον δὲ ταῦτʼ εἴρηται. ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ φίλησίς ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ ἔχει διάτασιν οὐδʼ ὄρεξιν, τῇ φιλήσει δὲ ταῦτʼ ἀκολουθεῖ· καὶ ἡ μὲν φίλησις μετὰ συνηθείας, ἡ δʼ εὔνοια καὶ ἐκ προσπαίου, οἷον καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἀγωνιστὰς συμβαίνει· 1167a εὖνοι γὰρ αὐτοῖς γίνονται καὶ συνθέλουσιν, συμπράξαιεν δʼ ἂν οὐδέν· ὅπερ γὰρ εἴπομεν, προσπαίως εὖνοι γίνονται καὶ ἐπιπολαίως στέργουσιν.
Goodwill resembles friendship, but it is not friendship; for goodwill arises even toward people we do not know, and without their being aware of it, but friendship does not. This has been said before as well. But neither is it affection. It has no intensity or longing, which go along with affection; and affection comes with familiarity, whereas goodwill can arise all of a sudden, as happens, for example, with competitors in the games. 1167a Spectators come to feel goodwill toward them and share their wishes, but would do nothing to help them; as we said, they feel goodwill suddenly and have only a superficial fondness.
ἔοικε δὴ ἀρχὴ φιλίας εἶναι, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἐρᾶν ἡ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως ἡδονή· μὴ γὰρ προησθεὶς τῇ ἰδέᾳ οὐδεὶς ἐρᾷ, ὁ δὲ χαίρων τῷ εἴδει οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐρᾷ, ἀλλʼ ὅταν καὶ ἀπόντα ποθῇ καὶ τῆς παρουσίας ἐπιθυμῇ· οὕτω δὴ καὶ φίλους οὐχ οἷόν τʼ εἶναι μὴ εὔνους γενομένους, οἱ δʼ εὖνοι οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φιλοῦσιν· βούλονται γὰρ μόνον τἀγαθὰ οἷς εἰσὶν εὖνοι, συμπράξαιεν δʼ ἂν οὐδέν, οὐδʼ ὀχληθεῖεν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν. διὸ μεταφέρων φαίη τις ἂν αὐτὴν ἀργὴν εἶναι φιλίαν, χρονιζομένην δὲ καὶ εἰς συνήθειαν ἀφικνουμένην γίνεσθαι φιλίαν, οὐ τὴν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον οὐδὲ τὴν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ· οὐδὲ γὰρ εὔνοια ἐπὶ τούτοις γίνεται.
Goodwill, then, seems to be the beginning of friendship, just as the pleasure of the eye is the beginning of erotic love. No one falls in love without first being pleased by the other’s looks; yet someone who delights in another’s appearance is not thereby in love, but only when he also longs for the other when absent and desires his presence. In the same way, people cannot be friends without first having come to feel goodwill, yet those who feel goodwill do not for that reason love; for they only wish good things for those they feel goodwill toward, but would do nothing to help them, and would not go to any trouble on their behalf. So one might say, by a figure of speech, that goodwill is idle friendship, and that when it lasts over time and reaches familiarity it becomes friendship — not the kind based on usefulness or on pleasure, since goodwill does not arise on those grounds either.
ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐεργετηθεὶς ἀνθʼ ὧν πέπονθεν ἀπονέμει τὴν εὔνοιαν, τὰ δίκαια δρῶν· ὁ δὲ βουλόμενός τινʼ εὐπραγεῖν, ἐλπίδα ἔχων εὐπορίας διʼ ἐκείνου, οὐκ ἔοικʼ εὔνους ἐκείνῳ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἑαυτῷ, καθάπερ οὐδὲ φίλος, εἰ θεραπεύει αὐτὸν διά τινα χρῆσιν. ὅλως δʼ εὔνοια διʼ ἀρετὴν καὶ ἐπιείκειάν τινα γίνεται, ὅταν τῳ φανῇ καλός τις ἢ ἀνδρεῖος ἤ τι τοιοῦτον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγωνιστῶν εἴπομεν.
The person who has received a benefit renders goodwill in return for what he has received, and so is doing what is just. But someone who wishes another to prosper because he hopes to do well through him seems to have goodwill not toward that person but rather toward himself, just as he is not a friend either if he courts him for some use. In general, goodwill arises because of excellence and a certain decency, when someone seems to another to be fine or brave or something of the sort, as we said in the case of competitors.
φιλικὸν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁμόνοια φαίνεται. διόπερ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁμοδοξία· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀγνοοῦσιν ἀλλήλους ὑπάρξειεν ἄν· οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ ὁτουοῦν ὁμογνωμονοῦντας ὁμονοεῖν φασίν, οἷον τοὺς περὶ τῶν οὐρανίων (οὐ γὰρ φιλικὸν τὸ περὶ τούτων ὁμονοεῖν), ἀλλὰ τὰς πόλεις ὁμονοεῖν φασίν, ὅταν περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ὁμογνωμονῶσι καὶ ταὐτὰ προαιρῶνται καὶ πράττωσι τὰ κοινῇ δόξαντα. περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ δὴ ὁμονοοῦσιν, καὶ τούτων περὶ τὰ ἐν μεγέθει καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχειν ἢ πᾶσιν, οἷον αἱ πόλεις, ὅταν πᾶσι δοκῇ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἱρετὰς εἶναι, ἢ συμμαχεῖν Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἢ ἄρχειν Πιττακὸν ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς ἤθελεν.
Concord, too, appears to be a feature of friendship. That is why it is not mere agreement in opinion, since that could exist even among people who do not know one another. Nor do people say that those who agree about just anything are in concord — about the heavenly bodies, for instance (being in concord about these has nothing to do with friendship). Rather, they say that cities are in concord when they agree about what is advantageous, decide on the same things, and carry out what they have resolved in common. So concord concerns matters of action, and among these, matters of some magnitude which both parties, or all, can have: for example, cities are in concord when everyone resolves that offices should be elective, or that they should ally with the Spartans, or that Pittacus should rule, at the time when he himself was willing to.
ὅταν δʼ ἑκάτερος ἑαυτὸν βούληται, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς Φοινίσσαις, στασιάζουσιν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὁμονοεῖν τὸ αὐτὸ ἑκάτερον ἐννοεῖν ὁδήποτε, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, οἷον ὅταν καὶ ὁ δῆμος 1167b καὶ οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν· οὕτω γὰρ πᾶσι γίνεται οὗ ἐφίενται. πολιτικὴ δὴ φιλία φαίνεται ἡ ὁμόνοια, καθάπερ καὶ λέγεται· περὶ τὰ συμφέροντα γάρ ἐστι καὶ τὰ εἰς τὸν βίον ἥκοντα. ἔστι δʼ ἡ τοιαύτη ὁμόνοια ἐν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν· οὗτοι γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτοῖς ὁμονοοῦσι καὶ ἀλλήλοις, ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντες ὡς εἰπεῖν (τῶν τοιούτων γὰρ μένει τὰ βουλήματα καὶ οὐ μεταρρεῖ ὥσπερ εὔριπος), βούλονταί τε τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα, τούτων δὲ καὶ κοινῇ ἐφίενται.
But when each of two parties wants the thing for himself, like the pair in the Phoenician Women, they fall into strife. For concord is not each having the same thing in mind, whatever it may be, but having it in mind for the same person — as when both the common people 1167b and the decent want the best people to rule; for in this way everyone gets what they are aiming at. Concord, then, appears to be political friendship, as it is in fact called; for it concerns what is advantageous and what bears on life. Concord of this kind exists among decent people. They are in concord both with themselves and with one another, since they stand on the same ground, so to speak (for the wishes of such people stay fixed, and do not ebb and flow like the currents of a tidal strait), and they wish for what is just and advantageous, and aim at these in common as well.
τοὺς δὲ φαύλους οὐχ οἷόν τε ὁμονοεῖν πλὴν ἐπὶ μικρόν, καθάπερ καὶ φίλους εἶναι, πλεονεξίας ἐφιεμένους ἐν τοῖς ὠφελίμοις, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πόνοις καὶ ταῖς λειτουργίαις ἐλλείποντας· ἑαυτῷ δʼ ἕκαστος βουλόμενος ταῦτα τὸν πέλας ἐξετάζει καὶ κωλύει· μὴ γὰρ τηρούντων τὸ κοινὸν ἀπόλλυται. συμβαίνει οὖν αὐτοῖς στασιάζειν, ἀλλήλους μὲν ἐπαναγκάζοντας, αὐτοὺς δὲ μὴ βουλομένους τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν.
Base people, however, cannot be in concord except to a small extent, just as they cannot be friends either, since they aim at getting more than their share of benefits and fall short in labors and public services. And each, wishing these things for himself, scrutinizes his neighbor and gets in his way; for if people do not watch over the common good, it is ruined. So the result is that they fall into strife, compelling one another to do what is just but unwilling to do it themselves.
οἱ δʼ εὐεργέται τοὺς εὐεργετηθέντας δοκοῦσι μᾶλλον φιλεῖν ἢ οἱ εὖ παθόντες τοὺς δράσαντας, καὶ ὡς παρὰ λόγον γινόμενον ἐπιζητεῖται. τοῖς μὲν οὖν πλείστοις φαίνεται ὅτι οἳ μὲν ὀφείλουσι τοῖς δὲ ὀφείλεται· καθάπερ οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν δανείων οἱ μὲν ὀφείλοντες βούλονται μὴ εἶναι οἷς ὀφείλουσιν, οἱ δὲ δανείσαντες καὶ ἐπιμελοῦνται τῆς τῶν ὀφειλόντων σωτηρίας, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς εὐεργετήσαντας βούλεσθαι εἶναι τοὺς παθόντας ὡς κομιουμένους τὰς χάριτας, τοῖς δʼ οὐκ εἶναι ἐπιμελὲς τὸ ἀνταποδοῦναι. Ἐπίχαρμος μὲν οὖν τάχʼ ἂν φαίη ταῦτα λέγειν αὐτοὺς ἐκ πονηροῦ θεωμένους, ἔοικε δʼ ἀνθρωπικῷ· ἀμνήμονες γὰρ οἱ πολλοί, καὶ μᾶλλον εὖ πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἐφίενται.
Benefactors seem to love those they have benefited more than those who have been treated well love those who treated them well, and this is investigated as though it were contrary to reason. Most people think the reason is that the one party is in debt and the other is owed. So just as with loans, where debtors wish their creditors did not exist, while lenders even take care for their debtors’ safety, so too, it is thought, benefactors wish those they have benefited to exist so that they will receive gratitude in return, while the beneficiaries are not concerned to repay. Epicharmus might perhaps say that those who say this are watching from a bad seat; but it seems true to human nature, since most people are forgetful, and aim to be treated well rather than to treat others well.
δόξειε δʼ ἂν φυσικώτερον εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον, καὶ οὐδʼ ὅμοιον τὸ περὶ τοὺς δανείσαντας· οὐ γάρ ἐστι φίλησις περὶ ἐκείνους, ἀλλὰ τοῦ σῴζεσθαι βούλησις τῆς κομιδῆς ἕνεκα· οἱ δʼ εὖ πεποιηκότες φιλοῦσι καὶ ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς πεπονθότας κἂν μηδὲν ὦσι χρήσιμοι μηδʼ εἰς ὕστερον γένοιντʼ ἄν. ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν συμβέβηκεν· πᾶς γὰρ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον ἀγαπᾷ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγαπηθείη ἂν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔργου ἐμψύχου γενομένου· 1168a μάλιστα δʼ ἴσως τοῦτο περὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς συμβαίνει· ὑπεραγαπῶσι γὰρ οὗτοι τὰ οἰκεῖα ποιήματα, στέργοντες ὥσπερ τέκνα. τοιούτῳ δὴ ἔοικε καὶ τὸ τῶν εὐεργετῶν· τὸ γὰρ εὖ πεπονθὸς ἔργον ἐστὶν αὐτῶν· τοῦτο δὴ ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἔργον τὸν ποιήσαντα.
But the cause would seem to lie more in the nature of things, and the case of lenders is not even similar. With them there is no affection, only a wish that the debtors survive so as to be repaid; whereas those who have done good love and cherish those who have received it, even if they are of no use to them and never could be later on. This is what happens with craftsmen too: every craftsman loves his own work more than he would be loved by the work if it came to life. 1168a This happens most of all, perhaps, with poets, who love their own poems excessively, cherishing them like children. The benefactors’ case seems to be like this: the person who has been treated well is their work, and so they love it more than the work loves the one who made it.
τούτου δʼ αἴτιον ὅτι τὸ εἶναι πᾶσιν αἱρετὸν καὶ φιλητόν, ἐσμὲν δʼ ἐνεργείᾳ (τῷ ζῆν γὰρ καὶ πράττειν), ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ ὁ ποιήσας τὸ ἔργον ἔστι πως· στέργει δὴ τὸ ἔργον, διότι καὶ τὸ εἶναι. τοῦτο δὲ φυσικόν· ὃ γάρ ἐστι δυνάμει, τοῦτο ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ ἔργον μηνύει. ἅμα δὲ καὶ τῷ μὲν εὐεργέτῃ καλὸν τὸ κατὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν, ὥστε χαίρειν ἐν ᾧ τοῦτο, τῷ δὲ παθόντι οὐδὲν καλὸν ἐν τῷ δράσαντι, ἀλλʼ εἴπερ, συμφέρον· τοῦτο δʼ ἧττον ἡδὺ καὶ φιλητόν. ἡδεῖα δʼ ἐστὶ τοῦ μὲν παρόντος ἡ ἐνέργεια, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος ἡ ἐλπίς, τοῦ δὲ γεγενημένου ἡ μνήμη· ἥδιστον δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, καὶ φιλητὸν ὁμοίως. τῷ μὲν οὖν πεποιηκότι μένει τὸ ἔργον (τὸ καλὸν γὰρ πολυχρόνιον), τῷ δὲ παθόντι τὸ χρήσιμον παροίχεται.
The cause of this is that existence is choiceworthy and lovable to everyone, and we exist by activity (that is, by living and acting), and the maker of a work exists, in a way, by his activity. So he loves his work, because he loves existence too. And this is natural: what he is in capacity, the work displays in activity. At the same time, for the benefactor there is something fine in his action, so that he delights in the person in whom it lies; whereas for the one who has been treated well there is nothing fine in the one who acted, but at most something advantageous, and this is less pleasant and less lovable. What is pleasant is the activity of the present, the hope of the future, and the memory of the past; but most pleasant is what goes with activity, and it is likewise most lovable. For the one who has done good, his work remains (since what is fine is long-lasting), whereas for the one who received it, the usefulness passes away.
ἥ τε μνήμη τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἡδεῖα, τῶν δὲ χρησίμων οὐ πάνυ ἢ ἧττον· ἡ προσδοκία δʼ ἀνάπαλιν ἔχειν ἔοικεν. καὶ ἡ μὲν φίλησις ποιήσει ἔοικεν, τὸ φιλεῖσθαι δὲ τῷ πάσχειν· τοῖς ὑπερέχουσι δὲ περὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν ἕπεται τὸ φιλεῖν καὶ τὰ φιλικά. ἔτι δὲ τὰ ἐπιπόνως γενόμενα πάντες μᾶλλον στέργουσιν, οἷον καὶ τὰ χρήματα οἱ κτησάμενοι τῶν παραλαβόντων· δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ μὲν εὖ πάσχειν ἄπονον εἶναι, τὸ δʼ εὖ ποιεῖν ἐργῶδες. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ αἱ μητέρες φιλοτεκνότεραι· ἐπιπονωτέρα γὰρ ἡ γέννησις, καὶ μᾶλλον ἴσασιν ὅτι αὑτῶν. δόξειε δʼ ἂν τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς εὐεργέταις οἰκεῖον εἶναι.
Again, the memory of fine things is pleasant, while that of useful things is not very pleasant, or less so; with expectation it seems to be the other way round. Also, loving is like acting, and being loved is like being acted upon; and loving and the features of friendship belong to those who take the leading part in the action. Again, everyone cherishes more what they have achieved with toil — as those who have made their money love it more than those who inherited it. And being treated well seems to involve no toil, while doing good is laborious. It is for these reasons, too, that mothers love their children more than fathers do: giving birth is more toilsome, and they know better that the children are their own. This would seem to be characteristic of benefactors as well.
Self-love
Aristotle distinguishes base self-love from the good person's love of what is fine.
ἀπορεῖται δὲ καὶ πότερον δεῖ φιλεῖν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα ἢ ἄλλον τινά. ἐπιτιμῶσι γὰρ τοῖς ἑαυτοὺς μάλιστʼ ἀγαπῶσι, καὶ ὡς ἐν αἰσχρῷ φιλαύτους ἀποκαλοῦσι, δοκεῖ τε ὁ μὲν φαῦλος ἑαυτοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττειν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μοχθηρότερος ᾖ, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον—ἐγκαλοῦσι δὴ αὐτῷ οἷον ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀφʼ ἑαυτοῦ πράττει—ὁ δʼ ἐπιεικὴς διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν βελτίων ᾖ, μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ φίλου ἕνεκα, τὸ δʼ αὑτοῦ παρίησιν. τοῖς λόγοις δὲ τούτοις τὰ ἔργα διαφωνεῖ, οὐκ ἀλόγως.
There is also a puzzle about whether one should love oneself most, or someone else. People criticize those who cherish themselves most, and call them “self-lovers” as a term of reproach. And the base person seems to do everything for his own sake, and the more so the worse he is — so people complain of him, for instance, that he does nothing except with himself in view — while the decent person acts because of the fine, and the better he is, the more he acts because of the fine, and for his friend’s sake, setting his own interest aside. But the facts are at odds with these arguments, and not without reason.
φασὶ γὰρ δεῖν φιλεῖν μάλιστα τὸν μάλιστα φίλον, φίλος δὲ μάλιστα ὁ βουλόμενος ᾧ βούλεται τἀγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, καὶ εἰ μηδεὶς εἴσεται· ταῦτα δʼ ὑπάρχει μάλιστʼ αὐτῷ πρὸς αὑτόν, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ δὴ πάνθʼ οἷς ὁ φίλος ὁρίζεται· εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ πάντα τὰ φιλικὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους διήκει. καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι δὲ πᾶσαι ὁμογνωμονοῦσιν, οἷον τὸ μία ψυχή καὶ κοινὰ τὰ φίλων καὶ ἰσότης φιλότης καὶ γόνυ κνήμης ἔγγιον· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα πρὸς αὑτὸν μάλιστʼ ἂν ὑπάρχοι· μάλιστα γὰρ φίλος αὑτῷ· καὶ φιλητέον δὴ μάλισθʼ ἑαυτόν. ἀπορεῖται δὴ εἰκότως ποτέροις χρεὼν ἕπεσθαι, ἀμφοῖν ἐχόντοιν τὸ πιστόν. ἴσως οὖν τοὺς τοιούτους δεῖ τῶν λόγων διαιρεῖν καὶ διορίζειν ἐφʼ ὅσον ἑκάτεροι καὶ πῇ ἀληθεύουσιν.
For people say one should love most the one who is most a friend, and the one most a friend is the person who wishes good things for someone for that person’s sake, even if no one will know. But these features belong most of all to a person in relation to himself, and so do all the other features by which a friend is defined; for it has been said that all the features of friendship extend from oneself to others as well. All the proverbs agree too, such as “one soul,” “friends’ things are shared,” “friendship is equality,” and “the knee is closer than the shin.” All these would apply most of all to a person in relation to himself, since he is most a friend to himself; and so he should love himself most. It is reasonable, then, to be puzzled about which side to follow, since both carry some conviction. Perhaps, then, we should separate such arguments and determine how far and in what way each side is right.
εἰ δὴ λάβοιμεν τὸ φίλαυτον πῶς ἑκάτεροι λέγουσιν, τάχʼ ἂν γένοιτο δῆλον. οἱ μὲν οὖν εἰς ὄνειδος ἄγοντες αὐτὸ φιλαύτους καλοῦσι τοὺς ἑαυτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας τὸ πλεῖον ἐν χρήμασι καὶ τιμαῖς καὶ ἡδοναῖς ταῖς σωματικαῖς· τούτων γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀρέγονται, καὶ ἐσπουδάκασι περὶ αὐτὰ ὡς ἄριστα ὄντα, διὸ καὶ περιμάχητά ἐστιν. οἱ δὴ περὶ ταῦτα πλεονέκται χαρίζονται ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὅλως τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ τῷ ἀλόγῳ τῆς ψυχῆς· τοιοῦτοι δʼ εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί· διὸ καὶ ἡ προσηγορία γεγένηται ἀπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ φαύλου ὄντος· δικαίως δὴ τοῖς οὕτω φιλαύτοις ὀνειδίζεται.
If we grasp how each side uses “self-love,” it may perhaps become clear. Those who make it a term of reproach call “self-lovers” those who allot themselves the larger share of money, honors and bodily pleasures. These are what most people reach for, and they are keen about them as the best things, which is also why they are fought over. Those who grasp for more than their share of these things gratify their appetites and, in general, their feelings and the non-rational part of the soul. And most people are like this; that is why the term has come to be used as it is, from the prevailing kind, which is base. So those who are self-lovers in this way are justly reproached.
ὅτι δὲ τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦθʼ αὑτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας εἰώθασι λέγειν οἱ πολλοὶ φιλαύτους, οὐκ ἄδηλον· εἰ γάρ τις ἀεὶ σπουδάζοι τὰ δίκαια πράττειν αὐτὸς μάλιστα πάντων ἢ τὰ σώφρονα ἢ ὁποιαοῦν ἄλλα τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετάς, καὶ ὅλως ἀεὶ τὸ καλὸν ἑαυτῷ περιποιοῖτο, οὐδεὶς ἐρεῖ τοῦτον φίλαυτον οὐδὲ ψέξει. δόξειε δʼ ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος μᾶλλον εἶναι φίλαυτος· ἀπονέμει γοῦν ἑαυτῷ τὰ κάλλιστα καὶ μάλιστʼ ἀγαθά, καὶ χαρίζεται ἑαυτοῦ τῷ κυριωτάτῳ, καὶ πάντα τούτῳ πείθεται· ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ πόλις τὸ κυριώτατον μάλιστʼ εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ πᾶν ἄλλο σύστημα, οὕτω καὶ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ φίλαυτος δὴ μάλιστα ὁ τοῦτο ἀγαπῶν καὶ τούτῳ χαριζόμενος.
That it is those who allot such things to themselves whom most people usually call self-lovers is clear enough. For if someone were always keen that he himself, above all others, should do what is just, or moderate, or anything else in accordance with the excellences, and in general were always securing the fine for himself, no one would call him a self-lover or blame him. Yet such a person would seem to be more of a self-lover. At any rate, he allots himself the finest things and the greatest goods, and gratifies the most authoritative part of himself, and obeys it in everything. And just as a city, or any other organized whole, seems to be most of all its most authoritative part, so too does a human being; and so the person who cherishes this part and gratifies it is most of all a self-lover.
καὶ ἐγκρατὴς δὲ καὶ ἀκρατὴς λέγεται τῷ κρατεῖν τὸν νοῦν ἢ μή, ὡς τούτου ἑκάστου ὄντος· 1169a καὶ πεπραγέναι δοκοῦσιν αὐτοὶ καὶ ἑκουσίως τὰ μετὰ λόγου μάλιστα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦθʼ ἕκαστός ἐστιν ἢ μάλιστα, οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἐπιεικὴς μάλιστα τοῦτʼ ἀγαπᾷ. διὸ φίλαυτος μάλιστʼ ἂν εἴη, καθʼ ἕτερον εἶδος τοῦ ὀνειδιζομένου, καὶ διαφέρων τοσοῦτον ὅσον τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν τοῦ κατὰ πάθος, καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι ἢ τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ τοῦ δοκοῦντος συμφέρειν. τοὺς μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς καλὰς πράξεις διαφερόντως σπουδάζοντας πάντες ἀποδέχονται καὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν· πάντων δὲ ἁμιλλωμένων πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ διατεινομένων τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν κοινῇ τʼ ἂν πάντʼ εἴη τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, εἴπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν.
Again, people are called self-controlled or uncontrolled according to whether or not their intellect is in control, on the assumption that this is what each person is; 1169a and it is the things done with reason that people seem most of all to have done themselves, and voluntarily. That this, then, is what each person is, or is most of all, is clear enough, and also that the decent person cherishes it most. That is why he would be a self-lover most of all — though of a different kind from the one reproached, and differing from it as much as living by reason differs from living by feeling, and as much as desiring the fine differs from desiring what seems advantageous. Now, everyone welcomes and praises those who are exceptionally keen on fine actions; and if everyone were competing for the fine and straining to do the finest things, the community would have everything it ought to have, and each individual would have the greatest of goods, since excellence is a good of this kind.
ὥστε τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν δεῖ φίλαυτον εἶναι (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὀνήσεται τὰ καλὰ πράττων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὠφελήσει), τὸν δὲ μοχθηρὸν οὐ δεῖ· βλάψει γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς πέλας, φαύλοις πάθεσιν ἑπόμενος. τῷ μοχθηρῷ μὲν οὖν διαφωνεῖ ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ἃ πράττει· ὁ δʼ ἐπιεικής, ἃ δεῖ, ταῦτα καὶ πράττει· πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς αἱρεῖται τὸ βέλτιστον ἑαυτῷ, ὁ δʼ ἐπιεικὴς πειθαρχεῖ τῷ νῷ.
So the good person ought to be a self-lover, since he will both benefit himself by doing fine things and help others; but the wicked person ought not to be, since he will harm both himself and those around him by following base feelings. For the wicked person, what he ought to do and what he does are at odds; but the decent person does what he ought to do. For every intellect chooses what is best for itself, and the decent person obeys his intellect.
ἀληθὲς δὲ περὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου καὶ τὸ τῶν φίλων ἕνεκα πολλὰ πράττειν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος, κἂν δέῃ ὑπεραποθνήσκειν· προήσεται γὰρ καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμὰς καὶ ὅλως τὰ περιμάχητα ἀγαθά, περιποιούμενος ἑαυτῷ τὸ καλόν· ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἡσθῆναι σφόδρα μᾶλλον ἕλοιτʼ ἂν ἢ πολὺν ἠρέμα, καὶ βιῶσαι καλῶς ἐνιαυτὸν ἢ πόλλʼ ἔτη τυχόντως, καὶ μίαν πρᾶξιν καλὴν καὶ μεγάλην ἢ πολλὰς καὶ μικράς. τοῖς δʼ ὑπεραποθνήσκουσι τοῦτʼ ἴσως συμβαίνει· αἱροῦνται δὴ μέγα καλὸν ἑαυτοῖς. καὶ χρήματα προοῖντʼ ἂν ἐφʼ ᾧ πλείονα λήψονται οἱ φίλοι· γίνεται γὰρ τῷ μὲν φίλῳ χρήματα, αὐτῷ δὲ τὸ καλόν· τὸ δὴ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἑαυτῷ ἀπονέμει. καὶ περὶ τιμὰς δὲ καὶ ἀρχὰς ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος· πάντα γὰρ τῷ φίλῳ ταῦτα προήσεται· καλὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπαινετόν.
It is also true of the excellent person that he does many things for the sake of his friends and his country, even dying for them if need be. He will give up money and honors and, in general, the goods people fight over, securing the fine for himself. He would choose intense pleasure for a short time over mild pleasure for a long time, a year of living finely over many years of living any old way, and one fine and great action over many small ones. This is presumably what happens with those who die for others: they choose a great and fine thing for themselves. He would also give up money so that his friends may get more; for his friend gets the money, but he gets the fine, and so he allots himself the greater good. It is the same with honors and offices: he will give all these up to his friend, since this is fine and praiseworthy for him.
εἰκότως δὴ δοκεῖ σπουδαῖος εἶναι, ἀντὶ πάντων αἱρούμενος τὸ καλόν. ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ πράξεις τῷ φίλῳ προΐεσθαι, καὶ εἶναι κάλλιον τοῦ αὐτὸν πρᾶξαι τὸ αἴτιον τῷ φίλῳ γενέσθαι. ἐν πᾶσι δὴ τοῖς ἐπαινετοῖς ὁ σπουδαῖος φαίνεται ἑαυτῷ τοῦ καλοῦ πλέον νέμων. 1169b οὕτω μὲν οὖν φίλαυτον εἶναι δεῖ, καθάπερ εἴρηται· ὡς δʼ οἱ πολλοί, οὐ χρή.
It is reasonable, then, that he is thought excellent, since he chooses the fine above everything. It is even possible for him to give up actions to his friend, and it may be finer to be the cause of his friend’s acting than to act himself. In everything praiseworthy, then, the excellent person evidently allots himself the greater share of the fine. 1169b In this way, then, one ought to be a self-lover, as has been said; but in the way most people are, one should not.
Does the happy person need friends?
Aristotle argues that even the happy, self-sufficient person needs good friends.
ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰ δεήσεται φίλων ἢ μή. οὐθὲν γάρ φασι δεῖν φίλων τοῖς μακαρίοις καὶ αὐτάρκεσιν· ὑπάρχειν γὰρ αὐτοῖς τἀγαθά· αὐτάρκεις οὖν ὄντας οὐδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ φίλον, ἕτερον αὐτὸν ὄντα, πορίζειν ἃ διʼ αὑτοῦ ἀδυνατεῖ· ὅθεν ὅταν ὁ δαίμων εὖ διδῷ, τί δεῖ φίλων; ἔοικε δʼ ἀτόπῳ τὸ πάντʼ ἀπονέμοντας τἀγαθὰ τῷ εὐδαίμονι φίλους μὴ ἀποδιδόναι, ὃ δοκεῖ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μέγιστον εἶναι. εἴ τε φίλου μᾶλλόν ἐστι τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν, καὶ ἔστι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸ εὐεργετεῖν, κάλλιον δʼ εὖ ποιεῖν φίλους ὀθνείων, τῶν εὖ πεισομένων δεήσεται ὁ σπουδαῖος. διὸ καὶ ἐπιζητεῖται πότερον ἐν εὐτυχίαις μᾶλλον δεῖ φίλων ἢ ἐν ἀτυχίαις, ὡς καὶ τοῦ ἀτυχοῦντος δεομένου τῶν εὐεργετησόντων καὶ τῶν εὐτυχούντων οὓς εὖ ποιήσουσιν.
There is also dispute about the happy person: will he need friends or not? People say that those who are blessed and self-sufficient have no need of friends, since they already have the good things. Being self-sufficient, then, they need nothing further, whereas a friend, being another self, provides what one cannot provide by oneself. Hence the line, “When heaven grants us good, what need of friends?” But it seems strange, when we assign all good things to the happy person, not to give him friends, which are thought to be the greatest of external goods. And if it belongs to a friend to do good rather than to receive it, and if doing good belongs to the good person and to excellence, and it is finer to do good to friends than to strangers, then the excellent person will need people to benefit. That is why people also ask whether friends are needed more in good fortune or in bad, on the grounds that the unfortunate person needs people to benefit him, and the fortunate need people they can benefit.
ἄτοπον δʼ ἴσως καὶ τὸ μονώτην ποιεῖν τὸν μακάριον· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἕλοιτʼ ἂν καθʼ αὑτὸν τὰ πάντʼ ἔχειν ἀγαθά· πολιτικὸν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ συζῆν πεφυκός. καὶ τῷ εὐδαίμονι δὴ τοῦθʼ ὑπάρχει· τὰ γὰρ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὰ ἔχει, δῆλον δʼ ὡς μετὰ φίλων καὶ ἐπιεικῶν κρεῖττον ἢ μετʼ ὀθνείων καὶ τῶν τυχόντων συνημερεύειν. δεῖ ἄρα τῷ εὐδαίμονι φίλων. τί οὖν λέγουσιν οἱ πρῶτοι, καὶ πῇ ἀληθεύουσιν; ἢ ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ φίλους οἴονται τοὺς χρησίμους εἶναι; τῶν τοιούτων μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν δεήσεται ὁ μακάριος, ἐπειδὴ τἀγαθὰ ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ· οὐδὲ δὴ τῶν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ, ἢ ἐπὶ μικρόν (ἡδὺς γὰρ ὁ βίος ὢν οὐδὲν δεῖται ἐπεισάκτου ἡδονῆς)· οὐ δεόμενος δὲ τῶν τοιούτων φίλων οὐ δοκεῖ δεῖσθαι φίλων. τὸ δʼ οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσως ἀληθές.
Perhaps it is also strange to make the blessed person solitary. No one would choose to have all good things on condition of having them all by himself, since a human being is a political creature, whose nature is to live with others. This holds of the happy person too, since he has the things that are good by nature; and clearly it is better to spend one’s days with friends and decent people than with strangers and whoever happens along. So the happy person needs friends. What, then, do those who hold the first view mean, and in what way are they right? Is it that most people think friends are those who are useful? The blessed person will have no need of friends like that, since he already has good things; nor of friends for pleasure, or only a little (for his life is pleasant and needs no imported pleasure). And because he does not need friends of these kinds, he is thought not to need friends at all. But this is perhaps not true.
ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ εἴρηται ὅτι ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐνέργειά τις ἐστίν, ἡ δʼ ἐνέργεια δῆλον ὅτι γίνεται καὶ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ὥσπερ κτῆμά τι. εἰ δὲ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ζῆν καὶ ἐνεργεῖν, τοῦ δʼ ἀγαθοῦ ἡ ἐνέργεια σπουδαία καὶ ἡδεῖα καθʼ αὑτήν, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον τῶν ἡδέων, θεωρεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον τοὺς πέλας δυνάμεθα ἢ ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὰς ἐκείνων πράξεις ἢ τὰς οἰκείας, αἱ τῶν σπουδαίων δὲ πράξεις φίλων ὄντων ἡδεῖαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς 1170a ʽἁ̓́μφω γὰρ ἔχουσι τὰ τῇ φύσει ἡδέἀ· ὁ μακάριος δὴ φίλων τοιούτων δεήσεται, εἴπερ θεωρεῖν προαιρεῖται πράξεις ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ οἰκείας, τοιαῦται δʼ αἱ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φίλου ὄντος. οἴονταί τε δεῖν ἡδέως ζῆν τὸν εὐδαίμονα.
For it was said at the beginning that happiness is a kind of activity, and an activity clearly comes into being; it does not belong to one like a possession. Now suppose that being happy lies in living and being active; that the activity of the good person is excellent and pleasant in itself, as was said at the beginning; that what is one’s own is also among pleasant things; that we are better able to contemplate our neighbors than ourselves, and their actions than our own; and that the actions of excellent people who are their friends are pleasant to good people 1170a (since these actions have both of the features that are pleasant by nature). Then the blessed person will need friends of this kind, since he decides to contemplate actions that are decent and his own, and such are the actions of a good person who is his friend. People also think the happy person must live pleasantly.
μονώτῃ μὲν οὖν χαλεπὸς ὁ βίος· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον καθʼ αὑτὸν ἐνεργεῖν συνεχῶς, μεθʼ ἑτέρων δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους ῥᾷον. ἔσται οὖν ἡ ἐνέργεια συνεχεστέρα, ἡδεῖα οὖσα καθʼ αὑτήν, ὃ δεῖ περὶ τὸν μακάριον εἶναι· ὁ γὰρ σπουδαῖος, ᾗ σπουδαῖος, ταῖς κατʼ ἀρετὴν πράξεσι χαίρει, ταῖς δʼ ἀπὸ κακίας δυσχεραίνει, καθάπερ ὁ μουσικὸς τοῖς καλοῖς μέλεσιν ἥδεται, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς φαύλοις λυπεῖται. γίνοιτο δʼ ἂν καὶ ἄσκησίς τις τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐκ τοῦ συζῆν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, καθάπερ καὶ Θέογνίς φησιν. φυσικώτερον δʼ ἐπισκοποῦσιν ἔοικεν ὁ σπουδαῖος φίλος τῷ σπουδαίῳ τῇ φύσει αἱρετὸς εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν εἴρηται ὅτι τῷ σπουδαίῳ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ ἐστι καθʼ αὑτό.
Now for a solitary person life is hard, since it is not easy to be continuously active by oneself, but easier with others and in relation to others. So his activity, which is pleasant in itself, will be more continuous, as it should be for the blessed person. For the excellent person, insofar as he is excellent, delights in actions in accordance with excellence and is disgusted by those that come from vice, just as a musician takes pleasure in beautiful melodies and is pained by bad ones. Living with good people would also provide a kind of training in excellence, as Theognis says. And if we look at the matter more from the standpoint of nature, it seems that an excellent friend is by nature choiceworthy for an excellent person. For it has been said that what is good by nature is good and pleasant in itself for the excellent person.
τὸ δὲ ζῆν ὁρίζονται τοῖς ζῴοις δυνάμει αἰσθήσεως, ἀνθρώποις δʼ αἰσθήσεως ἢ νοήσεως· ἡ δὲ δύναμις εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀνάγεται, τὸ δὲ κύριον ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ· ἔοικε δὴ τὸ ζῆν εἶναι κυρίως τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν. τὸ δὲ ζῆν τῶν καθʼ αὑτὸ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων· ὡρισμένον γάρ, τὸ δʼ ὡρισμένον τῆς τἀγαθοῦ φύσεως· τὸ δὲ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ· διόπερ ἔοικε πᾶσιν ἡδὺ εἶναι· οὐ δεῖ δὲ λαμβάνειν μοχθηρὰν ζωὴν καὶ διεφθαρμένην, οὐδʼ ἐν λύπαις· ἀόριστος γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη, καθάπερ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτῇ. ἐν τοῖς ἐχομένοις δὲ περὶ τῆς λύπης ἔσται φανερώτερον.
People define life, for animals, by the capacity for perception, and for human beings by the capacity for perception or thought. But a capacity is referred to its activity, and what is decisive lies in the activity; so living seems to be, in the full sense, perceiving or thinking. And life is among the things that are good and pleasant in themselves, since it is determinate, and the determinate belongs to the nature of the good; and what is good by nature is good for the decent person too — which is why life seems to be pleasant for everyone. But we must not take a wicked and corrupted life, or one spent in pain; for such a life is indeterminate, as are its attributes. This will be clearer in what follows, when we discuss pain.
εἰ δʼ αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ (ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πάντας ὀρέγεσθαι αὐτοῦ, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ μακαρίους· τούτοις γὰρ ὁ βίος αἱρετώτατος, καὶ ἡ τούτων μακαριωτάτη ζωή), ὁ δʼ ὁρῶν ὅτι ὁρᾷ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ὁ ἀκούων ὅτι ἀκούει καὶ ὁ βαδίζων ὅτι βαδίζει, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως ἔστι τι τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ὅτι ἐνεργοῦμεν, ὥστε ἂν αἰσθανώμεθʼ, ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα, κἂν νοῶμεν, ὅτι νοοῦμεν, τὸ δʼ ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα ἢ νοοῦμεν, ὅτι ἐσμέν (τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἦν αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν), 1170b τὸ δʼ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι ζῇ, τῶν ἡδέων καθʼ αὑτό (φύσει γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ζωή, τὸ δʼ ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἡδύ), αἱρετὸν δὲ τὸ ζῆν καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ὅτι τὸ εἶναι ἀγαθόν ἐστιν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἡδύ (συναισθανόμενοι γὰρ τοῦ καθʼ αὑτὸ ἀγαθοῦ ἥδονται), ὡς δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχει ὁ σπουδαῖος, καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον (ἕτερος γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ φίλος ἐστίν)· καθάπερ οὖν τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι αἱρετόν ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τὸν φίλον, ἢ παραπλησίως.
Suppose, then, that life itself is good and pleasant (and it seems to be, also from the fact that everyone desires it, and the decent and blessed most of all, since for them life is most choiceworthy and their existence most blessed). Suppose that one who sees perceives that he sees, one who hears that he hears, one who walks that he walks, and similarly in the other cases there is something that perceives that we are active, so that if we perceive, we perceive that we perceive, and if we think, we perceive that we think; and that perceiving that we perceive or think is perceiving that we exist (for existing, we said, is perceiving or thinking). 1170b Suppose that perceiving that one is alive is one of the things pleasant in themselves (for life is good by nature, and perceiving the good present in oneself is pleasant); that living is choiceworthy, and most of all for the good, because existing is good and pleasant for them (for they are pleased by their awareness of what is good in itself); and that the excellent person is related to his friend as he is to himself (for the friend is another self). Then just as one’s own existence is choiceworthy for each person, so too is one’s friend’s existence, or nearly so.
τὸ δʼ εἶναι ἦν αἱρετὸν διὰ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι αὑτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὄντος, ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη αἴσθησις ἡδεῖα καθʼ ἑαυτήν. συναισθάνεσθαι ἄρα δεῖ καὶ τοῦ φίλου ὅτι ἔστιν, τοῦτο δὲ γίνοιτʼ ἂν ἐν τῷ συζῆν καὶ κοινωνεῖν λόγων καὶ διανοίας· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν δόξειε τὸ συζῆν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν βοσκημάτων τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νέμεσθαι. εἰ δὴ τῷ μακαρίῳ τὸ εἶναι αἱρετόν ἐστι καθʼ αὑτό, ἀγαθὸν τῇ φύσει ὂν καὶ ἡδύ, παραπλήσιον δὲ καὶ τὸ τοῦ φίλου ἐστίν, κἂν ὁ φίλος τῶν αἱρετῶν εἴη. ὃ δʼ ἐστὶν αὐτῷ αἱρετόν, τοῦτο δεῖ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ, ἢ ταύτῃ ἐνδεὴς ἔσται. δεήσει ἄρα τῷ εὐδαιμονήσοντι φίλων σπουδαίων.
Existence, we said, is choiceworthy because of one’s perceiving that one is good, and such perception is pleasant in itself. So one must also share in perceiving that one’s friend exists, and this would come about in living together and sharing talk and thought; for this is what living together would seem to mean in the case of human beings, and not, as with cattle, grazing in the same place. If, then, for the blessed person existence is choiceworthy in itself, being good and pleasant by nature, and his friend’s existence is close to his own, then the friend too would be among the things choiceworthy. And what is choiceworthy for him he must have, or else he will be lacking in this respect. So whoever is to be happy will need excellent friends.
How many friends
Aristotle argues that one can have only a few friends of the best kind.
ἆρʼ οὖν ὡς πλείστους φίλους ποιητέον, ἢ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ξενίας ἐμμελῶς εἰρῆσθαι δοκεῖ μήτε πολύξεινος μήτʼ ἄξεινος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας ἁρμόσει μήτʼ ἄφιλον εἶναι μήτʼ αὖ πολύφιλον καθʼ ὑπερβολήν; τοῖς μὲν δὴ πρὸς χρῆσιν κἂν πάνυ δόξειεν ἁρμόζειν τὸ λεχθέν· πολλοῖς γὰρ ἀνθυπηρετεῖν ἐπίπονον, καὶ οὐχ ἱκανὸς ὁ βίος αὐτὸ τοῦτο πράττειν. οἱ πλείους δὴ τῶν πρὸς τὸν οἰκεῖον βίον ἱκανῶν περίεργοι καὶ ἐμπόδιοι πρὸς τὸ καλῶς ζῆν· οὐθὲν οὖν δεῖ αὐτῶν. καὶ οἱ πρὸς ἡδονὴν δὲ ἀρκοῦσιν ὀλίγοι, καθάπερ ἐν τῇ τροφῇ τὸ ἥδυσμα. τοὺς δὲ σπουδαίους πότερον πλείστους κατʼ ἀριθμόν, ἢ ἔστι τι μέτρον καὶ φιλικοῦ πλήθους, ὥσπερ πόλεως; οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων γένοιτʼ ἂν πόλις, οὔτʼ ἐκ δέκα μυριάδων ἔτι πόλις ἐστίν.
Should we, then, make as many friends as possible? Or, just as with hospitality it seems aptly said, “neither a host to many guests nor a host to none,” will it be fitting in friendship too to be neither friendless nor, again, to have an excessive number of friends? With friends for use, the saying would seem entirely fitting, since returning services to many people is laborious, and a life is not enough for doing it. So more of them than suffice for one’s own life are superfluous and a hindrance to living finely; there is no need for them. And of friends for pleasure, too, a few are enough, like seasoning in food. But as for excellent friends, should one have as many as possible in number, or is there some measure for a number of friends too, as there is for a city? For ten people would not make a city, and with a hundred thousand it is no longer a city.
τὸ δὲ ποσὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσως ἕν τι, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ μεταξὺ τινῶν ὡρισμένων. 1171a καὶ φίλων δή ἐστι πλῆθος ὡρισμένον, καὶ ἴσως οἱ πλεῖστοι μεθʼ ὧν ἂν δύναιτό τις συζῆν (τοῦτο γὰρ ἐδόκει φιλικώτατον εἶναι)· ὅτι δʼ οὐχ οἷόν τε πολλοῖς συζῆν καὶ διανέμειν ἑαυτόν, οὐκ ἄδηλον. ἔτι δὲ κἀκείνους δεῖ ἀλλήλοις φίλους εἶναι, εἰ μέλλουσι πάντες μετʼ ἀλλήλων συνημερεύειν· τοῦτο δʼ ἐργῶδες ἐν πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν. χαλεπὸν δὲ γίνεται καὶ τὸ συγχαίρειν καὶ τὸ συναλγεῖν οἰκείως πολλοῖς· εἰκὸς γὰρ συμπίπτειν ἅμα τῷ μὲν συνήδεσθαι τῷ δὲ συνάχθεσθαι. ἴσως οὖν εὖ ἔχει μὴ ζητεῖν ὡς πολυφιλώτατον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοσούτους ὅσοι εἰς τὸ συζῆν ἱκανοί· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι δόξειεν ἂν πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον σφόδρα.
But the right quantity is perhaps not some single number, but anything between certain limits. 1171a So for friends too there is a limited number, and it is perhaps the largest number with whom one could live together (for living together seemed to be most characteristic of friendship). That it is not possible to live with many people and divide oneself among them is clear enough. Moreover, they too must be friends with one another, if they are all to spend their days together; and this is hard to achieve among many. It also becomes difficult to share intimately in the joys and griefs of many, since one is likely to find oneself rejoicing with one person and grieving with another at the same time. Perhaps, then, it is good not to seek to have as many friends as possible, but as many as are enough for living together; for it would seem impossible even to be a close friend to many.
διόπερ οὐδʼ ἐρᾶν πλειόνων· ὑπερβολὴ γάρ τις εἶναι βούλεται φιλίας, τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἕνα· καὶ τὸ σφόδρα δὴ πρὸς ὀλίγους. οὕτω δʼ ἔχειν ἔοικε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων· οὐ γίνονται γὰρ φίλοι πολλοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἑταιρικὴν φιλίαν, αἱ δʼ ὑμνούμεναι ἐν δυσὶ λέγονται. οἱ δὲ πολύφιλοι καὶ πᾶσιν οἰκείως ἐντυγχάνοντες οὐδενὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι, πλὴν πολιτικῶς, οὓς καὶ καλοῦσιν ἀρέσκους. πολιτικῶς μὲν οὖν ἔστι πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον καὶ μὴ ἄρεσκον ὄντα, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐπιεικῆ· διʼ ἀρετὴν δὲ καὶ διʼ αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς πολλούς, ἀγαπητὸν δὲ καὶ ὀλίγους εὑρεῖν τοιούτους.
That is why one can’t be in love with several people either: love tends to be a kind of excess of friendship, and that is felt toward one person; so intense friendship, too, is felt toward only a few. This seems to be borne out in practice as well. People don’t have many friends in the way of comradely friendship, and the celebrated friendships are said to be between two people. Those who have many friends and are on intimate terms with everyone seem to be friends to no one, except in the way fellow citizens are — people call them people-pleasers. In the civic way, then, one can be a friend to many without being a people-pleaser, while being genuinely decent; but friendship on account of excellence, and for the friends’ own sake, one can’t have with many. One should be content to find even a few such people.
Friends in good and bad fortune
Aristotle asks whether friends are needed more in good fortune or bad, and praises living together.
πότερον δʼ ἐν εὐτυχίαις μᾶλλον φίλων δεῖ ἢ ἐν δυστυχίαις; ἐν ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ἐπιζητοῦνται· οἵ τε γὰρ ἀτυχοῦντες δέονται ἐπικουρίας, οἵ τʼ εὐτυχοῦντες συμβίων καὶ οὓς εὖ ποιήσουσιν· βούλονται γὰρ εὖ δρᾶν. ἀναγκαιότερον μὲν δὴ ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις, διὸ τῶν χρησίμων ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, κάλλιον δʼ ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις, διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ζητοῦσιν· τούτους γὰρ αἱρετώτερον εὐεργετεῖν καὶ μετὰ τούτων διάγειν. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἡ παρουσία αὐτὴ τῶν φίλων ἡδεῖα καὶ ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις καὶ ἐν ταῖς δυστυχίαις. κουφίζονται γὰρ οἱ λυπούμενοι συναλγούντων τῶν φίλων. διὸ κἂν ἀπορήσειέν τις πότερον ὥσπερ βάρους μεταλαμβάνουσιν, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὔ, ἡ παρουσία δʼ αὐτῶν ἡδεῖα οὖσα καὶ ἡ ἔννοια τοῦ συναλγεῖν ἐλάττω τὴν λύπην ποιεῖ.
Do we need friends more in good fortune or in bad? They are sought in both. Those in misfortune need help, and the fortunate need people to share their lives with and to do good to, since they want to do good. Friends are more necessary in misfortune, which is why it’s useful friends that are needed there; but it is finer to have them in good fortune, which is why people then look for decent friends, since it is more choiceworthy to do good to them and to spend time with them. For the very presence of friends is pleasant, in good fortune and in bad alike. People in pain are relieved when their friends share their pain. So one might even raise the puzzle whether friends take a share of it, as if it were a weight, or whether that isn’t so, but rather their presence, being pleasant, and the thought that they share the pain make the pain less.
εἰ μὲν οὖν διὰ ταῦτα ἢ διʼ ἄλλο τι κουφίζονται, ἀφείσθω· συμβαίνειν δʼ οὖν φαίνεται τὸ λεχθέν. ἔοικε δʼ ἡ παρουσία μικτή τις αὐτῶν εἶναι. αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὁρᾶν τοὺς φίλους ἡδύ, 1171b ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀτυχοῦντι, καὶ γίνεταί τις ἐπικουρία πρὸς τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι (παραμυθητικὸν γὰρ ὁ φίλος καὶ τῇ ὄψει καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, ἐὰν ᾖ ἐπιδέξιος· οἶδε γὰρ τὸ ἦθος καὶ ἐφʼ οἷς ἥδεται καὶ λυπεῖται)· τὸ δὲ λυπούμενον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς αὑτοῦ ἀτυχίαις λυπηρόν· πᾶς γὰρ φεύγει λύπης αἴτιος εἶναι τοῖς φίλοις.
Whether it’s for these reasons or some other that people are relieved, let’s set aside; at any rate, what we described does seem to happen. But the presence of friends seems to be a mixed thing. The very sight of one’s friends is pleasant, 1171b especially for someone in misfortune, and it gives some help against grief (for a friend is a comfort, both by being seen and by what he says, if he is tactful, since he knows one’s character and what gives one pleasure and pain). Yet to perceive him pained at one’s own misfortunes is painful, since everyone avoids being a cause of pain to his friends.
διόπερ οἱ μὲν ἀνδρώδεις τὴν φύσιν εὐλαβοῦνται συλλυπεῖν τοὺς φίλους αὑτοῖς, κἂν μὴ ὑπερτείνῃ τῇ ἀλυπίᾳ, τὴν ἐκείνοις γινομένην λύπην οὐχ ὑπομένει, ὅλως τε συνθρήνους οὐ προσίεται διὰ τὸ μηδʼ αὐτὸς εἶναι θρηνητικός· γύναια δὲ καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες τοῖς συστένουσι χαίρουσι, καὶ φιλοῦσιν ὡς φίλους καὶ συναλγοῦντας. μιμεῖσθαι δʼ ἐν ἅπασι δεῖ δῆλον ὅτι τὸν βελτίω. ἡ δʼ ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις τῶν φίλων παρουσία τήν τε διαγωγὴν ἡδεῖαν ἔχει καὶ τὴν ἔννοιαν ὅτι ἥδονται ἐπὶ τοῖς αὑτοῦ ἀγαθοῖς. διὸ δόξειεν ἂν δεῖν εἰς μὲν τὰς εὐτυχίας καλεῖν τοὺς φίλους προθύμως (εὐεργετικὸν γὰρ εἶναι καλόν), εἰς δὲ τὰς ἀτυχίας ὀκνοῦντα· μεταδιδόναι γὰρ ὡς ἥκιστα δεῖ τῶν κακῶν, ὅθεν τὸ ἅλις ἐγὼ δυστυχῶν. μάλιστα δὲ παρακλητέον ὅταν μέλλωσιν ὀλίγα ὀχληθέντες μεγάλʼ αὐτὸν ὠφελήσειν.
That is why those of a manly nature take care not to make their friends share their pain. Unless he is exceptionally insensitive to pain, such a man can’t bear the pain it causes them, and in general he doesn’t admit others to lament with him, since he isn’t given to lamenting himself. Women, though, and men of that sort enjoy people who groan along with them, and love them as friends who share their pain. But clearly in everything one should imitate the better person. The presence of friends in good fortune, on the other hand, brings both pleasant time together and the thought that they are pleased at one’s own goods. So it would seem that one should invite friends eagerly to share one’s good fortune (for it is fine to be ready to do good), but hesitate to invite them to share one’s misfortunes, since one should give others a share of one’s troubles as little as possible — hence the line “It’s enough that I am unfortunate.” One should call on them above all when they will be of great help to one at little trouble to themselves.
ἰέναι δʼ ἀνάπαλιν ἴσως ἁρμόζει πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἀτυχοῦντας ἄκλητον καὶ προθύμως (φίλου γὰρ εὖ ποιεῖν, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐν χρείᾳ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀξιώσαντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ κάλλιον καὶ ἥδιον), εἰς δὲ τὰς εὐτυχίας συνεργοῦντα μὲν προθύμως (καὶ γὰρ εἰς ταῦτα χρεία φίλων), πρὸς εὐπάθειαν δὲ σχολαίως· οὐ γὰρ καλὸν τὸ προθυμεῖσθαι ὠφελεῖσθαι. δόξαν δʼ ἀηδίας ἐν τῷ διωθεῖσθαι ἴσως εὐλαβητέον· ἐνίοτε γὰρ συμβαίνει. ἡ παρουσία δὴ τῶν φίλων ἐν ἅπασιν αἱρετὴ φαίνεται.
Conversely, it is perhaps fitting to go to friends in misfortune uninvited and eagerly (for it belongs to a friend to do good, especially to those in need who haven’t asked for it; this is finer and more pleasant for both), but when they are in good fortune, to go eagerly to help them (since friends are needed for this too), yet to be slow to go in order to be well treated oneself, since it isn’t fine to be eager to receive benefits. Still, one should perhaps beware of seeming disagreeable by rebuffing them, since this sometimes happens. The presence of friends, then, appears choiceworthy in all circumstances.
ἆρʼ οὖν, ὥσπερ τοῖς ἐρῶσι τὸ ὁρᾶν ἀγαπητότατόν ἐστι καὶ μᾶλλον αἱροῦνται ταύτην τὴν αἴσθησιν ἢ τὰς λοιπὰς ὡς κατὰ ταύτην μάλιστα τοῦ ἔρωτος ὄντος καὶ γινομένου, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς φίλοις αἱρετώτατόν ἐστι τὸ συζῆν; κοινωνία γὰρ ἡ φιλία, καὶ ὡς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον· περὶ αὑτὸν δʼ ἡ αἴσθησις ὅτι ἔστιν αἱρετή, καὶ περὶ τὸν φίλον δή· ἡ δʼ ἐνέργεια γίνεται αὐτῆς ἐν τῷ συζῆν, 1172a ὥστʼ εἰκότως τούτου ἐφίενται.
Well then: just as for lovers seeing the beloved is what they cherish most, and they prefer this sense to the others because love exists and comes to be above all through it, isn’t living together likewise the most choiceworthy thing for friends? For friendship is a partnership, and as one is toward oneself, so one is toward one’s friend. In one’s own case the perception that one exists is choiceworthy, and so it is in the case of one’s friend; and this perception becomes active in living together, 1172a so it’s reasonable that friends aim at this.
καὶ ὅ ποτʼ ἐστὶν ἑκάστοις τὸ εἶναι ἢ οὗ χάριν αἱροῦνται τὸ ζῆν, ἐν τούτῳ μετὰ τῶν φίλων βούλονται διάγειν· διόπερ οἳ μὲν συμπίνουσιν, οἳ δὲ συγκυβεύουσιν, ἄλλοι δὲ συγγυμνάζονται καὶ συγκυνηγοῦσιν ἢ συμφιλοσοφοῦσιν, ἕκαστοι ἐν τούτῳ συνημερεύοντες ὅ τι περ μάλιστʼ ἀγαπῶσι τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ· συζῆν γὰρ βουλόμενοι μετὰ τῶν φίλων, ταῦτα ποιοῦσι καὶ τούτων κοινωνοῦσιν οἷς οἴονται συζῆν. γίνεται οὖν ἡ μὲν τῶν φαύλων φιλία μοχθηρά (κοινωνοῦσι γὰρ φαύλων ἀβέβαιοι ὄντες, καὶ μοχθηροὶ δὲ γίνονται ὁμοιούμενοι ἀλλήλοις), ἡ δὲ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἐπιεικής, συναυξανομένη ταῖς ὁμιλίαις· δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ βελτίους γίνεσθαι ἐνεργοῦντες καὶ διορθοῦντες ἀλλήλους· ἀπομάττονται γὰρ παρʼ ἀλλήλων οἷς ἀρέσκονται, ὅθεν ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄπʼ ἐσθλά. περὶ μὲν οὖν φιλίας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω· ἑπόμενον δʼ ἂν εἴη διελθεῖν περὶ ἡδονῆς.
And whatever existence means for each sort of person, or whatever it is for the sake of which they choose to live, that is what they want to spend their time doing with their friends. That is why some drink together, others play dice together, others exercise together and hunt together, or do philosophy together — each kind spending their days together in whatever they love most in life. Since they want to live together with their friends, they do and share in the things in which they think living together consists. So the friendship of base people turns out to be bad (for, being unstable, they share in base pursuits, and they become bad by growing like each other), while the friendship of decent people is decent, and grows with their association. They seem to become better, too, by being active together and correcting each other, since each takes the imprint of what he approves of in the other — hence “From the good, good things.” So much for friendship. The next thing would be to discuss pleasure.