Socratesἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα εἰπὼν ᾤμην λόγου ἀπηλλάχθαι· τὸ δʼ ἦν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, προοίμιον. ὁ γὰρ Γλαύκων ἀεί τε δὴ ἀνδρειότατος ὢν τυγχάνει πρὸς ἅπαντα, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε τοῦ Θρασυμάχου τὴν ἀπόρρησιν οὐκ ἀπεδέξατο, ἀλλʼ ἔφη· ὦ Σώκρατες, πότερον ἡμᾶς βούλει δοκεῖν πεπεικέναι ἢ ὡς 357b ἀληθῶς πεῖσαι ὅτι παντὶ τρόπῳ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν δίκαιον εἶναι ἢ ἄδικον;
ὡς ἀληθῶς, εἶπον, ἔγωγʼ ἂν ἑλοίμην, εἰ ἐπʼ ἐμοὶ εἴη.
SocratesWhen I’d said this, I thought I was done with the discussion. But it turned out, apparently, to have been only a prelude. Glaucon is always extremely bold in everything, and on this occasion too he wouldn’t accept Thrasymachus’ giving up, but said, “Socrates, do you want to seem to have persuaded us, or to 357b truly persuade us, that it’s better in every way to be just than unjust?”
“Truly,” I said, “I’d choose that, if it were up to me.”
οὐ τοίνυν, ἔφη, ποιεῖς ὃ βούλει. λέγε γάρ μοι· ἆρά σοι δοκεῖ τοιόνδε τι εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ὃ δεξαίμεθʼ ἂν ἔχειν οὐ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων ἐφιέμενοι, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα ἀσπαζόμενοι, οἷον τὸ χαίρειν καὶ αἱ ἡδοναὶ ὅσαι ἀβλαβεῖς καὶ μηδὲν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον διὰ ταύτας γίγνεται ἄλλο ἢ χαίρειν ἔχοντα;
ἔμοιγε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, δοκεῖ τι εἶναι τοιοῦτον. 357c
τί δέ; ὃ αὐτό τε αὑτοῦ χάριν ἀγαπῶμεν καὶ τῶν ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ γιγνομένων, οἷον αὖ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ ὁρᾶν καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν; τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτά που διʼ ἀμφότερα ἀσπαζόμεθα.
“Then you’re not doing what you want,” he said. “Tell me: do you think there is a kind of good that we’d welcome having not because we want what results from it, but because we value it for its own sake—like enjoyment, and all the harmless pleasures that bring nothing later on except the enjoyment of having them?”
“I think there is something of that kind,” I said. 357c
“And what about the kind we love both for its own sake and for what comes from it—like understanding, and seeing, and being healthy? We welcome things like these, I suppose, for both reasons.”
ναί, εἶπον.
τρίτον δὲ ὁρᾷς τι, ἔφη, εἶδος ἀγαθοῦ, ἐν ᾧ τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι καὶ τὸ κάμνοντα ἰατρεύεσθαι καὶ ἰάτρευσίς τε καὶ ὁ ἄλλος χρηματισμός; ταῦτα γὰρ ἐπίπονα φαῖμεν ἄν, ὠφελεῖν δὲ ἡμᾶς, καὶ αὐτὰ μὲν ἑαυτῶν ἕνεκα οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμεθα ἔχειν, 357d τῶν δὲ μισθῶν τε χάριν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα γίγνεται ἀπʼ αὐτῶν.
ἔστιν γὰρ οὖν, ἔφην, καὶ τοῦτο τρίτον. ἀλλὰ τί δή;
ἐν ποίῳ, ἔφη, τούτων τὴν δικαιοσύνην τιθεῖς;
“Yes,” I said.
“And do you see a third kind of good,” he said, “which includes exercising, and being treated when you’re sick, and practicing medicine, and money-making generally? These we’d call burdensome but beneficial to us, and we wouldn’t welcome having them for their own sake, 357d but for the sake of the pay and whatever else comes from them.”
“Yes, there is this third kind too,” I said. “But what of it?”
“In which of these kinds,” he said, “do you place justice?”
ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἐν τῷ καλλίστῳ, ὃ καὶ διʼ αὑτὸ καὶ διὰ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ ἀγαπητέον τῷ μέλλοντι μακαρίῳ ἔσεσθαι.
οὐ τοίνυν δοκεῖ, ἔφη, τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐπιπόνου εἴδους, ὃ μισθῶν θʼ ἕνεκα καὶ εὐδοκιμήσεων διὰ δόξαν ἐπιτηδευτέον, αὐτὸ δὲ διʼ αὑτὸ φευκτέον ὡς ὂν χαλεπόν.
οἶδα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὅτι δοκεῖ οὕτω καὶ πάλαι ὑπὸ Θρασυμάχου ὡς τοιοῦτον ὂν ψέγεται, ἀδικία δʼ ἐπαινεῖται· ἀλλʼ ἐγώ τις, ὡς ἔοικε, δυσμαθής. 358b
“I think,” I said, “in the finest kind—the one that anyone who is going to be blessed must love both for its own sake and for what comes from it.”
“That’s not what most people think,” he said. “They put it in the burdensome kind, which has to be practiced for the sake of pay and the good name that comes from reputation, but in itself is to be avoided as hard.”
“I know that’s what they think,” I said, “and Thrasymachus has been disparaging it as that sort of thing for some time now, and praising injustice. But I seem to be a slow learner.” 358b
ἴθι δή, ἔφη, ἄκουσον καὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐάν σοι ἔτι ταὐτὰ δοκῇ. Θρασύμαχος γάρ μοι φαίνεται πρῳαίτερον τοῦ δέοντος ὑπὸ σοῦ ὥσπερ ὄφις κηληθῆναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ οὔπω κατὰ νοῦν ἡ ἀπόδειξις γέγονεν περὶ ἑκατέρου· ἐπιθυμῶ γὰρ ἀκοῦσαι τί τʼ ἔστιν ἑκάτερον καὶ τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ ἐνὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τοὺς δὲ μισθοὺς καὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀπʼ αὐτῶν ἐᾶσαι χαίρειν. οὑτωσὶ οὖν ποιήσω, ἐὰν καὶ σοὶ δοκῇ· ἐπανανεώσομαι 358c τὸν Θρασυμάχου λόγον, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἐρῶ δικαιοσύνην οἷον εἶναί φασιν καὶ ὅθεν γεγονέναι, δεύτερον δὲ ὅτι πάντες αὐτὸ οἱ ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἄκοντες ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὡς ἀγαθόν, τρίτον δὲ ὅτι εἰκότως αὐτὸ δρῶσι· πολὺ γὰρ ἀμείνων ἄρα ὁ τοῦ ἀδίκου ἢ ὁ τοῦ δικαίου βίος, ὡς λέγουσιν.
“Come on, then,” he said, “listen to me too, and see if you still think the same. Thrasymachus seems to me to have been charmed by you, like a snake, sooner than he should have been. But I’m not yet satisfied with the demonstration on either side. I want to hear what each of them is, and what power each has, itself by itself, when it’s present in the soul, and to say goodbye to the rewards and what comes from them. So here’s what I’ll do, if you agree. I’ll revive 358c Thrasymachus’ argument. First I’ll say what sort of thing people say justice is, and where it came from. Second, that all who practice it do so unwillingly, as something necessary, not as something good. Third, that it’s reasonable for them to act this way, since the life of the unjust man is, it turns out, far better than the life of the just man—so they say.
ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὔ τι δοκεῖ οὕτως· ἀπορῶ μέντοι διατεθρυλημένος τὰ ὦτα ἀκούων Θρασυμάχου καὶ μυρίων ἄλλων, τὸν δὲ ὑπὲρ τῆς δικαιοσύνης λόγον, ὡς 358d ἄμεινον ἀδικίας, οὐδενός πω ἀκήκοα ὡς βούλομαι—βούλομαι δὲ αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ ἐγκωμιαζόμενον ἀκοῦσαι—μάλιστα δʼ οἶμαι ἂν σοῦ πυθέσθαι. διὸ κατατείνας ἐρῶ τὸν ἄδικον βίον ἐπαινῶν, εἰπὼν δὲ ἐνδείξομαί σοι ὃν τρόπον αὖ βούλομαι καὶ σοῦ ἀκούειν ἀδικίαν μὲν ψέγοντος, δικαιοσύνην δὲ ἐπαινοῦντος. ἀλλʼ ὅρα εἴ σοι βουλομένῳ ἃ λέγω.
“Not that I think so myself, Socrates. But I’m at a loss, with my ears ringing from listening to Thrasymachus and countless others, while the argument on behalf of justice, that it’s 358d better than injustice, I’ve never yet heard from anyone the way I want to—I want to hear it praised itself by itself—and I think I’m most likely to hear that from you. So I’m going to speak at full stretch in praise of the unjust life, and in doing so I’ll show you how I want to hear you, in turn, criticizing injustice and praising justice. But see whether what I’m proposing is what you want.”
πάντων μάλιστα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ· περὶ γὰρ τίνος ἂν μᾶλλον πολλάκις τις νοῦν ἔχων χαίροι λέγων καὶ ἀκούων; 358e
κάλλιστα, ἔφη, λέγεις· καὶ ὃ πρῶτον ἔφην ἐρεῖν, περὶ τούτου ἄκουε, τί ὄν τε καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε δικαιοσύνη.
“More than anything,” I said. “What subject could a person with any sense be happier to talk and hear about again and again?” 358e
“Beautifully put,” he said. “Then listen to what I said I’d speak about first: what justice is, and where it came from.”
Where justice comes from
Glaucon argues that justice is a compromise among the weak, illustrated by the ring of Gyges.
πεφυκέναι γὰρ δή φασιν τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖσθαι κακόν, πλέονι δὲ κακῷ ὑπερβάλλειν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀγαθῷ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ὥστʼ ἐπειδὰν ἀλλήλους ἀδικῶσί τε καὶ ἀδικῶνται καὶ ἀμφοτέρων γεύωνται, τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις τὸ 359a μὲν ἐκφεύγειν τὸ δὲ αἱρεῖν δοκεῖ λυσιτελεῖν συνθέσθαι ἀλλήλοις μήτʼ ἀδικεῖν μήτʼ ἀδικεῖσθαι· καὶ ἐντεῦθεν δὴ ἄρξασθαι νόμους τίθεσθαι καὶ συνθήκας αὑτῶν, καὶ ὀνομάσαι τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἐπίταγμα νόμιμόν τε καὶ δίκαιον· καὶ εἶναι δὴ ταύτην γένεσίν τε καὶ οὐσίαν δικαιοσύνης, μεταξὺ οὖσαν τοῦ μὲν ἀρίστου ὄντος, ἐὰν ἀδικῶν μὴ διδῷ δίκην, τοῦ δὲ κακίστου, ἐὰν ἀδικούμενος τιμωρεῖσθαι ἀδύνατος ᾖ· τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ἐν μέσῳ ὂν τούτων ἀμφοτέρων ἀγαπᾶσθαι οὐχ ὡς 359b ἀγαθόν, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἀρρωστίᾳ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν τιμώμενον· ἐπεὶ τὸν δυνάμενον αὐτὸ ποιεῖν καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα οὐδʼ ἂν ἑνί ποτε συνθέσθαι τὸ μήτε ἀδικεῖν μήτε ἀδικεῖσθαι· μαίνεσθαι γὰρ ἄν.
They say that doing wrong is by nature good, and suffering wrong bad, but that the badness of suffering wrong far exceeds the good of doing it. So when people do wrong to one another and suffer it, and get a taste of both, those who can’t 359a escape the one and get the other decide it pays to make an agreement with one another neither to do wrong nor to suffer it. From there they begin to make laws and covenants among themselves, and to call what the law commands lawful and just. And this, they say, is the origin and essence of justice. It lies between the best thing, which is to do wrong without paying the penalty, and the worst, which is to suffer wrong without being able to take revenge. The just, lying in the middle between these two, is loved not as 359b a good, but as something honored because people are too weak to do wrong. For anyone able to do it, a real man, would never make an agreement with anyone neither to do wrong nor to suffer it. He’d be mad to.
ἡ μὲν οὖν δὴ φύσις δικαιοσύνης, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὕτη τε καὶ τοιαύτη, καὶ ἐξ ὧν πέφυκε τοιαῦτα, ὡς ὁ λόγος.
That, Socrates, according to this argument, is the nature of justice, and that is its character, and those are the conditions it naturally arises from.
ὡς δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἀδυναμίᾳ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν ἄκοντες αὐτὸ ἐπιτηδεύουσι, μάλιστʼ ἂν αἰσθοίμεθα, εἰ τοιόνδε ποιήσαιμεν 359c τῇ διανοίᾳ· δόντες ἐξουσίαν ἑκατέρῳ ποιεῖν ὅτι ἂν βούληται, τῷ τε δικαίῳ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ, εἶτʼ ἐπακολουθήσαιμεν θεώμενοι ποῖ ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἑκάτερον ἄξει. ἐπʼ αὐτοφώρῳ οὖν λάβοιμεν ἂν τὸν δίκαιον τῷ ἀδίκῳ εἰς ταὐτὸν ἰόντα διὰ τὴν πλεονεξίαν, ὃ πᾶσα φύσις διώκειν πέφυκεν ὡς ἀγαθόν, νόμῳ δὲ βίᾳ παράγεται ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἴσου τιμήν. εἴη δʼ ἂν ἡ ἐξουσία ἣν λέγω τοιάδε μάλιστα, εἰ αὐτοῖς γένοιτο οἵαν 359d ποτέ φασιν δύναμιν τῷ Γύγου τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ γενέσθαι. εἶναι μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν ποιμένα θητεύοντα παρὰ τῷ τότε Λυδίας ἄρχοντι, ὄμβρου δὲ πολλοῦ γενομένου καὶ σεισμοῦ ῥαγῆναί τι τῆς γῆς καὶ γενέσθαι χάσμα κατὰ τὸν τόπον ᾗ ἔνεμεν.
That even those who practice it do so unwillingly, from inability to do wrong, we’d see most clearly if we did the following 359c in thought. Let’s give each of them, the just man and the unjust, the freedom to do whatever he wants, and then follow along and watch where desire will lead each of them. We’d catch the just man red-handed going the same way as the unjust, because of the urge to have more than others. This is what every nature naturally pursues as good, though law forcibly diverts it into respect for equality. The freedom I mean would be most complete if they got the kind of power 359d that they say once came to the ancestor of Gyges the Lydian. He was, they say, a shepherd in the service of the man who then ruled Lydia. There was a heavy rainstorm and an earthquake, and the ground split open, and a chasm appeared at the spot where he was grazing his flock.
ἰδόντα δὲ καὶ θαυμάσαντα καταβῆναι καὶ ἰδεῖν ἄλλα τε δὴ ἃ μυθολογοῦσιν θαυμαστὰ καὶ ἵππον χαλκοῦν, κοῖλον, θυρίδας ἔχοντα, καθʼ ἃς ἐγκύψαντα ἰδεῖν ἐνόντα νεκρόν, ὡς φαίνεσθαι μείζω ἢ κατʼ ἄνθρωπον, τοῦτον δὲ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, περὶ δὲ 359e τῇ χειρὶ χρυσοῦν δακτύλιον ὄντα περιελόμενον ἐκβῆναι. συλλόγου δὲ γενομένου τοῖς ποιμέσιν εἰωθότος, ἵνʼ ἐξαγγέλλοιεν κατὰ μῆνα τῷ βασιλεῖ τὰ περὶ τὰ ποίμνια, ἀφικέσθαι καὶ ἐκεῖνον ἔχοντα τὸν δακτύλιον·
He saw it and was amazed, and went down into it, and saw, among the other marvels they tell of, a hollow bronze horse with little doors in it. Stooping and looking in through these, he saw a corpse inside, which looked larger than human size. It had nothing else on, only a gold ring on its 359e hand; he took this off and came out. When the shepherds held their usual meeting to report to the king each month about the flocks, he came too, wearing the ring.
καθήμενον οὖν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων τυχεῖν τὴν σφενδόνην τοῦ δακτυλίου περιαγαγόντα πρὸς ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὸ εἴσω τῆς χειρός, τούτου δὲ γενομένου 360a >ἀφανῆ αὐτὸν γενέσθαι τοῖς παρακαθημένοις, καὶ διαλέγεσθαι ὡς περὶ οἰχομένου. καὶ τὸν θαυμάζειν τε καὶ πάλιν ἐπιψηλαφῶντα τὸν δακτύλιον στρέψαι ἔξω τὴν σφενδόνην, καὶ στρέψαντα φανερὸν γενέσθαι. καὶ τοῦτο ἐννοήσαντα ἀποπειρᾶσθαι τοῦ δακτυλίου εἰ ταύτην ἔχοι τὴν δύναμιν, καὶ αὐτῷ οὕτω συμβαίνειν, στρέφοντι μὲν εἴσω τὴν σφενδόνην ἀδήλῳ γίγνεσθαι, ἔξω δὲ δήλῳ· αἰσθόμενον δὲ εὐθὺς διαπράξασθαι τῶν ἀγγέλων γενέσθαι τῶν παρὰ τὸν βασιλέα, ἐλθόντα 360b δὲ καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ μοιχεύσαντα, μετʼ ἐκείνης ἐπιθέμενον τῷ βασιλεῖ ἀποκτεῖναι καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὕτω κατασχεῖν.
As he sat with the others, he happened to turn the bezel of the ring toward himself, to the inside of his hand, and when this happened 360a he became invisible to those sitting beside him, and they talked about him as if he’d gone away. He was amazed, and fingering the ring again he turned the bezel outward, and as he turned it he became visible. Noticing this, he tested the ring to see whether it really had this power, and it turned out that way: when he turned the bezel inward he became invisible, and when he turned it outward, visible. As soon as he realized this, he arranged to be one of the messengers sent to the king. When he got 360b there, he committed adultery with the king’s wife, and with her help attacked the king, killed him, and so took over the kingdom.
εἰ οὖν δύο τοιούτω δακτυλίω γενοίσθην, καὶ τὸν μὲν ὁ δίκαιος περιθεῖτο, τὸν δὲ ὁ ἄδικος, οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο, ὡς δόξειεν, οὕτως ἀδαμάντινος, ὃς ἂν μείνειεν ἐν τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τολμήσειεν ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀλλοτρίων καὶ μὴ ἅπτεσθαι, ἐξὸν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἀδεῶς ὅτι βούλοιτο λαμβάνειν, 360c καὶ εἰσιόντι εἰς τὰς οἰκίας συγγίγνεσθαι ὅτῳ βούλοιτο, καὶ ἀποκτεινύναι καὶ ἐκ δεσμῶν λύειν οὕστινας βούλοιτο, καὶ τἆλλα πράττειν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἰσόθεον ὄντα. οὕτω δὲ δρῶν οὐδὲν ἂν διάφορον τοῦ ἑτέρου ποιοῖ, ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ ταὔτʼ ἂν ἴοιεν ἀμφότεροι. καίτοι μέγα τοῦτο τεκμήριον ἂν φαίη τις ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν δίκαιος ἀλλʼ ἀναγκαζόμενος, ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδίᾳ ὄντος, ἐπεὶ ὅπου γʼ ἂν οἴηται ἕκαστος οἷός τε ἔσεσθαι ἀδικεῖν, ἀδικεῖν.
Now suppose there were two rings like this, and the just man put on one and the unjust man the other. No one, it would seem, would be so steely as to stay in justice and bring himself to keep away from other people’s property and not touch it, when he could take whatever he wanted from the marketplace without fear, 360c go into houses and have sex with anyone he wanted, kill or free from prison anyone he wanted, and in all other respects act among human beings like a god. Doing this, he’d be acting no differently from the other; both would go the same way. And someone might say this is strong evidence that no one is just willingly, but only under compulsion, since justice isn’t a good for a person privately. For wherever each person thinks he’ll be able to do wrong, he does wrong.
λυσιτελεῖν γὰρ δὴ οἴεται πᾶς ἀνὴρ πολὺ 360d μᾶλλον ἰδίᾳ τὴν ἀδικίαν τῆς δικαιοσύνης, ἀληθῆ οἰόμενος, ὡς φήσει ὁ περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου λέγων· ἐπεὶ εἴ τις τοιαύτης ἐξουσίας ἐπιλαβόμενος μηδέν ποτε ἐθέλοι ἀδικῆσαι μηδὲ ἅψαιτο τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, ἀθλιώτατος μὲν ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι τοῖς αἰσθανομένοις καὶ ἀνοητότατος, ἐπαινοῖεν δʼ ἂν αὐτὸν ἀλλήλων ἐναντίον ἐξαπατῶντες ἀλλήλους διὰ τὸν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι φόβον. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δὴ οὕτω. 360e
Every man thinks injustice pays him far 360d better privately than justice—and he’s right to think so, as the spokesman for this argument will say. For if someone got hold of this kind of freedom and was never willing to do any wrong or touch other people’s property, those who knew about it would think him the most miserable and foolish of men. Still, they’d praise him to each other’s faces, deceiving one another out of fear of being wronged. So much for that. 360e
The perfectly just and the perfectly unjust
Glaucon contrasts the perfectly unjust man reputed just with the just man reputed unjust.
τὴν δὲ κρίσιν αὐτὴν τοῦ βίου πέρι ὧν λέγομεν, ἐὰν διαστησώμεθα τόν τε δικαιότατον καὶ τὸν ἀδικώτατον, οἷοί τʼ ἐσόμεθα κρῖναι ὀρθῶς· εἰ δὲ μή, οὔ. τίς οὖν δὴ ἡ διάστασις; ἥδε· μηδὲν ἀφαιρῶμεν μήτε τοῦ ἀδίκου ἀπὸ τῆς ἀδικίας, μήτε τοῦ δικαίου ἀπὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης, ἀλλὰ τέλεον ἑκάτερον εἰς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιτήδευμα τιθῶμεν.
As for the actual judgment between the lives we’re discussing, we’ll be able to judge correctly only if we set the most just man and the most unjust man apart from each other; if not, we won’t. So how do we set them apart? Like this: let’s take nothing away from the unjust man’s injustice, or from the just man’s justice, but make each of them complete in his own way of life.
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὁ ἄδικος ὥσπερ οἱ δεινοὶ δημιουργοὶ ποιείτω—οἷον κυβερνήτης ἄκρος ἢ ἰατρὸς τά τε ἀδύνατα ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ διαισθάνεται, 361a καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐπιχειρεῖ, τὰ δὲ ἐᾷ· ἔτι δὲ ἐὰν ἄρα πῃ σφαλῇ, ἱκανὸς ἐπανορθοῦσθαι—οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἄδικος ἐπιχειρῶν ὀρθῶς τοῖς ἀδικήμασιν λανθανέτω, εἰ μέλλει σφόδρα ἄδικος εἶναι. τὸν ἁλισκόμενον δὲ φαῦλον ἡγητέον· ἐσχάτη γὰρ ἀδικία δοκεῖν δίκαιον εἶναι μὴ ὄντα.
First, then, let the unjust man act the way skilled craftsmen do. An expert ship’s captain or doctor, say, can tell what’s impossible in his craft and what’s possible, 361a and attempts the one and leaves the other alone; and if he does slip up somewhere, he’s able to put it right. In the same way, let the unjust man go about his wrongdoing properly and escape notice, if he’s going to be thoroughly unjust. Anyone who gets caught must be regarded as a poor practitioner, since the height of injustice is to seem just when you aren’t.
δοτέον οὖν τῷ τελέως ἀδίκῳ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀδικίαν, καὶ οὐκ ἀφαιρετέον ἀλλʼ ἐατέον τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικοῦντα τὴν μεγίστην δόξαν αὑτῷ 361b παρεσκευακέναι εἰς δικαιοσύνην, καὶ ἐὰν ἄρα σφάλληταί τι, ἐπανορθοῦσθαι δυνατῷ εἶναι, λέγειν τε ἱκανῷ ὄντι πρὸς τὸ πείθειν, ἐάν τι μηνύηται τῶν ἀδικημάτων, καὶ βιάσασθαι ὅσα ἂν βίας δέηται, διά τε ἀνδρείαν καὶ ῥώμην καὶ διὰ παρασκευὴν φίλων καὶ οὐσίας. τοῦτον δὲ τοιοῦτον θέντες τὸν δίκαιον αὖ παρʼ αὐτὸν ἱστῶμεν τῷ λόγῳ, ἄνδρα ἁπλοῦν καὶ γενναῖον, κατʼ Αἰσχύλον οὐ δοκεῖν ἀλλʼ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἐθέλοντα. ἀφαιρετέον δὴ τὸ δοκεῖν. εἰ γὰρ δόξει δίκαιος 361c εἶναι, ἔσονται αὐτῷ τιμαὶ καὶ δωρεαὶ δοκοῦντι τοιούτῳ εἶναι· ἄδηλον οὖν εἴτε τοῦ δικαίου εἴτε τῶν δωρεῶν τε καὶ τιμῶν ἕνεκα τοιοῦτος εἴη.
So we must give the perfectly unjust man the most perfect injustice. We mustn’t take anything away from it: we must let him commit the greatest wrongs while having secured for himself 361b the greatest reputation for justice. If he does slip up somewhere, he must be able to set it right. He must be a capable enough speaker to persuade people, should any of his wrongdoing come to light, and able to use force wherever force is needed, thanks to his courage and strength and his supply of friends and money. Having set him up like this, let’s stand the just man beside him in our argument: a simple, noble man who, in Aeschylus’ phrase, wants not to seem good but to be good. So we must take away the seeming. For if he’s going to seem just, 361c honors and rewards will come to him for seeming so, and then it won’t be clear whether he’s like that for the sake of justice or for the sake of the rewards and honors.
γυμνωτέος δὴ πάντων πλὴν δικαιοσύνης καὶ ποιητέος ἐναντίως διακείμενος τῷ προτέρῳ· μηδὲν γὰρ ἀδικῶν δόξαν ἐχέτω τὴν μεγίστην ἀδικίας, ἵνα ᾖ βεβασανισμένος εἰς δικαιοσύνην τῷ μὴ τέγγεσθαι ὑπὸ κακοδοξίας καὶ τῶν ὑπʼ αὐτῆς γιγνομένων, ἀλλὰ ἴτω ἀμετάστατος μέχρι 361d θανάτου, δοκῶν μὲν εἶναι ἄδικος διὰ βίου, ὢν δὲ δίκαιος, ἵνα ἀμφότεροι εἰς τὸ ἔσχατον ἐληλυθότες, ὁ μὲν δικαιοσύνης, ὁ δὲ ἀδικίας, κρίνωνται ὁπότερος αὐτοῖν εὐδαιμονέστερος.
He must be stripped of everything except justice and made the exact opposite of the first man. Though he does no wrong, let him have the greatest reputation for injustice, so that his justice may be put to the test by whether it’s softened by a bad name and what comes of it. Let him go on unchanged until 361d death, seeming unjust all his life but being just, so that when both have gone to the extreme, the one of justice and the other of injustice, we can judge which of the two is happier.
βαβαῖ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, ὡς ἐρρωμένως ἑκάτερον ὥσπερ ἀνδριάντα εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἐκκαθαίρεις τοῖν ἀνδροῖν.
ὡς μάλιστʼ, ἔφη, δύναμαι. ὄντοιν δὲ τοιούτοιν, οὐδὲν ἔτι, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, χαλεπὸν ἐπεξελθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ οἷος ἑκάτερον 361e βίος ἐπιμένει. λεκτέον οὖν· καὶ δὴ κἂν ἀγροικοτέρως λέγηται, μὴ ἐμὲ οἴου λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας πρὸ δικαιοσύνης ἀδικίαν.
“Goodness, my dear Glaucon,” I said, “how vigorously you’re scouring each of the two men clean for judging, as if they were statues!”
As best I can, he said. And with the two of them like this, I don’t think it’s hard any more to go through in words what sort of life awaits each 361e of them. So it must be said. And if it’s said rather crudely, Socrates, don’t think it’s me speaking, but those who praise injustice above justice.
ἐροῦσι δὲ τάδε, ὅτι οὕτω διακείμενος ὁ δίκαιος μαστιγώσεται, στρεβλώσεται, δεδήσεται, 362a ἐκκαυθήσεται τὠφθαλμώ, τελευτῶν πάντα κακὰ παθὼν ἀνασχινδυλευθήσεται καὶ γνώσεται ὅτι οὐκ εἶναι δίκαιον ἀλλὰ δοκεῖν δεῖ ἐθέλειν. τὸ δὲ τοῦ Αἰσχύλου πολὺ ἦν ἄρα ὀρθότερον λέγειν κατὰ τοῦ ἀδίκου.
What they’ll say is this: that the just man, being so disposed, will be whipped, racked, put in chains, 362a and have his eyes burned out, and finally, after suffering every evil, he’ll be impaled, and he’ll realize that one should want not to be just but to seem so. And Aeschylus’ line, it turns out, would have been far more correctly said of the unjust man.
τῷ ὄντι γὰρ φήσουσι τὸν ἄδικον, ἅτε ἐπιτηδεύοντα πρᾶγμα ἀληθείας ἐχόμενον καὶ οὐ πρὸς δόξαν ζῶντα, οὐ δοκεῖν ἄδικον ἀλλʼ εἶναι ἐθέλειν, βαθεῖαν ἄλοκα διὰ φρενὸς καρπούμενον, 362b ἐξ ἧς τὰ κεδνὰ βλαστάνει βουλεύματα, πρῶτον μὲν ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ πόλει δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ εἶναι, ἔπειτα γαμεῖν ὁπόθεν ἂν βούληται, ἐκδιδόναι εἰς οὓς ἂν βούληται, συμβάλλειν, κοινωνεῖν οἷς ἂν ἐθέλῃ, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ὠφελεῖσθαι κερδαίνοντα τῷ μὴ δυσχεραίνειν τὸ ἀδικεῖν· εἰς ἀγῶνας τοίνυν ἰόντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ περιγίγνεσθαι καὶ πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν ἐχθρῶν, πλεονεκτοῦντα δὲ πλουτεῖν καὶ 362c τούς τε φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν, καὶ θεοῖς θυσίας καὶ ἀναθήματα ἱκανῶς καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς θύειν τε καὶ ἀνατιθέναι, καὶ θεραπεύειν τοῦ δικαίου πολὺ ἄμεινον τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὓς ἂν βούληται, ὥστε καὶ θεοφιλέστερον αὐτὸν εἶναι μᾶλλον προσήκειν ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων ἢ τὸν δίκαιον.
For they’ll say that it’s really the unjust man, since he pursues something bound up with reality and doesn’t live for appearances, who wants not to seem unjust but to be so, “reaping the deep furrow in his mind, 362b from which his shrewd counsels spring.” First, because he seems just, he holds office in the city; then he takes a wife from whatever family he likes and gives his children in marriage to whomever he likes; he makes contracts and partnerships with whomever he wants; and on top of all this he profits and gains, because he has no qualms about doing wrong. So when he enters contests, private or public, he comes out on top and gets the better of his enemies; and by getting the better of them he grows rich, 362c does good to his friends and harm to his enemies, and offers sacrifices and dedicates offerings to the gods on an ample and magnificent scale. He serves the gods, and whichever men he chooses, far better than the just man does, so that in all likelihood it’s more fitting for him, rather than the just man, to be dear to the gods.
οὕτω φασίν, ὦ Σώκρατες, παρὰ θεῶν καὶ παρʼ ἀνθρώπων τῷ ἀδίκῳ παρεσκευάσθαι τὸν βίον ἄμεινον ἢ τῷ δικαίῳ. 362d
That, Socrates, is how they say gods and men provide a better life for the unjust man than for the just. 362d
Adeimantus on rewards and reputations
Adeimantus complains that people praise justice only for its rewards and reputation.
ταῦτʼ εἰπόντος τοῦ Γλαύκωνος ἐγὼ μὲν αὖ ἐν νῷ εἶχόν τι λέγειν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὁ δὲ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Ἀδείμαντος, οὔ τί που οἴει, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἱκανῶς εἰρῆσθαι περὶ τοῦ λόγου;
ἀλλὰ τί μήν; εἶπον.
αὐτό, ἦ δʼ ὅς, οὐκ εἴρηται ὃ μάλιστα ἔδει ῥηθῆναι.
οὐκοῦν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τὸ λεγόμενον, ἀδελφὸς ἀνδρὶ παρείη· ὥστε καὶ σύ, εἴ τι ὅδε ἐλλείπει, ἐπάμυνε. καίτοι ἐμέ γε ἱκανὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τούτου ῥηθέντα καταπαλαῖσαι καὶ ἀδύνατον ποιῆσαι βοηθεῖν δικαιοσύνῃ. 362e
When Glaucon had said this, I had it in mind to say something in reply, but his brother Adeimantus said, “Surely, Socrates, you don’t think the case has been adequately stated?”
“Why, what else would I think?” I said.
“The very thing that most needed saying,” he said, “hasn’t been said.”
“Well then,” I said, “as the saying goes, let a brother stand by his man. So if Glaucon here is leaving anything out, you come to his aid. And yet what he’s said is already enough to throw me flat and leave me unable to help justice.” 362e
καὶ ὅς, οὐδέν, ἔφη, λέγεις· ἀλλʼ ἔτι καὶ τάδε ἄκουε. δεῖ γὰρ διελθεῖν ἡμᾶς καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους λόγους ὧν ὅδε εἶπεν, οἳ δικαιοσύνην μὲν ἐπαινοῦσιν, ἀδικίαν δὲ ψέγουσιν, ἵνʼ ᾖ σαφέστερον ὅ μοι δοκεῖ βούλεσθαι Γλαύκων.
And he said: Nonsense. Listen to this as well. We need to go through the arguments opposed to the ones he stated, the ones that praise justice and blame injustice, so that what I take Glaucon to mean will be clearer.
λέγουσι δέ που καὶ παρακελεύονται πατέρες τε ὑέσιν, καὶ πάντες οἱ 363a τινῶν κηδόμενοι, ὡς χρὴ δίκαιον εἶναι, οὐκ αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην ἐπαινοῦντες ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀπʼ αὐτῆς εὐδοκιμήσεις, ἵνα δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ εἶναι γίγνηται ἀπὸ τῆς δόξης ἀρχαί τε καὶ γάμοι καὶ ὅσαπερ Γλαύκων διῆλθεν ἄρτι, ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν ὄντα τῷ δικαίῳ. ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ οὗτοι τὰ τῶν δοξῶν λέγουσιν. τὰς γὰρ παρὰ θεῶν εὐδοκιμήσεις ἐμβάλλοντες ἄφθονα ἔχουσι λέγειν ἀγαθά, τοῖς ὁσίοις ἅ φασι θεοὺς διδόναι· ὥσπερ ὁ γενναῖος Ἡσίοδός τε καὶ Ὅμηρός φασιν, ὁ μὲν τὰς δρῦς 363b τοῖς δικαίοις τοὺς θεοὺς ποιεῖν ἄκρας μέν τε φέρειν βαλάνους, μέσσας δὲ μελίσσας· εἰροπόκοι δʼ ὄιες, φησίν, μαλλοῖς καταβεβρίθασι , καὶ ἄλλα δὴ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα.
Fathers, I suppose, tell their sons, and urge them, as do all who have anyone in 363a their care, that one must be just. They don’t praise justice itself, but the good name that comes from it, so that someone who seems just may get from that reputation the offices and marriages and everything else Glaucon went through just now, which come to the just man from being well thought of. But these people make even more of reputations. They throw in good standing with the gods, and then they have endless goods to describe, which they say the gods give to the pious. So the noble Hesiod and Homer say. Hesiod says the gods make the oaks 363b for the just “bear acorns at the top and bees in the middle,” and “the woolly sheep,” he says, “are weighed down with fleece,” and many other good things of that kind.
παραπλήσια δὲ καὶ ὁ ἕτερος· ὥς τέ τευ γάρ φησιν ἢ βασιλῆος ἀμύμονος ὅς τε θεουδὴς εὐδικίας ἀνέχῃσι, φέρῃσι δὲ γαῖα μέλαινα 363c πυροὺς καὶ κριθάς, βρίθῃσι δὲ δένδρεα καρπῷ, τίκτῃ δʼ ἔμπεδα μῆλα, θάλασσα δὲ παρέχῃ ἰχθῦς. Μουσαῖος δὲ τούτων νεανικώτερα τἀγαθὰ καὶ ὁ ὑὸς αὐτοῦ παρὰ θεῶν διδόασιν τοῖς δικαίοις· εἰς Ἅιδου γὰρ ἀγαγόντες τῷ λόγῳ καὶ κατακλίναντες καὶ συμπόσιον τῶν ὁσίων κατασκευάσαντες ἐστεφανωμένους ποιοῦσιν τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον 363d ἤδη διάγειν μεθύοντας, ἡγησάμενοι κάλλιστον ἀρετῆς μισθὸν μέθην αἰώνιον. οἱ δʼ ἔτι τούτων μακροτέρους ἀποτείνουσιν μισθοὺς παρὰ θεῶν· παῖδας γὰρ παίδων φασὶ καὶ γένος κατόπισθεν λείπεσθαι τοῦ ὁσίου καὶ εὐόρκου.
The other poet says much the same: “like some blameless king who, fearing the gods, upholds justice, and the black earth bears 363c wheat and barley, the trees are heavy with fruit, the flocks bear young unfailingly, and the sea provides fish.” Musaeus and his son give the just even headier goods from the gods than these. In their tales they take them down to Hades, lay them on couches, lay on a drinking party of the pious, and have them spend all 363d eternity drunk, with garlands on their heads, as if they thought eternal drunkenness the finest wage for excellence. Others stretch the wages from the gods out even further: they say that the pious man who keeps his oaths leaves behind his children’s children and a line to come after him.
ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἐγκωμιάζουσιν δικαιοσύνην· τοὺς δὲ ἀνοσίους αὖ καὶ ἀδίκους εἰς πηλόν τινα κατορύττουσιν ἐν Ἅιδου καὶ κοσκίνῳ ὕδωρ ἀναγκάζουσι φέρειν, ἔτι τε ζῶντας 363e εἰς κακὰς δόξας ἄγοντες, ἅπερ Γλαύκων περὶ τῶν δικαίων δοξαζομένων δὲ ἀδίκων διῆλθε τιμωρήματα, ταῦτα περὶ τῶν ἀδίκων λέγουσιν, ἄλλα δὲ οὐκ ἔχουσιν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἔπαινος καὶ ὁ ψόγος οὗτος ἑκατέρων.
With these and similar things they sing the praises of justice. The impious and unjust, on the other hand, they bury in some sort of mud in Hades and force to carry water in a sieve. And while they’re still alive, 363e they bring them into disrepute: the punishments Glaucon described for the just who are thought unjust, these they tell of the unjust, and they have nothing else to say. That, then, is how each is praised and blamed.
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις σκέψαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο αὖ εἶδος λόγων περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας ἰδίᾳ τε λεγόμενον 364a καὶ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν. πάντες γὰρ ἐξ ἑνὸς στόματος ὑμνοῦσιν ὡς καλὸν μὲν ἡ σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη, χαλεπὸν μέντοι καὶ ἐπίπονον, ἀκολασία δὲ καὶ ἀδικία ἡδὺ μὲν καὶ εὐπετὲς κτήσασθαι, δόξῃ δὲ μόνον καὶ νόμῳ αἰσχρόν· λυσιτελέστερα δὲ τῶν δικαίων τὰ ἄδικα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος λέγουσι, καὶ πονηροὺς πλουσίους καὶ ἄλλας δυνάμεις ἔχοντας εὐδαιμονίζειν καὶ τιμᾶν εὐχερῶς ἐθέλουσιν δημοσίᾳ τε καὶ ἰδίᾳ, τοὺς δὲ ἀτιμάζειν καὶ ὑπερορᾶν, οἳ ἄν πῃ ἀσθενεῖς τε 364b καὶ πένητες ὦσιν, ὁμολογοῦντες αὐτοὺς ἀμείνους εἶναι τῶν ἑτέρων.
Besides this, Socrates, consider yet another kind of talk about justice and injustice, heard both from private people 364a and from poets. They all hymn with one voice that moderation and justice are fine things, but hard and laborious, while self-indulgence and injustice are pleasant and easy to acquire, and shameful only in people’s opinion and by convention. They say that unjust deeds are, for the most part, more profitable than just ones. They’re quite ready to call bad people happy and to honor them, in public and in private, when they’re rich or have other kinds of power, and to dishonor and look down on those who happen to be weak 364b and poor, even though they agree that these are better than the others.
τούτων δὲ πάντων οἱ περὶ θεῶν τε λόγοι καὶ ἀρετῆς θαυμασιώτατοι λέγονται, ὡς ἄρα καὶ θεοὶ πολλοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς δυστυχίας τε καὶ βίον κακὸν ἔνειμαν, τοῖς δʼ ἐναντίοις ἐναντίαν μοῖραν. ἀγύρται δὲ καὶ μάντεις ἐπὶ πλουσίων θύρας ἰόντες πείθουσιν ὡς ἔστι παρὰ σφίσι δύναμις ἐκ θεῶν ποριζομένη θυσίαις τε καὶ ἐπῳδαῖς, εἴτε τι 364c ἀδίκημά του γέγονεν αὐτοῦ ἢ προγόνων, ἀκεῖσθαι μεθʼ ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἑορτῶν, ἐάν τέ τινα ἐχθρὸν πημῆναι ἐθέλῃ, μετὰ σμικρῶν δαπανῶν ὁμοίως δίκαιον ἀδίκῳ βλάψει ἐπαγωγαῖς τισιν καὶ καταδέσμοις, τοὺς θεούς, ὥς φασιν, πείθοντές σφισιν ὑπηρετεῖν.
Most astonishing of all is what they say about the gods and excellence: that the gods, too, allot misfortune and a bad life to many good people, and the opposite lot to their opposites. Begging priests and seers go to rich men’s doors and persuade them that they have a power, supplied by the gods through sacrifices and incantations, to heal with pleasures and festivals any 364c wrong committed by the man himself or by his ancestors; and that if he wants to injure some enemy, at small expense he’ll harm just and unjust alike with certain spells and binding curses, since, as they say, they persuade the gods to serve them.
τούτοις δὲ πᾶσιν τοῖς λόγοις μάρτυρας ποιητὰς ἐπάγονται οἱ μὲν κακίας πέρι, εὐπετείας διδόντες, ὡς τὴν μὲν κακότητα καὶ ἰλαδὸν ἔστιν ἑλέσθαι 364d ῥηϊδίως· λείη μὲν ὁδός, μάλα δʼ ἐγγύθι ναίει· τῆς δʼ ἀρετῆς ἱδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἔθηκαν καί τινα ὁδὸν μακράν τε καὶ τραχεῖαν καὶ ἀνάντη· οἱ δὲ τῆς τῶν θεῶν ὑπʼ ἀνθρώπων παραγωγῆς τὸν Ὅμηρον μαρτύρονται, ὅτι καὶ ἐκεῖνος εἶπεν— λιστοὶ δέ τε καὶ θεοὶ αὐτοί, καὶ τοὺς μὲν θυσίαισι καὶ εὐχωλαῖς ἀγαναῖσιν 364e λοιβῇ τε κνίσῃ τε παρατρωπῶσʼ ἄνθρωποι λισσόμενοι, ὅτε κέν τις ὑπερβήῃ καὶ ἁμάρτῃ.
For all these claims they bring in poets as witnesses. Some, speaking of badness, present it as easy: “Wickedness can be had in plenty, 364d easily; smooth is the road, and she lives very near; but before excellence the gods have set sweat,” and a road that’s long, rough and uphill. Others call Homer to witness that gods are swayed by human beings, since he too said: “Even the gods themselves can be moved by prayer; with sacrifices and soothing vows, 364e with libation and the savor of burnt fat, men turn them aside with their pleas, whenever someone oversteps and does wrong.”
βίβλων δὲ ὅμαδον παρέχονται Μουσαίου καὶ Ὀρφέως, Σελήνης τε καὶ Μουσῶν ἐκγόνων, ὥς φασι, καθʼ ἃς θυηπολοῦσιν, πείθοντες οὐ μόνον ἰδιώτας ἀλλὰ καὶ πόλεις, ὡς ἄρα λύσεις τε καὶ καθαρμοὶ ἀδικημάτων διὰ θυσιῶν καὶ 365a παιδιᾶς ἡδονῶν εἰσι μὲν ἔτι ζῶσιν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ τελευτήσασιν, ἃς δὴ τελετὰς καλοῦσιν, αἳ τῶν ἐκεῖ κακῶν ἀπολύουσιν ἡμᾶς, μὴ θύσαντας δὲ δεινὰ περιμένει.
And they produce a clamor of books by Musaeus and Orpheus, offspring, so they say, of the Moon and the Muses, and by these they perform their rites. They persuade not only individuals but whole cities that there are releases and purifications from wrongdoing, through sacrifices and 365a pleasant games, for the living and for the dead alike. These they call “initiations”: they free us from the evils down there, while terrible things await those who haven’t sacrificed.
ταῦτα πάντα, ἔφη, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, τοιαῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα λεγόμενα ἀρετῆς πέρι καὶ κακίας, ὡς ἄνθρωποι καὶ θεοὶ περὶ αὐτὰ ἔχουσι τιμῆς, τί οἰόμεθα ἀκουούσας νέων ψυχὰς ποιεῖν, ὅσοι εὐφυεῖς καὶ ἱκανοὶ ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα ὥσπερ ἐπιπτόμενοι συλλογίσασθαι ἐξ αὐτῶν ποῖός τις ἂν 365b ὢν καὶ πῇ πορευθεὶς τὸν βίον ὡς ἄριστα διέλθοι; λέγοι γὰρ ἂν ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων πρὸς αὑτὸν κατὰ Πίνδαρον ἐκεῖνο τὸ πότερον δίκᾳ τεῖχος ὕψιον ἢ σκολιαῖς ἀπάταις ἀναβὰς καὶ ἐμαυτὸν οὕτω περιφράξας διαβιῶ; τὰ μὲν γὰρ λεγόμενα δικαίῳ μὲν ὄντι μοι, ἐὰν μὴ καὶ δοκῶ ὄφελος οὐδέν φασιν εἶναι, πόνους δὲ καὶ ζημίας φανεράς· ἀδίκῳ δὲ δόξαν δικαιοσύνης παρεσκευασμένῳ θεσπέσιος βίος λέγεται.
All these things, my dear Socrates, he said, so many and of such a kind, that are said about excellence and badness, and about how men and gods value them: what do we think they do to the souls of the young who hear them? I mean those who are naturally gifted and able, as it were, to flit over everything they hear and gather from it what sort of person 365b one should be, and what path one should take, to get through life as well as possible. In all likelihood such a young man would say to himself, in Pindar’s words, “Shall I by justice climb the higher wall, or by crooked deceits,” and so fence myself in and live out my life? For what they say is that if I’m just but don’t also seem so, there’s no benefit in it, only obvious troubles and penalties; but for the unjust man who has provided himself with a reputation for justice, a godlike life is promised.
οὐκοῦν, ἐπειδὴ “τὸ δοκεῖν ”, ὡς δηλοῦσί μοι οἱ σοφοί, καὶ τὰν ἀλάθειαν βιᾶται καὶ κύριον εὐδαιμονίας, ἐπὶ τοῦτο δὴ τρεπτέον ὅλως· πρόθυρα μὲν καὶ σχῆμα κύκλῳ περὶ ἐμαυτὸν σκιαγραφίαν ἀρετῆς περιγραπτέον, τὴν δὲ τοῦ σοφωτάτου Ἀρχιλόχου ἀλώπεκα ἑλκτέον ἐξόπισθεν κερδαλέαν καὶ ποικίλην. “ἀλλὰ γάρ, φησί τις, οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἀεὶ λανθάνειν κακὸν ὄντα.” οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο οὐδὲν εὐπετές, 365d φήσομεν, τῶν μεγάλων· ἀλλʼ ὅμως, εἰ μέλλομεν εὐδαιμονήσειν, ταύτῃ ἰτέον, ὡς τὰ ἴχνη τῶν λόγων φέρει. ἐπὶ γὰρ τὸ λανθάνειν συνωμοσίας τε καὶ ἑταιρίας συνάξομεν, εἰσίν τε πειθοῦς διδάσκαλοι σοφίαν δημηγορικήν τε καὶ δικανικὴν διδόντες, ἐξ ὧν τὰ μὲν πείσομεν, τὰ δὲ βιασόμεθα, ὡς πλεονεκτοῦντες δίκην μὴ διδόναι.
So since, as the wise make plain to me, “seeming overpowers even truth” and is master of happiness, that’s what I must turn to entirely. As a front and facade I must draw around myself a painted illusion of excellence, and trail behind me the fox of that wisest of men, Archilochus, greedy and cunning. “But,” someone says, “it isn’t easy to be bad and always go unnoticed.” Nor is anything else that’s great easy, 365d we’ll reply. Still, if we’re going to be happy, this is the way we must go, where the tracks of the arguments lead. To go unnoticed we’ll organize conspiracies and political clubs; and there are teachers of persuasion who offer skill in speaking to the assembly and the courts. With these we’ll persuade in some cases and use force in others, so that we can take more than our share and not pay the penalty.
“ἀλλὰ δὴ θεοὺς οὔτε λανθάνειν οὔτε βιάσασθαι δυνατόν.” οὐκοῦν, εἰ μὲν μὴ εἰσὶν ἢ μηδὲν αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων μέλει, τί καὶ ἡμῖν 365e μελητέον τοῦ λανθάνειν; εἰ δὲ εἰσί τε καὶ ἐπιμελοῦνται, οὐκ ἄλλοθέν τοι αὐτοὺς ἴσμεν ἢ ἀκηκόαμεν ἢ ἔκ τε τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν γενεαλογησάντων ποιητῶν, οἱ δὲ αὐτοὶ οὗτοι λέγουσιν ὡς εἰσὶν οἷοι θυσίαις τε καὶ εὐχωλαῖς ἀγανῇσιν καὶ ἀναθήμασιν παράγεσθαι ἀναπειθόμενοι, οἷς ἢ ἀμφότερα ἢ οὐδέτερα πειστέον.
“But you can’t hide from the gods, or use force on them.” Well, if they don’t exist, or care nothing for human affairs, why should we 365e care about hiding either? And if they do exist and do care, we know of them, or have heard of them, from nowhere else than the laws and the poets who traced their genealogies; and these same people say that they’re the kind who can be swayed and won over “with sacrifices and soothing vows” and offerings. We must believe them on both counts or on neither.
εἰ δʼ οὖν πειστέον, ἀδικητέον καὶ θυτέον 366a ἀπὸ τῶν ἀδικημάτων. δίκαιοι μὲν γὰρ ὄντες ἀζήμιοι μόνον ὑπὸ θεῶν ἐσόμεθα, τὰ δʼ ἐξ ἀδικίας κέρδη ἀπωσόμεθα· ἄδικοι δὲ κερδανοῦμέν τε καὶ λισσόμενοι ὑπερβαίνοντες καὶ ἁμαρτάνοντες, πείθοντες αὐτοὺς ἀζήμιοι ἀπαλλάξομεν. “ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐν Ἅιδου δίκην δώσομεν ὧν ἂν ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσωμεν, ἢ αὐτοὶ ἢ παῖδες παίδων.” ἀλλʼ, ὦ φίλε, φήσει λογιζόμενος, αἱ τελεταὶ αὖ μέγα δύνανται καὶ οἱ λύσιοι θεοί, ὡς αἱ 366b μέγισται πόλεις λέγουσι καὶ οἱ θεῶν παῖδες ποιηταὶ καὶ προφῆται τῶν θεῶν γενόμενοι, οἳ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν μηνύουσιν.
And if we must believe them, then we should do wrong and offer sacrifices 366a from the proceeds. If we’re just, we’ll merely go unpunished by the gods, and we’ll forgo the gains from injustice; if we’re unjust, we’ll make our gains, and by our pleas as we overstep and do wrong we’ll persuade them and get off unpunished. “But in Hades we’ll pay the penalty for the wrongs we’ve done here, either we ourselves or our children’s children.” But my friend, he’ll say, doing his calculations, the initiations have great power, and so do the gods of release, as the 366b greatest cities say, and the children of gods who became poets and prophets of the gods, who reveal that this is how things are.
κατὰ τίνα οὖν ἔτι λόγον δικαιοσύνην ἂν πρὸ μεγίστης ἀδικίας αἱροίμεθʼ ἄν, ἣν ἐὰν μετʼ εὐσχημοσύνης κιβδήλου κτησώμεθα, καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρʼ ἀνθρώποις πράξομεν κατὰ νοῦν ζῶντές τε καὶ τελευτήσαντες, ὡς ὁ τῶν πολλῶν τε καὶ ἄκρων λεγόμενος λόγος; ἐκ δὴ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων 366c τίς μηχανή, ὦ Σώκρατες, δικαιοσύνην τιμᾶν ἐθέλειν ᾧ τις δύναμις ὑπάρχει ψυχῆς ἢ χρημάτων ἢ σώματος ἢ γένους, ἀλλὰ μὴ γελᾶν ἐπαινουμένης ἀκούοντα;
So on what argument would we still choose justice over the greatest injustice? If we get injustice along with a counterfeit show of decency, we’ll fare as we please with gods and men, in life and in death: so goes the account given by the many and by the best authorities. After all that’s been said, 366c Socrates, what way is there for anyone with any power, of soul or money or body or birth, to be willing to honor justice, and not laugh when he hears it praised?
ὡς δή τοι εἴ τις ἔχει ψευδῆ μὲν ἀποφῆναι ἃ εἰρήκαμεν, ἱκανῶς δὲ ἔγνωκεν ὅτι ἄριστον δικαιοσύνη, πολλήν που συγγνώμην ἔχει καὶ οὐκ ὀργίζεται τοῖς ἀδίκοις, ἀλλʼ οἶδεν ὅτι πλὴν εἴ τις θείᾳ φύσει δυσχεραίνων τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἐπιστήμην λαβὼν 366d ἀπέχεται αὐτοῦ, τῶν γε ἄλλων οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν δίκαιος, ἀλλʼ ὑπὸ ἀνανδρίας ἢ γήρως ἤ τινος ἄλλης ἀσθενείας ψέγει τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἀδυνατῶν αὐτὸ δρᾶν. ὡς δέ, δῆλον· ὁ γὰρ πρῶτος τῶν τοιούτων εἰς δύναμιν ἐλθὼν πρῶτος ἀδικεῖ, καθʼ ὅσον ἂν οἷός τʼ ᾖ.
So if anyone can show that what we’ve said is false, and is fully convinced that justice is best, he surely has great sympathy for the unjust and isn’t angry with them. He knows that, apart from someone who by a divine nature finds wrongdoing repugnant, or who has gained knowledge and 366d keeps away from it, no one else is just willingly. It’s through cowardice or old age or some other weakness that people blame wrongdoing, because they’re unable to do it. How this is so is clear: the first of such people to come into power is the first to do wrong, as far as he’s able.
καὶ τούτων ἁπάντων οὐδὲν ἄλλο αἴτιον ἢ ἐκεῖνο, ὅθενπερ ἅπας ὁ λόγος οὗτος ὥρμησεν καὶ τῷδε καὶ ἐμοὶ πρὸς σέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπεῖν, ὅτι “ὦ θαυμάσιε, πάντων 366e ὑμῶν, ὅσοι ἐπαινέται φατὲ δικαιοσύνης εἶναι, ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἡρώων ἀρξάμενοι, ὅσων λόγοι λελειμμένοι, μέχρι τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἔψεξεν ἀδικίαν οὐδʼ ἐπῄνεσεν δικαιοσύνην ἄλλως ἢ δόξας τε καὶ τιμὰς καὶ δωρεὰς τὰς ἀπʼ αὐτῶν γιγνομένας· αὐτὸ δʼ ἑκάτερον τῇ αὑτοῦ δυνάμει τί δρᾷ, τῇ τοῦ ἔχοντος ψυχῇ ἐνόν, καὶ λανθάνον θεούς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους, οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὔτʼ ἐν ποιήσει οὔτʼ ἐν ἰδίοις λόγοις ἐπεξῆλθεν ἱκανῶς τῷ λόγῳ ὡς τὸ μὲν μέγιστον κακῶν ὅσα ἴσχει ψυχὴ ἐν αὑτῇ, δικαιοσύνη δὲ μέγιστον ἀγαθόν.”
And the cause of all this is nothing other than the point from which this whole argument started, for Glaucon here and for me, when we spoke to you, Socrates: “You amazing man, of all 366e of you who claim to be praisers of justice, starting from the heroes of old whose words have come down to us and ending with people today, not one has ever blamed injustice or praised justice except for the reputations, honors and rewards that come from them. What each of them does by its own power when it’s present in the soul of the one who has it, unnoticed by gods and men, no one has ever adequately gone through in argument, whether in poetry or in prose: that injustice is the greatest of all the evils a soul holds within itself, and justice the greatest good.”
“εἰ γὰρ οὕτως ἐλέγετο ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπὸ πάντων ὑμῶν καὶ ἐκ νέων ἡμᾶς ἐπείθετε, οὐκ ἂν ἀλλήλους ἐφυλάττομεν μὴ ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ ἦν ἕκαστος ἄριστος φύλαξ, δεδιὼς μὴ ἀδικῶν τῷ μεγίστῳ κακῷ σύνοικος ᾖ.”
“If you’d all been talking like this from the start and persuading us of it from our youth, we wouldn’t be guarding one another against wrongdoing; each would be his own best guardian, afraid that by doing wrong he’d be living with the greatest evil.”
ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἔτι τούτων πλείω Θρασύμαχός τε καὶ ἄλλος πού τις ὑπὲρ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας λέγοιεν ἄν, μεταστρέφοντες αὐτοῖν τὴν δύναμιν φορτικῶς, ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖ. ἀλλʼ ἐγώ, οὐδὲν γάρ σε 367b δέομαι ἀποκρύπτεσθαι, σοῦ ἐπιθυμῶν ἀκοῦσαι τἀναντία, ὡς δύναμαι μάλιστα κατατείνας λέγω. μὴ οὖν ἡμῖν μόνον ἐνδείξῃ τῷ λόγῳ ὅτι δικαιοσύνη ἀδικίας κρεῖττον, ἀλλὰ τί ποιοῦσα ἑκατέρα τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτὴ διʼ αὑτὴν ἡ μὲν κακόν, ἡ δὲ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν· τὰς δὲ δόξας ἀφαίρει, ὥσπερ Γλαύκων διεκελεύσατο.
That, Socrates, and perhaps even more than that, is what Thrasymachus, and maybe someone else too, would say about justice and injustice, crudely turning their powers upside down, as it seems to me. But I, for I’ve no need to hide anything 367b from you, am speaking with all the force I can because I want to hear you argue the opposite. So don’t just show us in argument that justice is better than injustice; show us what each of them does, itself through itself, to the one who has it, that makes the one bad and the other good. And take away the reputations, as Glaucon urged.
εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀφαιρήσεις ἑκατέρωθεν τὰς ἀληθεῖς, τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς προσθήσεις, οὐ τὸ δίκαιον φήσομεν ἐπαινεῖν σε ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἄδικον εἶναι 367c ψέγειν ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν, καὶ παρακελεύεσθαι ἄδικον ὄντα λανθάνειν, καὶ ὁμολογεῖν Θρασυμάχῳ ὅτι τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν, συμφέρον τοῦ κρείττονος, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον αὑτῷ μὲν συμφέρον καὶ λυσιτελοῦν, τῷ δὲ ἥττονι ἀσύμφορον.
For unless you take away the true reputation from each and attach the false one, we’ll say you’re praising not being just but seeming so, and blaming not being unjust 367c but seeming so; that you’re urging us to be unjust and go unnoticed, and agreeing with Thrasymachus that justice is someone else’s good, the advantage of the stronger, while injustice is to one’s own advantage and profit, and to the disadvantage of the weaker.
ἐπειδὴ οὖν ὡμολόγησας τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν εἶναι δικαιοσύνην, ἃ τῶν τε ἀποβαινόντων ἀπʼ αὐτῶν ἕνεκα ἄξια κεκτῆσθαι, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον αὐτὰ αὑτῶν, οἷον ὁρᾶν, 367d ἀκούειν, φρονεῖν, καὶ ὑγιαίνειν δή, καὶ ὅσʼ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ γόνιμα τῇ αὑτῶν φύσει ἀλλʼ οὐ δόξῃ ἐστίν, τοῦτʼ οὖν αὐτὸ ἐπαίνεσον δικαιοσύνης, ὃ αὐτὴ διʼ αὑτὴν τὸν ἔχοντα ὀνίνησιν καὶ ἀδικία βλάπτει, μισθοὺς δὲ καὶ δόξας πάρες ἄλλοις ἐπαινεῖν· ὡς ἐγὼ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀποδεχοίμην ἂν οὕτως ἐπαινούντων δικαιοσύνην καὶ ψεγόντων ἀδικίαν, δόξας τε περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ μισθοὺς ἐγκωμιαζόντων καὶ λοιδορούντων, σοῦ δὲ οὐκ ἄν, εἰ μὴ σὺ κελεύοις, διότι πάντα τὸν βίον 367e οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπῶν διελήλυθας ἢ τοῦτο.
You’ve agreed, then, that justice is among the greatest goods, the ones worth having for the sake of what comes from them, but much more for their own sake, like seeing, 367d hearing, understanding, and of course being healthy, and all the other goods that are productive by their own nature and not by reputation. So praise justice for just this: the benefit it brings, itself through itself, to the one who has it, and the harm injustice does. Leave wages and reputations for others to praise. I’d put up with others praising justice and blaming injustice in that way, extolling and reviling the reputations and wages that go with them; but not you, unless you told me to, because you’ve spent your whole life 367e examining nothing but this.
μὴ οὖν ἡμῖν ἐνδείξῃ μόνον τῷ λόγῳ ὅτι δικαιοσύνη ἀδικίας κρεῖττον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τί ποιοῦσα ἑκατέρα τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτὴ διʼ αὑτήν, ἐάντε λανθάνῃ ἐάντε μὴ θεούς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους, ἡ μὲν ἀγαθόν, ἡ δὲ κακόν ἐστι.
So don’t just show us in argument that justice is better than injustice; show us too what each of them does, itself through itself, to the one who has it, whether or not gods and men notice, that makes the one good and the other bad.
καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας, ἀεὶ μὲν δὴ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ τε Γλαύκωνος καὶ τοῦ Ἀδειμάντου ἠγάμην, ἀτὰρ οὖν καὶ τότε πάνυ γε 368a ἥσθην καὶ εἶπον· οὐ κακῶς εἰς ὑμᾶς, ὦ παῖδες ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός, τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν ἐλεγείων ἐποίησεν ὁ Γλαύκωνος ἐραστής, εὐδοκιμήσαντας περὶ τὴν Μεγαροῖ μάχην, εἰπών— παῖδες Ἀρίστωνος, κλεινοῦ θεῖον γένος ἀνδρός· τοῦτό μοι, ὦ φίλοι, εὖ δοκεῖ ἔχειν· πάνυ γὰρ θεῖον πεπόνθατε, εἰ μὴ πέπεισθε ἀδικίαν δικαιοσύνης ἄμεινον εἶναι, οὕτω δυνάμενοι εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ. δοκεῖτε δή μοι ὡς 368b ἀληθῶς οὐ πεπεῖσθαι—τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἄλλου τοῦ ὑμετέρου τρόπου, ἐπεὶ κατά γε αὐτοὺς τοὺς λόγους ἠπίστουν ἂν ὑμῖν—ὅσῳ δὲ μᾶλλον πιστεύω, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἀπορῶ ὅτι χρήσωμαι.
When I heard this, though I’d always admired the natures of Glaucon and Adeimantus, I was especially 368a delighted on this occasion, and I said, “Sons of that man, it wasn’t badly said of you when Glaucon’s lover began his elegy, after you’d distinguished yourselves at the battle of Megara, with the words ‘Sons of Ariston, godlike offspring of a famous man.’ That seems to me well put, my friends. Something truly godlike has happened to you, if you aren’t convinced that injustice is better than justice when you can speak for it like that. And I really do believe you 368b aren’t convinced. I judge from the rest of your character, since from your words alone I wouldn’t trust you. But the more I trust you, the more I’m at a loss what to do.
οὔτε γὰρ ὅπως βοηθῶ ἔχω· δοκῶ γάρ μοι ἀδύνατος εἶναι—σημεῖον δέ μοι, ὅτι ἃ πρὸς Θρασύμαχον λέγων ᾤμην ἀποφαίνειν ὡς ἄμεινον δικαιοσύνη ἀδικίας, οὐκ ἀπεδέξασθέ μου—οὔτʼ αὖ ὅπως μὴ βοηθήσω ἔχω· δέδοικα γὰρ μὴ οὐδʼ ὅσιον ᾖ παραγενόμενον δικαιοσύνῃ κακηγορουμένῃ 368c ἀπαγορεύειν καὶ μὴ βοηθεῖν ἔτι ἐμπνέοντα καὶ δυνάμενον φθέγγεσθαι. κράτιστον οὖν οὕτως ὅπως δύναμαι ἐπικουρεῖν αὐτῇ.
“I can’t come to the rescue, since I think I’m not capable of it. My evidence is that you didn’t accept what I said to Thrasymachus when I thought I was showing that justice is better than injustice. Yet I can’t refuse to help either. I’m afraid it may even be impious to stand by while justice is being slandered 368c and give up on helping her while I still have breath and can speak. So the best thing is to defend her as well as I can.”
The city as the soul writ large
Socrates proposes to look for justice first in a city, and describes a simple city meeting basic needs.
ὅ τε οὖν Γλαύκων καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐδέοντο παντὶ τρόπῳ βοηθῆσαι καὶ μὴ ἀνεῖναι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ διερευνήσασθαι τί τέ ἐστιν ἑκάτερον καὶ περὶ τῆς ὠφελίας αὐτοῖν τἀληθὲς ποτέρως ἔχει. εἶπον οὖν ὅπερ ἐμοὶ ἔδοξεν, ὅτι τὸ ζήτημα ᾧ ἐπιχειροῦμεν οὐ φαῦλον ἀλλʼ ὀξὺ βλέποντος, ὡς ἐμοὶ 368d φαίνεται. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἡμεῖς οὐ δεινοί, δοκῶ μοι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τοιαύτην ποιήσασθαι ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ, οἵανπερ ἂν εἰ προσέταξέ τις γράμματα σμικρὰ πόρρωθεν ἀναγνῶναι μὴ πάνυ ὀξὺ βλέπουσιν, ἔπειτά τις ἐνενόησεν, ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ γράμματα ἔστι που καὶ ἄλλοθι μείζω τε καὶ ἐν μείζονι, ἕρμαιον ἂν ἐφάνη οἶμαι ἐκεῖνα πρῶτον ἀναγνόντας οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν τὰ ἐλάττω, εἰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει.
So Glaucon and the others begged me to help in every way and not let the argument drop, but to search out what each of them is and what the truth is about their benefits. I told them what I thought: that the inquiry we were undertaking was no trivial matter, but one for someone with sharp sight, as it seemed 368d to me. “Since we aren’t clever,” I said, “I think we should conduct this search the way we would if people without very sharp sight had been told to read small letters from a distance, and then someone noticed that the same letters were written somewhere else too, larger and on a larger surface. It would be a godsend, I think, to read those first and then examine the smaller ones, to see whether they’re the same.”
πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Ἀδείμαντος· ἀλλὰ τί τοιοῦτον, ὦ 368e Σώκρατες, ἐν τῇ περὶ τὸ δίκαιον ζητήσει καθορᾷς;
ἐγώ σοι, ἔφην, ἐρῶ. δικαιοσύνη, φαμέν, ἔστι μὲν ἀνδρὸς ἑνός, ἔστι δέ που καὶ ὅλης πόλεως;
πάνυ γε, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
οὐκοῦν μεῖζον πόλις ἑνὸς ἀνδρός;
μεῖζον, ἔφη.
“Certainly,” said Adeimantus. “But what do you see in our search for justice that’s like this, 368e Socrates?”
“I’ll tell you,” I said. “There’s justice, we say, of a single man, but surely also of a whole city?”
“Certainly,” he said.
“And a city is bigger than a single man?”
“Bigger,” he said.
ἴσως τοίνυν πλείων ἂν δικαιοσύνη ἐν τῷ μείζονι ἐνείη καὶ ῥᾴων καταμαθεῖν. εἰ οὖν βούλεσθε, πρῶτον ἐν ταῖς 369a πόλεσι ζητήσωμεν ποῖόν τί ἐστιν· ἔπειτα οὕτως ἐπισκεψώμεθα καὶ ἐν ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ, τὴν τοῦ μείζονος ὁμοιότητα ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἐλάττονος ἰδέᾳ ἐπισκοποῦντες.
ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη, καλῶς λέγειν.
ἆρʼ οὖν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, εἰ γιγνομένην πόλιν θεασαίμεθα λόγῳ, καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην αὐτῆς ἴδοιμεν ἂν γιγνομένην καὶ τὴν ἀδικίαν;
τάχʼ ἄν, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
οὐκοῦν γενομένου αὐτοῦ ἐλπὶς εὐπετέστερον ἰδεῖν ὃ ζητοῦμεν; 369b
πολύ γε.
“Then perhaps there’ll be more justice in the bigger thing, and it will be easier to understand. So if you like, let’s first look for what it’s like in 369a cities, and then examine it in each individual as well, looking for the likeness of the bigger in the form of the smaller.”
“I think that’s a good idea,” he said.
“Then if we watched a city coming into being in argument,” I said, “would we also see its justice coming into being, and its injustice?”
“Probably,” he said.
“And once that’s done, can we hope to see what we’re looking for more easily?” 369b
“Much more easily.”
δοκεῖ οὖν χρῆναι ἐπιχειρῆσαι περαίνειν; οἶμαι μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ὀλίγον ἔργον αὐτὸ εἶναι· σκοπεῖτε οὖν.
ἔσκεπται, ἔφη ὁ Ἀδείμαντος· ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει.
γίγνεται τοίνυν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, πόλις, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οὐκ αὐτάρκης, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ὢν ἐνδεής· ἢ τίνʼ οἴει ἀρχὴν ἄλλην πόλιν οἰκίζειν;
οὐδεμίαν, ἦ δʼ ὅς. 369c
οὕτω δὴ ἄρα παραλαμβάνων ἄλλος ἄλλον, ἐπʼ ἄλλου, τὸν δʼ ἐπʼ ἄλλου χρείᾳ, πολλῶν δεόμενοι, πολλοὺς εἰς μίαν οἴκησιν ἀγείραντες κοινωνούς τε καὶ βοηθούς, ταύτῃ τῇ συνοικίᾳ ἐθέμεθα πόλιν ὄνομα· ἦ γάρ;
“Do you think we should try to carry it through, then? I don’t think it’s a small job. So think it over.”
“We have,” said Adeimantus. “Go ahead and do it.”
“Well then,” I said, “a city comes into being, I think, because none of us happens to be self-sufficient; each of us needs many things. Or do you think a city is founded on any other principle?”
“None,” he said. 369c
“So one person takes on another for one need, and another for another; and since they need many things, they gather many people into one place to live as partners and helpers, and to this settlement we’ve given the name ‘city.’ Isn’t that so?”
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
μεταδίδωσι δὴ ἄλλος ἄλλῳ, εἴ τι μεταδίδωσιν, ἢ μεταλαμβάνει, οἰόμενος αὑτῷ ἄμεινον εἶναι;
πάνυ γε.
ἴθι δή, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τῷ λόγῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ποιῶμεν πόλιν· ποιήσει δὲ αὐτήν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ ἡμετέρα χρεία.
πῶς δʼ οὔ; 369d
ἀλλὰ μὴν πρώτη γε καὶ μεγίστη τῶν χρειῶν ἡ τῆς τροφῆς παρασκευὴ τοῦ εἶναί τε καὶ ζῆν ἕνεκα.
παντάπασί γε.
δευτέρα δὴ οἰκήσεως, τρίτη δὲ ἐσθῆτος καὶ τῶν τοιούτων.
ἔστι ταῦτα.
“Certainly.”
“And whenever they share things with one another, giving or taking, each does it thinking it’s better for himself?”
“Certainly.”
“Come on, then,” I said, “let’s make a city in argument from the beginning. And what will make it, it seems, is our need.”
“Of course.” 369d
“Now the first and greatest of our needs is the provision of food, so that we can exist and live.”
“Absolutely.”
“The second is housing, and the third clothing and that sort of thing.”
“That’s right.”
φέρε δή, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, πῶς ἡ πόλις ἀρκέσει ἐπὶ τοσαύτην παρασκευήν; ἄλλο τι γεωργὸς μὲν εἷς, ὁ δὲ οἰκοδόμος, ἄλλος δέ τις ὑφάντης; ἢ καὶ σκυτοτόμον αὐτόσε προσθήσομεν ἤ τινʼ ἄλλον τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπευτήν;
πάνυ γε.
εἴη δʼ ἂν ἥ γε ἀναγκαιοτάτη πόλις ἐκ τεττάρων ἢ πέντε ἀνδρῶν. 369e
φαίνεται.
“Well then,” I said, “how will the city be able to provide so much? Won’t one be a farmer, another a builder, and another a weaver? Or shall we add a shoemaker too, or someone else who looks after the needs of the body?”
“Certainly.”
“So the barest necessary city would consist of four or five men.” 369e
“Apparently.”
τί δὴ οὖν; ἕνα ἕκαστον τούτων δεῖ τὸ αὑτοῦ ἔργον ἅπασι κοινὸν κατατιθέναι, οἷον τὸν γεωργὸν ἕνα ὄντα παρασκευάζειν σιτία τέτταρσιν καὶ τετραπλάσιον χρόνον τε καὶ πόνον ἀναλίσκειν ἐπὶ σίτου παρασκευῇ καὶ ἄλλοις κοινωνεῖν, ἢ ἀμελήσαντα ἑαυτῷ μόνον τέταρτον μέρος ποιεῖν τούτου τοῦ 370a σίτου ἐν τετάρτῳ μέρει τοῦ χρόνου, τὰ δὲ τρία, τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ τῆς οἰκίας παρασκευῇ διατρίβειν, τὸ δὲ ἱματίου, τὸ δὲ ὑποδημάτων, καὶ μὴ ἄλλοις κοινωνοῦντα πράγματα ἔχειν, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸν διʼ αὑτὸν τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν;
“What next? Should each of them contribute his own work for all of them in common? Should the farmer, for example, being one man, provide food for four, spending four times the time and labor on providing food and sharing it with the others? Or should he not bother about them, and produce a quarter of this 370a food for himself alone in a quarter of the time, and spend the other three quarters providing a house, a cloak and shoes, not having the trouble of sharing with others but minding his own business by himself and for himself?”
καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαντος ἔφη· ἀλλʼ ἴσως, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω ῥᾷον ἢ ʼκείνως.
οὐδέν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, μὰ Δία ἄτοπον. ἐννοῶ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς εἰπόντος σοῦ, ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ἡμῶν φύεται ἕκαστος οὐ πάνυ 370b ὅμοιος ἑκάστῳ, ἀλλὰ διαφέρων τὴν φύσιν, ἄλλος ἐπʼ ἄλλου ἔργου πράξει. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι;
ἔμοιγε.
τί δέ; πότερον κάλλιον πράττοι ἄν τις εἷς ὢν πολλὰς τέχνας ἐργαζόμενος, ἢ ὅταν μίαν εἷς;
ὅταν, ἦ δʼ ὅς, εἷς μίαν.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οἶμαι καὶ τόδε δῆλον, ὡς, ἐάν τίς τινος παρῇ ἔργου καιρόν, διόλλυται.
And Adeimantus said, “Maybe, Socrates, the first way is easier than the other.”
“By Zeus,” I said, “that’s not at all surprising. Now that you say it, it occurs to me too that, first of all, each of us is born not at all 370b like anyone else, but different in nature, one suited to one job and another to another. Don’t you think so?”
“I do.”
“Well then, would someone do better working at many crafts on his own, or when one person works at one?”
“When one works at one,” he said.
“And this too is clear, I think: if someone misses the right moment for a job, it’s ruined.”
δῆλον γάρ.
οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι ἐθέλει τὸ πραττόμενον τὴν τοῦ πράττοντος σχολὴν περιμένειν, ἀλλʼ ἀνάγκη τὸν πράττοντα τῷ πραττομένῳ 370c ἐπακολουθεῖν μὴ ἐν παρέργου μέρει.
ἀνάγκη.
ἐκ δὴ τούτων πλείω τε ἕκαστα γίγνεται καὶ κάλλιον καὶ ῥᾷον, ὅταν εἷς ἓν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἐν καιρῷ, σχολὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγων, πράττῃ.
παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
“Yes, that’s clear.”
“For the work, I think, isn’t willing to wait until the worker has time; the worker has to keep up with the work 370c and not treat it as a sideline.”
“He has to.”
“So from this it follows that more of each thing gets done, and better and more easily, when one person does one thing, in accordance with his nature and at the right time, free of other tasks.”
“Absolutely.”
πλειόνων δή, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, δεῖ πολιτῶν ἢ τεττάρων ἐπὶ τὰς παρασκευὰς ὧν ἐλέγομεν. ὁ γὰρ γεωργός, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ αὐτὸς ποιήσεται ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἄροτρον, εἰ μέλλει καλὸν εἶναι, 370d οὐδὲ σμινύην, οὐδὲ τἆλλα ὄργανα ὅσα περὶ γεωργίαν. οὐδʼ αὖ ὁ οἰκοδόμος· πολλῶν δὲ καὶ τούτῳ δεῖ. ὡσαύτως δʼ ὁ ὑφάντης τε καὶ ὁ σκυτοτόμος· ἢ οὔ;
ἀληθῆ.
τέκτονες δὴ καὶ χαλκῆς καὶ τοιοῦτοί τινες πολλοὶ δημιουργοί, κοινωνοὶ ἡμῖν τοῦ πολιχνίου γιγνόμενοι, συχνὸν αὐτὸ ποιοῦσιν.
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
“Then we need more citizens than four, Adeimantus, to provide the things we mentioned. For the farmer, it seems, won’t make his own plow, if it’s to be a good one, 370d or his hoe, or any of the other tools for farming. Nor will the builder, who also needs many things. The same goes for the weaver and the shoemaker, doesn’t it?”
“True.”
“So carpenters and smiths and many other craftsmen of that sort will join our little city and make it quite populous.”
“Certainly.”
ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἄν πω πάνυ γε μέγα τι εἴη, εἰ αὐτοῖς βουκόλους τε καὶ ποιμένας τούς τε ἄλλους νομέας προσθεῖμεν, ἵνα οἵ τε 370e γεωργοὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀροῦν ἔχοιεν βοῦς, οἵ τε οἰκοδόμοι πρὸς τὰς ἀγωγὰς μετὰ τῶν γεωργῶν χρῆσθαι ὑποζυγίοις, ὑφάνται δὲ καὶ σκυτοτόμοι δέρμασίν τε καὶ ἐρίοις.
οὐδέ γε, ἦ δʼ ὅς, σμικρὰ πόλις ἂν εἴη ἔχουσα πάντα ταῦτα.
ἀλλὰ μήν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, κατοικίσαι γε αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον οὗ ἐπεισαγωγίμων μὴ δεήσεται, σχεδόν τι ἀδύνατον.
ἀδύνατον γάρ.
“But it still wouldn’t be very big if we added cowherds and shepherds and other herdsmen, so that 370e the farmers would have oxen for plowing, the builders, along with the farmers, would have draft animals for hauling, and the weavers and shoemakers would have hides and wool.”
“It wouldn’t be a small city either,” he said, “if it had all that.”
“And yet,” I said, “it’s practically impossible to found the city itself in a place where it won’t need imports.”
“Yes, it’s impossible.”
προσδεήσει ἄρα ἔτι καὶ ἄλλων, οἳ ἐξ ἄλλης πόλεως αὐτῇ κομιοῦσιν ὧν δεῖται.
δεήσει.
καὶ μὴν κενὸς ἂν ἴῃ ὁ διάκονος, μηδὲν ἄγων ὧν ἐκεῖνοι 371a δέονται παρʼ ὧν ἂν κομίζωνται ὧν ἂν αὐτοῖς χρεία, κενὸς ἄπεισιν. ἦ γάρ;
δοκεῖ μοι.
δεῖ δὴ τὰ οἴκοι μὴ μόνον ἑαυτοῖς ποιεῖν ἱκανά, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἷα καὶ ὅσα ἐκείνοις ὧν ἂν δέωνται.
δεῖ γάρ.
πλειόνων δὴ γεωργῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν δεῖ ἡμῖν τῇ πόλει.
πλειόνων γάρ.
“So it will need still others, who’ll bring it what it needs from another city.”
“It will.”
“And if the one who serves it goes empty-handed, taking nothing that those people 371a need from whom they’re getting what they need themselves, he’ll come back empty-handed, won’t he?”
“I think so.”
“So at home they must produce not only enough for themselves, but also goods of the kind and in the quantity those others need.”
“They must.”
“Then our city needs more farmers and other craftsmen.”
“Yes, more.”
καὶ δὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων διακόνων που τῶν τε εἰσαξόντων καὶ ἐξαξόντων ἕκαστα. οὗτοι δέ εἰσιν ἔμποροι· ἦ γάρ;
ναί.
καὶ ἐμπόρων δὴ δεησόμεθα.
πάνυ γε.
καὶ ἐὰν μέν γε κατὰ θάλατταν ἡ ἐμπορία γίγνηται, συχνῶν 371b καὶ ἄλλων προσδεήσεται τῶν ἐπιστημόνων τῆς περὶ τὴν θάλατταν ἐργασίας.
συχνῶν μέντοι.
τί δὲ δή; ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει πῶς ἀλλήλοις μεταδώσουσιν ὧν ἂν ἕκαστοι ἐργάζωνται; ὧν δὴ ἕνεκα καὶ κοινωνίαν ποιησάμενοι πόλιν ᾠκίσαμεν.
δῆλον δή, ἦ δʼ ὅς, ὅτι πωλοῦντες καὶ ὠνούμενοι.
“And also, surely, other servants, to import and export each kind of goods. These are merchants, aren’t they?”
“Yes.”
“So we’ll need merchants too.”
“Certainly.”
“And if the trade goes by sea, it will need a good many 371b others as well, who know about work at sea.”
“A good many, yes.”
“And what about in the city itself? How will they share with one another what each of them produces? It was for this, after all, that we formed a partnership and founded a city.”
“Clearly,” he said, “by selling and buying.”
ἀγορὰ δὴ ἡμῖν καὶ νόμισμα σύμβολον τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἕνεκα γενήσεται ἐκ τούτου.
πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 371c
ἂν οὖν κομίσας ὁ γεωργὸς εἰς τὴν ἀγοράν τι ὧν ποιεῖ, ἤ τις ἄλλος τῶν δημιουργῶν, μὴ εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ἥκῃ τοῖς δεομένοις τὰ παρʼ αὐτοῦ ἀλλάξασθαι, ἀργήσει τῆς αὑτοῦ δημιουργίας καθήμενος ἐν ἀγορᾷ;
“So from this we’ll get a marketplace, and money as a token for the sake of exchange.”
“Certainly.” 371c
“Then if the farmer, or any other craftsman, brings some of his produce to the marketplace and doesn’t arrive at the same time as those who need to exchange with him, will he sit in the marketplace idle, neglecting his own craft?”
οὐδαμῶς, ἦ δʼ ὅς, ἀλλὰ εἰσὶν οἳ τοῦτο ὁρῶντες ἑαυτοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν διακονίαν τάττουσιν ταύτην, ἐν μὲν ταῖς ὀρθῶς οἰκουμέναις πόλεσι σχεδόν τι οἱ ἀσθενέστατοι τὰ σώματα καὶ ἀχρεῖοί τι ἄλλο ἔργον πράττειν. αὐτοῦ γὰρ δεῖ μένοντας 371d αὐτοὺς περὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν τὰ μὲν ἀντʼ ἀργυρίου ἀλλάξασθαι τοῖς τι δεομένοις ἀποδόσθαι, τοῖς δὲ ἀντὶ αὖ ἀργυρίου διαλλάττειν ὅσοι τι δέονται πρίασθαι.
“Not at all,” he said. “There are people who see this and appoint themselves to this service. In well-run cities they’re usually those who are weakest in body and no use for any other work. They have to stay 371d right there around the marketplace and give money in exchange for goods to those who need to sell something, and goods in exchange for money to all who need to buy something.”
αὕτη ἄρα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἡ χρεία καπήλων ἡμῖν γένεσιν ἐμποιεῖ τῇ πόλει. ἢ οὐ καπήλους καλοῦμεν τοὺς πρὸς ὠνήν τε καὶ πρᾶσιν διακονοῦντας ἱδρυμένους ἐν ἀγορᾷ, τοὺς δὲ πλανήτας ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις ἐμπόρους;
πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 371e
ἔτι δή τινες, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, εἰσὶ καὶ ἄλλοι διάκονοι, οἳ ἂν τὰ μὲν τῆς διανοίας μὴ πάνυ ἀξιοκοινώνητοι ὦσιν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἰσχὺν ἱκανὴν ἐπὶ τοὺς πόνους ἔχωσιν· οἳ δὴ πωλοῦντες τὴν τῆς ἰσχύος χρείαν, τὴν τιμὴν ταύτην μισθὸν καλοῦντες, κέκληνται, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, μισθωτοί· ἦ γάρ;
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
“So this need,” I said, “brings shopkeepers into being in our city. Or don’t we call those who provide the service of buying and selling, set up in the marketplace, shopkeepers, and those who travel from city to city merchants?”
“Certainly.” 371e
“And there are still other servants, I think, who wouldn’t be very worthwhile partners where the mind is concerned, but have enough bodily strength for hard labor. They sell the use of their strength and call the price a wage, and so they’re called, I think, wage earners. Isn’t that so?”
“Certainly.”
πλήρωμα δὴ πόλεώς εἰσιν, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ μισθωτοί.
δοκεῖ μοι.
ἆρʼ οὖν, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, ἤδη ἡμῖν ηὔξηται ἡ πόλις, ὥστʼ εἶναι τελέα;
ἴσως.
ποῦ οὖν ἄν ποτε ἐν αὐτῇ εἴη ἥ τε δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀδικία; καὶ τίνι ἅμα ἐγγενομένη ὧν ἐσκέμμεθα;
ἐγὼ μέν, ἔφη, οὐκ ἐννοῶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ μή που ἐν αὐτῶν τούτων χρείᾳ τινὶ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους.
ἀλλʼ ἴσως, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καλῶς λέγεις· καὶ σκεπτέον γε καὶ οὐκ ἀποκνητέον.
“So wage earners too, it seems, help make up the full complement of a city.”
“I think so.”
“Well, Adeimantus, has our city now grown to completion?”
“Perhaps.”
“Then where in it would justice and injustice be? And along with which of the things we’ve looked at did they come into it?”
“I can’t think, Socrates,” he said, “unless perhaps it’s somewhere in the need these very people have of one another.”
“Perhaps you’re right,” I said. “We must look into it and not shrink from it.”
πρῶτον οὖν σκεψώμεθα τίνα τρόπον διαιτήσονται οἱ οὕτω παρεσκευασμένοι. ἄλλο τι ἢ σῖτόν τε ποιοῦντες καὶ οἶνον καὶ ἱμάτια καὶ ὑποδήματα; καὶ οἰκοδομησάμενοι οἰκίας, θέρους μὲν τὰ πολλὰ γυμνοί τε καὶ ἀνυπόδητοι ἐργάσονται, τοῦ δὲ 372b χειμῶνος ἠμφιεσμένοι τε καὶ ὑποδεδεμένοι ἱκανῶς· θρέψονται δὲ ἐκ μὲν τῶν κριθῶν ἄλφιτα σκευαζόμενοι, ἐκ δὲ τῶν πυρῶν ἄλευρα, τὰ μὲν πέψαντες, τὰ δὲ μάξαντες, μάζας γενναίας καὶ ἄρτους ἐπὶ κάλαμόν τινα παραβαλλόμενοι ἢ φύλλα καθαρά, κατακλινέντες ἐπὶ στιβάδων ἐστρωμένων μίλακί τε καὶ μυρρίναις, εὐωχήσονται αὐτοί τε καὶ τὰ παιδία, ἐπιπίνοντες τοῦ οἴνου, ἐστεφανωμένοι καὶ ὑμνοῦντες τοὺς θεούς, ἡδέως συνόντες ἀλλήλοις, οὐχ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν ποιούμενοι 372c τοὺς παῖδας, εὐλαβούμενοι πενίαν ἢ πόλεμον.
“First, then, let’s look at how people provided for in this way will live. Won’t they produce grain and wine and clothes and shoes? They’ll build houses, and in summer they’ll mostly work stripped and barefoot, and in 372b winter adequately clothed and shod. For food they’ll make barley meal from their barley and flour from their wheat, baking some and kneading some, and they’ll set out fine barley cakes and loaves on reeds or clean leaves. Reclining on beds strewn with bryony and myrtle, they’ll feast, they and their children, drinking wine afterwards, wearing garlands and singing hymns to the gods. They’ll enjoy one another’s company, and won’t have more 372c children than their means allow, guarding against poverty or war.”
καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων ὑπολαβών, Ἄνευ ὄψου, ἔφη, ὡς ἔοικας, ποιεῖς τοὺς ἄνδρας ἑστιωμένους.
ἀληθῆ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, λέγεις. ἐπελαθόμην ὅτι καὶ ὄψον ἕξουσιν, ἅλας τε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐλάας καὶ τυρόν, καὶ βολβοὺς καὶ λάχανά γε, οἷα δὴ ἐν ἀγροῖς ἑψήματα, ἑψήσονται. καὶ τραγήματά που παραθήσομεν αὐτοῖς τῶν τε σύκων καὶ ἐρεβίνθων καὶ κυάμων, καὶ μύρτα καὶ φηγοὺς σποδιοῦσιν 372d πρὸς τὸ πῦρ, μετρίως ὑποπίνοντες· καὶ οὕτω διάγοντες τὸν βίον ἐν εἰρήνῃ μετὰ ὑγιείας, ὡς εἰκός, γηραιοὶ τελευτῶντες ἄλλον τοιοῦτον βίον τοῖς ἐκγόνοις παραδώσουσιν.
And Glaucon broke in. “Your men seem to be feasting on plain bread,” he said, “with nothing to go with it.”
“That’s true,” I said. “I forgot that they’ll have things to go with it: salt, obviously, and olives and cheese, and they’ll boil onions and greens, the sort of things people boil in the country. And we’ll set out desserts for them, of figs and chickpeas and beans, and they’ll roast myrtle-berries and acorns 372d in the fire, drinking in moderation. And so, living out their lives in peace and good health, as you’d expect, they’ll die old and hand on another life just like it to their descendants.”
καὶ ὅς, εἰ δὲ ὑῶν πόλιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, κατεσκεύαζες, τί ἂν αὐτὰς ἄλλο ἢ ταῦτα ἐχόρταζες;
ἀλλὰ πῶς χρή, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων;
ἅπερ νομίζεται, ἔφη· ἐπί τε κλινῶν κατακεῖσθαι οἶμαι τοὺς μέλλοντας μὴ ταλαιπωρεῖσθαι, καὶ ἀπὸ τραπεζῶν 372e δειπνεῖν, καὶ ὄψα ἅπερ καὶ οἱ νῦν ἔχουσι καὶ τραγήματα.
And he said, “If you were founding a city of pigs, Socrates, what else would you fatten them on but this?”
“Well, how should they live, Glaucon?” I said.
“The customary way,” he said. “If they aren’t going to be miserable, I think they should recline on couches and dine off tables, 372e and have the dishes and desserts people have nowadays.”
The feverish city and its guardians
Glaucon demands luxuries, and the enlarged city needs an army of guardians with the right natures.
εἶεν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ· μανθάνω. οὐ πόλιν, ὡς ἔοικε, σκοποῦμεν μόνον ὅπως γίγνεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τρυφῶσαν πόλιν. ἴσως οὖν οὐδὲ κακῶς ἔχει· σκοποῦντες γὰρ καὶ τοιαύτην τάχʼ ἂν κατίδοιμεν τήν τε δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀδικίαν ὅπῃ ποτὲ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐμφύονται. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀληθινὴ πόλις δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι ἣν διεληλύθαμεν, ὥσπερ ὑγιής τις· εἰ δʼ αὖ βούλεσθε, καὶ φλεγμαίνουσαν πόλιν θεωρήσωμεν· οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει.
“Very well,” I said. “I understand. It seems we’re examining not only how a city comes into being, but how a luxurious city does. Perhaps that’s no bad thing: by examining a city like that too, we might well see how justice and injustice take root in cities. Now the true city, I think, is the one we’ve described, the healthy one, as it were. But if you want, let’s also look at a city with a fever. Nothing stops us.
ταῦτα γὰρ δή τισιν, ὡς δοκεῖ, οὐκ ἐξαρκέσει, οὐδὲ αὕτη ἡ δίαιτα, ἀλλὰ κλῖναί τε προσέσονται καὶ τράπεζαι καὶ τἆλλα σκεύη, καὶ ὄψα δὴ καὶ μύρα καὶ θυμιάματα καὶ ἑταῖραι καὶ πέμματα, καὶ ἕκαστα τούτων παντοδαπά. καὶ δὴ καὶ ἃ τὸ πρῶτον ἐλέγομεν οὐκέτι τἀναγκαῖα θετέον, οἰκίας τε καὶ ἱμάτια καὶ ὑποδήματα, ἀλλὰ τήν τε ζωγραφίαν κινητέον καὶ τὴν ποικιλίαν, καὶ χρυσὸν καὶ ἐλέφαντα καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα κτητέον. ἦ γάρ; 373b
ναί, ἔφη.
“For some people, it seems, these things won’t be enough, and neither will this way of life. Couches will be added, and tables and other furniture, and dishes too, and perfumes and incense, and courtesans and pastries, and every one of these in every variety. And the things we mentioned first, houses and clothes and shoes, can no longer be counted as the necessities; we’ll have to set painting and embroidery going, and acquire gold and ivory and everything of that kind. Isn’t that so?” 373b
“Yes,” he said.
οὐκοῦν μείζονά τε αὖ τὴν πόλιν δεῖ ποιεῖν· ἐκείνη γὰρ ἡ ὑγιεινὴ οὐκέτι ἱκανή, ἀλλʼ ἤδη ὄγκου ἐμπληστέα καὶ πλήθους, ἃ οὐκέτι τοῦ ἀναγκαίου ἕνεκά ἐστιν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, οἷον οἵ τε θηρευταὶ πάντες οἵ τε μιμηταί, πολλοὶ μὲν οἱ περὶ τὰ σχήματά τε καὶ χρώματα, πολλοὶ δὲ οἱ περὶ μουσικήν, ποιηταί τε καὶ τούτων ὑπηρέται, ῥαψῳδοί, ὑποκριταί, χορευταί, ἐργολάβοι, σκευῶν τε παντοδαπῶν δημιουργοί, τῶν τε ἄλλων 373c καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸν γυναικεῖον κόσμον. καὶ δὴ καὶ διακόνων πλειόνων δεησόμεθα· ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ δεήσειν παιδαγωγῶν, τιτθῶν, τροφῶν, κομμωτριῶν, κουρέων, καὶ αὖ ὀψοποιῶν τε καὶ μαγείρων; ἔτι δὲ καὶ συβωτῶν προσδεησόμεθα· τοῦτο γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ πόλει οὐκ ἐνῆν—ἔδει γὰρ οὐδέν—ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ καὶ τούτου προσδεήσει.
“Then we have to make the city bigger again. The healthy one is no longer adequate; now it has to be filled with a mass and multitude of things that are no longer in cities because they’re needed. All the hunters, for instance, and the imitators: many concerned with shapes and colors, many with music; poets and their assistants, rhapsodes, actors, chorus-dancers, contractors; and makers of all kinds of goods, including those 373c for women’s adornment. We’ll need more servants too. Or don’t you think we’ll need children’s attendants, wet nurses, nannies, hairdressers, barbers, and cooks and butchers as well? And we’ll need swineherds besides. There were none in our earlier city, since there was no need of them, but in this one we’ll need them too.
δεήσει δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων βοσκημάτων παμπόλλων, εἴ τις αὐτὰ ἔδεται· ἦ γάρ;
“And we’ll need a great many other animals as well, if people are going to eat them. Won’t we?”
πῶς γὰρ οὔ; 373d
οὐκοῦν καὶ ἰατρῶν ἐν χρείαις ἐσόμεθα πολὺ μᾶλλον οὕτω διαιτώμενοι ἢ ὡς τὸ πρότερον;
πολύ γε.
καὶ ἡ χώρα γέ που, ἡ τότε ἱκανὴ τρέφειν τοὺς τότε, σμικρὰ δὴ ἐξ ἱκανῆς ἔσται. ἢ πῶς λέγομεν;
οὕτως, ἔφη.
οὐκοῦν τῆς τῶν πλησίον χώρας ἡμῖν ἀποτμητέον, εἰ μέλλομεν ἱκανὴν ἕξειν νέμειν τε καὶ ἀροῦν, καὶ ἐκείνοις αὖ τῆς ἡμετέρας, ἐὰν καὶ ἐκεῖνοι ἀφῶσιν αὑτοὺς ἐπὶ χρημάτων κτῆσιν ἄπειρον, ὑπερβάντες τὸν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὅρον; 373e
πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.
“Of course.” 373d
“And living like this, we’ll have far more need of doctors than before?”
“Far more.”
“And the land, I suppose, which was enough to feed the people back then, will now be too small instead of enough. Or what do we say?”
“Just that,” he said.
“Then we’ll have to cut off a slice of our neighbors’ land, if we’re going to have enough for pasture and plowing, and they’ll want a slice of ours, if they too give themselves over to the unlimited acquisition of wealth and overstep the limit of what’s necessary?” 373e
“That’s quite inevitable, Socrates,” he said.
πολεμήσομεν δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὦ Γλαύκων; ἢ πῶς ἔσται;
οὕτως, ἔφη.
καὶ μηδέν γέ πω λέγωμεν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, μήτʼ εἴ τι κακὸν μήτʼ εἰ ἀγαθὸν ὁ πόλεμος ἐργάζεται, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον μόνον, ὅτι πολέμου αὖ γένεσιν ηὑρήκαμεν, ἐξ ὧν μάλιστα ταῖς πόλεσιν καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ κακὰ γίγνεται, ὅταν γίγνηται.
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ἔτι δή, ὦ φίλε, μείζονος τῆς πόλεως δεῖ οὔ τι σμικρῷ, 374a ἀλλʼ ὅλῳ στρατοπέδῳ, ὃ ἐξελθὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς οὐσίας ἁπάσης καὶ ὑπὲρ ὧν νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν διαμαχεῖται τοῖς ἐπιοῦσιν.
“So next we’ll go to war, Glaucon? Or how will it be?”
“Like that,” he said.
“And let’s not say yet,” I said, “whether war does any harm or any good, but only this much: that we’ve now found the origin of war too. It comes from the very things that, whenever they arise, are the chief source of evils in cities, both for individuals and for the community.”
“Certainly.”
“Then the city needs to be bigger still, my friend, and not by a little, 374a but by a whole army, which will march out and fight off invaders in defense of all its property and of everything we were just talking about.”
τί δέ; ἦ δʼ ὅς· αὐτοὶ οὐχ ἱκανοί;
οὔκ, εἰ σύ γε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἅπαντες ὡμολογήσαμεν καλῶς, ἡνίκα ἐπλάττομεν τὴν πόλιν· ὡμολογοῦμεν δέ που, εἰ μέμνησαι, ἀδύνατον ἕνα πολλὰς καλῶς ἐργάζεσθαι τέχνας.
ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη. 374b
τί οὖν; ἦν δʼ ἐγώ· ἡ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἀγωνία οὐ τεχνικὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι;
καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.
ἦ οὖν τι σκυτικῆς δεῖ μᾶλλον κήδεσθαι ἢ πολεμικῆς;
οὐδαμῶς.
“Why?” he said. “Aren’t the citizens themselves enough?”
“No,” I said, “not if you and the rest of us were right in what we agreed when we were shaping the city. We agreed, if you remember, that it’s impossible for one person to practice many crafts well.”
“That’s true,” he said. 374b
“Well then,” I said, “doesn’t fighting a war seem to be a matter of skill?”
“Very much so,” he said.
“Should we care more about shoemaking than about the art of war?”
“Not at all.”
ἀλλʼ ἄρα τὸν μὲν σκυτοτόμον διεκωλύομεν μήτε γεωργὸν ἐπιχειρεῖν εἶναι ἅμα μήτε ὑφάντην μήτε οἰκοδόμον ἀλλὰ σκυτοτόμον, ἵνα δὴ ἡμῖν τὸ τῆς σκυτικῆς ἔργον καλῶς γίγνοιτο, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ ὡσαύτως ἓν ἀπεδίδομεν, πρὸς ὃ ἐπεφύκει ἕκαστος καὶ ἐφʼ ᾧ ἔμελλε τῶν ἄλλων 374c σχολὴν ἄγων διὰ βίου αὐτὸ ἐργαζόμενος οὐ παριεὶς τοὺς καιροὺς καλῶς ἀπεργάσεσθαι· τὰ δὲ δὴ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον πότερον οὐ περὶ πλείστου ἐστὶν εὖ ἀπεργασθέντα; ἢ οὕτω ῥᾴδιον, ὥστε καὶ γεωργῶν τις ἅμα πολεμικὸς ἔσται καὶ σκυτοτομῶν καὶ ἄλλην τέχνην ἡντινοῦν ἐργαζόμενος, πεττευτικὸς δὲ ἢ κυβευτικὸς ἱκανῶς οὐδʼ ἂν εἷς γένοιτο μὴ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐκ παιδὸς ἐπιτηδεύων, ἀλλὰ παρέργῳ χρώμενος;
“Yet we wouldn’t let the shoemaker try to be a farmer at the same time, or a weaver or a builder; he was to be a shoemaker, so that our shoemaking would be done well. And in the same way we gave each of the others one job, the one he was naturally suited for, which he was to work at all his life, free 374c of the others, not letting the right moments slip by, and so do it well. Now isn’t it of the greatest importance that the business of war be done well? Or is it so easy that someone who farms, or makes shoes, or practices any other craft whatever, can be a soldier at the same time, when nobody could become even a competent player of board games or dice if he didn’t practice that very thing from childhood but treated it as a sideline?
καὶ ἀσπίδα μὲν λαβὼν ἤ τι ἄλλο τῶν πολεμικῶν ὅπλων τε καὶ ὀργάνων αὐθημερὸν ὁπλιτικῆς ἤ τινος ἄλλης μάχης τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον ἱκανὸς ἔσται ἀγωνιστής, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ὀργάνων οὐδὲν οὐδένα δημιουργὸν οὐδὲ ἀθλητὴν ληφθὲν ποιήσει, οὐδʼ ἔσται χρήσιμον τῷ μήτε τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἑκάστου λαβόντι μήτε τὴν μελέτην ἱκανὴν παρασχομένῳ;
“Will someone who picks up a shield, or any other weapon or instrument of war, be a competent fighter that very day, in the heavy infantry or any other kind of battle war involves, when no other tool, just by being picked up, will make anyone a craftsman or an athlete, or be any use to someone who hasn’t acquired the knowledge of it or put in enough practice?”
πολλοῦ γὰρ ἄν, ἦ δʼ ὅς, τὰ ὄργανα ἦν ἄξια.
οὐκοῦν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὅσῳ μέγιστον τὸ τῶν φυλάκων ἔργον, 374e τοσούτῳ σχολῆς τε τῶν ἄλλων πλείστης ἂν εἴη καὶ αὖ τέχνης τε καὶ ἐπιμελείας μεγίστης δεόμενον.
οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ καὶ φύσεως ἐπιτηδείας εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα;
πῶς δʼ οὔ;
ἡμέτερον δὴ ἔργον ἂν εἴη, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴπερ οἷοί τʼ ἐσμέν, ἐκλέξασθαι τίνες τε καὶ ποῖαι φύσεις ἐπιτήδειαι εἰς πόλεως φυλακήν.
ἡμέτερον μέντοι.
“If that were so,” he said, “tools would be worth a great deal.”
“Then,” I said, “the more important the guardians’ work is, 374e the more it would need freedom from other occupations, and the greatest skill and care.”
“I certainly think so,” he said.
“And won’t it also need a nature suited to that very pursuit?”
“Of course.”
“Then it would be our job, it seems, if we’re up to it, to pick out which natures, and what sort, are suited to guarding a city.”
“It is our job, yes.”
μὰ Δία, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, οὐκ ἄρα φαῦλον πρᾶγμα ἠράμεθα· ὅμως δὲ οὐκ ἀποδειλιατέον, ὅσον γʼ ἂν δύναμις παρείκῃ.
οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη.
οἴει οὖν τι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, διαφέρειν φύσιν γενναίου σκύλακος εἰς φυλακὴν νεανίσκου εὐγενοῦς;
τὸ ποῖον λέγεις;
οἷον ὀξύν τέ που δεῖ αὐτοῖν ἑκάτερον εἶναι πρὸς αἴσθησιν καὶ ἐλαφρὸν πρὸς τὸ αἰσθανόμενον διωκάθειν, καὶ ἰσχυρὸν αὖ, ἐὰν δέῃ ἑλόντα διαμάχεσθαι.
δεῖ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη, πάντων τούτων.
καὶ μὴν ἀνδρεῖόν γε, εἴπερ εὖ μαχεῖται.
πῶς δʼ οὔ;
“By Zeus,” I said, “it’s no small task we’ve taken on. Still, we mustn’t lose heart, as far as our strength allows.”
“No, we mustn’t,” he said.
“Do you think,” I said, “that when it comes to guarding, the nature of a well-bred puppy is any different from that of a well-born young man?”
“What do you mean?”
“Well, each of them has to be sharp at noticing things, quick at chasing down what he’s noticed, and strong as well, if he has to fight once he’s caught it.”
“Yes,” he said, “they need all of these.”
“And brave too, surely, if he’s going to fight well.”
“Of course.”
ἀνδρεῖος δὲ εἶναι ἆρα ἐθελήσει ὁ μὴ θυμοειδὴς εἴτε ἵππος εἴτε κύων ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν ζῷον; ἢ οὐκ ἐννενόηκας ὡς 375b ἄμαχόν τε καὶ ἀνίκητον θυμός, οὗ παρόντος ψυχὴ πᾶσα πρὸς πάντα ἄφοβός τέ ἐστι καὶ ἀήττητος;
ἐννενόηκα.
τὰ μὲν τοίνυν τοῦ σώματος οἷον δεῖ τὸν φύλακα εἶναι, δῆλα.
ναί.
καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅτι γε θυμοειδῆ.
καὶ τοῦτο.
πῶς οὖν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, οὐκ ἄγριοι ἀλλήλοις τε ἔσονται καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις, ὄντες τοιοῦτοι τὰς φύσεις;
“But will a horse or a dog or any other animal be willing to be brave if it isn’t spirited? Haven’t you noticed how 375b irresistible and invincible spirit is? When it’s present, every soul is fearless and unconquerable in the face of anything.”
“I have noticed.”
“Then it’s clear what the guardian must be like in body.”
“Yes.”
“And in soul too: he must be spirited.”
“That too.”
“Then how, Glaucon,” I said, “will people with natures like that keep from being savage to one another and to the rest of the citizens?”
μὰ Δία, ἦ δʼ ὅς, οὐ ῥᾳδίως. 375c
ἀλλὰ μέντοι δεῖ γε πρὸς μὲν τοὺς οἰκείους πρᾴους αὐτοὺς εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους χαλεπούς· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ περιμενοῦσιν ἄλλους σφᾶς διολέσαι, ἀλλʼ αὐτοὶ φθήσονται αὐτὸ δράσαντες.
ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.
τί οὖν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ποιήσομεν; πόθεν ἅμα πρᾷον καὶ μεγαλόθυμον ἦθος εὑρήσομεν; ἐναντία γάρ που θυμοειδεῖ πρᾳεῖα φύσις.
φαίνεται.
ἀλλὰ μέντοι τούτων γε ὁποτέρου ἂν στέρηται, φύλαξ ἀγαθὸς οὐ μὴ γένηται· ταῦτα δὲ ἀδυνάτοις ἔοικεν, καὶ οὕτω 375d δὴ συμβαίνει ἀγαθὸν φύλακα ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι.
“By Zeus,” he said, “it won’t be easy.” 375c
“And yet they have to be gentle toward their own people and harsh toward their enemies. Otherwise they won’t wait for others to destroy them; they’ll get there first and do it themselves.”
“True,” he said.
“What are we to do, then?” I said. “Where will we find a character that is gentle and high-spirited at once? A gentle nature is surely the opposite of a spirited one.”
“So it seems.”
“But if he lacks either of these, he’ll never be a good guardian. And having both looks impossible, and so 375d it turns out that a good guardian can’t exist.”
κινδυνεύει, ἔφη.
καὶ ἐγὼ ἀπορήσας τε καὶ ἐπισκεψάμενος τὰ ἔμπροσθεν, δικαίως γε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, ἀποροῦμεν· ἧς γὰρ προυθέμεθα εἰκόνος ἀπελείφθημεν.
πῶς λέγεις;
οὐκ ἐννενοήκαμεν ὅτι εἰσὶν ἄρα φύσεις οἵας ἡμεῖς οὐκ ᾠήθημεν, ἔχουσαι τἀναντία ταῦτα.
ποῦ δή;
“It looks that way,” he said.
I was at a loss too, but after thinking over what we’d said before, I said, “We deserve to be at a loss, my friend. We’ve abandoned the comparison we put forward.”
“What do you mean?”
“We didn’t notice that there are natures of the kind we thought didn’t exist, with both these opposite qualities.”
“Where?”
ἴδοι μὲν ἄν τις καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ζῴοις, οὐ μεντἂν ἥκιστα 375e ἐν ᾧ ἡμεῖς παρεβάλλομεν τῷ φύλακι. οἶσθα γάρ που τῶν γενναίων κυνῶν, ὅτι τοῦτο φύσει αὐτῶν τὸ ἦθος, πρὸς μὲν τοὺς συνήθεις τε καὶ γνωρίμους ὡς οἷόν τε πρᾳοτάτους εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀγνῶτας τοὐναντίον.
οἶδα μέντοι.
τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, δυνατόν, καὶ οὐ παρὰ φύσιν ζητοῦμεν τοιοῦτον εἶναι τὸν φύλακα.
οὐκ ἔοικεν.
ἆρʼ οὖν σοι δοκεῖ ἔτι τοῦδε προσδεῖσθαι ὁ φυλακικὸς ἐσόμενος, πρὸς τῷ θυμοειδεῖ ἔτι προσγενέσθαι φιλόσοφος τὴν φύσιν;
“You could see it in other animals too, but not least 375e in the one we compared with the guardian. You know, I’m sure, that this is the natural character of well-bred dogs: to be as gentle as can be toward the people they’re used to and know, and the opposite toward strangers.”
“Yes, I know.”
“So it’s possible,” I said, “and it’s not against nature to look for a guardian like that.”
“It seems not.”
“Then do you think the one who’s going to be a guardian needs something more as well: to be not only spirited but also philosophical by nature?”
πῶς δή; ἔφη· οὐ γὰρ ἐννοῶ.
καὶ τοῦτο, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἐν τοῖς κυσὶν κατόψει, ὃ καὶ ἄξιον θαυμάσαι τοῦ θηρίου.
τὸ ποῖον;
ὅτι ὃν μὲν ἂν ἴδῃ ἀγνῶτα, χαλεπαίνει, οὐδὲ ἓν κακὸν προπεπονθώς· ὃν δʼ ἂν γνώριμον, ἀσπάζεται, κἂν μηδὲν πώποτε ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὸν πεπόνθῃ. ἢ οὔπω τοῦτο ἐθαύμασας;
οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη, μέχρι τούτου προσέσχον τὸν νοῦν· ὅτι δέ που δρᾷ ταῦτα, δῆλον.
ἀλλὰ μὴν κομψόν γε φαίνεται τὸ πάθος αὐτοῦ τῆς 376b φύσεως καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφον.
πῇ δή;
“How so?” he said. “I don’t follow.”
“You’ll see this in dogs too,” I said, “and it’s something in the animal that deserves our admiration.”
“What’s that?”
“When it sees someone it doesn’t know, it gets angry, though it has never suffered any harm from him; but when it sees someone it knows, it welcomes him, even if it has never had anything good from him. Haven’t you ever marveled at that?”
“I’ve never really paid attention to it until now,” he said. “But obviously they do that.”
“Well, this trait of its nature looks like a clever one, 376b and truly philosophical.”
“In what way?”
ἧι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὄψιν οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ φίλην καὶ ἐχθρὰν διακρίνει ἢ τῷ τὴν μὲν καταμαθεῖν, τὴν δὲ ἀγνοῆσαι. καίτοι πῶς οὐκ ἂν φιλομαθὲς εἴη συνέσει τε καὶ ἀγνοίᾳ ὁριζόμενον τό τε οἰκεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀλλότριον;
οὐδαμῶς, ἦ δʼ ὅς, ὅπως οὔ.
ἀλλὰ μέντοι, εἶπον ἐγώ, τό γε φιλομαθὲς καὶ φιλόσοφον ταὐτόν;
ταὐτὸν γάρ, ἔφη.
οὐκοῦν θαρροῦντες τιθῶμεν καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ, εἰ μέλλει 376c πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους καὶ γνωρίμους πρᾷός τις ἔσεσθαι, φύσει φιλόσοφον καὶ φιλομαθῆ αὐτὸν δεῖν εἶναι;
τιθῶμεν, ἔφη.
“In that it tells a friendly face from a hostile one by nothing else than that it has come to know the one and doesn’t know the other,” I said. “And surely a creature that marks off what’s its own from what’s foreign by knowledge and ignorance must be a lover of learning?”
“It can’t be otherwise,” he said.
“But surely,” I said, “the love of learning and philosophy are the same thing?”
“The same,” he said.
“Then may we confidently lay it down for a human being too, that if he’s going to 376c be gentle toward his own people and those he knows, he must be philosophical and a lover of learning by nature?”
“Let’s lay it down,” he said.
φιλόσοφος δὴ καὶ θυμοειδὴς καὶ ταχὺς καὶ ἰσχυρὸς ἡμῖν τὴν φύσιν ἔσται ὁ μέλλων καλὸς κἀγαθὸς ἔσεσθαι φύλαξ πόλεως.
παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.
οὗτος μὲν δὴ ἂν οὕτως ὑπάρχοι. θρέψονται δὲ δὴ ἡμῖν οὗτοι καὶ παιδευθήσονται τίνα τρόπον; καὶ ἆρά τι προὔργου ἡμῖν ἐστιν αὐτὸ σκοποῦσι πρὸς τὸ κατιδεῖν οὗπερ ἕνεκα 376d πάντα σκοποῦμεν, δικαιοσύνην τε καὶ ἀδικίαν τίνα τρόπον ἐν πόλει γίγνεται; ἵνα μὴ ἐῶμεν ἱκανὸν λόγον ἢ συχνὸν διεξίωμεν.
“So the one who’s going to be a fine, good guardian of our city will be philosophical, spirited, fast and strong by nature.”
“Absolutely,” he said.
“Then that’s what he’ll be to begin with. But how are they to be brought up and educated? And will looking into that help us see what 376d our whole inquiry is aimed at, how justice and injustice come to be in a city? We don’t want to leave out anything that matters, or go through a long, drawn-out discussion.”
Stories about the gods
Socrates says the guardians' education must begin with stories, and censors false tales about the gods.
καὶ ὁ τοῦ Γλαύκωνος ἀδελφός, πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἔγωγε προσδοκῶ προὔργου εἶναι εἰς τοῦτο ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν.
μὰ Δία, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Ἀδείμαντε, οὐκ ἄρα ἀφετέον, οὐδʼ εἰ μακροτέρα τυγχάνει οὖσα.
οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
ἴθι οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐν μύθῳ μυθολογοῦντές τε καὶ σχολὴν ἄγοντες λόγῳ παιδεύωμεν τοὺς ἄνδρας. 376e
ἀλλὰ χρή.
τίς οὖν ἡ παιδεία; ἢ χαλεπὸν εὑρεῖν βελτίω τῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ χρόνου ηὑρημένης; ἔστιν δέ που ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ σώμασι γυμναστική, ἡ δʼ ἐπὶ ψυχῇ μουσική.
ἔστιν γάρ.
And Glaucon’s brother said, “Certainly. I fully expect this inquiry will help with that.”
“By Zeus, my dear Adeimantus,” I said, “then we mustn’t drop it, even if it turns out rather long.”
“No, we mustn’t.”
“Come on, then. Let’s educate these men in our discussion, as if we were telling a story and had time on our hands.” 376e
“We should.”
“So what will their education be? Or is it hard to find a better one than the one discovered over a long time? That, I suppose, is physical training for the body and music for the soul.”
“Yes, it is.”
ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ μουσικῇ πρότερον ἀρξόμεθα παιδεύοντες ἢ γυμναστικῇ;
πῶς δʼ οὔ;
μουσικῆς δʼ, εἶπον, τιθεῖς λόγους, ἢ οὔ;
ἔγωγε.
λόγων δὲ διττὸν εἶδος, τὸ μὲν ἀληθές, ψεῦδος δʼ ἕτερον;
ναί.
παιδευτέον δʼ ἐν ἀμφοτέροις, πρότερον δʼ ἐν τοῖς ψευδέσιν;
οὐ μανθάνω, ἔφη, πῶς λέγεις.
οὐ μανθάνεις, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὅτι πρῶτον τοῖς παιδίοις μύθους λέγομεν; τοῦτο δέ που ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν ψεῦδος, ἔνι δὲ καὶ ἀληθῆ. πρότερον δὲ μύθοις πρὸς τὰ παιδία ἢ γυμνασίοις χρώμεθα.
ἔστι ταῦτα.
“And won’t we begin educating them in music before physical training?”
“Of course.”
“Do you count stories as part of music,” I said, “or not?”
“I do.”
“And stories are of two kinds, true and false?”
“Yes.”
“And they must be educated in both, but first in the false ones?”
“I don’t understand what you mean,” he said.
“Don’t you understand,” I said, “that the first thing we do is tell children tales? Taken as a whole, these are false, though there’s some truth in them too. And we use tales with children before we use exercise.”
“That’s so.”
τοῦτο δὴ ἔλεγον, ὅτι μουσικῆς πρότερον ἁπτέον ἢ γυμναστικῆς.
ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.
οὐκοῦν οἶσθʼ ὅτι ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἔργου μέγιστον, ἄλλως 377b τε δὴ καὶ νέῳ καὶ ἁπαλῷ ὁτῳοῦν; μάλιστα γὰρ δὴ τότε πλάττεται, καὶ ἐνδύεται τύπος ὃν ἄν τις βούληται ἐνσημήνασθαι ἑκάστῳ.
κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.
ἆρʼ οὖν ῥᾳδίως οὕτω παρήσομεν τοὺς ἐπιτυχόντας ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων μύθους πλασθέντας ἀκούειν τοὺς παῖδας καὶ λαμβάνειν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐναντίας δόξας ἐκείναις ἅς, ἐπειδὰν τελεωθῶσιν, ἔχειν οἰησόμεθα δεῖν αὐτούς;
οὐδʼ ὁπωστιοῦν παρήσομεν.
“That’s what I meant when I said we must take up music before physical training.”
“Rightly,” he said.
“Now you know that the beginning is the most important part of any task, 377b especially with anything young and tender? That’s when it’s most easily shaped, and takes on whatever stamp one wants to impress on it.”
“Exactly.”
“Then shall we just casually let the children hear any old tales made up by any old people, and take into their souls opinions that are mostly the opposite of the ones we’ll think they ought to have when they’re grown up?”
“We won’t allow that at all.”
πρῶτον δὴ ἡμῖν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπιστατητέον τοῖς μυθοποιοῖς, 377c καὶ ὃν μὲν ἂν καλὸν μῦθον ποιήσωσιν, ἐγκριτέον, ὃν δʼ ἂν μή, ἀποκριτέον. τοὺς δʼ ἐγκριθέντας πείσομεν τὰς τροφούς τε καὶ μητέρας λέγειν τοῖς παισίν, καὶ πλάττειν τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τοῖς μύθοις πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ σώματα ταῖς χερσίν· ὧν δὲ νῦν λέγουσι τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκβλητέον.
ποίους δή; ἔφη.
ἐν τοῖς μείζοσιν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, μύθοις ὀψόμεθα καὶ τοὺς ἐλάττους. δεῖ γὰρ δὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τύπον εἶναι καὶ ταὐτὸν 377d δύνασθαι τούς τε μείζους καὶ τοὺς ἐλάττους. ἢ οὐκ οἴει;
“First, then, it seems, we must supervise the makers of tales, 377c and accept any fine tale they make, and reject any that isn’t. And we’ll persuade nurses and mothers to tell the children the ones we’ve accepted, and to shape their souls with tales far more than they shape their bodies with their hands. Most of the ones they tell now will have to be thrown out.”
“Which ones?” he said.
“We’ll see the lesser ones in the greater,” I said. “The greater and the lesser have to be of the same stamp and have the same 377d effect. Don’t you think so?”
ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη· ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐννοῶ οὐδὲ τοὺς μείζους τίνας λέγεις.
οὓς Ἡσίοδός τε, εἶπον, καὶ Ὅμηρος ἡμῖν ἐλεγέτην καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταί. οὗτοι γάρ που μύθους τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ψευδεῖς συντιθέντες ἔλεγόν τε καὶ λέγουσι.
ποίους δή, ἦ δʼ ὅς, καὶ τί αὐτῶν μεμφόμενος λέγεις;
ὅπερ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, χρὴ καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα μέμφεσθαι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐάν τις μὴ καλῶς ψεύδηται.
τί τοῦτο; 377e
“I do,” he said. “But I don’t see which ones you mean by the greater either.”
“The ones Hesiod and Homer told us,” I said, “and the other poets. They made up false tales and told them to people, and still do.”
“Which ones do you mean,” he said, “and what fault do you find with them?”
“The fault one should find first and foremost,” I said, “especially when the lie isn’t a fine one.”
“What’s that?” 377e
ὅταν εἰκάζῃ τις κακῶς οὐσίαν τῷ λόγῳ, περὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἡρώων οἷοί εἰσιν, ὥσπερ γραφεὺς μηδὲν ἐοικότα γράφων οἷς ἂν ὅμοια βουληθῇ γράψαι.
καὶ γάρ, ἔφη, ὀρθῶς ἔχει τά γε τοιαῦτα μέμφεσθαι. ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγομεν καὶ ποῖα;
“When someone gives a bad likeness in words of what gods and heroes are like, like a painter whose picture looks nothing like the things he means to paint.”
“Yes,” he said, “it’s right to find fault with things like that. But what do we mean, and what sort of things?”
πρῶτον μέν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τὸ μέγιστον καὶ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ψεῦδος ὁ εἰπὼν οὐ καλῶς ἐψεύσατο ὡς Οὐρανός τε ἠργάσατο ἅ φησι δρᾶσαι αὐτὸν Ἡσίοδος, ὅ τε αὖ Κρόνος 378a ὡς ἐτιμωρήσατο αὐτόν. τὰ δὲ δὴ τοῦ Κρόνου ἔργα καὶ πάθη ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑέος, οὐδʼ ἂν εἰ ἦν ἀληθῆ ᾤμην δεῖν ῥᾳδίως οὕτως λέγεσθαι πρὸς ἄφρονάς τε καὶ νέους, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μὲν σιγᾶσθαι, εἰ δὲ ἀνάγκη τις ἦν λέγειν, διʼ ἀπορρήτων ἀκούειν ὡς ὀλιγίστους, θυσαμένους οὐ χοῖρον ἀλλά τι μέγα καὶ ἄπορον θῦμα, ὅπως ὅτι ἐλαχίστοις συνέβη ἀκοῦσαι.
“First,” I said, “the greatest lie, about the greatest matters, and not a fine lie either: the story that Uranus did what Hesiod says he did, and that Cronus 378a took his revenge on him. As for what Cronus did, and what he suffered at the hands of his son, even if it were true I wouldn’t think it should be told so casually to young people who don’t know any better. It would be best to keep quiet about it, and if there were some need to tell it, as few people as possible should hear it, in secret, after sacrificing not a pig but some huge victim that’s hard to come by, so that as few as possible would get to hear it.”
καὶ γάρ, ἦ δʼ ὅς, οὗτοί γε οἱ λόγοι χαλεποί. 378b
καὶ οὐ λεκτέοι γʼ, ἔφην, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πόλει. οὐδὲ λεκτέον νέῳ ἀκούοντι ὡς ἀδικῶν τὰ ἔσχατα οὐδὲν ἂν θαυμαστὸν ποιοῖ, οὐδʼ αὖ ἀδικοῦντα πατέρα κολάζων παντὶ τρόπῳ, ἀλλὰ δρῴη ἂν ὅπερ θεῶν οἱ πρῶτοί τε καὶ μέγιστοι.
οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἦ δʼ ὅς, οὐδὲ αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ ἐπιτήδεια εἶναι λέγειν.
“Yes,” he said, “those stories are hard ones.” 378b
“And they mustn’t be told in our city, Adeimantus,” I said. “Nor must a young person be told, as he listens, that if he committed the worst crimes he’d be doing nothing remarkable, or if he punished his father for wrongdoing by any means he could, but would only be doing what the first and greatest of the gods did.”
“No, by Zeus,” he said, “I don’t think those things are fit to be told either.”
οὐδέ γε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τὸ παράπαν ὡς θεοὶ θεοῖς πολεμοῦσί 378c τε καὶ ἐπιβουλεύουσι καὶ μάχονται—οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀληθῆ—εἴ γε δεῖ ἡμῖν τοὺς μέλλοντας τὴν πόλιν φυλάξειν αἴσχιστον νομίζειν τὸ ῥᾳδίως ἀλλήλοις ἀπεχθάνεσθαι—πολλοῦ δεῖ γιγαντομαχίας τε μυθολογητέον αὐτοῖς καὶ ποικιλτέον, καὶ ἄλλας ἔχθρας πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς θεῶν τε καὶ ἡρώων πρὸς συγγενεῖς τε καὶ οἰκείους αὐτῶν—ἀλλʼ εἴ πως μέλλομεν πείσειν ὡς οὐδεὶς πώποτε πολίτης ἕτερος ἑτέρῳ ἀπήχθετο οὐδʼ ἔστιν τοῦτο ὅσιον, τοιαῦτα λεκτέα μᾶλλον πρὸς 378d τὰ παιδία εὐθὺς καὶ γέρουσι καὶ γραυσί, καὶ πρεσβυτέροις γιγνομένοις καὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς ἐγγὺς τούτων ἀναγκαστέον λογοποιεῖν. Ἥρας δὲ δεσμοὺς ὑπὸ ὑέος καὶ Ἡφαίστου ῥίψεις ὑπὸ πατρός, μέλλοντος τῇ μητρὶ τυπτομένῃ ἀμυνεῖν, καὶ θεομαχίας ὅσας Ὅμηρος πεποίηκεν οὐ παραδεκτέον εἰς τὴν πόλιν, οὔτʼ ἐν ὑπονοίαις πεποιημένας οὔτε ἄνευ ὑπονοιῶν.
“Nor, in fact,” I said, “that gods make war on gods 378c and plot against them and fight them, since it isn’t even true, if the people who are going to guard our city are to think it utterly shameful to fall out with one another lightly. The last thing we should do is tell them tales of the battles of the giants, or embroider them on robes, or the many feuds of every kind between gods and heroes and their own kin and families. No, if we’re somehow going to persuade them that no citizen has ever hated another, and that doing so is impious, then that’s the kind of thing old men and old women should tell 378d the children from the very start, and as they grow older, the poets too must be made to compose stories along these lines. But Hera’s being tied up by her son, and Hephaestus’ being hurled out of heaven by his father when he was going to defend his mother from a beating, and all the battles of the gods that Homer composed, must not be admitted into the city, whether they were composed with hidden meanings or without.
ὁ γὰρ νέος οὐχ οἷός τε κρίνειν ὅτι τε ὑπόνοια καὶ ὃ μή, ἀλλʼ ἃ ἂν τηλικοῦτος ὢν λάβῃ ἐν ταῖς δόξαις δυσέκνιπτά 378e τε καὶ ἀμετάστατα φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι· ὧν δὴ ἴσως ἕνεκα περὶ παντὸς ποιητέον ἃ πρῶτα ἀκούουσιν ὅτι κάλλιστα μεμυθολογημένα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀκούειν.
“A young person can’t judge what’s a hidden meaning and what isn’t, and whatever opinions he takes in at that age tend to become hard to wash out 378e and impossible to change. Perhaps that’s why we should do everything we can to make sure that the first stories they hear are told as finely as possible, to lead them toward excellence.”
ἔχει γάρ, ἔφη, λόγον. ἀλλʼ εἴ τις αὖ καὶ ταῦτα ἐρωτῴη ἡμᾶς, ταῦτα ἅττα τʼ ἐστὶν καὶ τίνες οἱ μῦθοι, τίνας ἂν φαῖμεν;
καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, οὐκ ἐσμὲν ποιηταὶ ἐγώ τε 379a καὶ σὺ ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἀλλʼ οἰκισταὶ πόλεως· οἰκισταῖς δὲ τοὺς μὲν τύπους προσήκει εἰδέναι ἐν οἷς δεῖ μυθολογεῖν τοὺς ποιητάς, παρʼ οὓς ἐὰν ποιῶσιν οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτέον, οὐ μὴν αὐτοῖς γε ποιητέον μύθους.
ὀρθῶς, ἔφη· ἀλλʼ αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο, οἱ τύποι περὶ θεολογίας τίνες ἂν εἶεν;
“That makes sense,” he said. “But if someone were to ask us about this too, what these things are and which tales we mean, what would we say?”
And I said, “Adeimantus, you and I aren’t poets 379a at the moment, but founders of a city. Founders ought to know the patterns the poets must follow when they tell their tales, and not permit them to depart from those patterns in what they compose; but it isn’t the founders’ job to make up tales themselves.”
“Right,” he said. “But that’s exactly the question: what would the patterns be for talk about the gods?”
τοιοίδε πού τινες, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ· οἷος τυγχάνει ὁ θεὸς ὤν, ἀεὶ δήπου ἀποδοτέον, ἐάντέ τις αὐτὸν ἐν ἔπεσιν ποιῇ ἐάντε ἐν μέλεσιν ἐάντε ἐν τραγῳδίᾳ.
δεῖ γάρ. 379b
οὐκοῦν ἀγαθὸς ὅ γε θεὸς τῷ ὄντι τε καὶ λεκτέον οὕτω;
τί μήν;
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδέν γε τῶν ἀγαθῶν βλαβερόν· ἦ γάρ;
οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.
ἆρʼ οὖν ὃ μὴ βλαβερὸν βλάπτει;
οὐδαμῶς.
ὃ δὲ μὴ βλάπτει κακόν τι ποιεῖ;
οὐδὲ τοῦτο.
“Something like this, I suppose,” I said. “God must always be portrayed as he really is, whether in epic, in lyric, or in tragedy.”
“He must.” 379b
“Now god really is good, and must be described that way?”
“Of course.”
“But nothing good is harmful, is it?”
“I don’t think so.”
“And does what isn’t harmful do harm?”
“Not at all.”
“And does what does no harm do anything bad?”
“No, not that either.”
ὃ δέ γε μηδὲν κακὸν ποιεῖ οὐδʼ ἄν τινος εἴη κακοῦ αἴτιον;
πῶς γάρ;
τί δέ; ὠφέλιμον τὸ ἀγαθόν;
ναί.
αἴτιον ἄρα εὐπραγίας;
ναί.
οὐκ ἄρα πάντων γε αἴτιον τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν εὖ ἐχόντων αἴτιον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀναίτιον. 379c
παντελῶς γʼ, ἔφη.
“And what does nothing bad can’t be the cause of anything bad?”
“How could it be?”
“Well then: is the good beneficial?”
“Yes.”
“So it’s the cause of doing well?”
“Yes.”
“Then the good isn’t the cause of everything. It’s the cause of things that are as they should be, but not responsible for bad things.” 379c
“Absolutely,” he said.
οὐδʼ ἄρα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὁ θεός, ἐπειδὴ ἀγαθός, πάντων ἂν εἴη αἴτιος, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ ὀλίγων μὲν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἴτιος, πολλῶν δὲ ἀναίτιος· πολὺ γὰρ ἐλάττω τἀγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν ἡμῖν, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν οὐδένα ἄλλον αἰτιατέον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἄλλʼ ἄττα δεῖ ζητεῖν τὰ αἴτια, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὸν θεόν.
ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν.
“Then god, since he’s good,” I said, “can’t be the cause of everything either, as most people say. He’s the cause of a few things in human life, and not responsible for many, since we have far fewer good things than bad. The good things we must attribute to no one else, but for the bad things we have to look for some other causes, not god.”
“What you say seems to me entirely true,” he said.
οὐκ ἄρα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἀποδεκτέον οὔτε Ὁμήρου οὔτʼ ἄλλου 379d ποιητοῦ ταύτην τὴν ἁμαρτίαν περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀνοήτως ἁμαρτάνοντος καὶ λέγοντος— ὡς δοιοί τε πίθοι κατακείαται ἐν Διὸς οὔδει κηρῶν ἔμπλειοι, ὁ μὲν ἐσθλῶν, αὐτὰρ ὃ δειλῶν· καὶ ᾧ μὲν ἂν μείξας ὁ Ζεὺς δῷ ἀμφοτέρων, ἄλλοτε μέν τε κακῷ ὅ γε κύρεται, ἄλλοτε δʼ ἐσθλῷ· ᾧ δʼ ἂν μή, ἀλλʼ ἄκρατα τὰ ἕτερα, τὸν δὲ κακὴ βούβρωστις ἐπὶ χθόνα δῖαν ἐλαύνει· 379e οὐδʼ ὡς ταμίας ἡμῖν Ζεὺς— ἀγαθῶν τε κακῶν τε τέτυκται.
“Then we mustn’t accept from Homer or any other 379d poet this foolish mistake about the gods, when he says that ‘two jars stand on the floor of Zeus’s house, full of fates, one of good ones and the other of bad,’ and that the man to whom Zeus gives a mixture of both ‘meets sometimes with bad fortune, sometimes with good,’ while the man to whom he gives not a mixture but one kind unmixed, ‘him evil hunger drives over the shining earth’; 379e nor that Zeus is for us the ‘dispenser of both good and evil.’
τὴν δὲ τῶν ὅρκων καὶ σπονδῶν σύγχυσιν, ἣν ὁ Πάνδαρος συνέχεεν, ἐάν τις φῇ διʼ Ἀθηνᾶς τε καὶ Διὸς γεγονέναι, οὐκ ἐπαινεσόμεθα, οὐδὲ θεῶν ἔριν τε καὶ κρίσιν 380a διὰ Θέμιτός τε καὶ Διός, οὐδʼ αὖ, ὡς Αἰσχύλος λέγει, ἐατέον ἀκούειν τοὺς νέους, ὅτι— θεὸς μὲν αἰτίαν φύει βροτοῖς, ὅταν κακῶσαι δῶμα παμπήδην θέλῃ.
“And if anyone says that the breaking of the oaths and the truce, which Pandarus brought about, happened through Athena and Zeus, we won’t approve; nor that strife and judgment among the gods 380a came about through Themis and Zeus. Nor again must we let the young hear what Aeschylus says, that ‘god makes guilt grow among mortals when he wants to ruin a house entirely.’
ἀλλʼ ἐάν τις ποιῇ ἐν οἷς ταῦτα τὰ ἰαμβεῖα ἔνεστιν, τὰ τῆς Νιόβης πάθη, ἢ τὰ Πελοπιδῶν ἢ τὰ Τρωικὰ ἤ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, ἢ οὐ θεοῦ ἔργα ἐατέον αὐτὰ λέγειν, ἢ εἰ θεοῦ, ἐξευρετέον αὐτοῖς σχεδὸν ὃν νῦν ἡμεῖς λόγον ζητοῦμεν, καὶ 380b λεκτέον ὡς ὁ μὲν θεὸς δίκαιά τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἠργάζετο, οἱ δὲ ὠνίναντο κολαζόμενοι· ὡς δὲ ἄθλιοι μὲν οἱ δίκην διδόντες, ἦν δὲ δὴ ὁ δρῶν ταῦτα θεός, οὐκ ἐατέον λέγειν τὸν ποιητήν.
“But if anyone composes a work with these iambic lines in it, about the sufferings of Niobe, or of the house of Pelops, or the Trojan War, or anything else of that kind, either we mustn’t let him say they are the work of a god, or, if they are, he must find pretty much the kind of account we’re now looking for, and 380b say that the god did what was just and good, and that they benefited from being punished. What we mustn’t let the poet say is that those who paid the penalty were miserable, and that the one who did this to them was a god.
ἀλλʼ εἰ μὲν ὅτι ἐδεήθησαν κολάσεως λέγοιεν ὡς ἄθλιοι οἱ κακοί, διδόντες δὲ δίκην ὠφελοῦντο ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐατέον· κακῶν δὲ αἴτιον φάναι θεόν τινι γίγνεσθαι ἀγαθὸν ὄντα, διαμαχετέον παντὶ τρόπῳ μήτε τινὰ λέγειν ταῦτα ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ πόλει, εἰ μέλλει εὐνομήσεσθαι, μήτε τινὰ ἀκούειν, 380c μήτε νεώτερον μήτε πρεσβύτερον, μήτʼ ἐν μέτρῳ μήτε ἄνευ μέτρου μυθολογοῦντα, ὡς οὔτε ὅσια ἂν λεγόμενα εἰ λέγοιτο, οὔτε σύμφορα ἡμῖν οὔτε σύμφωνα αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς.
“If they said that the wicked were miserable because they needed punishment, and that in paying the penalty they were benefited by the god, we should let them. But as for saying that god, who is good, becomes the cause of evils for anyone, we must fight in every way to stop anyone from saying these things in his own city, if it’s going to be well governed, and anyone from hearing them, 380c young or old, whether the tale is told in verse or in prose. Saying these things would be impious, and they would be neither to our advantage nor consistent with themselves.”
σύμψηφός σοί εἰμι, ἔφη, τούτου τοῦ νόμου, καί μοι ἀρέσκει.
οὗτος μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, εἷς ἂν εἴη τῶν περὶ θεοὺς νόμων τε καὶ τύπων, ἐν ᾧ δεήσει τούς τε λέγοντας λέγειν καὶ τοὺς ποιοῦντας ποιεῖν, μὴ πάντων αἴτιον τὸν θεὸν ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν.
καὶ μάλʼ, ἔφη, ἀπόχρη. 380d
“I’ll vote with you for this law,” he said. “I like it.”
“Then this,” I said, “would be one of the laws and patterns about the gods, which speakers must follow in what they say and poets in what they compose: that god is not the cause of everything, but only of good things.”
“That’s quite enough,” he said. 380d
τί δὲ δὴ ὁ δεύτερος ὅδε; ἆρα γόητα τὸν θεὸν οἴει εἶναι καὶ οἷον ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς φαντάζεσθαι ἄλλοτε ἐν ἄλλαις ἰδέαις τοτὲ μὲν αὐτὸν γιγνόμενον, καὶ ἀλλάττοντα τὸ αὑτοῦ εἶδος εἰς πολλὰς μορφάς, τοτὲ δὲ ἡμᾶς ἀπατῶντα καὶ ποιοῦντα περὶ αὑτοῦ τοιαῦτα δοκεῖν, ἢ ἁπλοῦν τε εἶναι καὶ πάντων ἥκιστα τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἰδέας ἐκβαίνειν;
οὐκ ἔχω, ἔφη, νῦν γε οὕτως εἰπεῖν.
τί δὲ τόδε; οὐκ ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ τι ἐξίσταιτο τῆς αὑτοῦ 380e ἰδέας, ἢ αὐτὸ ὑφʼ ἑαυτοῦ μεθίστασθαι ἢ ὑπʼ ἄλλου;
ἀνάγκη.
“Now what about this second one? Do you think god is a sorcerer, who shows himself by design in different forms at different times, sometimes actually changing, altering his own form into many shapes, and sometimes deceiving us and making us believe such things about him? Or is he simple, and less likely than anything to depart from his own form?”
“I can’t say,” he said, “at least not offhand.”
“Well, what about this? If anything departs from its own 380e form, isn’t it necessarily changed either by itself or by something else?”
“Necessarily.”
οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ μὲν ἄλλου τὰ ἄριστα ἔχοντα ἥκιστα ἀλλοιοῦταί τε καὶ κινεῖται;
οἷον σῶμα ὑπὸ σιτίων τε καὶ ποτῶν καὶ πόνων, καὶ πᾶν φυτὸν ὑπὸ εἱλήσεών τε καὶ ἀνέμων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων, οὐ τὸ ὑγιέστατον καὶ ἰσχυρότατον 381a ἥκιστα ἀλλοιοῦται;
πῶς δʼ οὔ;
ψυχὴν δὲ οὐ τὴν ἀνδρειοτάτην καὶ φρονιμωτάτην ἥκιστʼ ἄν τι ἔξωθεν πάθος ταράξειέν τε καὶ ἀλλοιώσειεν;
ναί.
“Now aren’t things in the best condition the least altered and moved by something else?
“For instance, a body is affected by food and drink and exertion, and every plant by the sun’s heat and winds and things of that kind. Isn’t the healthiest and strongest 381a least altered?”
“Of course.”
“And the soul that is bravest and has the most understanding: wouldn’t it be least disturbed and altered by anything outside it?”
“Yes.”
καὶ μήν που καὶ τά γε σύνθετα πάντα σκεύη τε καὶ οἰκοδομήματα καὶ ἀμφιέσματα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον τὰ εὖ εἰργασμένα καὶ εὖ ἔχοντα ὑπὸ χρόνου τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων ἥκιστα ἀλλοιοῦται.
ἔστι δὴ ταῦτα. 381b
πᾶν δὴ τὸ καλῶς ἔχον ἢ φύσει ἢ τέχνῃ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ἐλαχίστην μεταβολὴν ὑπʼ ἄλλου ἐνδέχεται.
ἔοικεν.
ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ θεός γε καὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ πάντῃ ἄριστα ἔχει.
πῶς δʼ οὔ;
ταύτῃ μὲν δὴ ἥκιστα ἂν πολλὰς μορφὰς ἴσχοι ὁ θεός.
ἥκιστα δῆτα.
“And the same reasoning surely applies to everything that’s put together, furniture and buildings and clothes: those that are well made and in good condition are least altered by time and other influences.”
“That’s so.” 381b
“So everything in good condition, whether by nature or by craft or both, is least open to change by something else.”
“So it seems.”
“But god and what belongs to god are in the best condition in every way.”
“Of course.”
“So in this respect god would be the least likely to take many shapes.”
“The least likely, certainly.”
ἀλλʼ ἆρα αὐτὸς αὑτὸν μεταβάλλοι ἂν καὶ ἀλλοιοῖ;
δῆλον, ἔφη, ὅτι, εἴπερ ἀλλοιοῦται.
πότερον οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιόν τε καὶ κάλλιον μεταβάλλει ἑαυτὸν ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ τὸ αἴσχιον ἑαυτοῦ; 381c
ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον, εἴπερ ἀλλοιοῦται· οὐ γάρ που ἐνδεᾶ γε φήσομεν τὸν θεὸν κάλλους ἢ ἀρετῆς εἶναι.
ὀρθότατα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, λέγεις. καὶ οὕτως ἔχοντος δοκεῖ ἄν τίς σοι, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, ἑκὼν αὑτὸν χείρω ποιεῖν ὁπῃοῦν ἢ θεῶν ἢ ἀνθρώπων;
ἀδύνατον, ἔφη.
“But would he change and alter himself?”
“Obviously,” he said, “if he’s altered at all.”
“Then does he change himself into something better and more beautiful, or into something worse and uglier than himself?” 381c
“It must be into something worse,” he said, “if he’s altered at all. For surely we won’t say that god is lacking in beauty or excellence.”
“You’re quite right,” I said. “And that being so, Adeimantus, do you think anyone, god or human, would willingly make himself worse in any way?”
“Impossible,” he said.
ἀδύνατον ἄρα, ἔφην, καὶ θεῷ ἐθέλειν αὑτὸν ἀλλοιοῦν, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἔοικε, κάλλιστος καὶ ἄριστος ὢν εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἕκαστος αὐτῶν μένει ἀεὶ ἁπλῶς ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ μορφῇ.
ἅπασα, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. 381d
“Then it’s impossible,” I said, “even for a god to want to alter himself. Each of them, it seems, being as beautiful and as good as can be, remains forever and simply in his own shape.”
“That seems to me absolutely necessary,” he said. 381d
μηδεὶς ἄρα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ ἄριστε, λεγέτω ἡμῖν τῶν ποιητῶν, ὡς— θεοὶ ξείνοισιν ἐοικότες ἀλλοδαποῖσι, παντοῖοι τελέθοντες, ἐπιστρωφῶσι πόληας· μηδὲ Πρωτέως καὶ Θέτιδος καταψευδέσθω μηδείς, μηδʼ ἐν τραγῳδίαις μηδʼ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιήμασιν εἰσαγέτω Ἥραν ἠλλοιωμένην, ὡς ἱέρειαν ἀγείρουσαν— Ἰνάχου Ἀργείου ποταμοῦ παισὶν βιοδώροις· 381e καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλὰ μὴ ἡμῖν ψευδέσθων. μηδʼ αὖ ὑπὸ τούτων ἀναπειθόμεναι αἱ μητέρες τὰ παιδία ἐκδειματούντων, λέγουσαι τοὺς μύθους κακῶς, ὡς ἄρα θεοί τινες περιέρχονται νύκτωρ πολλοῖς ξένοις καὶ παντοδαποῖς ἰνδαλλόμενοι, ἵνα μὴ ἅμα μὲν εἰς θεοὺς βλασφημῶσιν, ἅμα δὲ τοὺς παῖδας ἀπεργάζωνται δειλοτέρους.
“Then, my excellent friend,” I said, “let none of the poets tell us that ‘the gods, in the likeness of strangers from other lands, taking every kind of shape, go roaming through cities’; and let no one tell lies about Proteus and Thetis, or bring Hera onstage, in tragedy or any other poetry, transformed into a priestess collecting alms ‘for the life-giving children of Inachus, the river of Argos’; 381e and let them not tell us many other lies like these. And mothers mustn’t be won over by the poets and frighten their children by telling the tales badly, saying that certain gods go around at night looking like all sorts of strangers from everywhere. That way they won’t blaspheme against the gods and make their children more cowardly at the same time.”
μὴ γάρ, ἔφη.
ἀλλʼ ἆρα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, αὐτοὶ μὲν οἱ θεοί εἰσιν οἷοι μὴ μεταβάλλειν, ἡμῖν δὲ ποιοῦσιν δοκεῖν σφᾶς παντοδαποὺς φαίνεσθαι, ἐξαπατῶντες καὶ γοητεύοντες;
ἴσως, ἔφη.
τί δέ; ἦν δʼ ἐγώ· ψεύδεσθαι θεὸς ἐθέλοι ἂν ἢ λόγῳ ἢ ἔργῳ φάντασμα προτείνων;
οὐκ οἶδα, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
οὐκ οἶσθα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὅτι τό γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος, εἰ οἷόν τε τοῦτο εἰπεῖν, πάντες θεοί τε καὶ ἄνθρωποι μισοῦσιν;
πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις;
“No, they mustn’t,” he said.
“But perhaps,” I said, “while the gods themselves can’t change, they make us think they appear in all sorts of forms, deceiving us and casting spells on us?”
“Perhaps,” he said.
“Well then,” I said, “would a god be willing to lie, either in words or by holding out an illusion in action?”
“I don’t know,” he said.
“Don’t you know,” I said, “that the true lie, if one can call it that, is hated by all gods and humans?”
“What do you mean?” he said.
οὕτως, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὅτι τῷ κυριωτάτῳ που ἑαυτῶν ψεύδεσθαι καὶ περὶ τὰ κυριώτατα οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἐθέλει, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα φοβεῖται ἐκεῖ αὐτὸ κεκτῆσθαι.
οὐδὲ νῦν πω, ἦ δʼ ὅς, μανθάνω. 382b
οἴει γάρ τί με, ἔφην, σεμνὸν λέγειν· ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὅτι τῇ ψυχῇ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ψεύδεσθαί τε καὶ ἐψεῦσθαι καὶ ἀμαθῆ εἶναι καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἔχειν τε καὶ κεκτῆσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος πάντες ἥκιστα ἂν δέξαιντο, καὶ μισοῦσι μάλιστα αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ.
πολύ γε, ἔφη.
“This,” I said: “no one is willing to be deceived in the most important part of himself about the most important things. That’s where he’s most afraid of all to have falsehood lodged.”
“I still don’t understand,” he said. 382b
“That’s because you think I’m saying something profound,” I said. “All I’m saying is that to be deceived in one’s soul about the things that are, to be misled and ignorant, and to have and hold falsehood there, is what everyone would least accept. That’s where people hate falsehood most.”
“Very much so,” he said.
ἀλλὰ μὴν ὀρθότατά γʼ ἄν, ὃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, τοῦτο ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος καλοῖτο, ἡ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἄγνοια ἡ τοῦ ἐψευσμένου· ἐπεὶ τό γε ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μίμημά τι τοῦ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐστὶν παθήματος καὶ ὕστερον γεγονὸς εἴδωλον, οὐ πάνυ 382c ἄκρατον ψεῦδος. ἢ οὐχ οὕτω;
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
τὸ μὲν δὴ τῷ ὄντι ψεῦδος οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ θεῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπʼ ἀνθρώπων μισεῖται.
δοκεῖ μοι.
“But as I was just saying, this is what would most rightly be called the true lie: the ignorance in the soul of someone who has been deceived. The lie in words is a kind of imitation of that condition in the soul, an image that comes after it, not a completely 382c pure lie. Isn’t that so?”
“Certainly.”
“So the real lie is hated not only by gods but by human beings too.”
“I think so.”
τί δὲ δὴ τὸ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ψεῦδος; πότε καὶ τῷ χρήσιμον, ὥστε μὴ ἄξιον εἶναι μίσους; ἆρʼ οὐ πρός τε τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ τῶν καλουμένων φίλων, ὅταν διὰ μανίαν ἤ τινα ἄνοιαν κακόν τι ἐπιχειρῶσιν πράττειν, τότε ἀποτροπῆς ἕνεκα ὡς φάρμακον χρήσιμον γίγνεται; καὶ ἐν αἷς νυνδὴ 382d ἐλέγομεν ταῖς μυθολογίαις, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι ὅπῃ τἀληθὲς ἔχει περὶ τῶν παλαιῶν, ἀφομοιοῦντες τῷ ἀληθεῖ τὸ ψεῦδος ὅτι μάλιστα, οὕτω χρήσιμον ποιοῦμεν;
καὶ μάλα, ἦ δʼ ὅς, οὕτως ἔχει.
“But what about the lie in words? When is it useful, and to whom, so that it doesn’t deserve to be hated? Isn’t it useful against enemies, and with so-called friends when madness or some folly leads them to try to do something bad? Then it becomes useful as a medicine to turn them away from it. And in the tales we were just 382d talking about, since we don’t know the truth about ancient events, don’t we make it useful by making the falsehood as much like the truth as we can?”
“Very much so,” he said.
κατὰ τί δὴ οὖν τούτων τῷ θεῷ τὸ ψεῦδος χρήσιμον; πότερον διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι τὰ παλαιὰ ἀφομοιῶν ἂν ψεύδοιτο;
γελοῖον μεντἂν εἴη, ἔφη.
ποιητὴς μὲν ἄρα ψευδὴς ἐν θεῷ οὐκ ἔνι.
οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.
ἀλλὰ δεδιὼς τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ψεύδοιτο; 382e
πολλοῦ γε δεῖ.
ἀλλὰ διʼ οἰκείων ἄνοιαν ἢ μανίαν;
ἀλλʼ οὐδείς, ἔφη, τῶν ἀνοήτων καὶ μαινομένων θεοφιλής.
οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν οὗ ἕνεκα ἂν θεὸς ψεύδοιτο.
οὐκ ἔστιν.
πάντῃ ἄρα ἀψευδὲς τὸ δαιμόνιόν τε καὶ τὸ θεῖον.
“Then for which of these reasons would a lie be useful to god? Would he lie, making up likenesses of the truth, because he doesn’t know about ancient events?”
“That would be ridiculous,” he said.
“So there’s no lying poet in god.”
“I don’t think so.”
“Then would he lie because he’s afraid of his enemies?” 382e
“Far from it.”
“Because of the folly or madness of his friends, then?”
“But no one foolish or mad is dear to the gods,” he said.
“Then there’s no reason why a god would lie.”
“There isn’t.”
“Then everything divine, whether spirit or god, is entirely free of lies.”
παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.
κομιδῇ ἄρα ὁ θεὸς ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἀληθὲς ἔν τε ἔργῳ καὶ λόγῳ, καὶ οὔτε αὐτὸς μεθίσταται οὔτε ἄλλους ἐξαπατᾷ, οὔτε κατὰ φαντασίας οὔτε κατὰ λόγους οὔτε κατὰ σημείων πομπάς, οὔθʼ ὕπαρ οὐδʼ ὄναρ. 383a
οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ φαίνεται σοῦ λέγοντος.
συγχωρεῖς ἄρα, ἔφην, τοῦτον δεύτερον τύπον εἶναι ἐν ᾧ δεῖ περὶ θεῶν καὶ λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν, ὡς μήτε αὐτοὺς γόητας ὄντας τῷ μεταβάλλειν ἑαυτοὺς μήτε ἡμᾶς ψεύδεσι παράγειν ἐν λόγῳ ἢ ἐν ἔργῳ;
συγχωρῶ.
“Absolutely,” he said.
“Then god is entirely simple and true in deed and in word. He doesn’t change himself, and he doesn’t deceive others—not by apparitions, not by words, not by sending signs, whether waking or dreaming.” 383a
“That’s how it looks to me too,” he said, “now that you say it.”
“So do you agree,” I said, “that this is the second pattern within which we must speak and compose poetry about gods: that they are not sorcerers who transform themselves, and they don’t mislead us with falsehoods in word or deed?”
“I agree.”
πολλὰ ἄρα Ὁμήρου ἐπαινοῦντες, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐπαινεσόμεθα, τὴν τοῦ ἐνυπνίου πομπὴν ὑπὸ Διὸς τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι· οὐδὲ Αἰσχύλου, ὅταν φῇ ἡ Θέτις τὸν Ἀπόλλω ἐν τοῖς αὑτῆς 383b γάμοις ᾄδοντα ἐνδατεῖσθαι τὰς ἑὰς εὐπαιδίας — νόσων τʼ ἀπείρους καὶ μακραίωνας βίους, ξύμπαντά τʼ εἰπὼν θεοφιλεῖς ἐμὰς τύχας παιᾶνʼ ἐπηυφήμησεν, εὐθυμῶν ἐμέ. κἀγὼ τὸ Φοίβου θεῖον ἀψευδὲς στόμα ἤλπιζον εἶναι, μαντικῇ βρύον τέχνῃ· ὁ δʼ, αὐτὸς ὑμνῶν, αὐτὸς ἐν θοίνῃ παρών, αὐτὸς τάδʼ εἰπών, αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ κτανὼν τὸν παῖδα τὸν ἐμόν— 383c ὅταν τις τοιαῦτα λέγῃ περὶ θεῶν, χαλεπανοῦμέν τε καὶ χορὸν οὐ δώσομεν, οὐδὲ τοὺς διδασκάλους ἐάσομεν ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ χρῆσθαι τῶν νέων, εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ φύλακες θεοσεβεῖς τε καὶ θεῖοι γίγνεσθαι, καθʼ ὅσον ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον οἷόν τε.
“So although we praise much in Homer, this we won’t praise: Zeus sending the dream to Agamemnon. Nor will we praise Aeschylus when his Thetis says that Apollo, singing at her 383b wedding, dwelt on her happiness in her children: ‘Lives long and untouched by sickness, and calling my fortunes in every way dear to the gods, he raised a song of triumph and gladdened my heart. And I believed the holy mouth of Phoebus, brimming with the prophetic art, was free of lies. Yet he who sang, he who sat at the feast, he who said these things—he himself is the one who killed my son.’ 383c When anyone says such things about gods, we’ll be angry and won’t grant him a chorus, and we won’t let teachers use it to educate the young—if our guardians are to become god-fearing and godlike, as far as a human being possibly can.”
παντάπασιν, ἔφη, ἔγωγε τοὺς τύπους τούτους συγχωρῶ, καὶ ὡς νόμοις ἂν χρῴμην.
“I agree with these patterns completely,” he said, “and I would treat them as laws.”